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Introduction
William T. Alpert 
University of Connecticut
and 
The William H. Donner Foundation
Stephen A. Woodbury 
Michigan State University and W.E. Upjohn Institute
Some of the most important personal consumption items that indi 
viduals receive are closely tied to work and are provided or financed by 
employers, either voluntarily or by government mandate. In the United 
States and Canada, as in most industrialized countries, these benefits 
include retirement income, health care, income during times of unem 
ployment (in the form of unemployment insurance), income and medi 
cal care in the event of workplace injury (workers' compensation), and 
life insurance. Employers' expenditures on these employee benefits 
have grown dramatically in the last 50 years and now are on the order 
of one-third of total labor costs in most industrialized countries (Hart et 
al. 1988).
This volume brings together 14 original research chapters on vari 
ous aspects of the employee benefits systems of Canada and the United 
States. Preliminary versions of some of the papers in the volume were 
presented at a conference held in the mid 1990s sponsored and sup 
ported by the William H. Donner Foundation and the W.E. Upjohn 
Institute for Employment Research. In planning the volume, our inten 
tion has been to use a Canadian-U.S. comparison to highlight the basic 
economic features of employee benefits and the policy issues that are 
connected with them.
There are substantial differences between the employee benefit 
systems of Canada and the United States; the most striking are in the 
two countries' health care systems. In Canada, health care is provided 
through a system of provincial and territorial plans funded by the fed 
eral government out of general revenues, whereas in the United States
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health care is provided through a mixed private/public system financed 
largely by employer contributions and payroll taxes. Because the 
Canadian provincial and territorial plans are funded out of general rev 
enues, they are not perceived as an employer cost, as they are in the 
United States.
The differences between Canada and the United States in other 
social insurance programs are less stark, although the differences are 
nonetheless substantial. For example, government involvement in the 
provision of retirement income takes the form of three major programs 
in Canada, as opposed to just one in the United States. Public pensions 
are more generous and private pension plans are correspondingly less 
important in Canada than in the United States (see the chapters by 
Gunderson, Hyatt, and Pesando (p. 381) and by Dorsey (p. 413) in this 
volume).
The existence and magnitude of employee benefits pose numerous 
economic questions that are important to public policy. In organizing 
the volume, we have grouped these questions under four headings: 
labor supply and worker availability, labor demand, labor-market 
adjustment and equity, and pensions. We place issues such as whether 
the availability of benefits (or lack thereof) create incentives or disin 
centives to work under the heading of labor supply, treated in Part I. 
(To some extent, these issues are also treated in chapters on labor-mar 
ket adjustment. For example, the chapters by Olson (p. 295) and by 
Hunt-McCool, McCool, and Dor (p. 325) address the labor-supply 
implications of the U.S. health care system, which essentially requires 
an individual to work in order to be covered by health insurance.) 
Issues stemming from the status of employee benefits as a cost of labor 
(do employee benefits create incentives that alter the level or mix of 
employment?) are labor-demand issues, treated in Part II. The poten 
tial for employee benefits to affect worker turnover, tenure, and wages 
are adjustment issues, treated in Part III. Finally, Part IV centers on 
issues related to retirement income programs, both public and private.
Differences between Canada and the United States in employee 
benefits and labor costs offer a natural laboratory in which to examine 
the impacts of differing policies on labor market outcomes in the two 
countries. In both the United States and Canada, however, there is a 
dearth of research that is both rigorous and policy-relevant on the link 
ages between labor markets and the provision of these benefits by
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employers or the government. We hope that the research presented in 
this volume helps fill the gap.
CHAPTER SUMMARIES
In his overview chapter ("Does the Composition of Pay Matter?"), 
Sherwin Rosen addresses an essential question and places the issues 
posed by employee benefits in their proper economic context. Rosen 
views employment-related benefits as consumption decisions that have 
been centralized so as to become collective or group decisions, dele 
gated partly to firms and partly to governments. He offers three eco 
nomic reasons for the centralization of certain consumption decisions. 
First, there may be economies of scale in the provision of some goods; 
that is, joint provision of a common good may reduce transaction and 
other costs that would be incurred if decisions were made individually. 
Rosen notes that such economies take on special importance as a 
motive for employer-provided benefits when certain benefits escape 
taxation. Second, some goods may be viewed as inputs that enhance 
productivity—hence, firms paternalistically provide some goods to 
improve their workers' welfare and productivity. Similarly, enduring 
employment relationships and employment security may be viewed 
and analyzed in light of their effects on workers' productivity. Third, 
an insurance rationale—or an intertemporal consistency problem, as 
Rosen calls it—motivates many employee benefit programs. Rosen 
emphasizes the moral hazard that social provision of health, retire 
ment, and other benefits may produce and discusses the principle that 
public provision of such benefits may merely offset or substitute for 
their private provision. Rosen applies these three analytical insights in 
discussions of military compensation and of compensation in the 
former Soviet Union. Overall, Rosen's sweeping and comprehensive 
essay offers a framework for future economic research on employee 
benefits.
Part I of the volume comprises three chapters that treat the rela 
tionship between employee benefits and the supply of labor.
In Chapter 1 ("Child Care and the Supply of Labor in Canada and 
the United States"), Charles Michalopoulos and Philip Robins address
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differences between Canada and the United States in child-care 
arrangements and the working patterns of women. The growth of the 
labor-force participation rate of married women has been accompanied 
by the growing use of day-care centers and caregivers who are not fam 
ily relatives and the declining use of parental care and family relatives. 
Significant controversy has surrounded the extent to which the child- 
care choices and labor-force decisions of women are affected by gov 
ernment policies that subsidize child care. Michalopoulos and Robins 
analyze pooled Canadian and U.S. data with the goal of obtaining 
improved estimates of the effect of subsidies on child-care choices and 
labor supply of mothers. They describe the broad similarities and spe 
cific differences between the two countries' child-care policies (both 
countries provide general and targeted child-care subsidies through 
their personal income tax systems) and present data describing the 
methods of child care in each country. They then estimate the impact 
of child-care prices and subsidies on both the primary form of child 
care used by families and the labor-force behavior of mothers. The 
authors' empirical results suggest that the form of child care chosen 
and employment of the mother are influenced mainly by the husband's 
earnings, ethnicity, and location. There is little evidence that child-care 
prices and subsidies influence the form of child care in the two coun 
tries. Neither do child-care prices and subsidies appear to be major 
determinants of whether mothers work full time, part time, or not at all. 
In Chapter 2 ("An Economic Model of Employee Benefits and 
Labor Supply: An Application of the Almost Ideal Demand System"), 
Paul Fronstin turns to an essential question that has rarely been 
addressed in empirical research: Does the mix of compensation influ 
ence labor supply and, if so, how? He addresses this question by esti 
mating a system of demand equations for leisure and employee 
benefits using data from the 1993 Current Population Survey. His esti 
mation proceeds in two stages. In the first stage, he estimates a bivari- 
ate probit model of labor supply (the probability of working) and 
employee benefits (the probability of participating in a salary-reduc 
tion pension plan). In the second stage, he estimates selectivity-cor 
rected share equations for leisure and pension contributions. The 
central (and novel) result in Fronstin's chapter is his estimate of the 
cross-price elasticity between leisure and pension contributions, which 
he finds is essentially zero; that is, pensions, unlike wages, have mini-
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mal effect on the supply of labor. Fronstin's other results of estimation 
are in keeping with existing empirical findings; for example, he finds 
that pensions and wages are highly substitutable. Although limited by 
the unavailability of data on other aspects of compensation, Fronstin's 
innovative study points the way to further exploration of the relation 
ship between labor supply and employee benefits when improved data 
do become available.
As the labor-force participation of women has grown, so has the 
importance of family and medical leave benefits. In Chapter 3 ("The 
Economics of Family and Medical Leave in Canada and the United 
States"), Eileen Trzcinski and William T. Alpert provide a description 
of the family and medical leave policies of both Canada and the United 
States, noting that family and medical leave provisions have (poten 
tially) two components—the provision of wage replacement benefits 
during the leave and the guarantee of the same or similar job upon 
return from the leave. In Canada, each province mandates family and 
medical leave that includes both wage replacement and a job guaran 
tee, whereas in the United States, the Family and Medical Leave Act 
(FMLA) of 1993 provides only a job guarantee, and this only in firms 
with 50 or more workers. Trzcinski and Alpert use data on more than 
2,700 firms from the 1988 Small Business Administration's Employee 
Leave Survey to describe the incidence of family leave policies in the 
United States before enactment of the FMLA. They use the same data 
to model the determinants of each of the main components of family 
and medical leave—paid leave and a job guarantee. Their modeling 
efforts are more successful in tracing the factors that are correlated 
with paid leave provision than the factors that are correlated with a job 
guarantee upon return from a leave. They interpret their results to sug 
gest that different theoretical approaches are needed to understand the 
incidence of paid leave and a job guarantee and to predict the impacts 
of further legislative mandates.
Part II of the volume turns to an examination of the relationship 
between employee benefits and the demand for labor. Payroll taxes are 
used to finance all three of the major social insurance programs in the 
United States: Social Security, workers' compensation, and unemploy 
ment insurance. The most persistent criticism facing social insurance 
programs financed by employer contributions has been that they raise 
labor costs and thereby reduce both employment and the competitive-
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ness of U.S. business. In Chapter 4 ("Payroll Taxation, Employer 
Mandates, and the Labor Market: Theory, Evidence, and Unanswered 
Questions"), Jonathan Gruber appraises this and other criticisms of 
mandated employer contributions in the United States. Gruber reviews 
programs that are financed by payroll taxes and discusses the theory 
and evidence on the labor-market effects of payroll taxes and employer 
mandates (including various complications such as minimum wages 
and group-specific mandates). He also presents some new evidence on 
the influence of employer mandates on wages at both the individual 
and firm levels. He then considers the implications for efficiency and 
equity of changing the method of financing social insurance programs 
from the payroll tax to the income tax. This highly useful chapter 
highlights what is known about the labor-market effects of payroll tax 
ation and employer mandates, develops and presents new evidence, 
and points the way to fruitful avenues for further research.
In Chapter 5, Masanori Hashimoto continues this line of inquiry 
with a theoretical treatment of the relationship between employee ben 
efits and labor demand ("Fringe Benefits and Employment"). Hashim- 
oto's model differs from previous models of employee benefits by 
considering the entire market for benefits rather than focusing solely 
on the decisions of firms. In this setting, changes in employee benefits 
can occur because workers' tastes for benefits change, because the cost 
of providing benefits changes, or because of changes in government 
mandates. Whether increases in employee benefits reduce employ 
ment, then, depends on the cause of the increase in benefits. Increases 
in benefits that follow from reduced benefit costs or from increased 
demand for benefits by workers (resulting from favorable tax treat 
ment, for example) will increase employment. Increases in benefits 
that follow from increased government mandates, on the other hand, 
are likely to lead to employment losses. Hashimoto also reports the 
results of some sensitivity tests of his model's results.
Part III of the volume includes four chapters that consider the 
implications of employee benefits for worker turnover, wages, and 
equity. The first three chapters in Part III focus mainly on a peculiar 
feature of health insurance provision in the United States—that most 
individuals who are covered by private health insurance are covered 
through an employer-provided plan and that employer-provided health 
insurance often covers all members of a worker's family. It stands to
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reason that this link between the job and the availability of health 
insurance could affect the behavior of workers in a variety of ways.
In Chapter 6 ("Family Health Benefits and Worker Turnover"), 
Dan Black examines a previously unexplored aspect of the link 
between health benefits and turnover. Although much attention has 
focused on so-called preexisting conditions clauses as a source of "job 
lock," Black notes that the family coverage provisions of many 
employer-provided health insurance plans are an even more likely ave 
nue by which employer-provided health insurance could affect worker 
turnover. Black's theoretical treatment shows that the existence of 
employer-provided family health coverage can alter the value that a 
worker places on alternative job offers, increasing or decreasing the 
likelihood of turnover depending on specific circumstances. Black 
then uses April 1993 Current Population Survey (CPS) data to docu 
ment the extent of double coverage by employer-provided health insur 
ance. As a test of his theory, he uses the same data to estimate models 
(for men and women) of job change in which the probability of recent 
job change depends on coverage by a spouse's health insurance plan 
(among other variables). Black finds that workers (both men and 
women) who are covered by the employer-provided health insurance 
of their spouses are about 50 percent more likely than others to have 
changed jobs in the last year, suggesting in turn that the existence of 
employer-provided spousal benefits substantially distorts incentives to 
change jobs and reduces the efficiency of labor markets.
In Chapter 7 ("Part-Time Work, Health Insurance Coverage, and 
the Wages of Married Women"), Craig Olson examines whether 
employer-provided health insurance influences the labor-supply deci 
sions and wages of married women. Using CPS data from 1983 and 
1993, he first shows that women who are married to men without 
health-insurance coverage are more likely to have jobs that provide 
health insurance than are women married to men who do have health 
insurance coverage. In other words, wives whose husbands do not pro 
vide health insurance have a higher demand for health insurance than 
wives whose husbands do provide health insurance. In turn, married 
women who are not covered by their husbands' health insurance may 
increase their work hours in order to obtain health insurance coverage 
at work (part-time jobs are less likely than full-time jobs to offer health 
insurance). Olson's empirical results using 1993 data support this
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notion; in contrast, his results for 1983 show no impact of husbands' 
health insurance coverage on wives' work hours. Olson argues that 
this change was caused by the decline in health insurance coverage 
among men during the 1980s; that is, as health insurance coverage 
among men fell, more women increased their work hours to gain eligi 
bility for employer-provided health benefits.
In Chapter 8 ("Employer-Provided versus Publicly Provided 
Health Insurance: Effects on Hours Worked and Compensation"), Janet 
Hunt-McCool, Thomas McCool, and Avi Dor further examine the 
impact of employment-based health insurance on labor-market behav 
ior and outcomes. In particular, they examine differences in the behav 
ior of married women who are and are not covered by the 
employer-provided health insurance of their husbands. They view 
women who are covered by their husbands' health insurance as "virtual 
Canadians," in that their decisions about labor-force participation and 
labor supply are independent of employers' health insurance offers (as 
is the case under a system of public health care like Canada's). On the 
other hand, women who are not covered by their husbands' health 
insurance are likely to consider employers' health insurance offers in 
making labor-supply decisions. Using data from the 1987 National 
Medical Expenditure Survey, they estimate two-stage models of 
wages, earnings, compensation, and health insurance premiums (the 
first stage of their models creates controls for possible selection in the 
matching of women to men who do or do not have jobs that provide 
family health benefits). Their results are consistent with two hypothe 
ses: 1) women who are not covered by their husbands' health insurance 
select jobs that provide health insurance and 2) these women are will 
ing to sacrifice wage income for health insurance. Hunt-McCool, 
McCool, and Dor, like Black, suggest that efficiency and social welfare 
are reduced by the U.S. system of providing health care provision.
As employee benefits have grown as a share of total compensation, 
their potential to have important implications for the distribution of 
income has also grown. Few studies of income distribution, however, 
have considered employee benefits. In Chapter 9 ("Employee Benefits 
and the Distribution of Income and Wealth"), Daniel Slottje, Stephen 
Woodbury, and Rod Anderson examine household data that include 
information on health insurance expenditures (the National Medical 
Care Expenditure Survey and the National Medical Expenditure Sur-
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vey) or pension wealth (the 1983 and 1989 Surveys of Consumer 
Finances) in an effort to better understand how employee benefits 
influence income distribution. They find that employer contributions 
to health insurance, although more unequally distributed than personal 
income, are distributed in such a way that they slightly reduce the over 
all distribution of income. They find that the distribution of private 
pension wealth is about as unequal as the distribution of private nonre- 
tirement wealth overall, although private pensions smooth the high end 
of the wealth distribution. These findings suggest that neither health 
insurance nor private pensions can be seen as a major force behind 
increasing inequality in the distribution of income or wealth.
Part IV of the volume comprises four chapters that focus on pen 
sions and public policy toward retirement income in Canada and the 
United States. In Chapter 10 ("Public Pension Plans in the United 
States and Canada"), Morley Gunderson, Douglas Hyatt, and James 
Pesando offer a highly useful analytical description and comparison of 
the government programs that provide retirement income in Canada 
and the United States. They compare the contributions to and benefits 
from both public and private pensions, discuss the extent to which pub 
lic pensions replace earnings, and examine how public pensions trans 
fer income both within and between generations. The authors also 
treat the potential effects of the Canadian and U.S. public pension 
plans on work incentives, retirement, and the demand for labor. The 
authors' emphasis on comparing the Canadian and U.S. systems brings 
into relief the essential features of any public retirement system and 
highlights the problems facing any government program that provides 
retirement income.
Whereas Gunderson, Hyatt, and Pesando focus on public pensions, 
Stuart Dorsey describes and reviews the literature on private pensions 
in Canada and the United States in Chapter 11 ("Current Policy Issues 
Toward Private Pensions in Canada and the United States"). He begins 
with a brief review of the history of private pensions in Canada and the 
United States, then describes and compares the main features of gov 
ernment intervention into private pensions—tax policy and regula 
tion—which are remarkably similar in the two countries. The bulk of 
Dorsey's chapter is devoted to discussing four specific policy issues 
that confront both Canada and the United States in considering the 
future of private pensions: the extent of private pension coverage, the
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portability of private pensions, tax policy toward private pensions, and 
the problem of indexing pension benefits for inflation. In all of these 
discussions, Dorsey highlights the results of research and the relevance 
of research to policy toward private pensions.
In Chapter 12 ("Labor-Market Effects of Canadian and U.S. Pen 
sion Tax Policy"), James Pesando and John Turner examine a special 
feature of pension policy in both Canada and the United States: the 
tax-favored treatment of employer contributions to pension plans. Nei 
ther in Canada nor in the United States are employer contributions to 
private pensions subject to the personal income tax, creating an incen 
tive for workers to receive compensation in the form of contributions to 
a private pension plan. Pesando and Turner's main goal is to trace the 
influence of this favorable tax treatment on the extent of pension cover 
age. In addition, they examine how the tax treatment of pensions 
affects three other outcomes: the generosity of pension plans, whether 
private pension plans are funded through employer or worker contribu 
tions, and whether pensions take the form of defined-benefit or 
defined-contribution plans. The authors pay special attention to two 
important differences between Canada and the United States. First, 
worker contributions to private pension plans in Canada are tax deduct 
ible regardless of whether the worker participates in a defined-benefit 
or a defined-contribution plan, whereas a worker in the United States 
must participate in a 401k (or similar) plan for his or her contributions 
to be tax deductible. Second, in Canada, workers face a lower limit on 
the amount they can save through the pension system.
The volume closes with an empirical analysis of a worrisome 
trend—the decline in private pension coverage that occurred among 
young men during the 1980s. In Chapter 13 ("Did the Decline in Mar 
ginal Tax Rates during the 1980s Reduce Pension Coverage?"), Patri 
cia Reagan and John Turner use Current Population Survey data from 
1979, 1988, and 1993 to examine the reasons for this decline. Their 
analysis stems from the reasoning that, because employer contributions 
to private pensions are not subject to the personal income tax, the 
incentive for workers to be covered by pensions (and to receive com 
pensation in the form of contributions to a private pension plan) rises 
as the marginal personal income tax rate rises. Reagan and Turner's 
careful modeling efforts suggest that a 1-percentage-point increase in 
the marginal income tax rate leads to a 0.4-percentage-point increase in
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pension coverage rates. It follows that the drop in marginal tax rates 
that occurred during the 1980s was an important factor in the reduced 
pension coverage of young men.
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Does the Composition 
of Pay Matter?
Sherwin Rosen 
University of Chicago
THE ISSUES
Why are people paid in so many different ways? Most pay is in 
cash, but some is in kind. These days, a part usually is deferred until 
retirement, occasionally another part is paid "up front," and some goes 
to purchase certain things, such as social security and unemployment 
insurance, that are legally tied to job holding and payroll taxes. How 
different allocations of pay among these and many other components 
affect the allocation of resources and economic performance is the 
main problem for the economic analysis of employee benefits.
Consumption per person is the ultimate measure of economic per 
formance. After all, the economic role of productive capacity and 
other inputs in the economy derives from their contributions to sustain 
ing consumption and improving the living standards of citizens over 
the long term. In primitive times, when transportation costs were so 
large that gains from exchange and the development of markets were 
extremely limited, specific acts of production and work hardly could be 
separated from specific acts of consumption. Robinson Crusoe had to 
carefully coordinate the consumption of particular goods with their 
production because exchange with others was not possible. Work and 
consumption essentially were joint decisions. Virtually all compensa 
tion was in kind.
The modern economy, with its extensive market structures and 
extraordinary division of labor, achieves much of its high standard of 
living by exploiting specialization and gains from trade. As always, 
personal command over consumption still is determined by the produc 
tivity of one's labor and other resources, but consumption decisions are 
not nearly so tied to specific, personal acts of production. If all pay
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were in cash, virtually all personal consumption decisions would be 
independent of personal income sources. None whatsoever would be 
tied to particular acts of work, and each person would purchase pre 
cisely the most desired consumption bundle, independent of what oth 
ers chose. Needless to say, this is not the way things are always done. 
We have moved a long way from Robinson Crusoe, but many per 
sonal consumption items and other forms of spending are closely tied 
to work. Compensation is a complicated package of payments, prom 
ises, and obligations in most modern labor markets. Important aspects 
of compensation are provided in kind, often in the form of bundles of 
goods that are purchased in common by all workers in an organization. 
Fringe benefits, such as health and retirement plans, typically have 
many uniform features among all workers in a firm. The effort and 
attention paid to these items suggest that much is at stake in the precise 
form in which compensation is paid today.
THE EFFICIENCY OF MONETARY PAY: GENERALIZED 
PURCHASING POWER
Economies of information make decentralization through some 
form of market system the standard "default" paradigm for economics. 
In theory, it is the utility-maximizing allocation of work, output, con 
sumption, and investment that determines potential economic welfare, 
given tastes and technology. How is this allocation achieved? If pref 
erences were fully known and transactions were costless, people could 
equally well hire agents to purchase goods on their behalf to choose 
among particular items themselves. The same utility-maximizing out 
come would be achieved in either case.
However, if tastes are private information and not easily known or 
conveyed to others, vast resources are saved by decentralization. Deci 
sions are made more efficiently. Individual consumers are in the best 
position to make the most informed choices on their own behalf. Dele 
gating or contracting it to others is bound to lead to misallocations in 
most cases. There are considerable savings from not having to com 
municate all possible preferences to others, not only to avoid misun 
derstandings, but also for hired agents to make the right choices should
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unusual circumstances and unexpected opportunities arise. In addi 
tion, individual choice avoids potential conflicts of interest and control 
problems of delegating decisions to people who have independent 
interests and agendas of their own. Who will spend a person's money 
in that person's best interests? The person or someone else? This, of 
course, is the fundamental argument for the desirability—indeed, the 
necessity—of decentralized individual decision making to efficiently 
allocate resources. Why then, should compensation be paid in any 
other form?
The most important reason arises from Alfred Marshall's observa 
tion that workers must deliver their own work themselves. Insofar as 
there is utility or disutility in specific acts of work, work locations, 
work associates, etc., these must be appropriately accounted in final 
consumption and considered as payments in kind. 1 Even in the 
absence of these technological tie-ins and consumption (or possibly 
investment) aspects of work, however, there are other economic rea 
sons for consumption decisions to be "centralized" in collective or 
group decisions, sometimes tied to work decisions and at least partially 
delegated through firms, and other times delegated to government or 
other agencies.
One reason is potential economies of scale in the provision of 
some types of goods. Another is a form of externality, where the con 
sumption of one person affects the welfare of others in ways that can 
not be fully priced nor fully internalized socially by purely private 
choices. A third is intertemporal externality or consistency problems, 
where adverse individual outcomes are shared by the community at 
large.
Economies of Scale
Economies of scale is the most familiar, indeed, the stock argu 
ment for the provision of public goods through collective or public 
choice. Joint provision of a common good to many consumers saves 
transaction costs that otherwise would be incurred if individuals make 
the decisions for themselves, completely independent of each other. 
Saving transactions costs in these cases typically requires that the 
administrative agency purchase a standardized good or a very limited 
range of goods; otherwise, the economy of scale tends to be lost. Col-
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lective choices, therefore, necessarily involve some loss of freedom 
relative to making independent individual choices. Individuals in the 
group do not always get exactly what they desire most under these 
restrictions, and this represents the private and social costs of buying 
goods collectively through group consensus rather than individually.
Such costs are not voluntarily incurred unless there are corre 
sponding benefits. It is rational to subvert one's specific preferences to 
common, group-chosen consumption standards if the good can be 
obtained cheaply enough. Goods provided in this way tend to cater to 
median preferences in the group, but if the system is stable, the goods 
must be close enough to the preferences of any member to make con 
tinued participation worthwhile. Otherwise, members would defect, 
and the group would either change its character or disappear altogether.
In advanced market economies, perhaps the most important cause 
for components of pay to take this form is tax avoidance. To a first 
approximation (but see below), the firm cares about the total cost of an 
employee, not how the cost is allocated among various components of 
compensation. Furthermore, all costs are equally counted as expenses 
in calculating income, corporate or otherwise, for assessing tax liabili 
ties of the firm. To the extent that the tax system finds it difficult to tax 
in-kind income of workers, there are obvious incentives for firms and 
workers to agree to convert income into tax-free, in-kind forms. Some 
ways of doing so are easier than others (Woodbury and Huang 1991).
Tax authorities everywhere are loathe to impute income to "intan 
gibles" for tax purposes because of the difficulties of doing so without 
costly disputes and substantial differences of opinion. An obvious 
example is the failure to impute rent on owner-occupied housing in cal 
culating the personal income tax. A less obvious example is imputing 
taxable income for jobs with desirable amenities, such as good work 
ing conditions, location, office quality, air-conditioning, and other. 
Income taxes encourage on-the-job consumption of such items because 
it is too costly to calculate their monetary equivalents in each individ 
ual case. Obviously, these forms of pay are of greater value the greater 
the marginal tax rate. Progressive income taxation implies that these 
forms of pay are of greater value to higher-wage workers than they are 
to lower-wage workers.
The monetary value of many other things, such as company-pro 
vided meals, housing, club memberships, and work clothing are easier
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to assess, and they are often included in income for individual income- 
tax purposes. Other important benefits, such as the employer's share of 
contributions to retirement or to health insurance, however, have easily 
imputed value but still are exempted from taxable income by law. It is 
interesting to note that many in-kind pay provisions in the United 
States and Canada originated in periods such as wartime, when nomi 
nal wage controls were used to suppress inflation. There is a natural 
tendency toward "wage drift" in those circumstances: using wage and 
price controls to suppress inflation gives strong incentives for workers 
and employers to look for ways to increase worker incomes exempt 
from regulation. Provision of company-owned housing to employees 
often was used for this purpose in Europe in the post World War II era. 
World War II money wage controls are said to be the origins of firm- 
provided health insurance to workers in the United States.
Externalities and Productivity
Next, consider goods that have "productive consumption" 
attributes, that is, goods having important linkages between personal 
consumption and personal productivity. The consumption of many 
goods affects productivity directly, some for the good, others for the 
bad. In a fully decentralized and complete market economy, private 
consumption decisions would take these productivity by-products fully 
into account because individuals would confront the full costs and ben 
efits of their decisions. For instance, if an act of consumption, such as 
drinking, causes one's productivity to fall, the person rationally antici 
pates an extra charge in the form of reduced wages while under the 
influence and properly takes that into account in deciding where, when, 
and how much to drink.
In practice, many markets are incomplete and too costly to operate. 
In such cases, these by-product effects on others are not fully priced 
and not always fully internalized by private decisions. A worker who 
gets drunk and has to skip work might get docked a day's pay, but typ 
ically doesn't have to compensate co-workers for the bother and extra 
effort they must exert to make up for the absence. Usually these imper 
fections arise because transactions costs make it too expensive for 
firms and workers to contract directly on worker output.
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Rather, transactions costs are economized by contracting more 
imperfectly on inputs, such as own time, whose day-to-day quality is 
hard to monitor and can be partially affected by conscious worker (and 
firm) behavior. In these cases, firms have interests in their workers' 
consumption habits because it directly affects labor costs and firm pro 
ductivity. Paternalistic interests by firms in their workers' welfare can 
arise solely on considerations of self-interest, without any altruism 
whatsoever. Many U.S. firms provide athletic facilities, meals, and 
health services partly for these reasons.
This idea has many potential applications. Consider, for instance, 
the provision to workers of complementary inputs into the production 
process. One could imagine a system in which professors were 
required to purchase their own chalk for classroom lectures, instead of 
the system we have, where educational institutions typically provide it 
"free of charge." If professors were paid directly by their students and 
their fees varied directly with the demand for participation in specific 
classes, teachers would carefully calculate the costs and benefits of 
using chalk for enhancing their net revenues and would choose to use 
the socially efficient amount.
However, in the system we have, professors aren't paid directly by 
students. Most teachers are paid on an annual salary basis, and pay is 
only imperfectly geared to specific classroom performance, so having 
the professor buy the chalk probably would lead to inefficient decisions 
that would imperfectly serve the interests of students and schools. A 
teacher could decide to use no chalk whatsoever, saving these personal 
expenses while receiving, at least in the short run, more or less the 
same pay from the school. Under these conditions, it's just easier for 
the school to freely distribute chalk on each chalkboard each day and 
let the professor use all that is desired. Using chalk excessively at the 
margin may be better than not using enough.
There is no need to belabor the triviality of this example. It was 
chosen for its possible (mild) amusement value and familiarity to some 
readers, but there are many more important examples. A production 
worker in a large manufacturing establishment today is paid to work 
with capital and machines that are almost always owned by third-party 
shareholders in the firm and looked after by managers hired for that 
purpose. Yet, in the early days of the factory system, it was common 
for workers to rent machinery directly from the factory owner and mar-
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ket their own output themselves. "Compensation" would look much 
different under these two circumstances.
Corporate executives could be given no complementary resources, 
such as offices, secretaries or assistants, to work with. Instead, they 
might rent their own office (if indeed they wanted one) or hire addi 
tional help at their own expense. Such expenses would be worthwhile 
and incurred voluntarily if they improved the person's productivity 
enough. Yet, for most executives, decentralized arrangement such as 
these hardly ever arise because it is so difficult to pay executives on the 
basis of their specific "outputs." It is more economical for the firm to 
provide productivity-enhancing complementary resources as part of 
the work environment and pay managers mostly on the basis of their 
own time inputs.2
Worker-Firm Commitment
A particular form of these kinds of interactions has been exten 
sively analyzed in economics over the years. When it is expensive to 
use and to closely control implicit markets for internal transactions 
within the firm, it can be efficient to substitute cooperative, sharing 
solutions between workers and management instead. The concept of 
firm-specific human capital has been an important development in 
labor economics and essentially this is what lies behind it. If many 
internal transactions are not explicitly priced or are priced incorrectly, 
there is potential for unproductive conflict among various agents in an 
organization. In making their individual production and investment 
decisions, some conflict is avoided by providing incentives to encour 
age workers to weigh the interests of the organization as a whole in 
addition to their self-interests. It's as if workers were brought into the 
enterprise as implicit partners. All parties bear some of the costs and 
some of the returns in mutual investments in worker-worker and 
worker-management knowledge and relationships. Issues of paternal 
ism arise within the organization from the joint interests of all parties 
to protect their shared investments and stakes in the firm. This is not 
entirely unrelated to the ways in which interpersonal relationships 
develop in families.
Probably the most important benefit that results from these shared 
investments is employment security and enduring employment rela-
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tionships. In reality, employment contracts always are of random dura 
tion, with future (implicit) promises guaranteed only up to the external 
fortunes of the firm, the state of demand for its products, the economic 
conditions of its suppliers, and the quality of its managers. Neverthe 
less, the fact is that there is an enormous amount of job continuity over 
the working lives of most people. The typical pattern is for job turn 
over to be largest at younger ages, a time when learning and informa 
tion gathering about both the talents of young workers and their 
prospects in firms is most important. Job turnover falls sharply with 
work experience in the firm. Within 6 or 7 years of entry into the labor 
force, the typical worker has found a permanent job that will last for 20 
years or more.
It is a bit unusual to think of employment security as a fringe bene 
fit, perhaps because, with few exceptions in some trade union con 
tracts, these terms are not explicitly written down anywhere. None 
theless, the ties that are built up through mutual specific human capital 
investments serve as the equivalent of financial bonds and act to dis 
courage costly quits and layoffs under many circumstances. They 
affect employment variability and the incidence and duration of unem 
ployment in the economy (Rosen 1985).
A great deal of empirical work has established that the payment of 
normal fringe benefits and other fixed costs of employment in the firm, 
such as hiring and training costs that are not closely related to work 
intensity, insulate workers from short-term product market fluctuations 
(Hamermesh 1993; Hart 1984). For instance, if demand falls but the 
decline is expected to be temporary, the firm has something to lose by 
laying off workers. It has incentives to retain them because some val 
ued employees will never return if they are laid off, and the fixed costs 
associated with their initial employment must be incurred again on 
subsequent replacements. Similar considerations apply to workers and 
serve to deter them from quitting in response to attractive short-term 
outside opportunities. All of this acts as a kind of self-insurance that 
supplements explicit unemployment insurance programs mandated by 
the government.
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Intertemporal Consistency
Finally, there is a related concept of externalities that cuts across a 
different spectrum of consumption activities and personal behavior. 
For the problem at hand, the most important of these are "social insur 
ance" types of activities involving transfers of resources among indi 
viduals and over time. Perhaps the main growth of the State in 
otherwise decentralized market economies throughout the world is 
attributable to mandatory, tax-financed provision of activities such as 
health care, unemployment insurance, retirement plans, and the like. 
The subject is too vast to be discussed in any detail here, except to 
point out the tendency for centralized government decisions to increas 
ingly substitute for private planning and individual decisions through 
out this century. The fact is that governments have increasingly 
undertaken these paternalistic functions, often administrated through 
employment records and financed by payroll and income taxes. Few, if 
any, compelling explanations for this most important social and eco 
nomic trend have been offered, and no attempt will be made to do so 
here.
With the possible exception of unemployment compensation, most 
of these activities are best thought of as essentially private acts of con 
sumption or investment, that is, the government supplying or regulat 
ing private goods. How much a person wishes to set aside for future 
retirement or to spend on a personal medical condition is inherently a 
private decision, so the classical economic case for the possibility of 
public policy does not immediately apply. However, a case can be 
made that external social interests arise if the financing of these private 
decisions turns out to concern others. Choices may then not be time- 
consistent in the following sense. Some individuals may make earnest 
but erroneous decisions, and others may not be willing to let them suf 
fer the poor ex post consequences of unfortunate choices. If this out 
come comes to be anticipated, however, and individuals think they can 
be bailed out by throwing themselves at the mercy of the community, it 
encourages reckless, inefficient behavior that can be avoided by forc 
ing people to set aside resources to take care of themselves.
A person who hasn't bought health insurance on the expectation of 
not getting sick often is cared for at public expense should the unlikely 
and costly illness occur. Some people who gamble away their retire-
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ment wealth or invest retirement funds unwisely find themselves in a 
similar situation. The community finds it difficult to completely turn 
its back on such people ex post, and it is hard to credibly commit to not 
doing so ex ante. Knowing that the community will step in, however, 
creates incentives for inefficient private decision making in the first 
instance. Many firms make participation in retirement and health 
insurance plans mandatory for these reasons. It protects them against 
paying excessively for old loyalties and "family" ties to employees. 
The community at large has a similar interest in mandatory participa 
tion. In practice, it often finances these programs through payroll taxes 
on employment. 3
THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSTITUTION
The basic approach to analyzing the structure of compensation was 
put forth by Adam Smith in his extraordinary discussion of the tenden 
cies for labor market equilibrium to equalize the net advantages among 
alternative employments. If some kinds of jobs offer attractive ameni 
ties and substantial in-kind pay compared with others, their observed 
monetary compensation must be lower to ration eager job applicants 
and encourage some workers to apply to less attractive employments. 
This idea implies an index number approach to assessing "total advan 
tages," imputing value for all in-kind and other components and adding 
them to nominal wages to assess the total. In equilibrium, all compo 
nents additively substitute for each other at the margin. Otherwise net 
advantages would not be equalized.
The compelling simplicity of the logic of equalizing differences is 
not always matched by simplicity of application, especially in the 
realm of public policy. As has been stressed throughout this essay, the 
many alternative ways of providing consumption to people makes it 
important to keep substitution possibilities and private incentives in 
mind when analyzing public programs. In many cases there are impor 
tant offsets. Direct effects of policies are not always as large as they 
might appear on the surface. The important consequences of many 
programs are as likely to arise from hidden subsidies built into many of 
them, as to the programs themselves.
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Examples are easy to find. Indeed, analysis of these programs has 
provided plenty of work for analysts over the years, something like a 
works-project-administration relief bill for applied economists in the 
past few decades.
1) When the payroll tax was increased to finance Medicare 
for elderly persons in the United States in the mid 1960s, there 
was a significant decline in private health insurance purchases 
by the aged. To be sure, Medicare increased health insurance 
coverage among the elderly population, but the subsequent 
run-up in expenditures was caused as much by the enormous 
subsidy in Medicare prices as by increased coverage.
2) Private pension plans in the U.S. labor market invariably 
coordinate their benefits and provisions with a worker's 
expected claims on Social Security pensions. From a firm's 
point of view, it is a matter of indifference whether a dollar is 
paid into a funded private pension plan or into Social Secu 
rity's unfunded pay-as-you-go system through payroll taxes. 
Many have argued that the decline in private saving in the 
United States is partly attributable to the substitution of 
unfunded government pensions for funded private pensions.
3) The financing of public unemployment benefits increases 
the propensity for many firms to increase layoffs in adverse 
business conditions and increase the unemployment rate 
(Topel 1983). These kinds of incentives are even more adverse 
in the Canadian system than in the U.S. system because high- 
risk firms do not pay actuarial fees reflecting the risk they 
impose on the system to the insurance fund. Furthermore, the 
enormous subsidies for seasonal unemployment in the mari 
time provinces causes inefficient tax distortions in employ 
ment decisions elsewhere in Canada and encourages many 
workers to remain employed in seasonal industries even 
though their productivity is much lower in them than in other 
locations or in nonseasonal jobs.
4) The tendency for European governments to closely regu 
late employment commitments of firms affects their propensity 
to hire young workers, thus increasing the joblessness of youth 
and worsening their long-term prospects (Lazear 1990).
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There is compelling empirical evidence of substitution between 
wages and private fringe benefits and direct on-the-job consumption 
amenities in the form of equalizing differences (Woodbury 1983; 
Rosen 1986). Nonetheless, what often appears in the data seems not to 
be equalizing in this sense at all because it is generally the good jobs— 
the ones with high wages, good working conditions, and low turn 
over—that offer the most fringe benefits. Low wage jobs are more 
often associated with poor working conditions, high turnover and 
exposure to unemployment, as well as low fringe benefits. This, how 
ever, does not affect the logic of substitution and the necessity for 
analysis to proceed on such terms in contemplating new regulations 
and programs because these observations also are readily explained by 
a few simple extensions of the argument.
Focusing on the consumption aspects of pay composition reveals 
why higher paying jobs tend to offer more benefits and perquisites. 
Many consumption items tied to work are normal goods. They have 
positive income elasticities, so higher skilled and higher wage workers 
would be expected to purchase more of them, on average, than would 
lower skilled, lower wage workers. Were it not for greater consump 
tion and participation in these kinds of arrangements, highly skilled 
workers would have even higher wage rates than are actually observed. 
Favorable tax treatment of some forms of fringe benefits reinforces the 
incentives for high wage workers to convert their pay to these forms.
Estimates of total resources spent in these forms are surprisingly 
hard to find, but they must be a fairly large component of total compen 
sation. Health and retirement benefits, certainly the most easily mea 
sured components, account for about 10 percent of total monetary 
compensation (Smeeding 1983; Slottje et al. 2000). Assessing implicit 
values for such things as job security, work and location amenities, 
flexible work schedules, and a wide variety of other aspects of work 
has proven more difficult, not least because of the reasons mentioned 
in the paragraph above. Surely numbers on the order of another 10 
percent of total pay would seem to be a reasonable minimum. If so, 
fringe benefits broadly defined must account for 20 percent or more of 
total compensation in the U.S. labor force. Adding the payroll taxes 
used to finance a number of other related social programs contributes a 
substantial amount more. These are large numbers. They are impor-
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tant components of the economy and can be expected to grow over 
time.
SOME EXAMPLES AND APPLICATIONS
Some extreme cases illustrate many issues arising in the econom 
ics of fringe benefits in a dramatic way. Perhaps the most unusual case 
is military compensation. A substantial amount of military compensa 
tion is in-kind. In the ancient world, plunder was a principle compo 
nent of military pay—today compensation is provided by govern 
ments. Conscription in modern armies relieved the state of most direct 
cash payment obligations, so a very large fraction of conscript army 
pay was direct provision of consumption and future retirement bene 
fits. Nonetheless, even in voluntary armies the proportion of direct 
monetary pay in total compensation is much smaller as compared with 
that of other employments.
Almost all the factors mentioned above apply in one way or 
another to military compensation (Rosen 1992). The nature of military 
production requires massing personnel in far off locations largely 
removed from the rest of the population, so separation of consumption 
from production is difficult, if not impossible. The remote areas in 
which military outposts are placed makes it costly for private markets 
to supply many consumption needs directly to soldiers. The army 
itself must be a major provider of many of these things. To a large 
extent, these expenditures are taken "off the top" and make military 
monetary compensation appear smaller than is truly the case.
The army has direct interests in the consumption and behavioral 
patterns of personnel to maintain its readiness and force-quality status. 
Partly, this is controlled directly in the consumption goods that are 
made available, a point that is reinforced by the economies of scale in 
providing standardized consumption and other expenditures for 
recruits. In addition, the army has special reasons for insisting on com 
mon consumption standards and a fair bit of equality of treatment 
among recruits, to maintain and invest in the esprit de corps needed to 
maintain an effective force. Loyalties to the organization are extremely 
important because of the obvious conflicts between self-interest and 
organizational interest in dangerous situations.
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Of course, many military-specific skills also have little value in 
other employments. To protect its training investments in personnel 
from excessive depreciation through turnover, military organizations 
tend to back load pay to a significant extent, with vesting rights set up 
in ways that encourage career personnel to stay for lengthy periods. 
Back-loaded retirement pay also helps resolve agency and obedience 
problems that encourage proper teamwork. There are sound economic 
reasons why military organizations are so paternalistic.
Some private employments have military-like features. Work 
required in far flung outposts, such as the Hudson Bay Company in the 
19th Century, or the Alaskan pipeline in the 20th, largely followed the 
military model because the market for consumption goods was too thin 
to make complete decentralization practical. Furthermore, in many of 
these circumstances, the employing firms had a direct interest in the 
consumption patterns of their employees because it might affect their 
productivity. Institutions such as the truck system and the company 
store arose to meet these needs (Hilton 1957).
The former Soviet Union and other countries in the Eastern Bloc 
provide interesting contemporary examples of how fringe benefits 
affect resource allocation. The examples also have implications for 
current economic reforms there because the change in control of enter 
prises and production needed now may be impeded by past obligations 
the State enterprises made to their employees (Lazear and Rosen 
1995).
In many ways those economies followed a military-style economic 
organization, something that is practically inevitable in a central com 
mand and control system. In addition to their overwhelming role in 
total production, the state-owned enterprise typically served as the nat 
ural administrative unit through which many aspects of consumption 
were organized. Housing was often provided to employees at subsi 
dized rates, as were public utilities, child care, and many direct con 
sumption items such as food and clothing. Income in-kind and other 
"fringe benefits" were a much larger proportion of total pay in these 
economies than in most market economies, partly for ideological rea 
sons, but also because centrally commanded systems need substitutes 
for market mechanisms.
The socialist structure was inherently paternalistic. It encouraged 
equality and common consumption standards to promote solidarity and
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commitment to the system. Housing, education, food, and health ser 
vices were viewed as more socially productive kinds of consumption 
than were other goods. Conspicuous consumption was stigmatized. 
The practicalities of central control were important as well. The com 
mand system does not allow prices to fully allocate resources across 
most goods. Draconian penalties for participating in illegal markets 
discouraged their use. When the state determines production and con 
sumption allocations, surpluses and shortages of both goods and jobs 
become a chronic condition of life. Other, far more costly, social insti 
tutions arise to fill in the gap.
Queues are a familiar manifestation of nonprice rationing alloca 
tion problems, but there are other mechanisms that serve this purpose, 
including clout, political connections, and barter. For example, the 
provision of a substantial hot meal in company lunchrooms was very 
common in State enterprises because alternative markets either for pre 
pared meals or for raw ingredients were so limited. Furthermore, the 
central authority had to limit labor mobility in order to carry out is pro 
duction plans. More goods were made available in large cities such as 
Moscow than in other places, and an elaborate system of passport con 
trol was needed to insure that workers remained where the central plan 
allocated them. State control of housing was required for these pur 
poses, and since wage rates were not allowed to clear specific labor 
market shortages and surpluses, firms often supplied their own housing 
to get the labor they needed. Company-provided housing was itself 
partially allocated by internal queues within the firm rather than by 
prices.
The tax system that supported the state bureaucratic apparatus in 
these economies was hidden in total government ownership of physical 
capital. However, there were substantial implicit payroll taxes because 
state income and old-age security, and some health services, though 
formally administered by the central and local governments, were 
financed through taxes on the utilization of labor by enterprises. The 
absence of well-functioning private financial institutions also required 
extensive involvement of the state and enterprises in intertemporal 
allocations of consumption (saving and dissaving) of workers over 
their lifetimes. For example, retired workers often remained in their 
company-provided housing paying little for rent and utilities.
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In short, Soviet workers were important stakeholders in their enter 
prises. These intensive ties and social commitments undoubtedly were 
a major force in the operation of soft-budget constraints and unattain 
able consumption desires that eventually brought the system down. 
However, they have also presented serious obstacles for reform and 
movement toward a market system in these countries. In the command 
system, the firm and the state were so intertwined that it was almost 
impossible to distinguish between the obligations of the two. Now that 
the enterprise and the state have to be so clearly separated, it is not 
obvious to whom these commitments to workers will be transferred 
and how they will honored when control of enterprises redounds to pri 
vate hands. The state may sell off claims to machinery, equipment, and 
structures, but who will gain "title" to the security and consumption 
obligations these firms have built up with their workers?
No doubt, many of these obligations will merely be forgotten, and 
workers, left with broken promises, will have to fare on their own 
devices. Presently it is obvious that a system of consumer and worker 
"sovereignty," where workers' economic fortunes and connections 
were not so closely tied to specific enterprises, would make the transi 
tion to a market economy much easier. Uncertainty about previous 
commitments is proving to be an enormous obstacle in moving toward 
a rational ownership and market structure in these countries. In China, 
the remarkably productive rural and agricultural reforms hardly have 
been attempted in the large urban State enterprises. These difficulties 
are not confined to poor economies. In such rich countries as the new, 
unified Germany, the willingness of West Germans to pick up the 
social obligations of their Eastern relatives has been a great economic 
and social drag on that economy. Other formerly socialist or commu 
nist countries have no such rich relatives to lean upon. These problems 
are not only confined to countries attempting to reform their economic 
structures. In the United States, tie-ins of some fringe benefits to job 
holding, such as health insurance, apparently have inefficiently limited 
labor mobility between firms in recent years (Madrian 1994).
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CONCLUSIONS
Fringe benefits are of importance to such fundamental labor mar 
ket problems as the social organization of work and production, as well 
as to social and moral obligations between workers and firms and of 
governments to citizens. These issues cut deeply into core issues in 
labor economics and, indeed, of economic systems more generally. 
They deserve more attention than they have generally received from 
the economic research community.
Notes
1. Some jobs embody negative attributes and disutility In principle, these should be 
subtracted from total income to arrive at final consumption
2. No doubt the individual income tax is a factor here as well. However, it is not 
decisive because offices, secretaries, and other complementary inputs usually 
were provided to managers free of charge before the income tax was important. 
The income tax encourages excessive use of these things—plusher offices on 
higher floors and more secretaries and assistants.
3 This logic helps one to understand why there is a community interest in "social" 
programs, but it cannot explain either the form it takes or the magnitude of the 
interest. It cannot explain why governments have often gone into these businesses 
directly rather than regulating participation in private programs; nor can it account 
for the great growth of these programs in this century
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Increases in the employment of married women over the past few 
decades have been accompanied by changes in child-care choices. 
Today, more than one-half of all preschool children receive care during 
part of the day by someone other than their parents. Among children 
of employed parents, there has been an increasing trend toward the use 
of formal types of child-care arrangements, such as day-care centers 
and group day-care homes. Because the child-care market has become 
so important, economists have intensified their efforts to understand 
the market. Economists in both the United States and Canada have 
studied the effects of child-care prices on women's employment (Blau 
and Robins 1988; Connelly 1992; Kimmel 1995a; Cleveland, Gunder- 
son, and Hyatt 1994), the effects of child-care prices on receipt of wel 
fare (Connelly 1990; Kimmel 1995b), the effects of child-care costs on 
fertility (Blau and Robins, 1989), and the effects of child-care subsi 
dies on employment and child-care costs (Heckman 1974; Hofferth 
and Wissoker 1992; Michalopoulos, Robins, and Garfinkel 1992; Ribar 
1992, 1995; Cleveland and Hyatt 1994). All of these studies examine 
choices using data from a single country, either the United States or 
Canada. In contrast, this paper examines child-care choices in both 
countries, using a pooled data set based on national surveys in each 
country. Our objective is to exploit variation between the two coun 
tries to obtain better estimates of the factors that affect child-care and 
employment decisions.
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Several recent papers have examined the effects of child-care sub 
sidies in the United States on child-care choices and employment of 
mothers of young children. Hofferth and Wissoker (1992) predicted 
that subsidies would have a substantial effect on the mode of care cho 
sen. According to their estimates, if states were to increase subsidies to 
nonparental care by 10 percent, there would be an 11 to 30 percent 
increase in the use of center-based care, a 6 to 10 percent increase in 
care by relatives, and a 12 to 18 percent reduction in parental care. 
Michalopoulos, Robins, and Garfinkel (1992) find that increases in 
child-care subsidies would increase child-care expenditures, but such 
subsidies might have little impact on either the quality of care or the 
employment of mothers of young children. According to their esti 
mates, making the U.S. child-care tax credit considerably more pro 
gressive would more than triple child-care expenditures and increase 
child-care subsidies by a factor of eight. Even with such massive 
changes, however, they predict that the quality of child care would 
increase by only 30 percent and that hours worked by mothers of 
young children would increase by only 6 percent. 1
A potential problem with estimating the effects of child-care subsi 
dies using data from only one country is that parents are eligible for 
many of the same subsidies. For example, both countries have subsi 
dies through the federal income tax, which depend on a family's tax 
able income and child-care expenses. In principle, all families within a 
country have the same incentives because all are subject to the same 
income tax system. Previous studies have examined the effects of sub 
sidies within a particular country using instruments to predict potential 
subsidies. Michalopoulos, Robins, and Garfinkel, for example, used 
nonlabor income and predicted wage rates to determine potential sub 
sidies.
Previous research has also found that higher child-care prices 
reduce the use of market care and lower the likelihood of employment 
of mothers of young children. However, the magnitude of this effect is 
still being debated in the literature (See Blau [1995], for example). 
Ribar (1992) found relatively large effects of prices, while Micha 
lopoulos, Robins, and Garfinkel (1992) found very small effects. 
Chaplin et al. (1996) found that the effect of price is quite sensitive to 
the definition of price. As with subsidies, child-care prices are not 
given solely by providers but depend on a family's choices. Due to
Child Care and Labor Supply 35
economies of scale, parents who work full time can expect to pay less 
per hour of care than those who work part time, if the care is of the 
same type and quality (Folk and Beller 1993). Parents can also choose 
from a variety of types of care, each with a different quality and price.
In this chapter, we follow previous studies in examining the effects 
of economic factors on child-care and employment choices. However, 
we add to previous studies by using pooled data from Canada and the 
United States in examining choices. Because there is a natural separa 
tion of markets between the two countries, and because the citizens of 
the two countries are subject to different systems of subsidies and reg 
ulations, we should be able to exploit exogenous differences in prices, 
wages, and subsidies to obtain more precise estimates of the effects of 
economic factors on child-care and employment choices.
According to two national surveys of child care, about half of 
Canadian and U.S. mothers of preschool children work in a given 
week, and Canadian families are slightly less likely to use parental care 
and center care as the primary source of care for children under age 13. 
Among mothers who work full time, however, Canadian mothers are 
only about two-thirds as likely to use center care and correspondingly 
are more likely to use other non-relative care. Among mothers who do 
not work, Canadian mothers are much more likely than U.S. mothers to 
use center care and correspondingly are less likely to use parental care. 
After controlling for various economic and demographic factors, we 
find that if Canadians were to face the same economic circumstances 
as U.S. mothers, they would be somewhat less likely to work full time. 
When they do work full time, Canadian mothers are less likely to use 
center care; when they do not work, however, Canadian mothers are 
less likely to use parental care. However, we find little role for differ 
ences in prices and subsidies in affecting these child-care choices.
This chapter has two objectives. The first is to describe child-care 
programs and choices in the two countries. The second is to assess the 
importance of economic differences between the two countries in 
child-care and employment choices. In the following sections, we 
summarize the major child-care subsidy programs in the two countries 
and discuss their respective regulations; we use national survey data 
from each country to examine differences in child-care choices and 
child-care prices; and we provide an assessment of the role of differ-
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ences in tax credits, prices, and regulations, as well as other economic 
and demographic factors.
CHILD-CARE POLICIES IN CANADA AND 
THE UNITED STATES
Federal and local child-care policies are similar in Canada and the 
United States, but there are some differences. Both countries provide 
subsidies directly to parents though their federal income tax systems, 
as well as through subsidies targeted toward low-income families. In 
both countries, state and provincial governments regulate child-care 
providers. In addition, the Canadian provinces and most of the United 
States provide additional tax relief to users of child care. One key dif 
ference between the two countries has to do with state and provincial 
subsidies. While state spending in the United States is dwarfed by fed 
eral spending, provincial subsidies to providers who care for children 
in needy families are larger than federal expenditures in Canada. 
While state subsidies in the United States are largely targeted toward 
families receiving welfare, many more families in Canada are eligible 
for subsidies.
Federal Subsidies
In the United States, the federal government spent nearly $10 bil 
lion in 1992 on a complicated array of at least 41 federal programs that 
spend money directly on child care plus five additional programs that 
give tax breaks for families with child-care expenditures. The largest 
federal government expenditures were $2.8 billion for the child-care 
tax credit (which works through the federal income tax code) and $2.2 
billion for the Head Start program. 2 In addition, the federal govern 
ment provided about $3 billion in grants to the states, including $1.1 
billion on the Child Care Food Program, $300-$400 million each on 
child care for families receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Chil 
dren (AFDC), at-risk children, and the Child Care and Development 
Block Grant (Committee on Ways and Means of the U.S. House of 
Representatives 1993), and approximately $800 million on the Title
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XX Social Services Block Grant. 3 Another $3 billion in tax revenue 
was lost through tax exclusions for employer-provided child care.
The Canadian child-care subsidy system appears to be somewhat 
simpler than the U.S. system. As in the United States, the Canadian 
federal government subsidizes child care through the income tax code. 4 
In 1989, about 600,000 families claimed the tax credit, for a tax sav 
ings of $288.5 million (Hess 1992). (Note that throughout this paper, 
Canadian expenditures are converted to U.S. dollars using a conversion 
rate of 0.75 U.S. dollars per Canadian dollar.) The Canadian govern 
ment also provides grants to the provinces, which are used to subsidize 
child care for needy families. In contrast to the array of federal pro 
grams in the United States, the Canadian government provides funds to 
the provinces primarily through one program, the Canadian Assistance 
Plan (CAP) (Child Resource and Research Unit 1993).
The federal tax-based subsidies in the two countries are quite simi 
lar. Each limits the subsidy based on parents' taxable income, so that 
poor families with low tax bills have limited access to the subsidy. In 
the United States, the credit is nonrefundable, so that a family's maxi 
mum credit is its tax bill. In Canada, the maximum deduction is two- 
thirds of the income of the parent with lower earnings. Each credit has 
a maximum exemption per child. The U.S. credit allows a family to 
claim expenses of up to $2,400 for one child and $4,800 for two or 
more children. The maximum exemption for the Canadian deduction 
is more generous: in 1989, it allowed up to $3,000 for each child under 
age 7 and $1,500 for each child between 7 and 14. 5 In both countries, 
the subsidy is generally available to parents regardless of the type of 
child care used, with some minor restrictions. In Canada, the child- 
care provider cannot be a member of the immediate family or a relative 
under age 21, and the caregiver must provide a receipt. In addition, the 
taxpayer must be employed, operating her own business, or working on 
a research grant to receive the credit. In the United States, the credit is 
available only to parents who work or are looking for work and taxpay 
ers who claim the credit must provide the name, address, and an identi 
fication number of the caregiver.
The primary difference in the two plans is the relationship between 
allowable expenditures and the amount of the credit. In Canada, child- 
care expenses up to the maximum allowable amount are deducted from 
a parent's taxable income, so that a taxpayer essentially receives a
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rebate at her marginal tax rate. 6 In the United States, the credit also 
depends on family income but is not directly related to the tax rate. For 
families with income below $10,000, the credit is 30 percent of allow 
able expenditures. The credit rate declines gradually to 20 percent for 
families earning more than $28,000. As a result, the maximum credit 
declines as income increases in the United States, but increases (with a 
parent's earnings) in Canada, along with the marginal tax rate.
To compare the tax-based subsidies in the two countries, we calcu 
lated the amount that a family would receive under a variety of circum 
stances: if they paid $1 for child care for each hour the mother worked, 
if the husband earned $50,000 per year, if the family had one child 
under age 7, and if they took standard deductions and filed jointly in 
the United States. Figure 1 summarizes these calculations. The tax- 
based subsidy is shown for each country for up to 2,500 hours worked 
per year by the mother at two wage rates—$5 per hour and $20 per 
hour. For the lower wage earner, the U.S. credit is more generous. A 
woman has to work only about 250 hours (earning $1,250) in order to 
be eligible for some credit and would receive more than $500 per year 
if she worked full time. In contrast, because a Canadian mother can 
claim a larger amount of nontaxable earnings, she would have to work 
1,000 hours before having to pay taxes and hence be eligible for a tax 
subsidy and would receive about $300 per year if she worked full time. 
For the higher wage earner, the Canadian system appears to be more 
generous, providing about $700 per year for a full-time worker, while 
the U.S. credit provides about $400 for a full-time worker. Similar cal 
culations for larger families and for families with higher spousal 
income reveal the same pattern: the Canadian system is more generous 
for higher-earning families, but less generous for lower-earning parents 
because the marginal subsidy rate in the United States is lower for fam 
ilies with higher income, while the marginal subsidy rate in Canada is 
tied directly to the marginal tax rate.
Provincial and State Subsidies
Every Canadian province has an income-tested subsidy provided 
directly to a family's licensed child-care provider. Table 1 summarizes 
key features of the provincial subsidies in 1991. As is obvious from the 
table, the subsidies vary in generosity and eligibility from province to
Figure 1 Federal Child-Care Tax Subsidies in Canada and the United States
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Table 1 Features of the Canadian Provincial Child-Care Subsidies, 1991 ($)a
Province
Newfoundland & 
Labrador
Prince Edward Island
Nova Scotia
New Brunswick
Quebec
Ontario
Manitoba
Saskatchewan
Alberta
British Columbia
Turning 
pointb
8,280
11,160
13,590
10,098
11,250
12,715
14,171
15,651
17,085
17,079
Break-even 
point
14,490
29,376
25,200
19,629
37,500
19,509
30,055
32,571
28,478
23,317
Maximum 
subsidy0
NA
16.50/day
15.75/day
10.50/day
NA
NA
3,164/year
90% of fee
276/month
430/month
Expenditure 
per child
10
54
36
14
41
107
90
36
43
74
Federal 
contribution 
per child
7
26
23
6
28
25
52
20
15
30
SOURCE: The Childcare Resource and Research Unit 1993.
a All Canadian expenditure numbers were converted to U.S. dollars using an exchange rate of 0.75 U.S.$ per Can$.
b The turning point is the income level at which a family is no longer eligible for the full subsidy. The break-even point is the income
level at which the family is no longer eligible for any subsidy. For Ontario, the break-even point and turning point are not uniform
across the providence. The numbers provided are the median in Toronto. 
c Maximum subsidy is for an infant, generally less than 2 years old, in a center. For some provinces, the maximum subsidy depends on
the provider's fee. These are marked "NA."
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province. A family is potentially eligible for the full subsidy as long as 
its income is below the turning point (the income level at which the 
family is no longer eligible for the full subsidy). 7 As a result, in British 
Columbia and Alberta, a two-parent family with two children can earn 
more than $17,000 per year and still be potentially eligible for the full 
subsidy. In contrast, Newfoundland and Labrador will pay the full sub 
sidy only to families with less than $8,250 in annual earnings. A fam 
ily is potentially eligible for some subsidy until its income reaches the 
break-even point. As a result, a family can potentially earn more than 
$30,000 per year in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Quebec before it 
loses eligibility for provincial subsidies. In contrast, a family in New 
foundland is ineligible for the subsidy if it earns $14,250 or more per 
year.
In the United States, individual states also subsidize child care. 
Each of the states subsidizes child-care expenses for welfare recipients 
and provides funds to match federal Title XX Social Services Block 
Grants. In addition, many of the states provide subsidies directly to 
parents through state income tax child-care credits. In 1989, 28 states 
had such credits (Robins 1991). Like the federal income tax credit, 
most states' credits are nonrefundable. Only two states, New Mexico 
and Minnesota, had refundable credits. As a result, poor families with 
working parents were eligible for meager subsidies, as is the case for 
the federal tax credit. The maximum credit also varies considerably, 
from a high of $1,440 in Minnesota and $1,200 in New Mexico to a 
low of $39 per year in Arizona.
In general, the provinces appear to provide more generous subsi 
dies per capita than do the states. In 1992, the provinces spent $353 
million for subsidies to providers of needy children, the federal gov 
ernment contributed another $225 million for this subsidy through the 
CAP program, and the provinces spent another $226 million in other 
subsidies for providers (Child Resource and Research Unit 1993). 
Among the larger provinces, Ontario spent more than $100 per child 
under 12, British Columbia about $74, and Quebec about $40. In con 
trast, in 1985, the states spent a comparatively small $1.5 billion on 
child-care services (in 1992 dollars), including federal contributions, 
and another $350 million on income tax credits for child care (Robins 
1991). California was the most generous state, spending nearly $80
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per child under 12. Other large states spent much less, ranging from 
$16 per child under 12 in Texas to $65 in New York. 8
Provincial and State Child-Care Regulations
While the federal governments provide funds for subsidizing child 
care, the states and provinces have individual regulations on both fam 
ily providers and center care. These regulations take a number of 
forms, including background checks on providers, training require 
ments, and minimum education requirements. In this section, we 
focus on three of the regulations that are most common: the maximum 
number of children that a family provider can care for before being 
subject to regulation, the child-to-staff ratios for family providers and 
centers, and the maximum number of children for which a regulated 
family provider or center can provide care.
Figures 2 through 6 summarize and compare the percentage of 
children subject to several types of regulations. For example, Figure 2 
shows the maximum number of children allowed in family day care. 
The lines in Figure 2 show the proportion of children under age 13 who 
live in states or provinces with a given regulation. About 25 percent of 
all Canadian children live in provinces which prohibit more than five 
children in family day care, while only about 5 percent of U.S. children 
live in states with such a stringent regulation.
According to all five figures, Canada appears to have more strin 
gent child-care regulations. 9 Consider Figure 2 again. Among the 
states that regulate family providers, only the District of Columbia, 
Florida, Oklahoma, Alaska, and Massachusetts limit family providers 
to six or fewer children. In contrast, provinces representing about 65 
percent of children (including Ontario and Quebec) have such stringent 
regulations. Most of the large states allow 12 or more children, includ 
ing California, New York, Texas, Illinois, Michigan, and North Caro 
lina.
All the provinces and most of the states limit the child-to-staff 
ratio. Figures 3 and 4 summarize the maximum number of children 
that the states and provinces allow in day-care centers for 18-month- 
old children and 4-year-old children, respectively. Again, Canada 
appears to have much more stringent regulations. Nearly half of all 
Canadian 18-month-old children live in provinces which allow no
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Figure 2 Maximum Number of Children Allowed in Family Day Care 
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Figure 3 Child-to-Staff Ratio for 18-Month-Old Children in Center Care 
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Figure 4 Child-to-Staff Ratio for 4-Year-Old Children in Center Care 
(Percentage of Children Covered)
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Figure 5 Maximum Group Size for 18-Month-Old Children 
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Figure 6 Maximum Group Size for 4-Year-Old Children 
in Center Care 
(Percentage of Children Covered)
O)bo ro
o
<u 
Q_
lUU/o
80%-
60%-
40%-
20%-
0% •
/
Canada /
_^<^"
x - — — — — ^
/-• x'
_ _ _x x United States
/ 
/
/
/
/
16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34
Group Size
more than three children per group. In contrast, among the United 
States, only Maryland has such a stringent regulation. While no Cana 
dian province allows, more than six 18-month-old children per staff 
member, nearly 40 percent of U.S. children live in states which allow 
more than six children. The pattern is the same for 4-year-old children 
(Figure 4). While more than 90 percent of Canadian children live in 
provinces which prohibit more than eight children per staff member, 
fewer than 5 percent of U.S. children live in such states.
Most states and provinces also limit group size in center care. Fig 
ures 5 and 6 summarize these regulations for 18-month-old children 
and 4-year-old children, respectively. Once again, Canadian regula 
tions appear more restrictive. Except for Prince Edward Island, New 
Brunswick, and Saskatchewan, which do not regulate group size, all 
provinces prohibit groups of 18-month-old children with more than 14 
children. In contrast, nearly half of U.S. children live in states with no 
group-size regulations or regulations that allow more than 14 children. 
For 4-year-old children (Figure 6), more than 50 percent of children—
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including those living in Ontario, Manitoba, and Alberta—live in prov 
inces that cap the group size at 16. In contrast, no state prohibits 
groups smaller than 19, and more than half of children live in states 
with no group-size regulation.
CHILD-CARE CHOICES AND PRICES— 
A DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
Data
This section describes the child-care choices made by U.S. and 
Canadian families and the child-care prices faced by those families. If 
Canadians are making different choices, then further investigation 
might be warranted to determine how those choices are affected by 
price, public policies, and other economic factors. However, even if 
choices are the same, differences in economic circumstances might be 
contributing to this similarity.
To examine these issues, we use data from two national surveys of 
families with children under age 13. For the United States, we use the 
National Child Care Survey of 1990 (USNCCS). The USNCCS con 
tains information on a nationally representative sample of U.S. families 
with children under age 13. Families were chosen from phone lists in 
100 counties and county groups, and interviews were conducted if the 
family had a child under the age of 13. To make the sample nationally 
representative of families with young children, the 100 counties were 
randomly selected, with a probability of selection proportional to the 
number of children under 5 in the county. Information was obtained on 
child-care choices and expenditures, as well as labor-market behavior, 
income, and demographics. 10
For Canada, we use the National Child Care Survey of 1988 
(CNCCS). The CNCCS was a supplement to the Canadian Labour 
Force Survey, a nationally drawn survey of labor-market activity. As 
with the USNCCS, the CNCCS uses a multistage stratified sampling 
technique to obtain information for families with children under the 
age of 13. Because the survey is a supplement to the Canadian Labour 
Force Survey, its sample is designed to be representative of the labor
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force, not families with young children. In addition, in order to obtain 
accurate information on sparsely populated areas, families from small 
provinces are oversampled. As with the USNCCS, information was 
collected on child-care choices and expenditures, labor-market behav 
ior, income, and demographic characteristics."
A drawback to the CNCCS is that it contains limited information 
on earnings and wages. Annual household income, as well as income 
for parents, is reported in ranges of $7,500, with a top range of $45,000 
and higher. Hourly wages are not reported, and calculation of hourly 
wages based on categorical income would result in sizable measure 
ment error. Because hourly wages are a key component in analyzing 
employment and child-care choices, and because annual earnings are 
important for determining eligibility for child-care tax subsidies, an 
auxiliary part of our econometric analysis uses a second Canadian 
sample from the Labour Market Activity Survey (LMAS). 12 The 
LMAS provides information on hourly wages and hours of work for a 
subsample of parents in the CNCCS. Powell (1997) linked the 
CNCCS and the LMAS.
Primary Child-Care Choices
In both child-care surveys, parents were asked for the primary, sec 
ondary, and tertiary choices of child care for each child. In this paper, 
we focus on the primary child-care choice. Table 2 presents the distri 
bution of primary child-care choices in the USNCCS and the full sam 
ple of the CNCCS for children less than 13 years of age. Although 
U.S. families who were surveyed were given different options than 
Canadian families, we place choices into seven groups: care by a par 
ent at home or at work, care by a relative in the child's home, care by a 
relative outside the child's home, care by someone other than a relative 
in the child's home, care by someone other than a relative outside the 
child's home, center-based care, and other. 13
As Table 2 indicates, child-care choices are remarkably similar in 
the two countries. 14 Canadian parents are slightly less likely to take 
care of the children themselves or to use center care; they are slightly 
more likely to use other types of care. Although the magnitude of the 
differences is generally small, the sample sizes are large enough so that 
all but one of the differences are statistically significant.
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Table 2 Distribution of Primary Child-Care Choices in Canada and the 
United States, Children 0-12 Years Old
United States (%) Canada (%) 
Type of care (7,578 children) (41,331 children) ^-statistic3
Center
Parents
Relative, in the
child's home
13.3
56.6
7.5
11.8
51.7
9.2
3.6*
7.9*
9.9*
Relative, outside the
child's home 7.5 7.8 0.9
Non-relative, inside
the child's home 3.1 5.8 11.7*
Non-relative, outside 
the child's home 7.2 105 9.9*
Self-care and other 4.7 3.2 5.8*
SOURCE: Statistics Canada's National Child Care Survey of 1988 and The Urban
Institute's National Child Care Survey of 1990. 
a Mest that the probability is the same between countries. The chi-squared statistic for
the test of the hypothesis that the distributions are the same: 261.3* 
* Difference between Canada and the United States is significant at the 5% level.
Although the primary choices are similar between the two coun 
tries, there are some important underlying differences. Tables 3 and 4 
show the choices of care by the age of the child and the mother's 
employment status. From previous research, we know that mothers 
who work full time are more likely to use center care, which tends to 
be a more stable source of care. Mothers who do not work are gener 
ally more likely to rely on their own care. We also expect child-care 
arrangements to differ with the age of the child. Infants are more likely 
to be cared for by their parents or by relatives or non-relatives in the 
child's home. Older children are much more likely to be cared for in 
centers.
According to Table 3, the most striking differences between Cana 
dian and U.S. children are in center care and care provided by the par-
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Table 3 Distribution of Primary Child-Care Choice by Child's Age in 
Canada and the United States (%)
Type of care <1 year old
Center
United States
Canada
f-statistic
Parents
United States
Canada
^-statistic
Relative, inside the child's home
United States
Canada
r-statistic
Relative, outside the child's home
United States
Canada
^-statistic
Non-relative, in the child's home
United States
Canada
^-statistic
Non-relative, outside the child's home
United States
Canada
f-statistic
X2 statistic for null hypothesis
of same distributions
7.4
2.2
4.9*
60.6
54.8
2.8*
8.0
9.6
1.4
8.1
14.2
5.1*
3.6
6.7
3.6*
10.0
12.5
1.8
113.9*
1-2 years 
old
14.6
9.2
3.7*
50.1
43.6
2.1*
6.6
8.1
1.4
10.3
12.6
1.7
3.8
8.9
5.6*
12.6
17.6
3.4*
61.7*
3-4 years 
old
31.9
31.8
0.0
41.1
32.2
1.4
4.3
6.6
5.8*
77
9.4
2.1*
2.4
6.8
4.2*
10.4
13.2
2.6*
42.8*
5 years 
old
21.6
48.6
14.6*
49.4
24.7
11.7*
6.7
5.5
2.5*
8.2
5.3
2.5*
3.8 •
4.7
1.0
8.6
11.2
2.1*
215.7*
SOURCE: Statistics Canada's National Child Care Survey of 1988 and The Urban
Institute's National Child Care Survey of 1990. 
*Difference between the U.S. and Canadian percentages is significant at the 5% level.
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Table 4 Distribution of Primary Child-Care Choices by Mother's 
Employment Status in Canada and the United States (%)
Type of care
Center
United States
Canada
/-statistic
Parents
United States
Canada
/-statistic
Relative, inside the child's home
United States
Canada
/-statistic
Relative, outside the child's home
United States
Canada
/-statistic
Non-relative, in the child's home
United States
Canada
/-statistic
Non-relative, outside the child's home
United States
Canada
/-statistic
X2 statistic for null hypothesis that 
distributions are the same
Mothers 
employed 
full time
30.7
20.1
8.4*
23.3
21.0
1.3
6.6
8.8
3.7*
12.1
11.9
0.5
3.2
9.4
9.5*
22.2
28.8
4.9*
218.8*
Mothers 
employed 
part time
19.5
18.4
0.6
46.3
35.5
6.9*
6.2
8.9
2.6*
10.3
10.3
0.9
3.6
8.6
9.0*
12.3
19.1
5.8*
199.4*
Mothers not 
employed
13.4
24.1
10.5*
69.2
48.3
15.1*
5.4
6.2
1.2
5.5
10.2
6.5*
2.7
5.4
5.2*
2.5
5.6
6.1*
294.7*
SOURCE: Statistics Canada's National Child Care Survey of 1988 and The Urban 
Institute's National Child Care Survey of 1990. Employment status was determined 
by hours worked by the mother during the survey reference week, with full time 
denned as 35 hours or more.
*Difference between the U.S. and Canadian percentages is significantly different at the 
5% level.
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ents. Canadian preschool children of all ages are less likely than 
corresponding U.S. children to receive parent care as their primary 
care. Similarly, Canadian children who are less than 3 years old are 
less likely to be cared for in centers than are their U.S. counterparts. 
However, Canadian 5-year-olds receive quite different care than U.S. 
5-year-olds. About twice as many 5-year-old children in Canada are in 
center care as in parent care, while the proportions are reversed in the 
United States. For infants, the difference in parental care is made up 
for in Canada by use of relatives outside the child's home and non-rela 
tives inside the child's home.
Table 4 compares the child-care choices for children who live with 
their mothers and the hours worked by the mother in the week prior to 
the interview. The differences are even more striking in this table. 
While Table 2 indicates that Canadian families overall are slightly less 
likely to use center care, Canadian mothers who work full time (30 
hours or more per week) are much less likely to use center care than 
U.S. mothers. Only about 20 percent of Canadian mothers who work 
full time use center care, but more than 30 percent of U.S. mothers who 
work full time use center care. Equally striking is that Canadian moth 
ers who did not work are the most likely to use center care, and they 
are almost twice as likely as nonworking U.S. mothers to use center 
care. While Canadians overall use less parental care, this masks under 
lying differences across employment status. Both Canadian and U.S. 
mothers who work full time use parental care about 22 to 23 percent of 
the time. 15 In contrast, U.S. mothers who are not employed are much 
more likely to rely on their own care (69.2 vs. 48.3 percent).
Differences in use of center care partly reflect a difference in the 
surveys. In the USNCCS, school was not considered a source of care 
while, in the CNCCS, kindergarten was considered a source of care 
and grouped with center care. Therefore, 5-year-old Canadian children 
in kindergarten are considered to be in center care while 5-year-old 
U.S. children in kindergarten are assigned their secondary source of 
care. Likewise, Canadian children who are in kindergarten and who 
have unemployed mothers are considered to be in center care, while 
U.S. children who are in kindergarten and who have unemployed U.S. 
mothers are probably listed as being cared for by their parents.
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Price of Child Care
Differences in regulations should affect the price of care in the two 
countries. In addition, the very generous provincial subsidies to pro 
viders of children in needy families should decrease the price of care 
paid by parents in Canada. While the subsidies are paid only to 
licensed providers, they might also lower prices for relative care and 
unregulated day-care services because parents might be unwilling to 
pay much for unlicensed care if licensed care is available and inexpen 
sive.
Table 5 presents the results of tobit regressions of the price per 
hour of care paid for nonparental care for the youngest child under 6 in 
two-parent families. 16 The sample includes all families indicating that 
a particular type of care was used as the primary care. However, the 
sample is limited to the youngest child in each family since the most 
accurate information is collected for these children. 17
According to these results, U.S. families paying for care paid 95 
cents more per hour for center care, 72 cents more per hour for relative 
care, and 38 cents more per hour for non-relative care. 18 Because we 
use a tobit regression, these differences are most easily interpreted as 
the difference in hourly payments among parents who pay for care. In 
contrast, a simple comparison of mean hourly payments among parents 
paying for care (not reported) indicates that the United States pays 75 
cents more per hour for center care, 63 cents more for relative care, and 
6 cents less for non-relative care.
According to the estimated coefficients, more stringent regulations 
substantially affect the price of relative and non-relative care. Increas 
ing the maximum children in regulated family care lowers the price of 
relative and non-relative care by 20 and 6 cents per hour. In addition, 
relative and non-relative care in states in which this maximum is not 
specified are substantially cheaper. For center care, the child-to-staff 
ratio has little effect, while allowing the group size to increase by one 
child leads to a 1.8 cent increase in the hourly price.
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Table 5 Determinants of the Hourly Price of Child Care in Canada and 
the United States, Youngest Child Under 6 in Two-Parent 
Families (tobit estimates, standard errors in parentheses)
Variable
Intercept
U.S. family
Child-care regulations
Maximum children in regulated 
family care
Maximum children in regulated 
family care not specified
Maximum child-to-staff ratio
Maximum group size in center care
Maximum group size not regulated
Other variables
Age of child is under 1 year
Age of child is 1-2 years
Number of children under age 6 years
Number of children age 6-18 years
Lives in metropolitan area
Standard error of distribution
Number of observations
Average price of care (families 
paying for care) ($)
Percentage of families paying for care
Log of likelihood function
Relative care
0.3943 
(0.6234)
0.7239 
(0.4418)
-0.2067* 
(0.0457)
-2.4423* 
(0.7025)
-
_
_
-1.4989* 
(0.3552)
-0.4631 
(0.2775)
-0.7705* 
(0.2394)
-1.0957* 
(0.1419)
-0.1755 
(0.2490)
4.5356*
(0.1375)
3,163
1.74
24.3
-2,681
Non-relative 
care
1.6427* 
(0.1193)
0.3848* 
(0.0802)
-0.0601* 
(0.0088)
-0.4168* 
(0.1519)
-
_
_
0.1697* 
(0.0687)
0.2044* 
(0.0553)
-0.3034* 
(0.0478)
-0.1300* 
(0.0315)
0.3883* 
(0.0515)
1.3246*
(0.0188)
3,511
1.56
82.7
-5,100
Center care
0.1354 
(0.2660)
0.9451* 
(0.1662)
_
_
0.0090
(0.0127)
0.0179* 
(0.0039)
0.2020 
(0.5049)
0.1484 
(0.1858)
0.4068* 
(0.1269)
-0.5055* 
(0.0995)
-0.0320 
(0.0530)
0.1530 
(0.0851)
1.9690*
(0.0342)
2,744
1.72
71.7
-4,485
* Significantly different from 0 at the 5% confidence level.
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THE EFFECTS OF TAX CREDITS AND PRICES ON 
EMPLOYMENT AND CHILD-CARE CHOICES
As discussed previously, child-care tax subsidies are different in 
the two countries, regulations are set by provinces and states, and prov 
inces provide generous subsidies for children in needy families. These 
differences in policy have some testable implications. Greater subsi 
dies for child care should encourage mothers of young children to 
work by expanding their choices of affordable child care. 19 Likewise, 
those subsidies should increase the likelihood of using nonparental 
care, which is often paid for. Stringent regulations should have the 
opposite effect. If licensed providers must comply with stringent regu 
lations, they will be forced to charge more for their services. Increased 
prices for market child care would presumably lower the likelihood 
that a mother with young children would work and that she would 
choose market forms of care. This section attempts to test some of 
these hypotheses more directly.
A Model of Employment and Child-Care Choices
A common approach to estimating child-care choices is to use a 
multinomial logit model (see Duncan and Hill [1975] and Hofferth and 
Wissoker [1992], for example). We use a similar approach. Specifi 
cally, we assume that a mother chooses how much to work and which 
child-care type to use to maximize her utility. 20 According to this 
notion, the mother's decisions will be influenced by prices of various 
child-care opportunities, her potential earnings and other income, her 
preferences, and her ability to produce child care in the home. Assume 
that the utility of the Mi individual, if she chooses employment state j 
and child-care mode k, is given by
Vtjk = StJk <* + PA P, + w, Sw + N, §2jk + X&jk + ey*
where
plk is the price per hour of child care mode k for mother /,
wt is the mother's hourly wage rate,
N, is her nonlabor income, which we limit to spouse's income, 21
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Sljk is the potential child-care tax credit she would receive if she
works at level j and chooses mode k 22 
X, are other characteristics of the mother, and 
£ljk is random component that is i.i.d. across mothers, modes of 
care, and employment choices.
In this model, the explanatory variables can be classified into three 
types. Tax-based child-care subsidies, which depend on both income 
and the amount spent on care, vary by work state and child-care mode. 
To identify the effects of subsidies, we force the effect of subsidies to 
be the same across employment states and child-care modes. In other 
words, an extra dollar of subsidy has the same effect on utility whether 
the parent is considering using center care or relative care and whether 
the parent is considering working full time or part time. It is the 
amount of the potential subsidy that varies across these choices. The 
price of child care is assumed to vary only by child-care mode, so its 
effect is assumed to be constant within an employment state. That is, if 
the cost of all forms of care increased by $1 per hour, it would not 
affect the relative probabilities of choosing a particular type of care, 
but it would affect the choice of how much the mother works because 
working would entail higher expenses. No other variables differ by 
child-care mode or employment state. These variables include eco 
nomic factors, such as the hourly wage rate and other sources of 
income, as well as demographic factors, such as the ages of the chil 
dren. The contribution of these factors is assumed to vary from choice 
to choice. For example, the effects on utility of having a 1-year-old 
child will be different if the parent stays home and cares for the child 
than if the parent works full time and puts the child in a center.
The mother chooses employment state j and child-care mode k if 
Vljk>Vllm for all / and m. If the eyjk have an extreme value distribution, 
the probability of working is given by the logistic distribution function. 
To implement this model, we let j take on three values: 0 if the mother 
did not work in the week prior to being interviewed, 1 if she worked 
part time (fewer than 35 hours) in the week prior to being interviewed, 
and 2 if she worked full time (35 or more hours in the week prior to 
being interviewed). 23 We let k take on four values: 0 for parent care, 1 
for relative care, 2 for non-relative care, and 3 for center care. 24
To identify the effects of prices, wages, and tax credits in this 
model, we also assume:
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Ptjk = bok + bi^ + b2kRegu + ul}k 
w, = c0 + c lXl + c^Age, + c ^ Education l + v,
where
pljk is the price paid by family i, living in state/province j, choos 
ing child care mode k,
ReglJ are child care regulations in i's state/province, and 
Age and Education are used to represent the human capital of 
mother i.
Under this specification, we identify the effects of prices by allow 
ing local regulations to affect prices but not to directly affect employ 
ment or child-care choices. We identify the effects of wages by 
allowing age and education of the mother to affect only wages but not 
employment or child-care choices directly. 25
A number of calculations are necessary in order to estimate these 
relationships. The price a family pays for child care is endogenous: the 
family may choose to pay a high price in order to receive high quality 
care. In addition, we do not know what a family would have had to pay 
for types of care that it did not use. Therefore, we use the results of 
Table 5 to predict the price of three types of child care: relative care, 
non-relative care, and center care. First, we use the regression results 
to predict an hourly price for each type of care. For all predictions, we 
simulate the full distribution of prices by adding a random component 
to each predicted price, drawn from a normal distribution. The addi 
tion of these random components was originally suggested by Manski 
and Lerman (1977) as a possible means of avoiding the inconsistency 
of parameter estimates that results from using predicted values in a 
nonlinear regression. Because we use tobit analysis, there is a natural 
method of predicting whether a family would pay for care: if the pre 
dicted price for a family is negative, we assume the family would 
receive free care of that type.
We also predict wages for all women. 26 We do this for several rea 
sons. As for child-care prices, potential wage rates are not known for 
mothers who do not work. In addition, we calculate wage rates in Can 
ada from earnings and hours worked. Since this calculation introduces
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measurement error, an instrumental variable approach is indicated. 
Finally, wage rates might be endogenous to employment decisions. 
Women who choose to work full time are likely to receive higher 
wages than those who work part time simply because employers will 
offer higher wages to anyone who is willing to work full time. Women 
who are receiving higher wages are likely to be those who are more 
committed to the labor market, who have accumulated human capital 
over time, and therefore are more likely to continue working regardless 
of the wage they could receive.
The third calculation is of the potential tax-based subsidy for 
which a family would be eligible. 27 As with prices and wages, this 
measure is endogenous because it depends on child-care expenditures 
and either total family income (in the United States) or earnings of one 
of the parents (in Canada). Also, as with some prices and wages, the 
tax-based subsidy for an individual is unobserved. To calculate the 
tax-based subsidy, we assume that a mother will work either 0, 20, or 
40 hours per week, depending on whether she does not work, works 
part time, or works full time; we assume that she works each week of 
the year; and we assume that she uses a particular child-care type for 
all children under 6 for each hour that she works. 28
This model focuses on the decisions of the mother, taking the deci 
sions of other family members as given. In particular, only the earn 
ings of the father are considered, and it is assumed to be exogenous. 
This implies that the utility of other household members does not enter 
directly into the decision-making process, an assumption that is valid if 
family labor supply decisions are made sequentially, with the family 
first determining the work status of the father, and then determining 
hours supplied by the mother. In theory, the labor supply of a husband 
and wife are likely to be made simultaneously. Mroz (1988), however, 
provides some evidence that other income—primarily from the hus 
band—is exogenous to the wife's labor supply.
Differences in Choices and Explanatory Variables by Country
Before turning to the econometric results, we present the distribu 
tion of child-care and employment choices as well as the means of 
explanatory factors used in the econometric analysis in Table 6. The 
sample used in Table 6, as well as the econometric analysis, consists of
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Table 6 Sample Means of Variables Used in Econometric Analysis of 
Child-Care and Employment Choices, Married U.S. and 
Canadian Mothers of Children Under 6 Years Old
Variable
Distribution of employment and child-care choices
Percentage employed full time
Using center care
Using relative care
Using non-relative care
Using parent care
Percentage employed part time
Using center care
Using relative care
Using non-relative care
Using parent care
Percentage not employed
Using center care
Using relative care
Using non-relative care
Using parent care
Predicted hourly price of care ($)
Center care
Relative
Non-relative
Predicted annual subsidy ($)
Full-time worker using center care
Full-time worker using non-relative
Full-time worker using relative
Part-time worker using center care
Part-time worker using non-relative
Part-time worker using relative
U.S. families
33.8
10.8
6.5
8.5
8.0
19.1
3.6
3.5
2.8
92
47.1
5.5
5.2
2.8
33.6
1.74
0.82
1.70
424
141
479
312
144
327
Canadian 
families
26.9
4.8
5.9
10.2
6.0
22.9
3.8
4.2
6.7
8.2
50.1
8.6
8.5
5.3
21.1
1.02
0.89
1.76
260
147
482
105
67
194
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Variable
U.S. family (%)
Child is less than 1 year old (%)
Child is 1-2 years old (%)
Number of children under age 6
Number of children age 6-12
Husband's earnings (%)
$15,001-22,500
$22,501-30,000
$30,001-37,500
$37,501-45,000
$45,001 and higher
Black (U.S.A. only, %)
Hispanic (U.S.A. only, %)
Lives in urban area (%)
Immigrant (Canada only, %)
Predicted wage ($)
U.S. families
100.0
24.6
37.4
1.40
0.56
15.7
18.0
17.1
9.7
20.9
9.0
10.3
41.1
0.0
10.37
Canadian 
families
0.0
23.6
39.4
1.40
0.52
18.3
29.2
24.0
11.5
8.3
0.0
0.0
79.5
21.6
9.76
two-parent families in which the youngest child is under age 6. Child- 
care choices are shown for the youngest child in these families, so that 
each family enters the calculation only once. Knowing the differences 
between countries will be useful in assessing the impact of various fac 
tors on differences in employment and child-care choices in the two 
countries.
The first part of Table 6 shows the percentage of mothers making 
each of the 12 possible choices. This table differs from Table 4 in two 
ways. First, the sample is different, consisting of choices for youngest 
children under 6, whereas Table 4 shows results for all children under 
6. Second, the first part of Table 6 shows the overall distribution of 
choices, whereas Table 4 showed child-care choices given the mother's 
employment status. According to the first part of Table 6, U.S. mothers 
are more likely than Canadian mothers to work full time but less likely 
to work part time or to not work. Most of the difference in full-time
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employment is reflected in the greater use of center care by full-time 
working U.S. mothers (10.8 vs. 4.8 percent). Although fewer Canadian 
mothers work full time, more work full time and use non-relative care 
(10.2 vs. 8.5 percent). Likewise, while fewer U.S. mothers do not 
work or work part time, more U.S. mothers both do not work and use 
parent care (33.6 vs 27.7 percent) and work part time and use parent 
care (9.2 vs. 8.2 percent), indicating that Canadian mothers working 
less than full time are more likely to use other sources of care.
Table 6 next shows the mean predicted hourly price of care, by 
type of care. The means in Table 6 include both families that are pre 
dicted to pay nothing for care and those predicted to pay something. 
According to Table 6, center care and non-relative care for the entire 
sample are equally expensive, at about $1.70 per hour. Since relative 
care is so often free, the cost of using relative care is about $1.00 less 
per hour. While the means for center and non-relative care are similar 
in the United States, Canadians are predicted to pay just over $1.00 for 
center care—only about $0.10 more than for relative care—but still 
pay $1.76 for non-relative care. Canadians are predicted to pay less, 
on average, for center care because fewer Canadians are predicted to 
pay anything for center care (49 vs. 69 percent, numbers not shown).
Table 6 then shows the mean of predicted tax-based subsidies for 
six possible combinations of work (full-time and part-time) and child 
care (center, non-relative, and relative). 29 Differences in subsidies 
across countries reflect not only differences in prices but differences in 
the tax structures of the two countries. First, full-time working Cana 
dian mothers are predicted to receive lower subsidies if they use center 
care because the price of center care is predicted to be lower in Canada. 
However, full-time working Canadian mothers who use either relative 
care or non-relative care are predicted to receive about the same tax- 
based subsidies as U.S. families. In contrast, Canadian mothers who 
work part time are predicted to receive lower average subsidies regard 
less of the type of care they use. This stems from the primary differ 
ence in the tax code between the two countries: U.S. couples can file 
jointly so that the wife's earnings in a two-earner family might be con 
sidered fully taxable, whereas Canadian couples file individually, so 
that a part-time working mother in Canada pays little tax (and hence 
receives a lower child-care tax subsidy) after the nonrefundable per 
sonal credit is deducted from her income.
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The remainder of Table 6 presents differences in other explanatory 
factors. Several features are worth noting. The age distribution of chil 
dren and the number of children is similar between countries. Roughly 
one-quarter of the sample have children less than 1 year old and 
roughly two-fifths have children between the ages of 1 and 2. Earn 
ings of Canadian men are more equally distributed than earnings of 
U.S. men. Among U.S. husbands, 18.6 percent earned less than 
$15,000 per year, while 20.9 percent earned more than $45,000 per 
year. In contrast, only 8.7 percent of Canadian husbands earned less 
than $15,000 per year, and only 8.3 percent of Canadian husbands 
earned more than $45,000 per year. This finding of greater inequality 
in the United States corresponds with that of Blackburn and Bloom 
(1993), who found that the variance of male annual earnings in the 
United States in the late 1980s was about 10 percent higher than it was 
in Canada (0.32 vs. 0.29). Finally, predicted wages are similar, with 
U.S. women earning about 60 cents more per hour than Canadian 
women. 30
Determinants of Whether a Mother Works
Table 7 presents estimates of the effects of prices, income-tax 
based subsidies, and demographic characteristics on the probability 
that a mother in the sample worked full time, worked part time, and did 
not work in the week prior to being interviewed. 31 The numbers in 
Table 7 are the product of the derivative of the probability of working 
times the mean difference in characteristics between women in the two 
countries. The numbers give a sense of the expected impact of differ 
ences in the average characteristics of the two samples and policies in 
the two countries. Some characteristics might be important in explain 
ing different choices by different families (i.e., have an estimated coef 
ficient that is significantly different from zero) but still not be 
important in explaining different average choices by country if families 
in the two countries are similar with regard to these characteristics. On 
the other hand, some characteristics might be quite different between 
countries, but not important in explaining a family's choices, and again 
not contribute to explaining the differences across countries. Only if a 
characteristic meets both criteria—significantly explains an individual
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Table 7 Estimated Impact of Economic and Demographic Differences on 
the Distribution of Primary Child-Care Choice between Canada 
and the United States, Married Mothers of Children Under 6 
Years Olda
Variable
Probability Probability Probability
of working of working of not
full time part time working
Percentage point difference in 
probability between U.S. and 
Canadian families
Estimated impact of 
U.S. family (%)b 
Annual subsidy (000's of dollars) 
Full-time worker using center care
Full-time worker using 
non-relative
Full-time worker using relative 
Part-time worker using center care
Part-time worker using 
non-relative
Part-time worker using relative 
Hourly price of care
Center care
Nonrelative
Relative
Child is less than 1 year old 
Child is 1-2 years old 
Number of children under age 6 
Husband's income
$15,001-22,500
$22,501-30,000
$30,001-37,500
$37,501^0,000
$40,001 and higher 
Black (U.S.A. only, %)
6.91
9.06
0.11
-3.87
-2.21
-0.03
-3.04
-6.85
-0.07
-0.01
-0.01
0.15
-0.002
-0.06
-0.03
0.01
0.01
-0.09
0.04
0.00
-0.13
0.76
0.35
0.14
-1.72
1.23
0.00
0.00
-0.05
0.06
0.19
-0.01
0.00
0.00
-0.06
0.00
0.00
-0.15
0.13
0.18
0.07
-1.17
-1.31
0.01
0.00
-0.10
-0.04
-0.13
0.05
-0.01
-0.01
0.15
-0.04
0.00
0.28
-0.89
-0.53
-0.07
2.89
0.07
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Variable
Hispanic (U.S.A. only, %)
Lives in urban area (%)
Immigrant (Canada only, %)
Predicted wage ($)
Probability 
of working 
full time
-0.49
-0.68
-0.13
0.12
Probability 
of working 
part time
-0.29
0.86
0.25-
0.09
Probability 
of not 
working
0.78
-0.18
0.11
-0.20
a Except for the first two rows, the data represent the product of the derivative of the 
probability of working times the mean difference in characteristics between women 
in the two countries. See text for a complete explanation and examples.
b Estimated average difference in behavior between countries from the regression (i.e., 
after controlling for prices, wages, etc.). See text for complete explanation.
family's choices and is substantially different between the two coun 
tries—will it help explain different employment choices.
The interpretation of the results in Table 7 can be made clearer 
using an example. The first row of Table 7 shows the raw differences 
in behavior (as implied by Table 6). Thus, it indicates that the propor 
tion of U.S. mothers working full time is nearly 7 percentage points 
higher than it is for Canadian mothers, the proportion working part 
time is nearly 4 percentage points lower in the United States than in 
Canada, and the proportion of women not working in the United States 
is about 3 percentage points lower than it is in Canada. The second 
row of Table 7 shows the estimated average difference in behavior 
between countries from the regression (i.e., after controlling for prices, 
wages, and so on). As a result, the difference between the first row and 
the second row indicates how much these economic and demographic 
factors can explain different average choices in the two countries. The 
estimates imply that U.S. mothers are 9 percentage points more likely 
than Canadian mothers to work full time, nearly 7 percentage points 
less likely to not work, and only about 2 percentage points less likely to 
work part time. Thus, our model implies that if conditions and charac 
teristics were the same in the two countries, the gap in full-time 
employment and not working would be even bigger than it is now.
Subsidies and prices do not help explain different employment 
probabilities, despite the fact that U.S. families using center care pay 
substantially more than Canadian families and the fact that the tax-
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based subsidy is more generous for part-time working mothers. Since 
subsidies are most different for families who use center care (because 
prices of center care are most different between the two countries), 
they have their largest effect on families who use center care. How 
ever, even this effect is small. The greater subsidy available to women 
employed full time and using center care would affect the difference in 
the proportion working full time by only 0.11 percentage points and 
the percentage not working by 0.07 percentage points. The greater sub 
sidy available to women employed part time and using center care 
would affect the difference in the proportion working full time by 0.15 
percentage points and the proportion not working by 0.10 percentage 
points. Likewise, differences in prices have virtually no effect, at most 
changing the gap in the proportion not working by only 0.05 percent 
age points.
Of the economic and demographic characteristics, only two have a 
substantial impact on employment choices: having a spouse with earn 
ings over $40,000 and being a black U.S. resident. U.S. women are 
more likely to be married to men earning more than $40,000 per year. 
If Canadian women were just as likely as American women to be mar 
ried to such men, the proportion of women working full time would 
decrease by 1.72 percentage points, the proportion working part time 
would decrease by 1.17 percentage points, and the proportion not 
working would increase by 2.89 percentage points. The other charac 
teristic that has a substantial relationship to employment is race. If the 
U.S. population were completely non-black, then about 1.2 to 1.3 per 
cent would shift from full-time work to part-time work.
Determinants of Child-Care Choice
Tables 8 through 10 are analogous to Table 7, but they show which 
factors affect the primary child care used for the youngest child in two- 
parent families with children under 6 years old for the various classes 
of workers. The three tables show the predicted effects of various fac 
tors on child-care choices of families with mothers who are employed 
full time (Table 8), employed part time (Table 9), and not employed 
(Table 10). In each table, child-care choices are placed into four cate 
gories: care by the parent, care by another relative, non-relative care, 
and center care. 32
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6.01
7.77
0.64
-0.57
-1.74
0.11
2.03
1.75
Table 8 Estimated Impact of Economic and Demographic Differences on 
the Distribution of Primary Child-Care Choices between Canada 
and the United States, Families with Mothers Working Full Time 
and Children under 6a
Probability 
Probability Probability of using Probability
of using of using non-relative of using 
Variable center care relative care care parent care
Percentage point difference in 
probability between U.S. and 
Canadian families
Estimated impact of 
U.S. family (%)b
Annual subsidy (000's of 
dollars)
Full-time worker using 
center care
Full-time worker using 
non-reltive
Full-time worker using 
relative
Part-time worker using 
center care
Part-time worker using 
non-relative
Part-time worker using 
relative
Hourly price of care
Center care
Non-relative
Relative
Child is less than 1 year old 
Child is 1-2 years old
Number of children under 
age 6
Number of children age 6-12
0.14
0.00
0.00
-001
0.00
-0.01
-0.05
0.00
0.00
-0.03
0.05
0.00
-0.12
-0.01
-0.01
0.00
-0.01
-0.01
-0.02
0.01
0.01
0.00
-0.02
0.00
0.00
-0.17
-0.01
0.00
-0.01
-0.02
-0.01
-0.02
0.01
0.00
0.01
-0.02
-0.03
000
-0.21
-0.01
0.00
0.00
0.19
-0.01
-0.02
0.01
0.00
0.00
-0.02
0.01
0.00
0.07
(continued)
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Table 8 (continued)
Variable
Husband's earnings
$15,001-22,500
$22,501-30,000
$30,001-37,500
$37,501-45,000
$45,001 and higher
Black (U.S.A. only, %)
Hispanic (U.S.A. only, %)
Lives in urban area (%)
Immigrant (Canada only, %)
Predicted wage
Probability 
of using 
center care
-0.01
0.03
0.02
0.01
-0.03
0.36
-0.18
-0.35
0.07
0.03
Probability 
of using 
relative care
-0.07
0.07
0.14
0.05
-0.59
1.07
0.44
-0.27
-0.37
-0.05
Probability 
of using 
non-relative 
care
-0.04
0.23
-0.11
0.02
-0.54
-0.38
-0.60
0.34
0.16
0.09
Probability 
of using 
parent care
-0.01
0.44
0.30
0.06
-0.57
0.18
-0.15
0.40
0.01
0.04
a See Table 7 notes and the text for explanation of values.
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-022
0.84
-0.73
-2.70 -3.45
1.03
3.09
Table 9 Estimated Impact of Economic and Demographic Differences on 
the Distribution of Primary Child-Care Choice between Canada 
and the United States, Families with Mothers Working Part Time 
and Children under 6a
Probability 
Probability Probability of using Probability
of using of using non-relative of using 
Variable center care relative care care parent care
Percentage point difference in 
probability between U.S. and 
Canadian families
Estimated impact of 
U.S. family
Annual subsidy (000's of 
dollars)
Full-time using center care
Full-time using non-relative
Full-time using relative
Part-time using center care
Part-time using non-relative
Part-time using relative 
Hourly price of care
Center care
Non-relative
Relative
Child is less than 1 year old 
Child is 1-2 years old
Number of children under 
age 6
Number of children age 6-12 
Husband's earnings
$15,001-22,500
$22,501-30,000
$30,001-37,500
$37,501-40,000
$40,001 and higher
-0.01
0.00
0.00
-0.01
0.07
-0.01
-0.03
0.00
0.00
-0.03
0.04
0.00
-0.02
-0.01
0.02
-0.03
-0.02
-0.09
-0.01
0.00
0.00
-0.01
-0.01
0.24
0.00
0.00
0.00
-0.01
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.03
0.09
0.17
0.02
-0.57
-0.01
0.00
0.00
-0.01
-0.01
-0.02
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
-0.04
0.00
0.00
-0.06
-0.01
0.00
-0.05
-0.34
-0.01
0.00
0.00
-0.02
-0.01
-0.02
0.01
0.00
0.00
-0.01
-0.01
0.00
0.01
-0.10
0.02
0.05
-0.02
-0.17
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Table 9 (continued)
Variable
Black (U.S.A. only, %)
Hispanic (U.S.A. only, %)
Lives in urban area (%)
Immigrant (Canada only, %)
Predicted wage
Probability 
of using 
center care
-0.20
-0.11
-0.40
0.18
0.04
Probability 
of using 
relative care
-0.20 .
0.36
1.57
-0.34
-0.05
Probability 
of using 
non-relative 
care
-0.45
-0.30
0.30
0.23
0.02
Probability 
of using 
parent care
-0.45
-0.26
-0.62
0.18
0.08
' See Table 7 notes and the text for explanation and examples.
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-3.08
-443
-3.32
-6.99
-2.48
-43.9
5.92
8.97
Table 10 Estimated Impact of Economic and Demographic Differences 
on the Distribution of Primary Child-Care Choice Between 
Canada and the United States Families with Mothers Not 
Working and Children Under 6a
Probability 
Probability Probability of using Probability
of using of using non-relative of using 
Variable center care relative care care parent care
Percentage point difference in 
probability between U.S. and 
Canadian families
Estimated impact of 
U.S. family
Annual subsidy (000's of 
dollars)
Full-time using center care
Full-time using non-relative
Full-time using relative
Part-time using center care
Part-time using non-relative
Part-time using relative 
Hourly price of care
Center care
Non-relative
Relative
Child is less than 1 year old 
Child is 1-2 years old
Number of children under 
age 6
Number of children age 6-12 
Husband's earnings
$15,001-22,500
$22,501-30,000
$30,001-37,500
$37,501-40,000
$40,001 and higher
-0.02
0.00
0.00
-0.03
-0.01
-0.02
0.02
0.00
0.00
-0.14
025
0.00
-0.07
0.06
-0.02
-0.18
-0.12
1.14
-0.01
0.00
0.00
-0.02
-0.01
-0.03
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.11
-0.10
0.00
0.10
0.05
-0.13
-0.26
0.01
0.54
-0.01
0.00
0.00
-0.01
0.00
-0.02
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.04
-0.11
0.00
0.06
0.13
-0.25
-0.02
0.02
1.11
-0.03
0.00
0.00
-0.05
-0.02
-0.07
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.14
-0.08
0.00
0.34
005
-0.49
-0.07
0.01
0.10
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Table 10 (continued)
Probability 
Probability Probability of using Probability
of using of using non-relative of using 
Variable center care relative care care parent care
Black (U.S.A. only, %)
Hispanic (U.S.A. only, %)
Lives in urban area (%)
Immigrant (Canada only, %)
Predicted wage
0.10
0.01
-1.04
-0.06
0.03
0.40
1.56
1.72
0.21
-0.11
-0.07
-0.42
0.19
-0.01
0.01
-0.67
-0.36
-1.05
-0.25
-0.14
a See Table 7 notes and the text for explanation and examples.
The results in Tables 8 and 9 imply that economic and demo 
graphic differences explain little of the differences between Canadian 
and U.S. child-care choices. For example, U.S. mothers are about 6 
percentage points more likely than Canadian mothers to work full time 
and use center care. Economic and demographic differences alter this 
gap by about 1.76 percentage points; if economic and demographic 
characteristics were the same in the two countries, U.S. mothers would 
be 7.77 percentage points more likely to work full time and use center 
care. Among women working full time, only one factor explains even 
a 1-percentage-point difference in choices: if all U.S. women were 
non-black, then 1.07 percentage points fewer would work full time and 
use relative care. Likewise, among women working part time, only 
one factor explains even a 1-percentage-point difference in choices: the 
greater concentration of Canadians in urban areas lowers the difference 
in use of relative care by 1.57 percentage points and lowers the differ 
ence in use of parent care by 0.62 percentage points
The model does a better job at explaining differences in choices of 
care among women not working (Table 10). In particular, use of rela 
tive care and parent care by mothers who do not work is quite different 
after adjusting for demographics, prices, wages, and subsidies. The 
most important demographic and economic characteristics appear to be 
spouse's earnings, race, and urban status. If as many Canadian hus 
bands had earnings of more than $40,000, the difference in use of cen 
ter care and non-relative care would be about 1 percentage point
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greater. If no U.S. mother were black, the difference in use of relative 
care and parent care would change by about two-thirds of a percentage 
point. Likewise, if no U.S. mothers were Hispanic, the percentage 
using relative care would change by about 1.5 percentage points, while 
the percentage using non-relative care or parent care would change by 
about two-fifths of a percentage point. If Canadians and U.S. popula 
tions were equally urbanized, the difference in use of center care would 
change by about 1 percentage point, while the use of relative care 
would change by nearly 2 percentage points.
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has used national child-care survey data in Canada 
and the United States to compare employment and child-care choices 
in the two countries. Government programs are similar in the two 
countries. Both countries have nonrefundable subsidies for child care 
that operate through the federal income tax system. In both countries, 
states and provinces impose regulations on child-care providers with 
respect to child-to-staff ratios, maximum center size, and screening 
procedures.
Overall, the employment and child-care choices of Canadian fami 
lies are quite similar to those of U.S. families. In both countries, about 
40 percent of mothers do not work and nearly 20 percent of mothers 
work part time. In both countries, more than 50 percent of parents pro 
vide primary care for their children, about 10 percent use center care, 
and about 15 percent use family care. However, Canadian families pay 
substantially less for center care than U.S. families. In addition, the 
subsidy through the federal tax system in Canada is somewhat more 
generous to full-time workers than the federal tax credit in the United 
States. We are unable to find strong evidence that subsidies and prices 
are important determinants of employment and child-care choices in 
the two countries. The factors that seem to be the most important 
causes of differences in employment and child-care choices are the 
husband's earnings (particularly in families where the husband earns 
more than $40,000 per year), race/ethnicity, and geographic location.
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However, the bulk of the differences between the two countries are not 
explained by the variables included in our empirical model.
Notes
We are grateful to a number of people who have assisted us in our effort: Sandra Hof- 
ferth and Shen Azer provided information on child-care regulations in the United 
States; Susanna Gurr provided information on Canadian regulations and subsidies; 
Paul Fronstin provided an extract of the Urban Institute's National Child Care Survey 
and information on the federal and state income tax credits in the United States; 
Michael Sivyer of Statistics Canada provided us with the Canadian National Child 
Care Survey of 1988; and Lisa Powell linked the CNCCS with the LMAS. We also 
wish to acknowledge extensive and helpful comments on an earlier version of this 
paper by Charles Beach, Gordon Cleveland, and Jean Kimmel.
1 To infer the effects of subsidies on quality, Michalopoulos, Robins, and Garfmkel 
assume that the hourly price of child care is directly proportional to quality. This 
is true only if child-care markets are perfectly competitive, if there are no differ 
ences in costs from place to place, if parents have full information about the care 
their children receive, and if quality is best measured by the parents' preferences 
regarding alternative sources of care. In contrast, a child-development expert 
might argue that quality can be measured only by looking at inputs which are 
known to enhance the child's development. For an excellent overview of quality 
and child care, see Blau (1991).
2. Because of its highly developmental nature, Head Start is not always placed in the 
category of child-care programs.
3. Robins (1991) estimates that the U.S federal government spent about $550 mil 
lion on the Title XX Social Serices Block Grant in 1985. The Consumer Price 
Index increased 34.5 percent between 1985 and 1992. If expenditures have just 
kept pace with inflation, Title XX grants would have totaled about $740 million in 
1992.
4. These subsidies are the result of an income tax deduction, since child-care expen 
ditures are deducted from taxable income.
5. For 1993, this was changed to a maximum deduction of $3,750 for each child 
under the age of 7 and for each handicapped child under the age of 15, and up to 
$2,250 for each child between the ages of 7 and 14.
6. The Canadian federal tax code does not allow joint returns. In a two-parent fam 
ily, the parent with the lower income claims the child-care deduction. For the 
analysis of this paper, we assume the mother is always the parent claiming the 
deduction.
7. Not all families who are income eligible receive the subsidy described in Table 1. 
First, the subsidy is not an entitlement; each province has a limited amount of 
money allocated to subsidies Second, as the table implies, each province has a 
maximum expenditure level that will be subsidized. Finally, each province has
Child Care and Labor Supply 73
social criteria for eligibility, such as requiring employment or training. As a 
result, there is evidence that 80 percent of child-care subsidies goes to single-par 
ent families.
8. The source for these numbers is Robins (1991), who reports state expenditures per 
child under 18. since there are approximately two children under 12 for every 
three children under 18, we multiplied the per-child expenditures by 1.5 to make 
them comparable to the Canadian expenditures. In addition, the amounts have 
been inflated by 34.5 percent to account for the change in the Consumer Price 
Index between 1985 and 1992.
9. Stringent regulations are unlikely to affect the quality of child care if they are not 
enforced. We have no information about the relative enforcement of regulations 
in the two countries. In the United States, for example, Phillips and Mekos (1993) 
compared regulations in Georgia, Virginia, and Massachusetts. While Massachu 
setts had the most stringent regulations, its regulations were also most likely to be 
ignored. Nevertheless, child-to-staff ratios and group sizes were lower in Massa 
chusetts than in either Georgia or Virginia.
10. See Hofferth et al. (1991) for more details on this survey.
11. See Special Services Group of Statistics Canada (1992) for more information 
regarding sampling techniques and information contained in the survey.
12. To be specific, we use the subsample from the LMAS only in estimating the rela 
tionship between a mother's wages and her age, education, and location. The 
results of this exercise are used to predict wages for the entire CNCCS sample, 
allowing us to use the entire sample for the primary econometric analysis in the 
following section on the effects of tax credits and prices.
13. Canadian families were asked to classify care as kindergarten, school program, 
relative inside and outside the home, non-relative inside and outside the home, 
center-based, respondent, respondent's spouse at work, respondent's spouse at 
home, older sibling, and self-care. To arrive at our definitions, we defined center 
care as care in a center, kindergarten, or school program; we included older sib 
lings in relative care; and we defined parent care as care by the respondent or his 
or her spouse. U.S families were given a broader range of choices. However, 
preprocessing of the data by the Urban Institute resulted in classifications similar 
to ours: center care, relatives outside the home, relatives inside the home, in-home 
provider, family day care, parents, and others. For comparison with the Canadian 
data, we equated in-home providers with non-relatives inside the home and family 
day care with non-relative care outside the home. The USNCCS had one type of 
care, lesson care, with no equivalent in the CNCCS. For children for which lesson 
care was the primary mode of child care, we used the secondary mode of child 
care. Since nearly all children in lesson care were school-age and since we focus 
on preschool children in this paper, this difference should not substantially affect 
our results.
14. In all statistical results in this paper, sample weights are used to make the results 
indicative of national averages.
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15. This percentage might seem high, but two factors should be noted. First, parental 
care includes care by the father when the mother is working. Therefore, this cate 
gory includes couples who stagger their work hours so that one is always avail 
able to provide care. In addition, some families with mothers who work full time 
have fathers who work less than full time.
16. In these regressions we make no attempt to correct for selection bias. While Ribar 
(1992) and Kimmel (1994) have both found that price equations are sensitive to 
assumptions regarding selection bias, we are not confident that the standard cor 
rection procedures provide more credible results. Note that the tobit model 
accounts for the fact that many users of a particular form of care report a zero 
price.
17. In addition, if we included all children, we would have an unbalanced panel. This 
would add complexity to the estimation without yielding substantially different 
results. In an unreported set of regressions, the sample was not limited to the 
youngest child but included all children under 6. Results were nearly identical to 
those reported.
18. By grouping Canadian kindergartners into center care but U.S. kindergartners into 
parent care, we are probably exaggerating the differences in cost of center care 
between the two countries.
19. In addition, greater subsidies might increase the gross cost of care, leaving the 
average net cost the same. Thus, it is possible that subsidies would have only a 
distributional effect in a general equilibrium setting. The model estimated in this 
paper does not address this issue.
20. Either parent could provide parent care. Since most parents who stay out of the 
labor force to care for their children are women, we focus on the mothers' deci 
sions.
21. We limit nonlabor income to spouse's income for two reasons. First, the two pri 
mary alternative sources of income, asset income and welfare, are clearly endoge 
nous to the mother's employment choice. Second, spouse's income is the only 
nonlabor income included in both surveys.
22. A number of previous studies have assumed that price of child care or the hourly 
subsidy affects the decision by lowering the net hourly wage rate. This is equiva 
lent to forcing the parameter on price or the subsidy in our specification to be 
equal in magnitude, but opposite in sign, to the parameter on the wage rate. In 
contrast, our specification is more general and does not impose this restriction.
23. This procedure limits our analysis to the extensive margin, i.e., whether a mother 
works and, if she does work, whether she works part time or full time. An inter 
esting question is whether child-care prices and subsidies also affect the intensive 
margin, i.e., how many hours a working mother works. Powell (1997), for exam 
ple, finds that, for Canadian women, the elasticity of hours worked with respect to 
child-care prices is greater than the elasticity of participation.
24. Relative care includes relative care inside and outside the child's home. Family 
day care is defined as non-relative, noncenter care inside or outside the child's 
home.
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25. In addition, our predictions of wages and prices do not correct for selection, i.e., 
the possibility that workers might receive higher wage offers than nonworkers and 
that parents using a type of care might face lower prices than other parents. Other 
research (Chaplin et al. 1996) has suggested that results are sensitive to variables 
used to identify selection equations. It is beyond the scope of this paper to test the 
sensitivity of estimates to alternative selection procedures. Nonetheless, our 
results should be suggestive of the relative effects of prices, wages, and tax subsi 
dies on employment and child-care choices.
26. To predict wages, we use the estimated wage regression presented in Table Al (p. 
79). As in the case of prices, we add a random component to each predicted wage 
to simulate the full distribution of wages.
27. To measure the effects of subsidies, we focus on the federal child-care tax subsi 
dies in both countries. In particular, we ignore the state tax credits in the United 
States' and Canada's provincial subsidies to providers of children in needy fami 
lies. In addition, we ignore the direct effects of the many subsidies paid directly 
to providers. To the extent that these subsidies lower child-care prices paid by 
families, differences between subsidies will be reflected in differences in prices 
between the two countries. The effect of prices on child-care and employment 
choices will, therefore, include the indirect effect of subsidies paid to providers.
28. A common justification for assuming that women work either 0, 20, or 40 hours is 
that about three-fourths of all women either do not work or work exactly 40 hours 
per week. See, for example, Fraker and Moffitt (1988) or Hoynes (1993) for more 
discussion of the reasonableness of this assumption.
29. Predicted subsidies for nonworkers are zero since the tax-based subsidy in both 
countries requires recipients to work. In addition, we assume that parent care is 
free so that the tax-based subsidy would be zero for any family using parent care.
30. See Table Al (p. 79) for the wage regression used to predict wages. In this regres 
sion, the effects of age and education are constrained to be the same for Canadian 
and U.S. women. However, an alternative specification was tried in which age 
and education were allowed to have different effects on wages in the two coun 
tries. This specification produced the same conclusion that U.S. women earn 
somewhat more than Canadian women. In addition, a specification test could not 
reject the simpler, constrained specification in favor of the more general specifica 
tion.
31. Results of the logit regression are presented in Tables A3-A5, pp. 81-86.
32. In these tables, parent care is defined as any care by either parent, either in the 
home or at the place of work. Relative care is defined as care provided by a 
grandparent, sibling, or other nonparental relative. Informal non-relative care is 
care at a family day-care provider or care in the child's home. The excluded 
choice is parent care.
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Table Al OLS Regression of the Log of Hourly Wage for Mothers in the 
United States and Canada3
Variable
Intercept
U.S.
Education
High school degree
Some post-secondary education
Post-secondary education
University degree
Age
20-24 years old
25-34 years old
35-44 years old
45 years old and older
Lives in metropolitan area
Race/ethnicity
French is native language
Neither English nor French is native language
Black
Hispanic
R2
Parameter estimate
1.2031*
(0.2278)
0.1840*
(0.1856)
0.1360*
(0.0537)
0.3357*
(0.0557)
0.6719*
(0.0584)
1.0678*
(0.0646)
0.1749
(0.1334)
0.2700*
(0.1267)
0.3457*
(0.1274)
0.3704*
(0.1392)
0.1824*
(0.0259)
-0.0518
(0.3254)
-0.0884
(0.4543)
-0.0180
(0.0371)
-0.0215
(0.0480)
0.2091
a Number of observations: 2,963, standard errors in parentheses. 
* Different from 0 at the 5% confidence level.
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Table A2 Multinomial Logit Estimates of the Choice of Primary Child- 
Care and Employment Parameters Related to Child-Care 
Prices and Tax-Based Subsidies, Married Mothers of Children 
under 6 in the United States and Canada3
____________Variable _________ ______Estimate____
Annual subsidy (000's of dollars) 0.3004*
(0.0737)
Hourly price of care
Non-relative care 0.0012
(0.0096)
Relative care -0.0126
(0.0146)
Center care -0.0259 
_________________________________(0.0165)_____
SOURCE: Canadian National Child Care Survey of 1998, Labour Market Activity Sur 
vey of 1988, and The Urban Institute's National Child Care Survey of 1990.
a In the United States, if the primary care is listed as lesson, then the secondary care is 
used as primary care. The omitted category is parent care for nonworking mothers. 
The intercept includes white non-Hispanic, Canadian children 3-5 years old in fami 
lies with less than 20,000 Can$ in income. Standard errors in parentheses.
*Different from 0 at the 5% confidence level.
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Table A3 Multinomial Logit Estimates of the Choice of Primary Child- 
Care and Employment Parameters for Full-Time Employment, 
Married Mothers of Children under 6 in the United States and 
Canada3
Variable
Intercept
American family
Age of child
Less than 1 year
1-2 years
Number of children
Under age 6
Aged 6-12
Husband's earnings
$15,001-22,500
$22,501-30,000
$30,001-37,500
$37,501^5,000
More than $45,000
Black (U.S.A.)
Hispanic (U.S.A.)
Center 
care
-0.5805* 
(0.2030)
1.0308* 
(0.1129)
-2.3369* 
(0.1709)
-0.1661* 
(0.1029)
-0.5895* 
(0.1022)
-0.8269* 
(0.0700)
0.2646 
(0.1589)
-0.2756 
(0.1491)
-0.1163 
(0.1547)
-0.1592 
(0.1850)
-0.1152 
(0.1833)
1.2046* 
(0.2815)
-0.7588 
(0.4077)
Relative 
care
-0.3687* 
(0.1724)
-0.3582* 
(0.1234)
-0.8933* 
(0.1142)
-0.1805 
(0.0928)
-0.2372* 
(0.0761)
-0.5886 
(0.0593)
0.4466* 
(0.1337)
-0.2811* 
(0.1314)
-0.3914* 
(0.1446)
-0.4675* 
(0.1885))
-0.1992* 
(0.2181)
1.4145* 
(0.3054)
0.6315* 
(0.2819)
Non-relative 
care
-0.2507 
(0.1470)
-0.2615* 
(0.0996)
-0.7955* 
(0.0940)
-0.0464 
(0.0752)
0.3096* 
(0.0622)
-0.5409 
(0.0495)
0.2443* 
(0.1203)
-0.4234* 
(0.1146)
0.1245 
(0.1203)
-0.1261 
(0.1431)
-0.6815* 
(0.1564)
-0.2817 
(0.4567)
-0.9469* 
(0.3531)
Parent 
care
-0.7120* 
(0.1473)
0.0194 
(0.1093)
-0.8426* 
(0.1138)
-0.3122 
(0.0859)
-0.0416 
(0.0653)
-0.0447 
(0.0477)
0.1508 
(0.1137)
-0.9022* 
(0.1130)
-0.9159* 
(0.1276)
-0.6818* 
(0.1580)
-1.1537* 
(0.1846)
0.6334 
(0.3371)
-0.1404 
(0.3116)
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Variable
Immigrant (Canada)
Lives in urban area
Predicted wage
Center 
care
0.2664* 
(0.0988)
-0.1587 
(0.1403)
0.0286 
(0.0050)
Relative 
care
0.0125 
(0.0857)
0.2010 
(0.1233)
-0.0018 
(0.0055)
Non-relative 
care
-0.1931* 
(0.0685)
-0.1300 
(0.1094)
0.0260* 
(0.0041)
Parent 
care
0.0830 
(0.0767)
-0.0503 
(0.1155)
0.0217* 
(0.0050)
SOURCE: Canadian National Child Care Survey of 1988, Labour Market Activity Sur 
vey of 1988, and The Urban Institute's National Child Care Survey of 1990.
a The omitted category is parent care for nonworking mothers. The intercept includes 
white non-Hispanic, Canadian children 3-5 years old in families with less than 
$15,000 in income. All amounts are in U.S. dollars. Standard errors are in parenthe 
ses.
* Different from 0 at the 5% confidence level.
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Table A4 Multinomial Logit Estimates of the Choice of Primary Child- 
Care and Employment Parameters for Part-Time Employment, 
Married Mothers of Children under 6 in the United States and 
Canada3
Variable
Intercept
U.S. family
Age of child
Less than 1 year
1-2 years
Number of children
Under age 6
Aged 6-12
Husband's earnings
$15,001-22,500
$22,501-30,000
$30,001-37,500
$37,501-45,000
More than $45,000
Black (U.S.A.)
Hispanic (U.S.A.)
Center 
care
-0.9142* 
(0.2568)
-0.0196 
(0.1494)
-2.0560* 
(0.2421)
-0.9927* 
(0.1299)
-0.5979* 
(0.1325)
-0.2719* 
(0.1671)
0.1891 
(0.2124)
-0.2552 
(0.1943)
-0.1779 
(0.1995)
-0.3939 
(0.2180)
-0.2642 
(0.2302)
-0.7657 
(0.7528)
-0.2852 
(0.4654)
Relative 
care
-0.5023* 
(0.1871)
-0.9784* 
(0.1477)
-0.6901* 
(0.1259)
-0.2326* 
(0.1050)
-0.1547* 
(0.0784)
-0.1801* 
(0.0617)
0.1072* 
(0.1486)
-0.3394* 
(0.1450)
-0.5552* 
(0.1516)
-0.2548* 
(0.1893)
-0.5098* 
(0.2120)
1.1811* 
(0.7552)
0.6510* 
(0.3888)
Non-relative 
care
-0.4065* 
(0.1862)
-0.0650* 
(0.1434)
-0.6000* 
(0.1124)
-0.0978 
(0.0894)
0.1485* 
(0.0676)
-0.1798* 
(0.0536)
0.4262* 
(0.1608)
-0.1669 
(0.1541)
0.0366 
(0.1576)
-0.3965* 
(0.1771)
-0.5806* 
(0.1936)
-1.223 
(12.7576)
-0.4677 
(0.6071)
Parent 
care
-0.2254* 
(0.1439)
0.0746 
(0.0985)
-0.6967* 
(0.0959)
-0.1247 
(0.0770)
-0.0500 
(0.0555)
-0.1719* 
(0.0408)
0.5396* 
(0.1192)
-0.2031* 
(0.1163)
-0.1362* 
(0.1207)
-0.1944 
(0.1463)
-0.2548 
(0.1516)
-0.7704 
(0.5349)
-0.2971 
(0.3026)
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Variable
Immigrant (Canada)
Lives in urban area
Predicted wage
Center 
care
0.2852* 
(0.1109)
-0.3232 
(0.1742)
0.0301* 
(0.0059)
Relative 
care
-0.7443* 
(0.0920)
0.2255 
(0.1440)
-0.0065 
(0.0059)
Non-relative 
care
-0.2205* 
(0.0814)
-0.2199 
(0.1224)
0.0150* 
(0.0051)
Parent 
care
0.1381* 
(0.1684)
-0.1610 
(0.1035)
0.0270* 
(0.0044)
SOURCE: Canadian National Child Care Survey of 1988, Labour Market Activity Sur 
vey of 1988, and The Urban Institute's National Child Care Survey of 1990.
a The omitted category is parent care for nonworking mothers. The intercept includes 
white non-Hispanic, Canadian children 3-5 years old in families with less than 
$15,000 in income. All amounts are in U.S dollars. Standard errors are in parenthe 
ses.
*Different from 0 at the 5% confidence level.
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Table AS Multinomial Logit Estimates of the Choice of Primary
Child-Care and Employment Parameters for Non-Employment, 
Married Mothers of Children under 6 in the United States and 
Canada3
Variable
Intercept
U.S. family
Age of child
Less than 1 year
1-2 years
Number of children
Under age 6
Aged 6-12
Husband's earnings
$15,001-22,500
$22,501-30,000
$30,001-37,500
$37,501^5,000
More than $45,000
Black (U.S.A.)
Hispanic (U.S.A.)
Center 
care
-0.7914* 
(0.1743)
-0.8638* 
(0.1328)
-3.1277* 
(0.2273)
-0.6654* 
(0.1060)
-0.3822* 
(0.0803)
-0.3015* 
(0.0465)
-0.1649 
(0.1485)
-0.1679 
(0.1387)
0.2190 
(0.1424)
-0.6359* 
(0.1615)
-0.6979* 
(0.1704)
-0.4580 
(0.4669)
-0.0916 
(0.3993)
Relative 
care
-0.5535* 
(0.1492)
-1.4702* 
(0.1286)
0.4283* 
(0.0955)
-0.3516* 
(0.0899)
-0.1452* 
(0.0558)
-0.0344 
(0.0478)
-0.1140 
(0.1223)
-0.0456 
(0.1171)
0.3070* 
(0.1224)
-0.0633 
(0.1572)
-0.3329* 
(0.1588)
0.9153* 
(0.3800)
1.0764* 
(0.2853)
Non-relative 
care
-0.4065* 
(0.1862)
-0.0650* 
(0.1434)
-0.6000* 
(0.1124)
-0.0978 
(0.0894)
0.1485* 
(0.0676)
-0.1798* 
(0.0536)
0.4262* 
(0.1608)
-0.1669 
(0.1541)
0.0366 
(0.1576)
-0.3965* 
(0.1771)
-0.5806* 
(0.1936)
-1.223 
(12.7576)
-0.4677 
(0.6071)
Parent 
care
-1.4899* 
(0.1976)
1.3608* 
(0.1591)
0.1206 
(0.1205)
-0.6368* 
(0.1039)
-0.1105 
(0.0671)
-0.0441 
(0.0562)
0.9716* 
(0.1699)
-0.1633 
(0.1549)
-0.0271 
(0.1580)
-0.1957 
(0.1809)
0.8899* 
(0.1799)
-0.2223 
(0.7468)
-0.7703 
(0.6106)
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Variable
Immigrant (Canada)
Lives in urban area
Predicted wage
Center 
care
0.2447* 
(0.0827)
-0.0213 
(0.1070)
0.0163* 
(0.0047)
Relative 
care
-0.5125* 
(0.0699)
0.1400 
(0.1132)
-0.0094 
(0.0050)
Non-relative 
care
-0.2205* 
(0.0814)
-0.2199 
(0.1224)
0.0150* 
(0.0051)
Parent 
care
-0.1843* 
(0.0896)
-0.0372 
(0.1209)
0.0113* 
(0.0055)
SOURCE: Canadian National Child Care Survey of 1988, Labour Market Activity Sur 
vey of 1988, and The Urban Institute's National Child Care Survey of 1990.
a The omitted category is parent care for nonworking mothers. The intercept includes 
white non-Hispanic, Canadian children 3-5 years old in families with less than 
$15,000 in income. All amounts are in U.S. dollars. Standard errors are in parenthe 
ses.
*Different from 0 at the 5% confidence level.
2 An Economic Model of 
Employee Benefits 
and Labor Supply
An Application of the Almost Ideal Demand System
Paul Fronstin 
Employee Benefit Research Institute
Employee benefits that are voluntarily provided by employers have 
become a major source of income for workers in the United States. In 
1960, employee benefits accounted for 8 percent of total compensa 
tion, with pensions and health insurance accounting for 3.4 percent. 
By 1993, employee benefits accounted for 18 percent of total compen 
sation, or $673.6 billion, with pensions and health insurance account 
ing for 10.3 percent (Employee Benefit Research Institute 1995). 
Among firms most likely to offer employee benefits, the percentage is 
even higher. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce (1995) found that the 
average payment for pension plans and health insurance was 17.6 per 
cent of payroll in 1994.
Pension plans are one of the most popular employee benefits pro 
vided by employers. According to Table 1, 60 percent of all wage and 
salary workers in 1993 were employed by an employer that sponsored a 
pension plan. While 79 percent of wage and salary workers participated 
in the pension plan when their employer sponsored a plan, only 47 per 
cent of all wage and salary workers participated in a pension plan 
because some employers did not offer a pension plan, some workers did 
not qualify to participate in a pension plan, and some workers voluntar 
ily choose not to participate. Of those participating in a pension plan, 
54 percent were included in a defined-benefit plan, while 62 percent 
were included in a defined-contribution plan. Almost 25 percent partic 
ipated in both defined-benefit and defined-contribution plans.
Employer sponsorship and employee participation in a pension 
plan varies across demographic variables and job characteristics. Table 
1 indicates that older workers are more likely to work for an employer
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Table 1 Employer Sponsorship and Employee Participation in Pension Plans
Variable
Total
Age
18-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
Marital status
Married
Widowed
Divorced
Separated
Never married
Race
White
Black
Sponsorship 
rate
0.60
0.43
0.59
0.64
0.65
0.59
0.62
0.58
0.63
0.56
0.52
0.61
0.62
Participation 
rate
0.47
0.16
0.44
0.55
0.59
0.52
0.52
0.49
0.52
0.44
032
0.49
0.47
Sponsored
participation 
rate
0.79
0.38
0.73
0.86
0.90
0.88
0.84
0.84
0.83
0.78
0.62
0.80
0.75
Defined 
benefit
0.54
0.37
0.49
0.57
0.57
0.59
0.55
0.53
0.57
0.50
0.49
0.55
0.51
Of those 
participating
Defined 
contribution
0.62
0.59
065
0.62
061
0.58
0.63
0.57
059
0.53
0.61
0.64
0.50
Not 
determinable
0.14
0.18
0.14
0.13
0.13
0.14
0.13
0.19
0.14
0.19
0.15
0.13
0.20
Hispanic
Other
Education
Some school
High school
College
Graduate school
Gender
Male
Female
Number of children
0
1
2
3 or more
Union contract
Covered
Not covered
Occupation
White collar
0.43
0.55
0.36
0.58
0.71
0.79
0.59
0.62
0.64
0.60
0.60
0.52
0.90
0.54
0.68
0.31
0.41
0.25
0.45
0.59
0.70
0.49
0.45
0.52
0.48
0.47
0.38
0.82
0.41
0.54
0.73
0.75
0.69
0.77
0.82
0.88
0.83
0.74
0.82
0.80
0.79
0.73
0.91
0.75
0.80
0.50
0.52
045
0.53
0.55
0.63
0.55
0.54
0.55
0.55
0.53
0.53
0.68
0.49
0.55
0.51
0.63
0.48
0.59
0.70
0.66
0.64
0.59
063
0.61
0.62
0.60
0.47
0.68
0.66
0.21
0.15
0.21
0.15
0.10
0.10
0.13
0.14
0.13
0.14
0.14
0.15
0.13
0.14
0.12
Table 1 (continued)
Sponsorship 
Variable rate
Blue collar
Service collar
Firm size
1-24
25^9
50-99
100-249
250 or more
Industry
Agriculture, forestry, & fishing
Mining
Construction
Manufacturing
Transportation, communications, 
& utilities
Wholesale trade
0.42
0.52
0.17
0.43
0.59
0.70
0.87
015
0.75
0.35
0.75
0.73
0.57
Participation 
rate
0.28
0.42
0.14
0.32
0.46
0.55
0.70
0.13
0.69
0.31
0.64
0.63
0.48
Sponsored
participation 
rate
0.67
0.81
0.82
0.75
0.77
0.79
0.80
0.84
0.93
0.88
0.85
0.86
0.84
Defined 
benefit
0.55
0.52
0.35
0.42
0.44
0.48
0.59
0.52
0.52
0.56
0.54
0.59
043
Of those 
participating
Defined 
contribution
0.45
0.56
0.62
0.60
0.63
0.59
0.63
0.67
0.75
0.49
0.68
0.66
0.71
Not 
determinable
0.19
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.12
0.13
0.13
0.15
0.13
0.15
0.13
0.14
0.14
Retail trade
Finance, insurance, & real estate
Personal services
Business & repair services
Entertainment services
Professional & related services
Public administration
Hours of work
Part-time
Full-time
0.41
0.71
0.23
0.33
0.38
0.71
0.93
0.41
0.63
0.25
0.57
0.13
0.25
0.24
0.54
0.85
0.15
0.53
0.61
0.80
0.57
0.74
0.62
0.76
0.91
0.37
0.84
0.37
0.52
0.43
0.36
0.55
0.56
0.71
0.48
0.55
0.63
0.75
0.49
0.82
0.63
0.54
0.51
0.54
0.62
0.17
0.14
0.21
0.10
0.14
0.13
0.13
0.15
0.14
SOURCE: Employee Benefits Supplement to the 1993 Current Population Survey.
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that sponsors a pension plan, more likely to participate in that pension 
plan, and more likely to have a defined-benefit plan than younger 
workers. Not surprisingly, differences in sponsorship and participation 
also occur across family type, race, education, gender, unionization, 
occupation, firm size, industry, and hours of work.
Health insurance is another employee benefit that many employers 
offer to workers. According to Table 2, 74 percent of wage and salary 
workers were employed by an employer that sponsored a health insur 
ance plan in 1993, and 58 percent of all workers participated in a health 
insurance plan. Of the 79 percent that participated in their employer's 
health insurance plan, 40 percent have coverage only for themselves, 
while 60 percent also have coverage for a family member. 1 Table 2 
also shows the probability of participating in a health insurance plan 
and the type of plan for various demographic variables and work- 
related attributes.
Theoretically, workers demand employee benefits from their 
employer for numerous reasons. First, preferential tax treatment of 
employee benefits reduces the price of the benefits to both employers 
and employees and is thus expected to increase the demand for 
employee benefits. However, the evidence regarding the effect of pref 
erential tax treatment on employee benefits is mixed. Using cross-sec 
tional data, Alpert (1983), Clain and Leppel (1989), and Woodbury and 
Bettinger (1991) found positive effects of preferential tax treatment on 
the demand for employee benefits. However, Turner (1987) found that 
employees do not demand a greater number of tax-preferred employee 
benefits when taxes increase. In addition, Vroman and Anderson 
(1984) and Alpert (1987) did not find significant positive tax effects on 
employee benefit growth when using time-series analysis. Second, 
group purchasing results in lower prices for health insurance than an 
individual would obtain in the marketplace. Third, the existence of 
economies of scale in the provision of employee benefits makes it more 
efficient (less costly) to provide savings vehicles for retirement and 
health insurance through the workplace (Mitchell and Andrews 1981).
Employers have sound reasons for providing employee benefits. 
Many workers have strong preferences for employee benefits. As a 
result, competition in the labor market will force firms to provide 
employee benefits. Firms that do not offer the wage/benefit packages 
that workers desire can experience higher turnover rates as well as dif-
Table 2 Employer Sponsorship and Employee Participation in Health Plans, by Type of Plan
Variable
Total
Age
18-24
25-34
35^4
45-54
55-64
Marital Status
Married
Widowed
Divorced
Separated
Never married
Race
White
Black
Sponsorship 
rate
0.74
0.62
0.76
0.77
0.76
0.71
0.75
0.71
0.77
0.73
0.69
0.75
0.76
Participation 
rate
0.58
034
060
0.63
0.64
0.59
0.59
0.59
0.69
0.58
0.52
0.59
0.62
Sponsored 
participation 
rate
0.79
0.55
0.79
0.82
0.85
0.84
0.79
0.84
0.89
0.79
0.75
0.79
0.81
Of those participating
Single 
coverage
0.40
0.75
0.45
0.30
0.34
0.39
0.20
0.69
062
0.46
0.89
0.39
0.44
Family 
coverage
0.60
0.25
0.55
0.70
0.66
0.61
0.80
0.31
0.38
0.54
0.11
0.61
0.56
Table 2 (continued)
Variable
Hispanic
Other
Education
Some school
High school
College
Graduate school
Gender
Male
Female
Number of children
0
1
2
3 or more
Union contract
Covered
Sponsorship 
rate
0.60
0.73
0.53
0.73
0.82
0.87
0.73
0.74
0.77
0.75
0.74
0.68
0.95
Participation 
rate
0.47
0.58
0.39
0.57
0.68
0.76
0.63
0.53
0.64
0.60
0.56
0.50
0.86
Sponsored 
participation 
rate
0.77
0.79
0.73
0.78
0.82
0.87
0.86
0.72
0.83
0.81
0.77
0.74
0.90
Of those participating
Single 
coverage
0.41
0.45
0.41
0.39
0.43
0.35
0.33
0.49
0.54
0.39
0.27
0.31
0.31
Family 
coverage
0.59
0.55
0.59
0.61
0.57
0.65
0.67
0.51
0.46
0.61
0.73
0.69
0.69
Not covered
Occupation
White collar
Blue collar
Service collar
Firm size
1-24
25^9
50-99
100-249
250 or more
Industry
Agriculture, forestry, & fishing
Mining
Construction
Manufacturing
Transportation, communications,
& utilities
Wholesale trade
Retail trade
0.70
0.81
0.56
0.67
0.35
0.76
0.84
0.87
0.94
0.30
0.91
0.50
0.89
0.85
0.79
0.60
0.53
0.64
0.37
0.57
0.27
0.55
0.64
0.68
0.77
0.24
0.85
0.41
0.79
0.75
0.68
0.38
0.76
0.79
0.66
0.84
0.76
0.72
077
0.78
0.82
0.80
0.93
083
0.89
0.88
0.86
0.63
0.42
0.41
0.47
0.34
0.45
0.47
0.44
0.44
0.36
0.36
0.16
0.32
0.33
0.29
0.38
0.49
0.58
0.59
0.53
0.66
0.55
0.53
0.56
0.56
0.64
0.64
0.84
0.68
0.67
0.71
0.62
0.51
Table 2 (continued)
Variable
Finance, insurance, & real estate
Personal services
Business & repair services
Entertainment services
Professional & related services
Public administration
Hours of work
Part-time
Full-time
Sponsorship 
rate
0.82
0.36
0.55
0.56
0.82
0.97
0.51
0.78
Participation 
rate
0.66
0.25
0.41
0.37
0.61
0.85
0.16
0.66
Sponsored 
participation 
rate
0.80
0.70
0.75
0.66
0.74
0.88
0.32
0.85
Of those participating
Single 
coverage
0.42
054
0.49
0.54
0.45
0.38
0.49
0.39
Family 
coverage
0.58
0.46
0.51
0.46
0.55
0.62
0.51
0.61
SOURCE: Employee Benefits Supplement to the 1993 Current Population Survey.
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ficulties recruiting workers. Virtually all studies on labor mobility con 
clude that pension plans significantly reduce turnover rates (B artel and 
Borjas 1977; Gustman 1990; Ippolito 1986; McCormick and Hughes 
1984; Mitchell 1982; Mitchell 1983). 2 Employers also have an eco 
nomic incentive to offer pension plans to reduce their hiring and train 
ing costs. If an employer's objective is to increase job tenure among 
workers, employers have an added incentive to increase their invest 
ment in training, which will increase the overall productivity of their 
work force. In addition, health insurance plans may improve the health 
and productivity of workers, potentially lowering the firm's rate of 
absenteeism. Along the same lines, the provision of child care facili 
ties can also reduce the incidence of absenteeism. 3
While previous research has contributed to our understanding of 
employee benefits, many studies have not fully utilized theoretical or 
econometric techniques in developing a framework for studying 
employee benefits and their role in the labor market. In addition, data 
problems have led some authors to make conclusions that conflict with 
economic theory. For example, Smith and Ehrenberg (1983) attempted 
to estimate the trade-off between wages and employee benefits but 
failed to find a trade-off because of data problems. In fact, most stud 
ies using micro-level data find a positive relationship between wages 
and employee benefits, mostly because they do not have adequate data 
and can not control for all of the variables that affect employee bene 
fits. However, studies using more aggregated data have found a trade 
off (Woodbury 1983; Woodbury and Huang 1991).
One reason for the various shortcomings in the employee benefits 
literature may be model misspecification. Traditionally, in the simple 
static model of labor supply, labor-force participation decisions are 
assumed to be a function of hourly wages, nonwage income, and per 
sonal characteristics. However, what ultimately matters to workers is 
the total compensation they receive per unit of time worked, along with 
the quality of basic working conditions. In this paper, the simple static 
model of labor supply is extended to include the demand for employee 
benefits. Unlike previous work, which has focused on specific aspects 
of employee benefits, the model presented in this paper is flexible 
enough to take into account all types of employee benefits. A unique 
feature of the model is that labor supply is estimated jointly with the
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demand for employee benefits, using Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
Equations with a correction for selectivity bias.
The chapter is organized into sections that develop the theoretical 
model, present the empirical model, describe the data set and the con 
struction of the variables, discuss the empirical results, and provide a 
summary.
THEORETICAL MODEL
We assume that an individual receives earned income, Y, for time 
worked, and has unearned income, Yn . Earned income and unearned 
income are used to purchase market goods and services, G, such that:
Y + Yn =pg G, (1)
where pg represents the market price of goods and services.
Earned income is equal to the individuals potential hourly wage 
rate4 (pw) (net of taxes) multiplied by the number of hours worked (H) 
minus the employer's and employee's contribution to employee bene 
fits:
Y = pwH-pzB, (2)
where Y equals wH(l - f), pw is equal to w(l - f) + B/H, t represents the 
marginal tax rate, pz represents the shadow price of employee benefits, 5 
and B represents the quantity of employee benefits consumed by the em 
ployee. In Eq. 2, Y represents after-tax, take-home income that the 
worker can freely spend to purchase market goods and services and/or 
employee benefits. Employee contributions to employee benefits are 
subtracted from potential take-home income because these contributions 
come out of the workers potential take-home wage in order to take 
advantage of lower prices via economies of scale, group purchase, and 
the preferential tax treatment.
Firms hire additional workers until the workers marginal revenue 
product is equal to the workers total compensation rate, where total 
compensation is equal to the sum of wages and the monetary value of
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employee benefits. We assume that employers are indifferent to the 
composition of total compensation, but adjustments are not costless. 
As a result, workers face a trade-off between wages and employee ben 
efits (assuming total compensation is constant across workers with 
equal human capital).
Substituting Eq. 2 into Eq. 1 gives us:
PwH-pzB+Yn =pgG. (3)
Individuals are also subject to a time constraint:
T = L + H, (4)
where T represents total available time and L represents leisure time.6 
Solving Eq. 4 for H, and substituting into Eq. 3 yields the following 
full-income budget constraint:
PwT+Yn = pw L + pz B + pg G. (5)
From Eq. 5, an individual can consume leisure time (L), employee ben 
efits (#), and other market goods and services (G).
Dual to an individual's utility maximization objective is an objec 
tive to minimize expenditures on consumption of goods and services. 
Formally, the individual's dual problem is to choose L, B, and G so as 
to minimize total expenditures (£).
, (6) 
subject to the constraint on utility (f/0) that
UQ = U(L,B,G). (7)
The optimal amounts of L, B, and G chosen will depend on the respec 
tive prices and required utility. Consumer behavior is summarized by 
the expenditure function, which shows the minimal expenditures nec 
essary to achieve a given level of utility for a particular set of prices. 
The consumers equilibrium condition is given by
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E(pg ,pw,pz ;U) = pw T + Yn (8)
where pwT + Yn represents full income. It is assumed that the expendi 
ture function is linearly homogeneous and concave in prices.
ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION
Ever since Stone's (1954) system of demand equations, which 
were derived explicitly from economic theory, alternative specifica 
tions and functional forms of the consumers utility function have been 
proposed, the most popular being the linear model (Stone 1954), the 
Rotterdam model7 (Theil 1965), and the translog model (Berndt and 
Christensen 1972). To avoid placing prior restrictions on the individu 
als utility function, a flexible approximation to the consumers' expen 
diture function is utilized in this study. The resulting expenditure 
function yields an easily estimatable system of consumer demand 
equations from which price and income elasticities can be derived. 
The consumer expenditure function is represented as follows:
logE(p,u) = a(p) + ub(p), (9)
where u lies between 0 (subsistence) and 1 (bliss) and p represents a 
vector of prices. The expenditure function is linearly homogeneous, 
concave in factor prices, and a(p) and b(p) can be regarded as the costs 
of subsistence and bliss, respectively. In order to let the consumer 
expenditure function be flexible, a(p) and b(p) are set as follows:
(11)
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) pointed out that the choice of func 
tional form for the above functions is partly due to the need for a flexi 
ble functional form; however, their main justification is that the 
resulting system of demand equations has desirable properties. In fact,
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substitution of Eqs. 10 and 11 into Eq. 9 yields an expenditure function 
that is flexible and easily estimatable. The resulting system of demand 
equations is known as the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS). The 
AIDS system gives an estimate of the direct or indirect utility function 
yielding estimates of the structure of the workers' preferences for lei 
sure, labor supply, employee benefits, and market goods and services. 
Own-price, cross-price, and income elasticities are easily derived from 
the AIDS model.
The expenditure function used in this study is shown as follows:
(12)
where the subscript /, j equal g, w, and z.
The expenditure function can be logarithmically differentiated, 
yielding the expenditure shares associated with leisure, employee ben 
efits, and market goods and services,
Sw =aw + ZjbWJ (\og Pj ) + bw (logm/p*) (13a)
( 13b>
(13C)
where bl} =Yi(.ci} +C/J' anc* ^e subscript 7 = w, z, and g. The share 
of total compensation spent on each good is a function of the natural 
log of prices and an income term, log(m//?*), where p* represents a 
price index. 8
Economic theory requires the demand system to exhibit three 
properties: adding-up, homogeneity, and symmetry. Adding-up 
implies that the sum of the share equations equal one. We impose this 
condition by restricting the parameters in our system of equations as 
follows:
I, at = 1,1, blw = 0,L, biz = 0,2, blg = 0,X, bt = 0. (14)
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In order for the demand system to be homogeneous of degree zero in 
prices and income, the following within-equation restrictions are 
imposed:
!A,= 0,1,^=0,1,^=0. (15)
Additionally, symmetry is imposed by setting the cross-substitution 
effects equal, such that btj = bjr
After imposing the adding-up, homogeneity, and symmetry condi 
tions, and appending a vector of demographic variables and normally 
distributed error terms, the system of demand equations is written as 
follows:
(16a)
(16b)
(16c)
Our data allow us to estimate the system only for workers with 
employee benefits and, thus, needs to be adjusted for selectivity bias. 
The method to correct for selectivity bias when the subsample is 
selected based on two choices can be found in Maddala (1983, p. 368). 9
Suppose labor supply and employee benefits are imperfectly 
observed such that:
S =Sl+^, (Ha)
Sz =S*z+ uz (17b)
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Suppose, further, that there are latent variables:
y*2 =X2 -c 2 +£2
(18a) 
(18b)
such that the individual works if and only if ^ >0 and receives 
employee benefits if y2 > 0 . If the MS and es are joint normally distrib 
uted,
y y^21 ^22.
then the selectivity bias has the form
/ ^ —i 
"le'r^Vfe
where
£ > —-
and
f — _ v T i,, .*., i, ( ,
p is the correlation between e { and £2 ,
(19)
e2 |e2 >-.
(20)
(21)
({) represents the standard normal density function, 
O represents the cumulative distribution function, and 
F is the bivariate normal distribution function.
The parameters T l5 T2 , and part of S22 can be estimated up to scale 
using a bivariate probit model. The model is estimated with sample 
selection because only workers are assumed to receive employee bene-
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fits. The selectivity equations include a comprehensive set of economic 
and demographic variables likely to influence the decision to work and 
receive employee benefits.
Once the selectivity bias has been taken into account, the expendi 
ture share equations can be written as follows:
Sw = aw + bwg (log pg/pw) + bwz (log pzlpw) + bw (log m/p*) (22a)
ll |ff =1,5 =!)] + £„
Sz = az + bzg (log Pg/pz) + bwz (log pJPl) + bz (log mlp*) (22b)
\H =1,B =!)] + &
bzg (log pjpg) + bwg (log pjpg) + bg (log m/p*) (22c)
where H = 1 if the individual participates in the labor force, B = 1 if the 
individual receives employee benefits, F, are parameters, and £, repre 
sent error terms that have zero means conditional on both the individu 
als decision to work and receive employee benefits.
The system of share equations can be estimated using Zellner's 
two-step (or iterative) Feasible Generalized Least Squares procedure or 
maximum likelihood, which is suitable for constrained, singular sys 
tems. One share equation is deleted from the system of equations to 
avoid singularity, because the share equations sum to 1 . The choice of 
which equation to delete is arbitrary and has no effect on the empirical 
results. Data limitations motivate the deletion of the market goods and 
services equation; however, we capture the market goods share from 
our estimation. Also, the price of market goods and services, pg , is nor 
malized to 1 to further simplify the system.
The estimates of the demand system are used to compute the own- 
price, cross-price, and income elasticities of demand. Confidence inter 
vals are constructed for the elasticities by computing the large- sample 
variance of each elasticity (see Kmenta 1986, p. 486).
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DATA
The data for this study come from the April 1993 Current Popula 
tion Survey (CPS). This survey included an employee-benefits supple 
ment in which detailed questions were asked on employer-provided 
pension plans and health insurance plans. With respect to employer- 
provided pension plans, respondents to the supplemental questions 
were asked if their employer or union sponsored a pension plan for 
anyone in their company and whether they were included in the plan. 
Detailed questions were also asked about the type of plan. From the 
survey, we can determine whether the individual was included in a 
defined-benefit plan or a defined-contribution plan and the type of 
defined-contribution plan (i.e., profit sharing, employee stock owner 
ship plan, 401k plan, salary reduction plan, etc.). An additional set of 
questions was asked about any salary reduction plans (i.e. 401k, 403b, 
etc.), the amount the individual contributed to the plan, and the amount 
of the contribution that the employer matched.
Salary reduction pension plan data is highly suitable to our model 
because it allows individuals to make choices about their level of con 
tributions to the pension plan. Unlike a defined-benefit plan where a 
worker's retirement benefit is determined by an equation, usually based 
on age, years of service, and final pay—an equation that the worker has 
little control over—a defined-contribution plan with a salary reduction 
component allows a worker more flexibility at the margin in determin 
ing their degree of participation in the plan. Workers are allowed to 
determine how much they want to contribute to the plan on a pre-tax 
basis, and many plans allow workers to change their level of contribu 
tions on a regular basis (i.e., once a month) so that workers are not con 
strained to their choice of contribution level for a long period of time. 
This flexibility is highly desirable when trying to model workers' pref 
erences for pension benefits.
While the CPS also includes data on health insurance plans, the 
data are not detailed enough to yield information about the cost of the 
plan. Respondents to the survey were asked about employer sponsor 
ship of a health insurance plan, their participation, and whether the 
plan also covered family members. The survey does not ask whether 
the worker has a choice of health insurance options or the relative cost
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of those options. In this survey, a worker with three options would be 
treated the same as a worker with only one option. In addition, the cost 
of health insurance is not as optimal as pension plan contributions for 
the model presented in this chapter because workers can not typically 
switch health insurance plans on a regular basis, assuming they even 
have a choice of health insurance plans. Open enrollment, where avail 
able, is usually limited to once per year.
The sample used in this paper is limited to the noninstitutionalized 
civilian population between the ages of 18 and 64. Active duty military 
personnel and the self-employed are not included in the sample, result 
ing in a sample of 37,975 working and nonworking males and 42,875 
working and nonworking females. This sample is used to provide esti 
mates of the bivariate probit model, which is used to correct the system 
of demand equations for selectivity bias. The system of demand equa 
tions is corrected for selectivity bias because it is only estimated with 
data on workers participating in a salary reduction pension plan. This 
results in a selected sample of 2,129 males and 1,544 females. Sample 
means and variable definitions are provided in Table 3.
From the CPS, the following variables are needed to estimate the 
system of demand equations:
1) Share of Leisure Time, Sw :
The share of leisure time is measured as the percentage of full- 
income spent on the consumption of leisure. This is computed as
Total available time, T, is assumed to be equal to 5,840 hours, which is 
the total time available in a given year, given time for sleep. Nonwage 
income, Yn , is measured as total personal unearned income.
2) Share of Pension Plan Contributions, Sz : 
The share of pension plan contributions is computed as follows:
The shadow price of pension plan contributions is measured using 
the workers' marginal tax rate, as discussed in the next section. The
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amount of pension plan contributions, B, is calculated as the annual 
employee contribution to the salary reduction pension plan and does 
not include any match provided by the employer.
3) Price of Pension Plan Contributions, Pz :
The worker's marginal tax rate is used as a proxy for the shadow 
price of the pension plan. As mentioned above, this variable has been 
used extensively in previous research. It should be noted, however, 
that the use of the marginal tax rate has two potential shortcomings. 
First, the marginal tax rate is correlated with income. Higher income 
workers are in higher marginal tax rates. While this may present a 
problem in this study because real total compensation is used as an 
explanatory variable, price and income should have independent 
effects on the share equations. Second, the possibility exists that a 
worker will lower their marginal tax rate by increasing their contribu 
tions to their pension plan. However, a worker's ability to contribute to 
a pension plan on a pre-tax basis is limited by constraints set by the 
Internal Revenue Service, which minimizes the severity of this prob 
lem. In 1993, workers could not contribute more than $9,200 to a 401k 
plan and $9,500 to a 403b plan on a pre-tax basis.
Assumptions about an individual's tax-filing status are made from 
the various demographic characteristics provided in the CPS. Each 
individual's tax-filing status is based on their marital status and the 
number of dependent children. It is assumed that all married and sepa 
rated individuals file a joint tax return. Widowed, divorced, and never 
married individuals are assumed to file as heads of household if they 
have dependent children, otherwise they are assumed to file as single 
taxpayers. Standard deductions and personal exemptions from taxable 
income are based on the number of dependents in the family.
The marginal tax rate is computed from both federal and state 
income tax forms. Local taxes, where applicable, and the social secu 
rity payroll tax are not included in the marginal tax rate. Given limita 
tions on geographic region in the CPS, it is impossible to calculate 
local income tax rates. In addition, previous research has shown that 
estimates of the demand for employee benefits are commonly unaf 
fected by the inclusion of the Social Security payroll tax (Woodbury 
and Hamermesh 1992; Woodbury and Bettinger 1991).
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Table 3 Sample Means and Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
Sw leisure share
Sz benefit share
Sg goods and services share
pw price of leisure
pt price of benefits
m/P* real total compensation
AGE age
AGESQ age squared
MARRIED =1 if married
WIDOWED =1 if widowed
DIVORCED =1 if divorced
SEPARATE =1 if separated
SINGLE =1 if never married
OWNKIDS number of own children under age 18
EDUC1 =1 if some school
EDUC2 =1 if high school graduate
EDUC3 = 1 if college graduate
EDUC4 =1 if completed graduate school
WHITE =1 if white, non-Hispanic
BLACK =1 if black, non-Hispanic
HISPANIC =1 if Hispanic
OTHRACE =1 if other race
UNION =1 if union worker
FULLTIME =1 if full-time worker
WHITECOL=1 if white collar
BLUECOL =1 if blue collar
SERVCOL =1 if service collar
FS 1 = 1 if 1-24 employees
FS2 = 1 if 25-49 employees
FS3 =1 if 50-99 employees
Males
0.59
0.01
0.40
16.02
0.21
9827.97
40.82
1761.98
0.79
0.01
0.08
0.01
0.12
1.34
0.02
0.51
0.28
0.18
0.91
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.21
0.99
0.67
0.28
0.05
0.06
0.03
0.06
Females
0.63
0.01
0.37
11.91
0.21
6859.48
40.59
1748.35
0.63
0.03
0.15
0.02
0.16
1.11
0.02
0.62
0.24
0.12
0.88
0.06
0.03
0.04
0.19
0.94
0.87
0.09
0.04
0.08
0.03
0.04
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Variable
FS4
FS5
MATCH
Fw
Fz
Definition
=1 if 100-249 employees
=1 if 250 or more employees
=1 if employer matches contribution
Selectivity term in leisure equation
Selectivity term in benefit equation
Males
0.07
0.78
0.65
020
0.21
Females
0.07
0.78
0.59
0.15
0.16
4) Price of Leisure Time, pw :
The price of leisure time (the after tax hourly wage rate) is mea 
sured using observed data from the CPS. The hourly wage rate was 
calculated based on usual hours of work per week, weeks worked per 
year, and annual earnings. In some cases where weeks worked per 
year was missing, the mean (51.5) was substituted.
5) Real After-Tax Total Compensation, m:
The measure of real total compensation is obtained by summing 
after-tax annual earnings with annual pension plan contributions and 
dividing by the price index, p*.
6) Price Index,/?*:
Using Stone's (1953) price index, some researchers have approxi 
mated/?* as:
log p* = Sw (log Pw) + Sz (log /?z) + Sg (log Pg)
and have found this to be a good approximation of the price index 
(Anderson and Blundell 1983, 1984; Deaton and Muellbauer 1980; 
Kang 1983; and Woodbury and Huang 1991). We follow this approach 
to estimate the price index. When pg is normalized to 1, the last term 
drops out.
7) Demographic Variables that Affect the Share of Leisure and the 
Share of Pension Plan Contributions:
A vector of demographic variables affecting both the share of lei 
sure and the share of pension plan contributions includes controls for
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the following: age, marital status, number of children, race, education, 
union status, occupation, industry, firm size, and geographic region.
Two variables are included to control for age: age (AGE) and age- 
squared (AGESQ). We expect age to have a nonlinear effect on the 
demand for leisure with the oldest workers having a greater demand for 
leisure as they transition out of the labor force. With respect to pension 
plan contributions, we expect age to always have a positive effect. As 
workers age, they will have less time to take advantage of compound 
interest, and they will also realize the need to start saving for retire 
ment. Thus, they will make larger contributions to their pension plans.
A set of dummy variables on marital status (WIDOWED, 
DIVORCED, SEPARATE, SINGLE) are also included in both the lei 
sure demand equation and the employee benefit demand equation 
(MARRIED is the base group). We expect to find differences in pen 
sion plan contributions between males and females and across marital 
status. Unmarried women are expected to be less likely to demand lei 
sure time and more likely to contribute to pension plans than married 
women. Our expectations are based on previous research, which has 
shown that unmarried women are less likely to intend to retire early 
than married women because they have access to fewer resources than 
married women (Holtmann et al. 1994). The marital status of men, 
however, has not been shown to affect their plans to retire early. We 
expect similar results in this study. In addition, we expect the number 
of children (OWNKIDS) to have an effect on both the share of leisure 
and the share of pension plan contributions. Workers with more chil 
dren are more likely to demand leisure time than workers without chil 
dren in order to spend more time with their children. With respect to 
pension plan contributions, workers with children are expected to con 
tribute less to their pension plan because of the additional expenses 
needed to raise children, all else being equal.
Race has been shown to be correlated with the probability that an 
individual works, therefore, we include a set of dummy variables 
(BLACK, HISPANIC, OTHRACE) to determine whether race plays a 
role in the share of leisure demanded (given that an individual is 
already working) and the share of pension plan contributions 
demanded (given that a worker participates in a salary reduction pen 
sion plan; WHITE is the base group).
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Education variables (EDUC2, EDUC3, and EDUC4) are included 
in the model as well (EDUC1 is the base group). We expect more edu 
cated workers to demand less leisure time because of the implicit 
demands of a job that are correlated with education. In addition, we 
expect more educated workers to demand a greater share of their total 
income in the form of pension plan contributions. More educated 
workers are more likely to be able to evaluate and understand the 
advantages of contributing to their pension plan than less educated 
workers. More educated workers may also be more comfortable 
directing their asset allocation decisions.
With respect to employment characteristics, variables are included 
to control for union membership, occupation, industry, and firm size. 
We expect union membership (UNION) to increase a worker's demand 
for leisure because the union may be better able to negotiate a fixed 
work schedule. Our expectations of union membership on pension 
plan contributions are less clear. While unions may be better able to 
educate their members about the advantages of contributing to a pen 
sion plan, union members are typically more likely to have an 
employer-funded defined-benefit plan. Therefore, there may be no 
need to contribute to a defined-contribution pension plan in addition to 
the defined-benefit plan.
The set of dummy variables to control for occupation include a 
variable for white collar workers (the base group), a variable to control 
for blue collar workers (BLUECOL), and a variable to control for ser 
vice collar workers (SERVCOL). 10 With respect to firm size, we 
expect workers employed in large firms to have a greater demand for 
pension plan contributions because large firms typically have better 
educational programs and materials concerning the advantages of con 
tributing to a pension plan than a small firm. Dummy variables are 
included to control for firms with 1-24 workers (FSl=the base group), 
25^9 workers (FS2), 50-99 workers (FS3), 100-249 workers (FS4), 
and 250 or more workers (FS5).
8) Demographic Variables which Affect Only Pension Plan 
Contributions:
Two additional employment related variables are only included in 
the share of pension plan contributions equation. A dummy variable is 
include to control for whether the worker was employed part time or
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full time (FULLTIME), and a dummy variable was included to control 
for whether the employer offered a match to the workers' contributions 
to the pension plan (MATCH). The direction of the effect of the 
employer match is unclear because of two potential offsetting effects. 
On one hand, we expect the presence of an employer match to have a 
positive effect on a worker's contribution to a pension plan. If an 
employer offers a dollar-for-dollar match, a worker may contribute 
more to the plan because the opportunity cost of not contributing is 
higher when the match is forgone. Alternatively, the availability of an 
employer match may result in a worker contributing less to the plan if 
the match acts as a substitute for the worker's own contributions. 11
RESULTS
Bivariate Probit Model
Table 4 contains the results from the bivariate probit model used to 
estimate selectivity corrected estimates of the model on leisure demand 
and employee benefits demand. As mentioned previously, the bivariate 
probit model is estimated with sample selection because we assume 
that only workers will receive employee benefits. The results of the 
bivariate probit model are worth briefly mentioning. Separate equa 
tions are estimated for males and females. A likelihood-ratio test for 
equality of coefficients in the male and female equations rejects the 
hypothesis that the two equations are the same.
With respect to the labor supply equation, we find that the proba 
bility of working is positively related to age until an individual reaches 
age 55, at which point the probability of working decreases as com 
pared with the aged 18-24 base group. These results are consistent for 
both males and females.
The effects of marital status on the probability of working are not 
consistent for males and females. Married males are more likely to be 
working than their unmarried counterparts. Divorced, separated, and 
never married women, however, are more likely to be working than 
married or widowed women, suggesting that unmarried women have
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fewer resources than married women, and thus have a greater incentive 
to participate in the labor force.
The effect of education is consistent for males and females: there is 
a higher probability of participating in the labor force the more educa 
tion an individual attains. Race is also generally consistent for males 
and females, with nonwhites less likely to be participating in the labor 
force than whites, with the exception of Hispanic males. In addition, 
the more children an individual has, the less likely they are to be partic 
ipating in the labor force. This is an interesting result because most 
individuals with children would be expected to need the resources that 
can be derived from working. It is not surprising, however, that the 
effect is over three times larger for females than it is for males because 
single parent families headed by women are more likely to qualify for 
public assistance.
Given that an individual is working, we find the following results 
with respect to participation in a salary reduction pension plan. For 
both males and females, age effects are strongest for younger workers, 
implying that older workers are more likely to have a defined benefit 
plan or less likely to have any type of pension plan. Marital status 
appears to play an important role in the probability of whether a 
worker participates in a salary reduction pension plan, with different 
effects for males and females. Unmarried males are less likely than 
married and widowed males to be participating in a salary reduction 
pension plan. Divorced women, on the other hand, are more likely to 
be participating in a salary reduction pension plan than all other 
women. This result suggests that divorced women may have lost their 
rights to their husbands' pension benefits and must accumulate their 
own resources for retirement.
Education has a strong linear effect on the probability that a 
worker participates in a salary reduction pension plan. Race has a 
strong negative effect, with nonwhites having a lower probability of 
participating in a salary reduction pension plan than whites. Number 
of children also has a negative effect on the probability of participating 
in a salary reduction pension plan.
With respect to characteristics associated with the labor market, we 
find statistically significant effects for union membership, hours of 
work, occupation, and firm size. Union membership is found to 
decrease the probability that a worker participates in a salary reduction
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Table 4 Bivariate Probit Model Estimates for Labor Supply Equation 
and Employee Benefit Equation
Male
Constant
AGE2
AGES
AGE4
AGES
WIDOWED
DIVORCED
SEPARATE
SINGLE
EDUC2
EDUC3
EDUC4
BLACK
HISPANIC
OTHRACE
OWNKIDS
Employee 
benefit 
equation
-3.646***
(0.120)
0.470***
(0.059)
0.520***
(0.060)
0.496***
(0.062)
0.284***
(0.068)
-0.128
(0.157)
-0.108***
(0.041)
-0.262***
(0.091)
-0.273***
(0.035)
0 434***
(0.052)
0.681***
(0.060)
0.698***
(0.062)
-0.408***
(0.056)
-0.193***
(0.058)
-0.238***
(0.059)
-0.025***
(0.009)
Labor supply 
equation
-0.491***
(0.031)
0.116***
(0.023)
0.121***
(0.026)
0.078***
(0.028)
-0.187***
(0.031)
-0.326***
(0.084)
-0.141***
(0.026)
-0.130***
(0 047)
-0.168***
(0.019)
0.195***
(0.020)
0.270***
(0.025)
0.316***
(0.030)
-0.140***
(0.024)
0.009
(0.026)
-0.170***
(0.032)
-0.017***
(0.005)
Female
Employee 
benefit 
equation
—3 457***
(0.095)
0.445***
(0.056)
0.516***
(0.057)
0.532***
(0.059)
0.271***
(0.067)
0.061
(0.076)
0.087**
(0.035)
-0.072
(0.076)
0.024
(0.034)
0.505***
(0.061)
0.646***
(0.067)
0.636***
(0.072)
-0.346***
(0.049)
-0.265***
(0.064)
-0.074
(0.061)
-0.093***
(0.010)
Labor supply 
equation
-0.878***
(0.031)
0.106***
(0.023)
0.170***
(0.025)
0.138***
(0.026)
-0.223***
(0.030)
-0.027
(0.039)
0.182***
(0.021)
0.067*
(0.038)
0.109***
(0.019)
0.364***
(0.021)
0.477***
(0.026)
0511***
(0.033)
-0.085***
(0.022)
-0.070***
(0.027)
-0.091***
(0.031)
-0.068***
(0.005)
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UNION
FULLTIME
SERVCOL
BLUECOL
FS2
FS3
FS4
FS5
P
n
logL
Male
Employee 
benefit Labor supply 
equation equation
-0.152***
(0.028)
0.672***
(0.088)
-0.299*** -
(0.049)
_0.12l***
(0.027)
0.592***
(0.059)
0.909***
(0.051)
0.883***
(0.049)
1.109***
(0.037)
0.963***
(0.202)
37,975
-29,179.1
Female
Employee 
benefit 
equation
-0.145***
(0.030)
0.443***
(0.041)
-0.431***
(0.053)
-0.057
(0.040)
0.373***
(0.069)
0.626***
(0.060)
0.669***
(0.053)
0.900***
(0.035)
0.987
(9.563)
42,875
-29,340.5
Labor supply 
equation
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
NOTE: Age dummies represent the following categones: AGEl =1 if aged 18-24 (base 
group), AGE2 =1 if aged 25-34, AGE3 =1 if aged 35-44, AGE4 =1 if aged 45-54, 
and AGES =1 if aged 55-64. All other variables are defined in Table 3. Standard 
errors in parentheses.
"**significant at the 1% level. 
**significant at the 5% level. 
*significant at the 10% level.
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pension plan. Because of collective bargaining agreements, union 
members are more likely to have a defined-benefit plan funded by the 
employer. Full-time workers are more likely than part-time workers 
and white collar workers are more likely than blue collar and service 
collar workers to participate in salary reduction plans. In addition, 
workers employed in large firms are more likely to participate in salary 
reduction pension plans than workers in small firms. These results are 
generally consistent for both males and females.
Finally, the correlation coefficient between the labor supply equa 
tion and the salary reduction pension plan equation, p, is statistically 
significant for males but not for females.
AIDS Model Results
Table 5 contains the estimated coefficients from the AIDS model. 
The adjusted R2 for males and females is 0.89 and 0.90, respectively, 
for the leisure share equation, and 0.40 for both males and females for 
the salary reduction pension plan equation.
The parameters on the price and income variables are significant in 
most cases for both males and females. However, the estimated own- 
price, cross-price, and income elasticities presented in Table 6, give us 
a better understanding of the effects in the model. Therefore, we first 
discuss the results of the demographic and labor-market variables and 
then discuss the estimated elasticities.
Returning to the results in Table 5, we find consistent nonlinear 
effects of age on the share of leisure time for both males and females. 
At first, an increase in age reduces the demand for leisure time 
(increases time spent at work) and eventually increases the demand for 
leisure time. Predictions from the model indicate that males will start 
to increase their demand for leisure time at age 52.75, while females 
will increase their demand for leisure time at age 47.25. With respect 
to pension plan contributions, we find significant positive effects of age 
for males, but insignificant effects for females.
As mentioned previously, we expect marital status to have different 
effects for males and females on the share of leisure and the share of 
pension plan contributions. For males, we find that separated and 
never married males demand a greater share of leisure than married, 
widowed, and divorced males. For females, we find that all nonmar-
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ried females demand a smaller share of leisure than their married 
female counterparts. With respect to pension plan contributions, mari 
tal status has no effect for males (with the exception of a small negative 
effect for separated males). Divorced females, on the other hand, have 
a significantly lower share demand for pension plan contributions than 
all other females. This may suggest that given their budget constraints, 
divorced females choose to spend less on pension plan contributions 
than other females. While we expected unmarried women to be spend 
ing a greater share of their income on pension plan contributions, the 
effect of marital status appears to be working through the probability of 
participating in the pension plan (the bivariate probit model), as 
opposed to the amount contributed once participation has been deter 
mined.
The number of children exerts consistent positive effects on leisure 
demand for both males and females. Both males and females appear to 
demand a greater share of leisure the more children they have. With 
respect to pension plan contributions, the number of children has a 
negative effect on the share of pension plan contributions for males and 
an insignificant effect for females.
Our results for race are in large part consistent for both males and 
females in both the leisure share equation and the pension plan contri 
bution share equation. We find that nonwhites demand a greater share 
of their income in the form of leisure than whites. For males, there is 
no effect of race on pension plan contributions (any difference appears 
in the probability of participating model), while black females demand 
a greater share of pension plan contributions than females of other 
races.
With respect to education, we find consistent effects for males and 
females in the leisure share equation but not in the benefits share equa 
tion. We find that increasing levels of education result in a decreased 
demand for the share of leisure time, indicating that higher levels of 
education are associated with increasing shares of work time. Higher 
education levels result in a greater share demand of benefits for males, 
while education has no effect on the share demand of benefits for 
females.
With respect to the variables associated with the labor market, we 
find the following. Hours of work do not exert a significant effect on 
pension plan contributions for males, but do exert a negative effect for
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Table 5 Estimated Coefficients of the Leisure Share and
Benefit Share Equations
"w
az
as
"ww
bwg
bwz
bzz
bzg
bgg
bw
bz
bg
Males
2.001***
(0.021)
-0.011**
(0.005)
-0.990***
(0.021)
0.079***
(0.002)
-0.079***
(0.002)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.003***
(0.001)
0.003***
(0.001)
0.076***
(0.002)
-0.175***
(0.001)
0.003***
(0.000)
0.171***
(0.001)
Females
2.021***
(0.024)
-0.002
(0.005)
-1.019***
(0.025)
0.080***
(0.002)
-0.080***
(0.002)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.003***
(0.000)
0.003***
(0.001)
0.077***
(0.002)
-0.176***
(0.002)
0.003***
(0.000)
0.173***
(0.002)
AGE
AGESQ
Variables Variables
in leisure in benefits
equation equation
-0.00211*** 0.00037**
(0.00069) (0.00015)
0.00002*** 0.00000**
(0.00001) (0.00000)
Variables Variables
in leisure in benefits
equation equation
-0.00189*** -0.00014
(0.00064) (0.00013)
0.00002** 0.00000
(0.00001) (0.00000)
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Males
WIDOWED
DIVORCED
SEPARATE
SINGLE
OWNKIDS
BLACK
HISPANIC
OTHRACE
EDUC2
EDUC3
EDUC4
FULLTIME
UNION
BLUECOL
SERVCOL
Variables 
in leisure 
equation
-0.00403
(0.00915)
0.00389
(0.00262)
0.01448**
(0.00649)
0.01155***
(0.00294)
0.00282***
(0.00057)
0.01321***
(0.00468)
0.01065***
(0.00401)
0.00974**
(0.00442)
-0.01816***
(0.00456)
-0.02373***
(0.00597)
-0.02240***
(0.00623)
-
0.00621***
(0.00210)
0.00608***
(0.00205)
-0.00003
(0.00406)
Variables 
in benefits 
equation
-0.00301
(0.00192)
-0.00084
(0.00056)
-0.00247*
(0.00137)
-0.00003
(0.00065)
-0.00034***
(0.00012)
-0.00025
(0.00103)
-0 00077
(0.00086)
0.00031
(0.00094)
0.00180*
(0.00099)
0.00240*
(0.00133)
0.00327**
(0.00139)
0.00139
(0.00176)
-0.00055
(0.00046)
-0.00055
(0.00044)
-0.00017
(0.00088)
Females
Variables 
in leisure 
equation
-0.02579***
(0.00391)
-0.02310***
(0.00199)
-0.01130***
(0.00429)
-0.00728***
(0.00190)
0.00400***
(0.00081)
0.01865***
(0.00336)
0.01020***
(0.00412)
0.01106***
(0.00373)
-0.00824*
(0.00462)
-0.01340***
(0.00520)
-0.01785***
(0.00540)
-
0.00521***
(0.00198)
0.00264
(0.00264)
0.01222***
(0.00407)
Variables 
in benefits 
equation
-0.00100
(0.00068)
-0.00115***
(0.00036)
-0.00102
(0.00074)
-0.00027
(0.00033)
0.00009
(0.00016)
0.00145**
(0.00064)
-0.00027
(0.00074)
0.00052
(0.00065)
-0.00089
(0.00083)
-0.00104
(0.00098)
-0.00087
(0.00102)
-0.00286***
(0.00075)
0.00113***
(0.00037)
0.00039
(0.00046)
0.00062
(0.00074)
(continued)
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Table 5 (continued)
Males
FS2
FS3
FS4
FS5
MATCH
Selectivity term
adjusted R2
n
Variables 
in leisure 
equation
-0.01585***
(0.00537)
-0.01823***
(0.00608)
-0.02029***
(0.00590)
-0.02734***
(0.00699)
-
0.18142***
(0.03589)
0.89
2,129
Variables 
in benefits 
equation
0.00081
(0.00117)
0.00246*
(0.00138)
0.00274**
(0.00135)
0.00382**
(0.00162)
0.00031
(0.00030)
-0.02078**
(0.00821)
0.40
1,544
Females
Variables 
in leisure 
equation
0.00162
(0.00461)
-0.01401***
(0.00439)
-0.00541
(0.00413)
-0.02113***
(0.00445)
-
0.18941***
(0.02867)
0.90
Variables 
in benefits 
equation
-0.00021
(0.00080)
-0.00070
(0.00082)
-0.00154**
(0.00079)
-0.00168*
(0.00094)
-0.00019
(0.00024)
0.01588**
(0.00646)
0.40
NOTE: Estimation results from applying an iterative unweighted version of Zellner's 
seemingly unrelated regression equations. The dependent variables are the shares of 
total full income received as leisure consumption and employee benefit share. 
Asymptotic standard error shown in parentheses. Each equation includes a set of 
two-digit industry dummy variables, and eight region variables, in addition to the 
control variables shown.
Standard errors in parentheses.
***significant at the 1% level. 
**sigmficant at the 5% level. 
*significant at the 10% level.
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Table 6 Price and Income Elasticities
Males Females
Uncompensated price elasticities
Mtvw
T\zz
\g
1\wz
*W
T\ wg
T|gw
r\ zg
%
Compensated price elasticities
n*'1 ww
T\*zz
T|*gg
T)*wz
n*M zw
n*wg
nV
n*zg
^*gz
Income elasticities
Ivvrn
T\zm
\m
-0.691
-1.450
-0.984
0.002
-0.261
0.572
-0.445
0.266
0.005
-0.278
-1.439
-0.409
0.008
0.590
0.270
0.393
0.850
0016
0.703
1.446
1.424
(0.003)
(0.072)
(0.004)
(0 001)
(0.043)
(0.003)
(0.004)
(0.076)
(0.002)
(0.003)
(0.072)
(0.005)
(0.001)
(0.048)
(0.003)
(0.004)
(0.084)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.043)
(0.004)
-0.696
-1.547
-0.965
0.002
-0.314
0.555
-0.512
0334
0.006
-0.246
-1.538
-0.424
0.006
0.643
0240
0.410
0.895
0.014
0.718
1.527
1.472
(0.003)
(0.074)
(0.005)
(0.001)
(0.050)
(0.003)
(0.005)
(0.084)
(0.002)
(0.003)
(0.074)
(0.005)
(0.001)
(0.054)
(0.003)
(0.005)
(0.096)
(0.002)
(0.003)
(0.059)
(0.005)
NOTE: Elasticities computed from the parameter estimates displayed in Table 5. Stan 
dard error of each elasticity is in parentheses next to each elasticity. Standard errors 
are computed by taking a Taylor series approximation at the sample mean.
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females. Union status significantly increases the demand for leisure 
for both males and females. It has no effect on pension plan contribu 
tions for males but has a positive, significant effect for females. Occu 
pation also has no effect on pension plan contributions for both males 
and females. On the other hand, firm size plays an important role in 
pension plan contributions, but the results for males and females are 
mixed. We find that male workers employed in larger firms contribute 
a larger share of income to pension plans than workers in small firms, 
but the opposite is true for females. In addition, an employer match 
does not significantly affect a worker's pension plan contributions.
Finally, we find evidence of selectivity bias for males and females 
in both the leisure share equation and the pension plan contribution 
share equation. Note, however, that the signs on the selectivity correc 
tion term are inconsistent for males and females and may be due to the 
fact that the estimated correlation between the error terms in the bivari- 
ate probit model was insignificant for females.
Elasticities
The estimated coefficients shown in Table 5 are used to estimate 
uncompensated, compensated, and income elasticities. These elastici 
ties, computed at the sample mean, along with each standard error 
(shown in parentheses next to the elasticity) are shown in Table 6. The 
uncompensated own-price elasticities are all statistically significant 
and of the correct sign. Our results suggest that a 10 percent increase 
in the wage rate would reduce the share of leisure by 6.91 percent for 
males and 6.96 percent for females. We find that a 10 percent increase 
in the price of a pension plan (that is, a 10 percent decrease in the mar 
ginal tax rate) results in a 14.5 percent decrease in the share of income 
contributed to a salary reduction pension plan for males and a 15.5 per 
cent decrease for females, suggesting that pension plan contributions 
are very elastic with respect to a worker's marginal tax rate. We also 
find a nearly unitary own-price elasticity for other goods and services.
The uncompensated cross-price elasticities yield interesting 
results. We find no effect between the share of leisure time and the 
price of pension plans. However, we do find a negative effect between 
wages and pension plan contributions, suggesting that pension plan 
contributions and wages are gross substitutes. We find that a 10 per-
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cent decrease in the wage rate results in a 2.61 percent increase in pen 
sion plan contributions for males and a 3.14 percent decrease for 
females. Both males and females behave as we would expect when 
facing an employer's wage-benefit trade-off curve. The other uncom- 
pensated cross-price elasticities suggest that pension plan contributions 
and other goods and services are gross complements, while the results 
are mixed for the share of leisure and other goods and services.
The income elasticities are all positive and significant, indicating 
that all of the goods are normal goods. The results suggest that the 
share of leisure is income inelastic, while the share of pension plan 
contributions and market goods and services are income elastic.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, the simple static model of labor supply is extended 
to incorporate the demand for employee benefits. Traditionally, labor- 
supply models have ignored employee benefits, even though they have 
become a significant component of total compensation during the 20th 
century. The model presented in this paper incorporates the demand 
for employee benefits by assuming that the demand for employee ben 
efits, the demand for leisure time, and the demand for market goods 
and services are determined simultaneously. Previous studies assumed 
that labor supply decisions were exogenous to the demand for 
employee benefits. In addition, previous studies have only modeled 
the separate components of employee benefits. The model presented in 
this paper is flexible enough to include all employee benefits.
Our results, determined using data from the April 1993 Current 
Population Survey, are consistent with economic theory. We find that 
the income elasticity of worker contributions to a pension plan is 
approximately 1.5, indicating that if worker income increased by 10 
percent, contributions to a pension plan would increase by 15 percent. 
This result is consistent with previous findings. We also find that pen 
sion plan contributions are sensitive to a worker's marginal tax rate. 
This result is consistent with Woodbury and Huang (1991), who found 
that pension plan contributions would fall between 50 and 64 percent if 
their tax-preferred status was removed. We also find evidence of a
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trade-off between wages and employee benefits and the magnitude of 
the effect is consistent with adjustments for a worker's marginal tax 
rate.
While a joint model of employee benefits and labor supply is pre 
sented in this paper, data limitations allowed us to estimate the model 
only for pension plan contributions. The model presented in this paper 
is flexible enough to incorporate all employee benefits. As more data 
on the composition and cost of employee benefits becomes available at 
the micro level, future research should be able to estimate more 
detailed models.
Notes
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and should not be construed 
as representing the opinions or policies of the Employee Benefit Research Institute or 
any sponsoring agencies.
1. Those workers with single coverage may not need family coverage if there are no 
dependents.
2. Some of the evidence attributes the lower turnover rates to nonportability and 
backloading of pensions. Other studies present evidence that pension-covered 
jobs offer higher levels of total compensation; hence, the compensation premium 
accounts for the lower turnover rate.
3. Unionization and the role of collective bargaining have also been shown to affect 
an employer's decision to offer employee benefits (Freeman 1981; Belman and 
Hey wood 1991).
4. This is the maximum wage rate that the individual would earn, based on their 
human capital and other characteristics, when no employee benefits were 
received.
5. The parameter pz represents the rate of exchange between wages and employee 
benefits on the boundary of the employee's choice set Competition will tend to 
bring pz into equality both with the price at which workers would buy benefits in 
the market and with the employer's marginal cost of providing the benefits (see 
Atrostic [1982] and Triplet! [1983]).
6. Leisure refers to hours not worked that are not paid for by the employer. Paid 
vacation, sick leave, and other paid time away from work are included in 
employee benefits. For the purposes of this study, time used for home production 
is included as leisure time.
7 In the Rotterdam model, the demand function is estimated in the logarithm of dif 
ferentials instead of in levels of differentials.
8. The income term, log(m //?*), can be derived using the following steps. For a util 
ity maximizing individual, total expenditures is a function of utility and prices.
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The expenditure function can be inverted to give utility as a function of income 
and prices. We can do this for the expenditure function given in Eq. 12 and substi 
tute the result into the budget share Eq 13 to get the budget share equations as a 
function of income and prices.
9. See Michalopoulos et al. (1992) for an application of this method to child-care 
demand.
10. Service collar workers include those employed as private household service work 
ers, protective service workers, and other service workers.
11. The size of the match would be a better measure of employer contributions to the 
plan than whether a match is available. Unfortunately, data on the size of the 
employer match was missing for nearly a third of the sample.
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3 The Economics of Family and
Medical Leave in Canada
and the United States
Eileen Trzcinski 
Wayne State University
William T. Alpert 
University of Connecticut
This chapter explores the basic premise that family and medical 
leave consists of two separate analytical components: the wage 
replacement component and the job guarantee component. In legisla 
tion and in private businesses, these two components typically are dealt 
with separately. In the United States, for example, the Federal Family 
and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) provides job-guaranteed leave but no 
wage replacement. Canada has legislation that compels businesses to 
provide job guarantees during leave and legislation that grants wage 
replacement administered through the unemployment insurance sys 
tem. This dual system is also evident in the private practices of busi 
nesses where paid sick leave policies are separate from policies that 
deal with job guarantees.
The central hypothesis underlying this premise is that the factors 
that determine the provision of wage replacement during leave differ 
from the determinants of whether or not a job guarantee is provided. In 
general this hypothesis implies that differences exist in the factors that 
determine the provision of paid versus unpaid leave. It is specifically 
hypothesized that the determinants of paid leave are similar to those 
that account for other fringe benefits. Conversely, it is also hypothe 
sized that the provision of unpaid leave will not be as fully explained 
by the standard reduced form demand models specifying fringe benefit 
determination as will the provision of paid leave. Instead, it is conjec 
tured that the provision of unpaid leave can be explained by models 
that stress issues such as workplace efficiency, hours of work, and/or 
determinants of managerial control.
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These hypotheses are tested through a combination of empirical 
approaches that involve 1) an examination of the incidence of leave in 
the United States and Canada and 2) estimation of the determinants of 
the incidence of leave and the conditions surrounding leave. In investi 
gating the determinants of the incidence of leave among firms, we rely 
on a standard theoretical and empirical model of fringe benefit deter 
mination. This model consists of the estimation of a reduced form 
demand equation for fringe benefits with various proxy variables repre 
senting fringe benefit prices and other factors hypothesized to influ 
ence the incidence or levels of fringe benefits. Although this paper 
provides information on legislative mandates and information on the 
incidence of private sector policies for both Canada and the United 
States, the empirical analyses are limited to the United States and are 
based on data from the U.S. Small Business Administration Leave Sur 
vey. Overall, the findings presented below lend support to our central 
hypotheses that family and medical leave consists of two separate ana 
lytical components—a wage replacement component and a job guaran 
tee component.
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF FAMILY AND MEDICAL 
LEAVE IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES
Canada and the United States offer an opportunity to perform natu 
ral experiments in comparative social policies. The two countries 
claim common political, legal, cultural, and constitutional legacies; 
federal configurations; remarkably similar standards of living; and 
diverse societies. Both are advanced industrial countries with substan 
tial primary and manufacturing sectors and dominant rapidly growing 
service sectors. Most recently, the adoption of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement by both countries and the passage of the Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms (Bill of Rights) in Canada are bound to make 
the two countries more similar.
Important differences between Canada and the United States do 
exist, however, and may grow—the melting pot versus the mosaic as 
metaphor for society, universal health care in one country with no 
equivalent system in the other, and numerous other distinctions ranging
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from Arctic policy to the status of urban minorities. Furthermore, Can 
ada continues to endure a constitutional crisis while the United States 
faces serious racial tensions. In the area of family leave policies, Can 
ada and the United States share the basic problems of the changing 
nature of the modern workforce, the altering roles of women and men 
in the workplace, the changing contributions of men and women to the 
workforce, and the shifting needs of families and businesses to be com 
petitive in global markets (see Labour Canada, Women's Bureau 
[1990] for a summary of the position of women in the workforce in 
Canada).
Canada and the United States have a common, well-known post- 
World War II labor-force experience. In 1991, 53 percent of all Cana 
dian women aged 15 and over were employed while in the United 
States 57 percent of women aged 16 and over were working. In both 
Canada and the United States, half of all new mothers enter or reenter 
the labor force within one year of their baby's birth. Married women 
accounted for nearly all the growth in female employment during the 
past decade in both countries. The employment rate among married 
women in Canada grew from 47 percent in 1981 to 56 percent in 1991. 
In the United States, the employment rate among married women 
jumped from 48 percent to an identical 56 percent during the same 
period. While women have historically experienced slightly higher 
unemployment rates than men, the unemployment rates of women and 
men have converged in both countries during the past several years.
In spite of progress in both countries, most women continue to 
work in traditionally "female dominated occupations," such as teach 
ing, nursing or related health professions, clerical, sales, and services. 
Currently, however, women are entering "nontraditional" careers at 
rates over five times greater than 30 years ago. The number of two- 
career couples has increased by more than a factor of four in Canada 
since 1960 and by a similar amount in the United States. In the United 
States, more than 25 percent of all babies are now being born to single 
women. In Canada, where the number has risen rapidly during the 
past decade, the percentage is now 24.7 percent. The 1991 birth rate in 
Canada was 15.3 per 1,000, while the 1991 rate for the United States 
was 16.7 per 1,000. Birth rates have increased slightly in both coun 
tries during the past few years (Statistics Canada 1993; U.S. Depart 
ment of Commerce 1993).
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In Canada, family and medical leave and benefits are provided 
through a combination of government mandates, private policies, and 
union contracts. Wage replacement for medical, maternity, and paren 
tal leaves are provided under the Canadian Unemployment Insurance 
program. After 20 weeks of covered earnings in the year prior to a 
benefit application, a worker may claim 15 weeks of maternity bene 
fits, 10 weeks of parental benefits, and 15 weeks of sickness benefits up 
to a maximum of 30 weeks of benefits per occurrence. Unemployment 
insurance covers 57 percent of insurable earnings up to a maximum 
amount. This figure is adjusted annually to reflect living cost changes. 
The maximum earnings covered in 1993 was Can$745.00 per week, 
yielding a maximum weekly benefit of Can$425.00. In addition, many 
Canadian employees are covered either by paid sick leave or a supple 
mental unemployment benefit plan that can pay up to 95 percent of the 
employee's salary, including the unemployment insurance "clawback," 
which is designed to limit the liability of the unemployment insurance 
system to highly compensated employees. 1 Additional maternity leave 
policies are also provided by the private sector but, as noted in the fol 
lowing section, private policies are less extensive for maternity leave 
than they are for medical reasons.
In 1992, the Canadian Unemployment Insurance system covered 
10.933 million workers and had 1.148 million "regular beneficiaries." 
Approximately 235,000 workers received special benefits, such as 
sickness or maternity benefits. About 2.5 percent of the female labor 
force claims maternity benefits in a year, an amount equal to about 1 
percent of the labor force. Tables 1 and 2 describe the growth of public 
payments for sickness, maternity, adoption, and parental leave in Can 
ada. Real family-leave-type benefits have grown rapidly for the past 
decade and a half in Canada, keeping pace with the growth of real reg 
ular unemployment benefits. Canada has relatively low take-up rates 
for family-leave-type benefits. It is possible that the low Canadian 
rates are caused by individuals who do not meet eligibility require 
ments, by those who find the replacement rate too low to warrant filing 
for unemployment insurance, and by those who are unaware of the 
possibility of receiving benefits. Finally, it might be that many individ 
uals use vacation, sick, and other paid leave time during their period of 
family responsibility.
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Table 1 Canadian Unemployment Insurance: Nominal and Real Benefit 
Payments by Type of Benefit and Percentage of Regular 
Payments (Nominal Can$)a
Year
1976
1980
1984
1988
1992
1993
Regular
6,357,234
[3,019,686]
5,578,202
[3,748,552]
9,551,002
[8,825,126]
8,166,124
[9,309,381]
13,508,947
[15,400,200]
12,776,735
[14,569,478]
Sickness
273,272
[129,804]
(4.3)
230,164
[154,670]
(4.1)
221,304
[204,559]
(3.4)
285,227
[325,159]
(3.5)
383,596
[437,299]
(2.8)
383,348
[437,017]
(3.0)
Maternity
293,947
[139,625]
(4.6)
349,324
[234,746]
(6.3)
428,483
[395,918]
(4.5)
488,301
[566,663]
(6.1)
732,562
[835,121]
(5.4)
707,604
[806,688]
(5.5)
Adoption
_b
-
-
-
3,324
[3,071]
-
4,140
[4,720]
-
4,570
[5,210]
-
4,427
[5,047]
—
Parental
-
-
-
-
-
-
_
-
431,525
[491,939]
(3-2)
432,630
[493,198]
(3.3)
SOURCE: Labour Division, Unemployment Insurance Statistics Section, 1994
a Values in brackets represent real Canadian dollars (CPI=100 in 1986). Percent of regular
payment given in parentheses. 
b - Not available or less than 0.1%.
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Table 2 Canadian Unemployment Insurance
Number of Weeks Paid by Type of Benefit and Percentage 
of Regular Benefit (in Can$)a
Year
1976
1980
1984
1988
1992
1993
Regular
32,419
31,262
55,130
46,696
60,821
56,728
Sickness
1,345 
(4.1)
1,210 
(3.8)
1,193
(2.2)
1,498 
(3.2)
1,714 
(2.8)
1,712 
(3.0)
Maternity
1,399 
(4.1)
1,806
(5.8)
2,218 
(4.0)
2,590 
(5.5)
3,062 
(5.0)
2,227 
(3.9)
Adoption
_b
-
15
18
16
15
Parental"
-
-
-
1,784 
(2.9)
1,747 
(3.1)
SOURCE: Labour Division, Unemployment Insurance Statistics Section 1994. 
a Percent of regular benefit in parentheses. 
b - Not available or less than 0.1%.
Job guarantees in Canada are mandated in provincial and territorial 
legislation for most workers on maternity and parental leave. In gen 
eral, Canadian women on maternity leave are guaranteed the same or 
comparable employment upon their return to work, their seniority is 
protected, and their benefits are continued. Most jurisdictions (except 
Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Yukon) have parental leave that allows 
either parent from 12 to 34 weeks of job-guaranteed leave to care for a 
newborn or newly adopted child. (See Labour Canada, Women's 
Bureau [1993, 1988, 1984]; Maldonado and McDonald [1993]; Cana 
dian Union of Public Employees [1991]; and Schwartz [1988] for cur 
rent and historical summaries of leave legislation in Canada.) 
Canadian law does not, however, provide specific provisions for job 
guarantees surrounding medical leave. Instead, Canadians must rely 
on interpretations of labor law regarding whether a termination of an 
employee by an employer on account of illness is justifiable. In Can 
ada, a contract can be terminated as a result of "frustration when it has 
become impossible of performance because of a supervening event
Family and Medical Leave 135
which is fortuitous and unforeseeable." In general, although there are 
certain exceptions, temporary incapacity by one of the parties does not 
result in frustration of the contract under Canadian law (Arthurs et al. 
1988).
Until 1993, leave in the United States was provided either at the 
discretion of the employer or mandated by state statute (for surveys of 
state leave statutes, see Finn-Stevenson & Trzcinski [1991] and the 
Women's Legal Defense Fund [1990]). With the exception of five 
states that provide temporary disability insurance, all wage replace 
ment during medical leave is provided through paid sick leave policies 
and private sickness and accident insurance. Paid leave for other fam 
ily reasons is largely unavailable. The Family and Medical Leave Act 
was signed into law in February 1993 and became effective in August 
1993. This legislation specifies that employees of companies with 50 
or more workers are entitled to 12 weeks of unpaid leave per year for 
childbirth, adoption, or to tend to the serious illness of a child, parent, 
spouse, or the employee himself.
The legislation guarantees the continuation of all fringe benefits 
(including health insurance). Upon return from leave, the employee 
must be provided with the same or equivalent job, and seniority rights 
must also be maintained. To be eligible, the employee must have 
worked at the company for at least one year and have worked a mini 
mum of 25 hours per week for that year. Under certain conditions, the 
company may deny leaves to "key employees," defined in the law as 
the highest paid 10 percent of its workforce. Finally, if the employer or 
the employee desires it, the person on leave must use accrued paid 
leave time for the leave in question. The law does not require, how 
ever, that the employer allow paid sick leave to be used for other condi 
tions covered under the law, such as parental leave or leave to care for 
sick children, spouses, or parents.
An important distinction, then, between the U.S. and Canadian 
cases is the general availability of paid maternity, parental, and medical 
leave through the unemployment insurance system in Canada. A sec 
ond major distinction between Canada and the United States is that 
Canadian workers have no mandated leave for family responsibilities 
other than parental leave for newborn children or newly adopted chil 
dren. Only Quebec mandates five days unpaid leave for family respon 
sibilities. Furthermore, it is also important to note that, in exempting
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companies with fewer than 50 employees, the Family and Medical 
Leave Act eliminates 95 percent of all U.S. firms as well as 61 percent 
of the workforce from the force of law (U.S. General Accounting 
Office 1989). Thus, while a mandate exists in the U.S. case, fewer than 
half of all U.S. workers are affected by it.
PROVISION OF LEAVE IN CANADA AND THE UNITED 
STATES: A DESCRIPTIVE TREATMENT
For the U.S. analysis, we use data from the U.S. Small Business 
Administration Employee Leave Survey commissioned in 1988 to 
answer several major questions facing policy makers with respect to 
mandated leave. An important aspect of the survey was the collection 
of data on the leave policies of U.S. businesses in a nationally repre 
sentative sample of firms. The survey instrument for the Small Busi 
ness Administration's (SBA's) Employee Leave Survey was a four- 
page questionnaire forwarded to 10,000 business executives. The 
questionnaire requested information concerning company policies on 
paid sick leave, sickness and accident insurance, vacation leave, unpaid 
leave, leave to care for sick children and ailing parents, and the han 
dling of work during leaves. It also contained questions on costs of 
leaves and terminations to the firms, the benefits accruing to part-time 
employees, and the firm's characteristics. The survey included an 
instruction sheet that asked respondents to indicate whether they were 
the only worker in their company or if the company employed only 
members of the owners immediate family. In cases in which the firm 
employed family members only, the respondent was requested to 
return the blank questionnaire and the instruction sheet with an indica 
tion that the firm employed only family members.
A random sample of 10,000 firms was obtained from the SBA's 
Small Business Data Base (SBDB). The SBDB is a data file covering 
some 3.8 million businesses (enterprises) with almost 5 million estab 
lishments, representing 93 percent of private employment in the United 
States. The file mainly consists of firms that have paid employees and 
that have entered formal credit markets. It generally excludes partner 
ships, sole proprietorships with no paid employees, and wage and sal-
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ary workers who maintain secondary businesses. The SBDB is 
primarily drawn from Dun and Bradstreet's Small Business and Mil 
lion Dollar Directory Files. The SBDB used in this study had been last 
updated prior to this survey in 1986.
The SBA Employee Leave Survey was mailed in November and 
December of 1988. To encourage responses, the questionnaire was 
mailed to each potential respondent twice, approximately three weeks 
apart. Each mailing contained a different cover letter from the SBA 
underscoring the importance of the survey and urging the recipient to 
respond to the questionnaire. A first-class return postage paid envelope 
was included with each mailing to encourage responses.
Responses were received from 2,732 of the 10,000 firms for an 
apparent overall response rate of approximately 27 percent. However, 
some 2,551 of the surveys from both mailings were nondeliverable, 
suggesting that about 1,275 of the mailed questionnaires should not be 
counted as part of the 10,000 firm sample. If we discount the nondeliv 
erable questionnaires, the sample size shrinks to 8,725 and the 
response rate increases to 31.3 percent. Further details on the survey 
design, the sample, and an analysis of nonresponse bias are presented 
in Trzcinski and Alpert (1990).
Policies in the United States
This section presents findings from the SBA survey on the inci 
dence of leave as well as on benefits and guarantees surrounding 
leaves. Findings concerning leave for family responsibilities are also 
presented. Although the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Employee 
Benefits surveys provide information on the incidence of paid sick 
leave, sickness and accident insurance, and maternity and paternity 
leave, the SBA survey remains the only national survey that collected 
information on the incidence of unpaid medical leave and on the condi 
tions surrounding leave, such as health benefit continuation, seniority 
protection, and job guarantees.
Incidence of Leave. Table 3 presents the incidence of leave poli 
cies by firm size and differentiates among the separate categories of 
leave. Table 3 shows that, for businesses in the SBA survey, the inci 
dence of paid sick leave increased as firm size increased. In companies
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Table 3 Percentage of U.S. Firms with Leave, by Firm Size and Type 
of Leave
Firm size3
Type of leave
Paid sick leave
Sickness and accident 
insurance
Unpaid leave for 
sickness/disability
Vacation that can be used 
for sickness/disability
Separate maternity leave
1-15
(#=1110)
31.5
16.1
74.1
59.9
6.1
16-49
(#=326)
48.5
26.9
84.7
75.6
15.7
50-99
(#=76)
61.8
36.0
89.5
89.5
20.0
100 or more
(#=184)
75.0
41.0
90.2
86.5
22.8
SOURCE: Trzcinski and Alpert 1990.
a Firm size is determined by number of employees.
with 1-15 employees, 31.5 percent provided paid sick leave. This per 
centage increased to 48.5 percent for firms with 16-49 employees and 
to 61.8 percent for firms with 50-99 employees. In firms with 100 or 
more employees, 75 percent provided job-guaranteed paid sick leave. 
Regardless of firm size, firms were more likely to offer unpaid leave 
than paid leave. Only 9.8 percent of the largest firms did not allow 
employees to take unpaid leave for sickness. The percentage rose to 
25.9 in the smallest firms.
Table 3 also shows the percentage of firms that both provided vaca 
tion and allowed vacation days to be used for sickness. Firms some 
times place restrictions on the use of vacation because the firms want to 
maintain control over scheduling or are acting paternalistically. More 
than 50 percent of all firms allowed employees access to paid leave for 
sickness through reallocation of vacation days. The percentage of 
firms either not providing vacation or not allowing the use of vacation 
days for sickness ranged from 40.1 percent in the smallest firms to 11.5 
percent in firms with 50-99 employees.
The 1978 U.S. Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) stipulates that 
employers who provide sickness or disability leave must also extend 
this leave to women for pregnancy and childbirth-related disabilities.
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Thus, prior to the enactment of the FMLA, paid sick leave, short-term 
temporary disability policies, and unpaid sick leave policies repre 
sented the major source of leave available for pregnancy and child 
birth-related disabilities. In 1987, the Supreme Court ruled in 
California Federal v. Guerra that separate maternity leave policies do 
not violate the Civil Rights Act. Hence, firms may legally supplement 
existing sick leave policies or implement sick leave policies that apply 
exclusively to pregnancy and childbirth-related disabilities. The per 
centage of firms implementing such policies range from 6.1 in the 
smallest firms to 22.8 in the largest firms (Table 3). The percentages of 
business reporting separate maternity leave policies in the U.S. Small 
Business Administration survey were lower than the percentages 
reporting such policies in Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Employee 
Benefits surveys, where the percentages reporting unpaid maternity 
leave range from 17 percent in small establishments to 37 percent in 
large establishments (U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Sta 
tistics 1991). The differences between the two surveys occur because 
unpaid maternity leave that covers disabilities, but not care for new 
born children, was usually reported under unpaid medical leave in the 
SBA survey. Under EEOC guidelines, maternity leave for care-giving 
purposes cannot be granted to women without equivalent leave also 
being granted to men (U.S. EEOC 1990). The BLS survey found that 
the incidence of unpaid paternity leave ranges from 8 percent in small 
establishments to 18 percent in large ones. The higher rate of mater 
nity leave as compared with paternity leave in the BLS surveys results 
from the inclusion of unpaid leave for disabilities resulting from preg 
nancy and childbirth in the maternity leave percentages as maternity, 
but not paternity, leaves.
Benefits and Guarantees during Leave. All the enacted state and 
federal legislation provide for unpaid leave. Thus, given the relatively 
high incidence of unpaid leave policies in large firms and legislative 
exemptions for small firms, the primary role of current legislative initi 
atives centers on providing uniformity and certainty in leave policy to 
employees in firms employing 50 or more. A critical aspect of any 
leave legislation or firm-specific leave policy concerns how the law or 
firm policy deals with the conditions under which the employee may
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return to work. Three major questions answered in the FMLA and in 
firm-specific policy are as follows:
1) Upon returning from a leave for illness, disability, pregnancy, 
or childbirth, are employees guaranteed the same or a 
comparable job?
2) Are employees guaranteed seniority for promotion and other 
purposes during the leave?
3) Does the employer continue to pay the employer share of 
health benefits during the leave?
Information concerning guarantees and benefits during leave are 
presented in Table 4. In general, the data indicate that, with the excep 
tion of unpaid sick leave and maternity leave for firms employing 
between 50 and 99 workers, the incidence of all forms of leave with 
health insurance continuation and job and seniority guarantees 
increases with firm size. The incidence of unpaid sick leave and mater 
nity leave (and attendant guarantees and health insurance continuation) 
in firms employing between 50 and 99 workers usually is slightly 
higher than it is in the largest firms. This may simply be an anomaly in 
this data or it might indicate that economies of scale for these benefits 
cease at a firm size of approximately 50-99 workers. The data might 
also be reflecting state-level legislation mandating that such leaves be 
provided by firms employing in excess of 50 people.
Between 19 and 25 percent of all firms in the smallest firm size 
category (1-15 employees) provide paid sick leave with seniority and 
job guarantees and health insurance continuation for both managers 
and nonmanagers (Table 4). Similarly, for both occupation groups, 
approximately 40 percent of small firms provide unpaid sick leave with 
a job guarantee, between 30 and 32 percent with a seniority guarantee, 
and about a quarter continue to pay health insurance during sick leave. 
Less than 5 percent of all firms in this category provide any job, senior 
ity, or health insurance continuation benefits while an employee is on a 
maternity leave.
In the two largest firm size categories for both managers and non- 
managers, the percentage of firms providing paid sick leave with a job 
guarantee increases to about 60 percent, but paid sick leave with 
seniority guarantees is provided by only about 45 percent of the firms. 
The same pattern is followed with both unpaid sick leave (61-70 per-
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Table 4 Leaves with Benefits and Guarantees in U.S. Firms: Incidence by 
Type of Leave and Firm Size (%)
Firm size
Type of leave
Paid sick leave
Job guarantee
Seniority guarantee
Employer continues to
pay health insurance
Unpaid sick leave
Job guarantee
Seniority guarantee
Employer continues to
pay health insurance
Separate maternity leave
Job guarantee
Seniority guarantee
Employer continues to
pay health insurance
Paid sick leave
Job guarantee
Seniority guarantee
Employer continues to
pay health insurance
Unpaid sick leave
Job guarantee
Seniority guarantee
Employer continues to
pay health insurance
Separate maternity leave
Job guarantee
Seniority guarantee
Employer continues to
pay health insurance
1-15
(#=1025)
24.6
194
20.7
396
30.1
262
4.7
4.1
3.8
(#=1041)
24.6
19.3
204
42.3
31.6
25.8
49
4.2
3.9
16-49
Managers
(#=311)
47.6
30.2
38.2
62.2
38.7
47.2
12.7
7.8
112
Nonmanagers
(#=311)
45.1
30.8
36.7
59.6
38.3
429
12.5
7.8
10.3
50-99
(#=75)
592
453
520
69.7
52.6
61.8
19.7
13.3
15.8
(#=73)
58.9
44.4
51.4
65.8
48.7
57.9
18.7
12.2
14.7
100 or more
(#=184)
62.5
45.3
41.9
64.3
44.8
43.7
16.8
10.9
11.4
(#=181)
60.2
446
409
61.3
44.1
39.8
15.9
11.0
10.9
SOURCE- Trzcmski and Alpert 1990. 
a Firm size determined by number of employees
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cent of firms providing this benefit with a job guarantee and 44-53 per 
cent providing such leave with a seniority guarantee) and separate 
maternity leave (15-20 percent providing separate maternity leave with 
a job guarantee but only about 11-13 percent providing seniority guar 
antees). The proportion of firms with 50-99 employees providing 
health insurance continuation is smaller than the proportion providing 
job guarantees for each of the benefits listed in Table 4 but the propor 
tion is larger for seniority guarantees. While in the largest firm size 
category, however, the percentage of firms providing seniority guaran 
tees is generally larger in each benefit category than the percentage 
offering to pay for health insurance during an employee leave.
The data in Table 4 reveal a substantial percentage of the busi 
nesses that provided leave did so without providing a job guarantee and 
without providing for health benefit continuation. The major exception 
is separate maternity leave policies, where the incidence of leave with 
job guarantees quite closely matched the overall incidence of leave. 
Thus, prior to the enactment of the Family and Medical Leave Act, a 
substantial minority of firms provided neither health insurance contin 
uation nor job or seniority guarantees with leave. While approximately 
90 percent of businesses with 50-99 and with 100 or more employees 
provided either formal or informal unpaid medical leave, a substantial 
percentage of these businesses provided neither a job guarantee nor 
health benefit continuation.
The same basic picture is presented in Table 5, where a tabulation 
of the SBA survey results for questions concerning leave to care for 
sick children and ailing parents is presented. Specifically, the survey 
requested employers to note whether paid sick leave, vacation time, or 
any other leave could be used by managerial or nonmanagerial 
employees to care for their infirm children or parents. The question 
was phrased so that it is not known whether such leave is discretionary 
or whether it contains job guarantees.
As in the case of other leaves, the data in Table 5 show that, as firm 
size increases, the percentage of firms allowing workers to use various 
kinds of leave to care for sick children also increases. With the notable 
exception of the other leave category (in which case employers' per 
mission for use of other leave to care for sick children increases mono- 
tonically with our firm size groupings from about 6 or 7 percent in the 
smallest firm size category to about 32 percent in the largest), employ-
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Table 5 Leave to Care for Sick Children and Leave to Care
for Ailing Parents in U.S. Firms, Incidence by Type of Leave 
and Firm Size (%)a
Firm sizeb
Type of leave 1-15 16-49 50-99 100 or more
Sick children
Managers
Sick leave
Vacation
Other leave
Sick, vacation and/or 
other leave
Nonmanagers
Sick leave
Vacation
Other leave
Sick, vacation and/or 
other leave
(#=978)
18.6
44.2
6.1
47.5
(#=988)
18.7
45.0
6.5
51.0
(#=281)
29.5
68.7
11.9
73.2
(#=281)
29.2
68.1
10.8
72.5
(#=68)
47.8
80.6
19.1
85.3
(#=67)
44.8
79.1
19.1
85.3
(#=168)
46.4
78.6
32.3
88.0
(#=167)
44.9
78.4
32.3
86.9
Ailing parents
Managers
Sick leave
Vacation
Other leave
Sick, vacation and/or 
other leave
Nonmanagers
Sick leave
Vacation
Other leave
Sick, vacation and/or 
other leave
(#=965)
16.6
42.3
5.8
45.2
(#=978)
16.6
43.5
6.0
50.0
SOURCE: Trzcinski and Alpert 1990. 
a Percentages include 1) discretionary and
(#=277)
27.4
68.8
11.2
71.5
(#=278)
26.6
67.7
10.9
71.6
nondiscretionary
(#=67)
43.3
77.6
15.9
80.0
(#=67)
40.3
76.1
15.9
82.2
leaves and
(#=167)
40.1
78.3
30.3
86.2
(#=166)
38.6
78.3
30.3
85.2
2) leaves with
and without job guarantees. 
b Firm size determined by number of employees.
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ers' permission for their employees to use either sick or vacation leaves 
for sick child care increases with firm size, usually reaching its maxi 
mum in the category of between 50 and 99 employees. Between 45 
percent (nonmanagers) and 48 percent (managers) of all employers in 
this category allow sick leave to be used to care for sick offspring and 
80 percent (nonmanagers) and 81 percent (managers) allow their 
employees to use vacation to care for sick children.
Permission to use any form of leave for the care of ailing children 
is granted about half the time in the smallest firm size category 
(approximately 48 percent for managers and 51 percent for nonman 
agers) increasing (monotonically) to almost 90 percent (88 percent for 
managers and 87 percent for nonmanagers) in the largest firm size cat 
egory.
The results for ailing parents are extremely close to those for sick 
children. Between 45 percent (managers) and 50 percent (nonman 
agers) of employers in small firms (1-15 employees) allow their 
employees to use sick, vacation, or other leave to care for ailing par 
ents. This percentage increases monotonically until, in the largest firm 
size category, approximately 86 percent of employers allow their man 
agers to use sick vacation or other leave to care for infirm parents.
In summary, permission to use other leaves to care for sick chil 
dren and ailing parents were approximately equally available for man 
agers and nonmanagers. The granting of permission to use sick, 
vacation, and/or other leaves to care for ill children or parents is quite 
common, ranging from 50 percent of employers in the smallest firm 
size category to almost 90 percent in the largest. Firms most readily 
allowed the use of vacation leave for the care of sick children or infirm 
parents. Even in the smallest firm size category, between 40 and 45 
percent of the employers surveyed allowed the use of vacation leave 
for this purpose. This is understandable because vacation leave is one 
of the most flexible benefits provided by employers. Ideally, an 
employer would like an employee to take the vacation to "recharge" 
him- or herself and to be more efficient upon return to work. However, 
it appears that firms recognize that they will have little control over 
how vacations are actually used by employees and that any attempt to 
monitor and control vacation use will almost certainly be counterpro 
ductive.
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Private Sector Policies in Canada
Table 6, which provides results from an employer survey con 
ducted by the Pay Research Bureau (1988), shows that the types of 
benefits provided in Canada mirror those provided in the United States. 
The incidence of paid sick leave is high in Canada among managerial 
and professional workers, while it is relatively low among non-office 
workers. On the other hand, sickness indemnity insurance coverage 
rate is lower among managerial and professional workers but is much 
higher among non-office personnel. For virtually all covered workers 
(non-office workers having the highest coverage rate at over 40 per 
cent), employers pay all of the costs of sickness indemnity plans.
Most firms provide personal and parental leave; however, its length 
and the conditions under which it is granted vary greatly. Likewise, 
paid leave for an illness in the family is provided by about half of all 
employers of white-collar workers, but much of this leave is discretion 
ary—that is, granted at the discretion of the employer. Most non-office 
workers do not have access to paid leave for family illness.
Table 6 Incidence of Medical and Family-Related Benefits in Canada 
(% employees covered)
Management/ 
Benefit professional Office Nonoffice
Supplementary health 
insurance
Formal paid sick leave plans
Sickness indemnity plans
Combined formal paid sick 
leave and sickness
indemnity plans
Long-term disability plans
Paid holidays
Paid vacations
Paid bereavement leave
Personal and parental leave
Paid leave — illness in family
98.3
86.6
5.0
8.0
97.2
96.6
96.6
814
79.2
51.9
97.3
78.8
4.1
16.6
85.3
100.0
100.0
86.9
85.9
50.1
93.2
44.7
40.3
12.5
76.7
100.0
100.0
98.6
79.1
19.4
SOURCE: Pay Research Bureau 1988.
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The duration of paid maternity leave varies greatly in Canada, 
from one day to 18 weeks (Pay Research Bureau 1988). Employers are 
permitted to supplement unemployment insurance through formalized 
supplemental unemployment benefit plans. Among management and 
professional workers, 33.7 percent are covered by such plans. Among 
office workers, the percentage falls to 25.4 percent; for non-office 
workers, the percentage covered is only 14.6 percent. For management 
and professional workers, 3.3 percent of employees receive such leave 
through a discretionary plan. For office workers, the proportion of 
workers eligible for such plans is 4 percent. Among non-office work 
ers, the percentage falls to 2.5 percent. Such plans can make up the 
difference between an employee's unemployment benefit and their sal 
ary, up to a maximum of 95 percent of the employee's regular salary 
(Pay Research Bureau 1988).
MODELING THE INCIDENCE OF LEAVE AND CONDITIONS 
SURROUNDING LEAVE
Theoretical Considerations
Using the data from the U.S. Small Business Administration Leave 
Survey, we estimate two sets of models: the first deals with leave inci 
dence and the second with benefits and guarantees available for leave 
takers.
The model used to examine the provision of paid and unpaid leave 
is conventional since we hypothesize that leave is provided as a result 
of the interaction of employer supply and employee demand. The SBA 
survey was designed to address the question of what factors influence 
the incidence of leave and conditions surrounding leave. Specific 
questions were included in the questionnaire to measure important sup 
ply- and demand-side factors that theoretically influence whether or 
not leave is provided.
Fringe benefit supply varies in response to differences in relative 
costs of benefit provision (Rice 1966; Alpert 1982; Woodbury 1983; 
Vroman and Anderson 1984; and Even 1992). The supply of fringe 
benefits is hypothesized to vary with their costs to the firm. A principal
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determinate of cost is thought to be the size of the firm because fringe 
benefit provision is thought to be subject to economies of scale of 
group purchase. Measures of firm size are usually utilized to act as 
proxy variables for these economies of scale. We use several variables 
to proxy for such economies, including number of employees, sales 
volume, and type of firm ownership.
We also hypothesize that, in industries in which larger firms pre 
dominate, leaves will be provided more frequently as a result of com 
petition (for comparable compensation packages), follow-the-leader 
relationships, and demonstration and/or learning effects among the 
firms in such industries. In order to proxy these effects, we include in 
our analysis a variable (Percentage Small in the Industry) that captures 
the percentage of small firms in the industry in which the firm does 
business. This variable measures the percentage of firms in the indus 
try employing fewer than 100 workers. Unpublished data from the 
SBA was used to construct this variable.
The model also contains several demand-side variables. Recogniz 
ing that unionized workers often either demand larger quantities of 
fringe benefits or can express their demand for more fringe benefits 
through their union better than nonunionized workers, we include a 
variable equaling one if a majority of the firm's workforce is unionized 
and zero otherwise. We also include a variable reflecting the percent 
age of workers in the firm's industry who are unionized (reflecting the 
possibility of spillover effects of unionization on other union and non 
union firms in the industry). It is important to recognize that such 
spillover effects might operate in either direction since a heavily union 
ized industry would be an industry in which, all else constant, workers' 
tastes are better communicated to employers. If workers overall prefer 
other forms of compensation (for example, cash wages) to leave and 
insurance, a high rate of unionization might actually lower the likeli 
hood that workers in a particular firm have such benefits (holding con 
stant unionization in that firm). Conversely, if workers overall prefer 
leave and insurance to other forms of compensation, high rates of 
industry unionization could raise the likelihood that workers in a par 
ticular firm have such benefits.
In addition, workers' tastes (and hence their demand) for fringe 
benefits are likely to vary with certain demographic characteristics. 
Here, we hypothesize that tastes for leave can be proxied by the gender
148 Trzcinski and Alpert
and age of a firm's workforce. We use a variable measuring the per 
centage of the firm's workforce that is female of childbearing age (16- 
44 years old) and the percentage of the firm's workforce that is over the 
age of 55 to measure two subgroups of workers more likely to demand 
leave than are other groups. Testing the hypothesis that women work 
ers prefer leave and insurance-type benefits to other forms of compen 
sation, we include a variable reflecting the percentage of female 
workers in the industry in our estimating equations. Finally, we con 
trol for the unemployment rate (at the time of the survey) in the state in 
which the firm is located, the percentage of the state's workforce 
located in rural areas, and several industry categorical variables to cap 
ture industry effects. An important variable omitted from the equations 
is worker income. Other variables, such as firm size and age, will act 
as proxies for income, but readers should be aware of the bias created 
in the estimated coefficients by the omission of a variable that directly 
measures worker income.
The following sections present bivariate logit estimates (and OLS 
equivalent coefficients) of the incidence of paid and unpaid medical 
leave and the incidence of different types of family leave.
Incidence of Medical Leave
Table 7 displays estimates of logit regressions in which employer 
provision of some types of medical leave are regressed on a variety of 
independent variables, including three measures of scale of firm: num 
ber of employees, sales volume, and ownership type. Across the differ 
ent firm size measures, smaller firms are generally significantly less 
likely than larger firms to provide medical leave. For paid sick leave 
only and combined paid sick leave and sickness and accident insur 
ance, firms with 15 or fewer employees are significantly less likely to 
provide these benefits than firms employing 100 or more workers. 
Thus, there appears to be a threshold effect for paid leave, with the 
threshold occurring at the smallest firm size category. It is interesting 
to note that no such effect is apparent for sickness and accident insur 
ance. For formal unpaid leave, the effect suggested in the two-way 
analysis continues to be present. Each included firm size category 
variable's coefficient shows that firms within that firm size category are 
significantly less likely to provide this benefit than firms employing
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Table 7 Logit Estimates of the Probability that a Firm Provides 
Medical Leave (OLS Equivalent Coefficient)3
Variable5
Firm size
1-15 employees
1 6-49 employees
50-99 employees
Sales volume
Less than $250,000
$250,000-$ 1,000,000
$1,000,000-$ 10,000,000
$10,000,000-$50,000,000
Ownership type
Sole proprietorship
Partnership
Paid sick 
leave
-0186
[-0.772***]
(0.253)
-0.081
[-0.377]
(0.265)
-0007
[-0 029]
(0.338)
-0.314
[-1 304***]
(0 349)
-0207
[-0.861***]
(0 349)
-0.174
[-0.722**]
(0.334)
-0.160
[-0.663*]
(0 384)
-.0131
[-0.542***]
(0.197)
-0.158
[-0.656**]
(0.295)
Sickness and 
accident 
insurance
-0.065
[-0.387]
(0.274)
-0018
[-0.105]
(0.284)
0.031
[0.186]
(0.347)
-0.153
[-0912***]
(0 356)
-0.138
[-0.821**]
(0.354)
-0.071
[-0.424]
(0 324)
-0.003
[-0.020]
(0.361)
-0.028
[-0.165]
(0 237)
0.005
[0.029]
(0.327)
Either paid 
sick& 
sickness & 
accident 
insurance
-0.156
[-0.626**]
(0 258)
-0.002
[-0.010]
(0.274)
0068
[0.274]
(0.362)
-0.420
[-1.684***]
(0 375)
-0.341
[-1 368***]
(0.376)
-0.266
[-1.068***]
(0.364)
-0.114
[-0.457]
(0 434)
-0.107
[_0 430**]
(0.190)
-0.150
[-0.601**]
(0.284)
Unpaid 
leave 
(formal)
-0.266
[-1.540***]
(0310)
-0157
[-0.911***]
(0.316)
-0.144
[-0.837**]
(0.412)
-0.190
[-1.102***]
(0.406)
-0.139
[-0.805**]
(0.404)
-0.087
[-0.503]
(0 349)
-0.055
[-0.320]
(0.391)
-0.079
[-0 457]
(0 332)
0.014
[0.082]
(0 402)
(continued)
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Table 7 (continued)
Variable5
Corporation
Percentage small in industry
Industry
Agriculture, mining,
construction
Manufacturing
Transportation
Wholesale trade
Retail trade
Unionized
Percent unionized in
industry
Percent female age 16-44,
managers
Paid sick 
leave
0.016
[0.066]
(0.160)
-0.151
[-6.255***]
(1.854)
-0.279
[-1 159***]
(0.283)
-0.159
[-0.659**]
(0.307)
0.009
[0.037]
(0.489)
0010
[0.042]
(0.212)
-0.331
[-1.137***]
(0.180)
0.069
[0.285]
(0.288)
-0.454
[-1.885]
(1.556)
0.079
[0.328*]
0.191)
Sickness and 
accident 
insurance
0.058
[0.343*]
(0 182)
-0046
[-3.838**]
(0.1820)
-0.009
[-0.052]
(0.303)
0.198
[1.176***]
(0.329)
0285
[1 692***]
(0 524)
0.030
[0.176]
(0 239)
-0.038
[-0.225]
(0.210)
0.107
[0.634**]
(0.273)
-0.872
[-5.182***]
(1.652)
0.028
[0.167]
(0.221)
Either paid 
sick& 
sickness & 
accident 
insurance
0055
[0.220]
(0.160)
-2.057
[-8.253***]
(1.974)
-0.260
[-1.043***]
(0.273)
-0.061
[-0.244]
(0.310)
0.100
[0.403]
(0.490)
-0.001
[-0.003]
(0.216)
-0.218
[-0.873***]
(0.172)
0.090
[0.360]
(0.301)
-0.648
[-2.602*]
(1.559)
0.078
[0.311*]
(0.189)
Unpaid 
leave 
(formal)
0.017
[0 101]
(0.229)
0309
[1.790]
(2 286)
-0.108
[-0.626]
(0.470)
-0.010
[0.058]
(0.384)
-0.001
[-0.003]
(0 626)
0.028
[0.164]
(0.348)
0.017
[0.096]
(0.258)
0013
[0 076]
(0.341)
0.243
[1.410]
(1.759)
0.040
[0.234]
(0.286)
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Variable15
Percent female age 16-^44,
nonmanagers
Percent female in industry
Percent age 55 or more,
Manager
Percent age 55 or more,
nonmanager
State unemployment rate
Percent of state population
in rural area
N
Chi-square
-2 log L
-2 log L (intercept only)
Paid sick 
leave
0.193
[0.802***]
(0.173)
-0.191
[-0.793*]
(0.456)
0.140
[0.581***]
(0 207)
-0.041
[-0.171]
(0.285)
-1.46
[-605]
(380)
-0.037
[-0.152]
(0.442)
1599
367.43***
-1790.72
-2158.15
Sickness and 
accident 
insurance
0.024
[0.140]
(0.200)
-0.216
[-1.286***]
(0.507)
0.070
[0.419*]
(0.237)
-0019
[-0.115]
(0.335)
-2.346
[-13 947***]
(4.339)
-0.053
[0316]
(0 489)
1585
149.13***
-1509 19
1658 32
Either paid 
sick& 
sickness & 
accident 
insurance
0.143
[0.575***]
(0.171)
-0.391
[-1.568***]
(0.454)
0198
[0 796***]
(0.205)
-0.048
[-0.191]
(0.274)
-2420
[-9710***]
(3.754)
-0.024
[-0.0963]
(0.437)
1594
395 94***
-1812.48
-2208.43
Unpaid 
leave 
(formal)
0.034
[0.197]
(0 265)
0.258
[1.497**]
(0.679)
0.053
[0.307]
(0.333)
-0.011
[-0.063]
(0.478)
0.144
[0.833]
(5601)
-0282
[-1.637**]
(0.676)
1564
157.91***
-967.00
-1124.91
1 Original logit coefficient given in brackets and standard error of the original logit coeffi 
cient in parentheses.
b Excluded categories of categorical variables include: 100 or more employees, sales vol 
ume greater than $50 million annually, Subchapter S Corporations (ownership type), ser 
vices (industry), and nonunion workers.
***sigmficant at the 1% level (two-tailed test). 
**sigmficant at the 5% level (two-tailed test). 
*significant at the 10% level (two-tailed test).
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100 or more workers, and the likelihood that a business provides 
unpaid leave increases steadily as the number of the firm's employees 
increases.
These scale effects are quite small, however. The OLS equivalent 
coefficients of all forms of paid leave show that a 10 percent decrease 
in the size of the firm decreases the odds that a firm will offer leave by 
1 or 2 percent. However, in the case of unpaid leave, a decrease in firm 
size decreases the odds that the firm will offer leave substantially. For 
example, as the size of the firm falls below 100 employees, a 10 per 
cent reduction in firm size lowers the likelihood that a firm will provide 
unpaid leave by about 8.4 percent.
For both paid and unpaid leave, increases in sales volume also pos 
itively affect the likelihood that businesses provide leave. For paid 
leave, this effect is consistent across three of the sales volume catego 
ries and is not limited to the type of threshold effect observed for a 
number of employees. In the case of paid sick leave, all four sales vol 
ume categorical variables have significant and negative effects relative 
to the excluded category, sales volume equal to or exceeding $50 mil 
lion. In this case, the lower the sales volume, the greater the negative 
effect on the incidence of leave relative to the excluded sales size cate 
gory. For example in firms with annual sales volumes of less than 
$250,000 a 10 percent reduction in sales volume will result in a 3 per 
cent reduction in the likelihood of paid leave, while in a firm with sales 
volume between $10 and $50 million, a 10 percent reduction in sales 
volume will yield a 1.6 percent lowered probability of paid sick leave 
provision. In the estimate of combined paid sick leave/sickness and 
accident insurance, the significant effects hold for the three lowest 
sales volume categories, while for unpaid leave, only the two lowest 
sales volume categories show significantly lower incidences of leave 
compared with businesses with higher sales volumes. Ownership type 
also affects the incidence of paid leave but not unpaid leave. Sole pro 
prietorships and partnerships tend to be less likely to provide leaves 
than are corporations and Subchapter S Corporations. This effect is 
relatively large with the OLS equivalent coefficient in the paid leave 
equation equaling -0.66.
The variable, Percentage Small in the Industry, has significant and 
negative coefficients in Table 7 in the paid medical leave and combined 
paid sick leave and sickness and accident insurance equations, but it
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has no statistically significant effect in the unpaid medical leave equa 
tion.
The five dummy variables included to control for industry are agri 
culture, mining, and construction; manufacturing; transportation; 
wholesale trade; and retail trade. The excluded category is the service 
sector. Industry effects are limited to paid leave and sickness and acci 
dent insurance. There are large and significant differences between 
service and manufacturing firms in the provision of paid sick leave and 
sickness and accident insurance. In these cases, the OLS equivalent 
coefficients are -0.66 and +1.18. Firms in agriculture and in retail 
trade are less likely to provide paid sick leave than are firms in the ser 
vice sector. Firms in transportation are more likely than service sector 
firms to offer sickness and accident insurance, but this difference is not 
observable in the joint variable of paid sick leave and/or sickness and 
accident insurance. No statistically significant industry effects are 
observed in the unpaid leave equation.
A firm-specific variable and an industry-specific variable are 
included in the equation to measure the effects of unionization. These 
two unionization variable coefficients indicate that unions tend to 
affect the provision of leave and insurance in opposite directions. 
Firms whose workers are covered by a union contract are significantly 
more likely to provide sickness and accident insurance compared with 
firms whose workers are not unionized, but this variable has no effect 
on the joint provision of paid leave policies (Table 7). The findings 
also indicate that a spillover effect may be occurring. The percentage 
of workers unionized in the industry depresses the likelihood that a 
particular firm in that industry provides sickness and accident insur 
ance. As noted above, this result is plausible since, in spite of the fact 
that unionized workers are able to raise the level of a particular benefit 
in a given firm (industry unionization rate constant), it is also possible 
that even though unionization in a particular firm may raise the likeli 
hood of the presence of leave and/or insurance-type benefits in that 
firm, a high rate of unionization in an industry (reflecting overall 
worker preferences in that industry) may lower the likelihood that a 
particular firm in that industry offers leave and/or insurance-type bene 
fits. The latter result applies in this case for sickness and accident 
insurance. Neither the firm-specific nor the industry-specific union
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coefficient achieves statistical significance in the unpaid leave equa 
tion.
The firm level demographic variables (percent female aged 16-44 
and percent aged 55 or more) are entered separately in the equation for 
both managers and nonmanagers. The empirical analyses suggest that 
firm-specific and industry-specific demographic variables operate on 
two separate and conflicting levels where the negative effects of per 
cent female in the industry are counterbalanced by the effects of the 
firm-specific demographics. More specifically, the two variables, per 
cent female of the firm's managerial and nonmanagerial workforce 
aged 16-44, exert positive effects on the incidence of paid sick leave. 
This effect carries over to the combined incidence of paid sick leave 
days and sickness and accident insurance. In the unpaid leave equa 
tion, no effects are observed for the firm-specific measures of percent 
female, but the negative industry-specific effect remains. Although 
both coefficients of the variables percent female of the managerial and 
nonmanagerial workforce achieved statistical significance, the effects 
of firm-specific demographics concerning older workers are limited to 
effects stemming from the percent of older managers. In no case does 
the percent of the firm's nonmanagerial workforce aged 55 or older 
exert a statistically significant positive effect on the dependent variable. 
The percent of the firm's managerial workforce, aged 55 or older 
affects the likelihood of paid leave in the incidence equations, but it 
exerts no effect on incidence of unpaid leave.
As the state unemployment rate increases, the likelihood that a 
firm offers sickness and accident insurance significantly declines, as 
does the likelihood of the firm offering either paid sick leave days and/ 
or sickness and accident insurance. These effects are large. For exam 
ple, a 1 percent increase in the state unemployment rate reduces the 
likelihood that a firm will offer sickness and accident insurance by 2.35 
percent. No statistically significant effect of the state unemployment 
rate is observed in the unpaid leave equation.
The final control variable in this analysis is the percentage of the 
state's population that resides in a rural area. Here, the only significant 
effect occurs for the provision of formal unpaid medical leave policies: 
the greater this percentage, the less likely is a firm to have a formal, 
unpaid leave policy.
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Table 7 indicates that, although the unpaid leave equation does 
achieve statistical significance, the overall explanatory power as mea 
sured by chi-square is far below the level achieved by the paid leave 
equation. Several variables that consistently achieved significance in 
the paid leave equations do not to achieve significance in the unpaid 
leave equation, including ownership type, industry type, unionization 
(firm specific and industry), percent managers aged 55 or older, and 
state unemployment rate. As we noted at the beginning of this paper, 
we expected that a reduced form demand framework would better 
explain the provision of paid leave and insurance-type benefits than 
unpaid leave. From the results presented in Table 7, this appears to be 
the case.
Incidence of Family Leave
Table 8 presents logit estimates for four types of family leave: 
maternity leave (separate policy for disability and infant care), mater 
nity leave (separate policy for infant care only), leave to care for sick 
children, and leave to care for ailing parents. In the latter two cases, 
the existence of such leave typically indicates that the firm permits the 
use of other types of leave for caring for sick children and/or ailing par 
ents.
Only two coefficients of the categorical variables for economies of 
scale of group purchase are statistically significant at conventional lev 
els in Table 8. Thus, only in the smallest firm size category do signifi 
cantly fewer firms offer their workers maternity leave (either with 
disability and infant care or infant care only). In this set of four equa 
tions, two coefficients of the dummy variables for number of employ 
ees attain statistical significance. Firms employing 1-15 workers are 
less likely than other firms to have either separate maternity leave for 
disability and/or infant care. In no case does number of employees 
affect the likelihood that a firm provides leave to care for sick children 
or ailing parents. Sales volume, on the other hand, significantly affects 
the probability that a firm provides leave to care for ailing parents only 
in the smallest sales volume category. Sales volume has more perva 
sive effects on the provision of leave to care for sick children than it 
does for ailing parents, with the coefficient of the sick children variable 
achieving statistical significance in the smallest three sales size catego-
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Table 8 Logit Estimates of the Probability that a Firm Provides Separate 
Family Leave Policies (OLS Equivalent Coefficient)3
Maternity leave
Variable15
Firm size
1-15 employees
16-49 employees
50-99 employees
Sales volume (annual)
Less than $250,000
$250,000-$ 1,000,000
$1,000,000-$ 10,000,000
$ 1 0,000,000-$50,000,000
Ownership type
Sole proprietorship
Partnership
Corporation
Percentage small in industry
Separate 
policy, 
disability & 
infant care
-0.024
[-1.259**]
(0.332)
-0060
[-0.314]
(0.336)
-0.062
[-0.100]
(0.410)
0.004
[0212]
(0.435)
0.006
[0.338]
(0.444)
0.005
[0.242]
(0.401)
0.000
[0.004]
(0.477)
0.005
[0.259]
(0.327)
0.003
[0.177]
(0 450)
0008
[0.393]
(0.256)
-0.051
[-2.646]
(2 294)
Separate 
policy: 
infant care 
only
-0.069
[-1 295**]
(0.567)
-0.031
[-0.586]
(0.593)
-0.006
[-.111]
(0.709)
0.022
[0.419]
(0 685)
0037
[0.697]
(0.723)
-0.006
[-0.119]
(0.668)
0.013
[0.252]
(0.783)
-0.063
[1.186*]
(0.622)
0.001
[0.027]
(1.144)
0.069
[1.284**]
(0.534)
-0.515
[-9.617***]
(3 698)
Leave 
to care 
for sick 
children
-0.053
[-0.245]
(0.282)
-0.012
[-0 058]
(0.293)
0.120
[0.559]
(0.350)
-0.279
[-1 295***]
(0361)
-0.144
[-0.669*]
(0.354)
-0.153
[-0 709**]
(0 329)
-0.097
[-0.452]
(0.376)
-0.145
[-0.675***]
(0 243)
-0025
[-0.116]
(0.320)
0.022
[0.101]
(0.177)
-0.929
[-4.308**]
(1.803)
Leave 
to care 
for ailing 
parents
-0.045
[-0.183]
(0.305)
0.032
[0.131]
(0.316)
0.149
[0 604]
(0.379)
-0.239
[-0.970***]
(0 384)
-0.120
[-0.489]
(0.378)
-0.122
[-0.496]
(0351)
-0.030
[-0.120]
(0.402)
-0.179
[-0.729***]
(0.260)
-0045
[-0.181]
(0.339)
0.036
[0.147]
(0 190)
-1.056
[-4.296**]
(1.946)
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Maternity leave
Variableb
Industry
Agriculture, mining,
construction
Manufacturing
Transportation
Wholesale trade
Retail trade
Unionized
Percent unionized in
industry
Percent female age 16-44,
Managers
Percent female age 16-44,
Nonmanagers
Percent female in industry
Separate 
policy 
disability & 
infant care
-0.008
[-0.408]
(0.436)
0000
[0.001]
(0.402)
0.003
[0.140]
(0 666)
0.008
[0.427]
(0.321)
-0.014
[-0 709**]
(0.306)
-0.003
[-0.134]
(0.394)
-0.003
[-0.131]
(1.916)
0.003
[0.186]
(0.284)
0.016
[0.822***]
(0.267)
0.001
[0 066]
(0.704)
Separate 
policy: 
infant care 
only
-0.061
[-1.140]
(0.908)
-0.041
[-0.780]
(0716)
0015
[0.281]
(1.060)
0.014
[0.262]
(0 576)
0.004
[0.086]
(0.459)
-0.020
[-0.377]
(0.724)
-0013
[-0 240]
(2.826)
0.028
[0.529]
(0.468)
0.006
[0.116]
(0.461)
0.038
[-0.708]
(1.123)
Leave 
to care 
for sick 
children
-0.382
[_1 774***]
(0 382)
-0.173
[-0.804**]
(0.334)
-0.152
[-0.706]
(0 546)
-0079
[-0.365]
(0.240)
0.204
[_0946***]
(0.213)
-0.055
[-0.253]
(0.322)
-0.049
[-0.226]
(1 604)
0.085
[0 394*]
(0.215)
0.082
[0.383**]
(0.197)
-0.116
[-0.540]
(0.513)
Leave 
to care 
for ailing 
parents
-0.477
[-1.938***]
(0411)
-0.228
[-0 928***]
(0.363)
-0.196
[-0.799]
(0.605)
-0106
[-0 430*]
(0 253)
-0.280
[-1.138***]
(0.228)
0.043
[-0.173]
(0 336)
0.094
[0 383]
(1.737)
0.125
[0.509**]
(0.229)
0.106
[0431**]
(0.210)
-0.177
[-0.727]
(0.549)
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Table 8 (continued)
Maternity leave
Variable5
Percent age 55 or more,
Managers
Percent age 55 or more,
Nonmanagers
State unemployment rate
Percent of state population
in rural area
AT
Chi-square
-2 log L
-2 log L (intercept only)
Separate 
policy: 
disability & 
infant care
0.001
[0.064]
(0.340)
0.004
[0.202]
(0.469)
-0.029
[-1 495]
(5.492)
0.012
[0.631]
0(.651)
1601
86.62***
-962.62
-1049.24
Separate 
policy: 
infant care 
only
-0.025
[-0 469]
(0.685)
0.014
[0.266]
(0771)
-0.395
[-7.386]
(9.324)
0.165
[3.096***]
(1.110)]
1574
47.78***
-388.99
^36.47
Leave 
to care 
for sick 
children
0.073
[0341]
(0.243)
-0.101
[-0.470]
(0.367)
0.531
[2.467]
(4.243)
-0.038
[-0.176]
(0.505)
1601
209.76***
-1464.09
-1673.85
Leave 
to care 
for ailing 
parents
0.140
[0.571**]
(0 257)
-0.099
[-0.402]
(0.390)
0.646
[2.629]
(4.488)
0.049
[0.201]
(0 534)
1399
194 15***
-1280.69
-1474.85
a Original logit coefficient in brackets and standard error of original logit coefficient in 
parentheses.
Excluded categories of categorical variables include: 100 or more employees, sales vol 
ume greater than $50 million annually, Subchapter S Corporations (ownership type), ser 
vices (industry), and nonunion workers
***sigmficant at the 1% level (two-tailed test). 
**sigmficant at the 5% level (two-tailed test) 
*significant at the 10% level (two-tailed test).
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ries. The statistically significant effects of ownership type also vary 
across the four equations. Corporations are more likely than other 
types of firms to provide separate maternity leave policies for infant 
care only, while sole proprietorships are less likely than other firms to 
provide separate parental leave policies and policies to care for sick 
children and ailing parents. As the percentage of small firms in the 
industry increases, the likelihood that a firm offers these same three 
types of leave also decreases significantly. Significant industry effects 
are more pronounced for leave to care for sick children and ailing par 
ents, with firms in agriculture, manufacturing, and retail trade less 
likely to provide these policies than firms in the service industry.
Neither of the coefficients of the unionization variables achieve 
statistical significance in any of the four cases examined here. In con 
trast to the effect of the percent female in the industry variable on med 
ical leave, the percent female in the industry variable exerts no effect 
on the incidence of different types of family leave. However, the likeli 
hood that a firm provides leave to care for sick children and for ailing 
parents increases significantly as the variable percent female aged 16- 
44 increases for both the managerial and nonmanagerial workforce. 
These effects are quite small, however. The OLS equivalent coeffi 
cients indicate that a 10 percent increase in any of these variables will 
lead to about a 1 percent increase in the likelihood that the firm in 
question will provide leave to care for sick children or ailing parents. 
The percent female, aged 16-44 of nonmanagers variable (but not the 
percent of managers variable), also affects the provision of separate 
policies for maternity leave. The percent of the firm's managerial 
workforce aged 55 or more has statistically significant effects on the 
incidence of leave to care for ailing parents.
In contrast to its negative effect on the provision of unpaid medical 
leave, the percent of the state population that resides in rural areas vari 
able shows a positive and significant relationship to the incidence of 
separate maternity leave policies for infant care only. The state unem 
ployment rate has no significant effects in any of the equations.
Many of the predictions of the model are demonstrated to be accu 
rate. The results in Table 8 show that limited economies of scale of 
group purchase exist for maternity leave for firms with more than 15 
employees, but no scale effects (as measured by numbers of employ 
ees) are present in the provision of leaves to care for sick children or
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ailing parents. Firms with less than $10 million in annual sales are sig 
nificantly less likely to provide leave to care for sick children than are 
firms with annual sales in excess of $50 million and very small firms 
(annual sales of less than $250,000) are significantly less likely to pro 
vide leave to care for ailing parents than are firms in the largest firm 
category. Few industry effects exist for these benefits; however, in gen 
eral, there is a significantly lower incidence of leave to care for sick 
children in all industries (except transportation and wholesale trade) 
than in services. Similarly, leave to care for sick children and ailing 
parents is significantly positively related to the percent of females 
(both managers and nonmanagers) variables. Only in the case of the 
leave to care for ailing parents equation does the percent of the firm's 
managerial workforce aged 55 or more have statistically significant 
effects. Thus, the most important determinants of maternity leave and 
leave to care for sick children and ailing parents are scale of firm (as 
measured by annual sales) and the percentage of small firms in the 
firm's industry. In the case of the latter variable, several industry 
effects and the percentage of managerial and nonmanagerial female 
employees between the ages of 16 and 44 are also important. The only 
other coefficient achieving statistical significance in any equation is 
that the larger the percent of a state's population that resides in rural 
areas the more maternity leave for infant care is provided.
Benefits and Guarantees Surrounding Medical Leave
Since most large firms provide both paid and unpaid medical leave, 
the major impact of the FMLA and state leave legislation centers on 
the mandating of conditions surrounding leave. As Table 4 indicates, a 
substantial percentage of firms, including large firms, provide leave 
without providing health benefit continuation or job guarantees. 
Although the lack of a job guarantee does not necessarily imply that an 
employee will be terminated, analysis of the SBA survey concerning 
terminations in businesses with and without job guarantees did find a 
significantly higher rate of terminations on account of illness and dis 
ability in businesses without job guarantees in their plans as compared 
to businesses with such job guarantees. Conversely, the analysis also 
found a correspondingly higher rate of leave-taking in businesses with
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job guarantees than in businesses without job guarantees (Trzcinski 
1994).
We provide multinomial logit estimates of the incidence of paid 
and unpaid leave with and without health benefit continuation (Tables 
9 and 10) and with and without job guarantees (Tables 11 and 12). The 
equations are estimated separately for managers (Tables 9 and 11) and 
nonmanagers (Tables 10 and 12).
In general, we hypothesize that the same variables that have signif 
icant effects in Table 7 for paid medical leave also have significant 
effects in Tables 9-12. Minor variations may occur, however, because 
a firm was designated as having paid or unpaid medical leave if either 
managerial and/or nonmanagerial employees had access to leave in 
Table 7. In a small percentage of cases, managers had access to leave, 
while nonmanagers did not (or the converse). Hence, the exact per 
centages reporting leave may vary slightly across the equations. The 
unpaid medical leave variable used in Table 7 refers to formal unpaid 
leave plans, while Tables 9-12 classify a firm's unpaid leave policy 
into three categories of unpaid leave: formal leave with a job guaran 
tee, leave with no guarantee (including informal plans and formal plans 
without job guarantees), and no unpaid leave.
The major issue in examining Tables 9-12 centers on determining 
when a variable operates differently in its effect on whether a leave is 
provided with or without the benefit continuation or a job guarantee. 
The most potentially interesting cases are 1) those in which the vari 
able's coefficient achieves statistical significance for one of the options 
but not the other, and 2) those in which the variable's coefficient 
achieves significance for the two options, but the effect is different in 
magnitude or operates in a different direction or both. In this set of 
four equations, there is no instance in which a variable significantly 
affects health benefit continuation and job guarantees and where these 
effects are statistically significant and in different directions.
Health Benefit Continuation. The only significant economies of 
scale of group purchase effects occur in firms employing more than 15 
workers (Tables 9 and 10). Firms in the smallest employment size cat 
egory provide significantly fewer paid leaves with and without benefit 
continuation for managers and nonmanagers. They also provide sig 
nificantly fewer unpaid leaves with benefit continuation for managers
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and nonmanagers than do firms with more than 100 employees. These 
effects are generally small, as shown by the OLS equivalent coeffi 
cients, which indicate that a 10 percent increase in the independent 
variable will result in about a 1 percent increase in the probability that 
a firm will provide paid medical leave (with or without benefit continu 
ation).
Other measurers of firm size have significant coefficients in the 
paid medical leave (managers and nonmanagers) equations. Firms 
with less than $50 million in sales provide significantly fewer paid 
medical leaves for managers and nonmanagers than do other firms. The 
only similar scale effects for unpaid medical leave occur for nonman 
agers' unpaid medical leave without benefit continuation for workers 
in firms with annual sales volumes of less than $250,000, with signifi 
cantly fewer firms providing such leaves.
Sole proprietorships offer significantly fewer formal unpaid medi 
cal leaves for managers (not surprisingly, since the proprietor is often 
the only manager in a sole proprietorship). The likelihood of firms in 
industries with a higher percentage of businesses employing fewer than 
100 workers providing paid medical leaves (with or without benefit 
continuation) for either managers or nonmanagers is significantly 
lower than for firms in industries where the percentage of small firms 
in those industries is higher. The OLS equivalent coefficients show 
that the effect of the sole proprietorship form of business organization 
on the provision of paid leave with and without benefit continuation is 
small.
Tables 9 and 10 show few industry effects on leave for managers 
and nonmanagers. There is only a significantly negative coefficient on 
the retail trade dummy variable, indicating that firms in retail trade pro 
vide significantly fewer paid medical leaves (with or without benefit 
continuation) for either managers or nonmanagers than do firms in ser 
vices. In the case of paid leaves (with or without benefit continuation), 
firms in agriculture, mining, and construction are significantly less 
likely to provide such leave than are service sector firms.
Other variables that significantly affect the provision of paid and 
unpaid medical leave are the percentage of female managers in a firm, 
which positively affects the likelihood that a firm will provide both 
types of medical leave for managers and nonmanagers with or without 
benefit continuation. Across the board, the higher the percentage of
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Table 9 Multinomial Logit Estimates of the Probability that a Firm 
Provides Paid and Unpaid Medical Leave With and Without 
Health Benefit Continuation, for Managers (OLS Equivalent 
Coefficient)3
Paid medical leave
Variable13
Firm Size
1-15 employees
16-49 employees
50-99 employees
Sales volume (annual)
Less than $250,000
$250,000-$ 1,000,000
$1,000,000-$ 10,000,000
$ 1 0,000,000-$50,000,000
Ownership type
Sole proprietorship
Partnership
Corporation
Without 
benefit 
continuation
-0.104
[-0.746**]
(0.332)
-0.005
[-0.033]
(0.348)
-0.003
[-0.023]
(0 466)
-0.281
[-2.01***]
(0.455)
-0.248
[-1.773***]
(0461)
-0.191
[-1.366***]
(0.428)
-0.039
[-0.276]
(0.491)
-0.066
[-0.473*]
(0.286)
-0.081
[-0.582]
(0.414)
0.025
[0.178]
(0.223)
With benefit 
continuation
-0.095
[-0.528*]
(0.305)
0.021
[0.119]
(0318)
0.111
[0.619]
(0.398)
-0.413
[-2.302***]
(0 438)
-0.251
[-1.401***]
(.422)
-0.192
[-1.071***]
(.403)
-0.110
[-.611]
(0.477)
-0.169
[-0.940***]
(0.249)
-0.147
[-0.820**]
(0.360)
0.045
[0.248]
(0.184)
Unpaid medical leave
Without 
benefit 
continuation
0.028
[0.129]
(0.304)
0.115
[0.523]
(0.331)
0.155
[0.701]
(0.475)
-0.122
[-0.555]
(0.406)
0.017
[0.077]
(0.416)
-0.069
[-0.315]
(0.398)
0.120
[0.892]
(0.568)
-0.017
[0.078]
(0.203)
-0.083
[-0.376]
(0.292)
0.019
[0.084]
(0.183)
With benefit 
continuation 
and formal plan
0.279
[-0.125**]
(0.489)
-0.098
[-0.393]
(0.511)
0.151
[0.608]
(0.636)
-0.432
[-1.739**]
(0.683)
-0.223
[-.0900]
(0.642)
-0.189
[-0.761]
(0.566)
-0.144
[-0.581]
(0.794)
-0.307
[-1.236**]
(0.616)
-0.117
[-0.471]
(0.648)
0.110
[0.445]
(0.354)
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Table 9 (continued)
Paid medical leave
Variable5
Percentage small in industry
Industry
Agriculture, mining,
construction
Manufacturing
Transportation
Wholesale trade
Retail trade
Unionized
Percent unionized in
industry
Percent female age 16-44,
Managers
Percent female age 16-44,
Nonmanagers
Percent female in industry
Without 
benefit 
continuation
-1.143
[-10.163***]
(2.450)
-0.121
[-0.868**]
(0 395)
-0.037
[-0.265]
(0 405)
-0.002
[0.011]
(0671)
0.019
[-0.138]
(0.324)
-0.132
[-0.945***]
(0.271)
0.076
[0 543]
(0.377)
0327
[-2.340]
(1 958)
0.120
[0.855***]
(0.261)
0076
[0.544**]
(0.247)
-0.150
[-1.069]
(0.656)
With benefit 
continuation
-1305
[-7.268***]
(2.285)
-0.259
[-1.442***]
(0.352)
-0.062
[-0.344]
(0.375)
0.015
[0 083]
(0.596)
-0.010
[0.056]
(0.249)
-0.139
[-0.773***]
(0.207)
0091
[0.506]
(0.346)
-00390
[-2.174]
(1.885)
0044
[0 244]
(0.232)
0.103
[0.572***]
(0.209)
-0317
[-1.768***]
(0.542)
Unpaid medical leave
Without With benefit 
benefit continuation 
continuation and formal plan
-0.736
[-3.337]
(2.142)
-0.075
[-0.340]
(0.282)
-0.052
[-0 235]
(0.341)
-0.117
[-0.531]
(0.521)
-0.047
[-0213]
(0.249)
-0.022
[-0 099]
(0.185)
0.009
[0.041]
(0.324)
0.207
[0.940]
(1 605)
0.080
[0.366*]
(0.221)
0.202
[0.915***]
(0.200)
-0.151
[-0.683]
(0.484)
1 236
[4.978]
3.936)
-0285
[-1.148]
(0.718)
0056
[0.224]
(0.634)
-0046
[-0.187]
(1.003)
0.035
[0.139]
(0.473)
0002
[0.010]
(0.375)
0.096
[0.386]
(0.526)
0.402
[1.620]
(3.149)
0.130
[0.525]
(0.435)
0.234
[0941**]
(0.399)
0.173
[0.698]
(0.999)
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Paid medical leave Unpaid medical leave
Variable13
Without
benefit With benefit 
continuation continuation
Without With benefit
benefit continuation
continuation and formal plan
Percent age 55 or more,
Managers
Percent age 55 or more,
Nonmanagers
State unemployment rate
Percent of state population
in rural area
N
Chi-square
-2 log L
-2 log L (intercept only)
0.133 0136
[0.953***] [0.756***]
(0.307) (0.248)
-0.089 -0.027
[-0637] [-0.152]
(0.465) (0.342)
-1.108 -2.204
[-7 917] [-12.279***]
(5.509) (4.540)
-0.224 0.087
[-1.598**] [0.482]
(0.653) (0.514)
1485
513 162
-1201 739
-1458.320
-0.017 0.088
[0.077] [0 355]
(0 229) (0 468)
-0.016 0.044
[0.074] [0.178]
(0.280) (0.638)
-0896 -1.750
[-4.062] [-7.050]
(4.130) (8.250)
0.109 0.125
[0.494] [-0 503]
(0.489) (0.977)
1590
164.233
-1065.228
-1147.344
a Original logit coefficient in brackets and standard error of original logit coefficient in 
parentheses.
b Excluded categories of categorical variables include' 100 or more employees, sales vol 
ume greater than $50 million annually, Subchapter S Corporations (ownership type), ser 
vices (industry), and nonunion workers.
***significant at the 1% level (two-tailed test).
**significant at the 5% level (two-tailed test).
*significant at the 10% level (two-tailed test)
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Table 10 Multinomial Logit Estimates of the Probability that a Firm 
Provides Paid and Unpaid Medical Leave with and without 
Health Benefit continuation for Nonmanagers (OLS 
Equivalent Coefficient)3
Paid medical leave
Variable5
Firm size
1-15 employees
16-49 employees
50-99 employees
Sales volume
Less than $250,000
$250,000-$ 1,000,000
$1,000,000-$10,000,000
$ 10,000,000-$50,000,000
Ownership type
Sole proprietorship
Partnership
Without With 
benefit benefit 
continuation continuation
-0.113
[-0.760**]
(0.324)
0.007
[0.045]
(0.339)
-0.015
[-0.098]
(0.462)
-0.285
[-1.922***]
(0.446)
-0.266
[-1.790***]
(0.454)
-0.052
[-1.348***]
(0.422)
-0.057
[-0.381]
(0.491)
-0.060
[-0.404]
(0.274)
-0.095
[-0.639]
(0.408)
-0079
[-0.468]
(0.306)
0.026
[0.154]
(0.320)
0.122
[0.662*]
(0.401)
-0.355
[-2.093***]
(0.436)
-0.237
[-1.399***]
(0.426)
-0.187
[-1.103***]
(0.406)
-0.091
[-0.536]
(0.479)
-0.150
[-0.886***]
(0.250)
-0.118
[-0.697b]
(0.353)
Unpaid medical leave
Without 
benefit 
continuation
0.025
[0.107]
(0.303)
0115
[0.502]
(0.330)
0.161
[0.699]
(0.474)
-0.141
[-0.614]
(0.405)
-0.028
[-0.123]
(0.415)
-0.082
[-0.356]
(0.397)
0.187
[0.813]
(0.567)
-0.020
[0.088]
(0.203)
-0.089
[-0.386]
(0.292)
Benefit 
continuation 
and formal 
plan
-0.240
[-0.982**]
(0.496)
-0.062
[-0.254]
(0.520)
0.165
[0.674]
(0 647)
-0.276
[-1.128*]
(0.662)
0.175
[-0.717]
(0.663)
0.152
[-0.621]
(0.589)
-0.015
[-0.061]
(0.775)
-0.178
[-0.726]
(0.555)
-0.073
[-0.298]
(0.654)
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Paid medical leave
Without With 
benefit benefit 
Variable1* continuation continuation
Corporation
Percentage small in industry
Industry
Agri., mining, const.
Manufacturing
Transportation
Wholesale trade
Retail trade
Unionized
Percent unionized in
industry
Percent female age 16-44,
Managers
Percent female age 16-44,
Nonmanagers
0.020
[0.137]
(0.218)
-1.429
[-9.626***]
(2.388)
-0.090
[-0 605]
(0.371)
-0.024
[-0.164]
(0.388)
0.036
[0.241]
(0.637)
0.006
[0.039]
(0.310)
-0.168
[-1 129***]
(0 276)
0.068
[0.458]
(0.364)
-0.380
[-2.557]
(1.869)
0.097
[0.652**]
(0.255)
0.086
[0 580**]
(0.241)
0.043
[0.255]
(0.186)
-1.129
[-6.659***]
(2.277)
-0.218
[-1 283***]
(0.345)
-0.044
[-0.262]
(0.368)
0074
[0.438]
(0.576)
-0.011
[-0 064]
(0.251)
-0.146
[-0.859***]
(0.211)
0.095
[0.560*]
(0.337)
-0.392
[-2.310]
(1.844)
0.021
[0.125]
(0.233)
0.119
[0.702***]
(0.209)
Unpaid medical leave
Benefit 
Without continuation 
benefit and formal 
continuation plan
0.0188
[0.082]
(0.183)
-0.747
[-3.251]
(2 142)
-0.076
[-0.330]
(0.282)
-0.053
[-0.229]
(0.341)
-0.121
[-0.525]
(0.522)
-0.047
-0.047
(0.249)
-0.020
[-0.085]
(0.185)
0.005
[0.023]
(0.324)
0.213
[0.928]
(1.608)
0.086
[0.375*]
(0 221)
0.209
[0.910***]
(0.200)
0.135
[0.550]
(0.370)
1.113
[4.548]
(4.021)
-0.313
[-1.279*]
(0.724)
0.031
[0.126]
(0.638)
-0.076
[-0.312]
(1.011)
-0.003
[-0.014]
(0.479)
-0.062
[-0.254]
(0.389)
0.130
[0.533]
(0.521)
0.461
[1.882]
[1.882]
0.083
[0.339]
(0.444)
0.252
[1 028***]
(0.399)
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Table 10 (continued)
Variable13
Percent female in industry
Percent age 55 or more,
Managers
Percent age 55 or more,
Nonmanagers
State unemployment rate
Percent of state population
in rural area
N
Chi-square
-2 log L
-2 log L (intercept only)
Paid medical leave
Without With 
benefit benefit 
continuation continuation
-0.121 -0.290
[-0.813] [-1.709***]
(0 642) (0.543)
0.114 0102
[0.769**] [0.600**]
(0.301) (0.253)
-0.019 -0007
[-0.133] [-0.040]
(0.412) (0.343)
-0812 -2.298
[-5 469] [-13.552***]
(5.292) (4.564)
-0.234 0.056
[-1 573**] [0 330]
(0634) (0517)
1485
485 347
-1227.464
-1470 138
Unpaid medical leave
Benefit 
Without continuation 
benefit and formal 
continuation plan
-0153 0097
[-0 666] [0.398]
(0.484) (1.013)
-0.015 -0043
[-0.066] [0.176]
(0 228) (0.480)
-0.142 -0.020
[-0 620] [-0 084]
(0 279) (0.685)
-0.965 -1.088
[-4.198] [-4448]
(4.131) (8312)
0116 -0.184
[0.506] [-0.751]
(0.489) (1.007)
1590
141.402
-1063 651
-1134.353
a Original logit coefficient in brackets and standard error of original logit coefficient in
parentheses. 
b Excluded categories of categorical variables include: 100 or more employees, sales
volume greater than $50 million annually, Subchapter S Corporations (ownership
type), services (industry), and nonunion workers. 
***significant at the 1% level (two-tailed test).
**significant at the 5% level (two-tailed test).
*significant at the 10% level (two-tailed test)
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Table 11 Multinomial Logit Estimates of the Probability that a Firm Provides 
Paid and Unpaid Medical Leave with and without Job Guarantee, for 
Managers (OLS Equivalent Coefficient)3
Paid medical leave
Variable5
Firm size
1-15 employees
16-49 employees
50-99 employees
Sales volume
Less than $250,000
$250,000-$ 1,000,000
$1,000,000-$10,000,000
$ 10,000,000-$50,000,000
Ownership type
Sole proprietorship
Partnership
Corporation
Without 
guarantee
-0.046
[-0.515]
(0.393)
-0.009
[-0.098]
(0.410)
0013
[0 140]
(0.527)
-0.174
[_1 937***]
(0 543)
-0.126
[_1.4H***]
(0.536)
-0102
[_1 141**]
(0501)
-0.005
[-0.051]
(0.550)
-0.098
[-1 093***]
(0.369)
-0.091
[-1 015*]
(0.535)
0.018
[0.202)
(0.247)
With 
guarantee
0137
[-0.631**]
(0.284)
0.027
[0.126]
(0.298)
0106
[0.487]
(0.382)
-0.456
[-2.099***]
(0.402)
-0336
[_1 544***]
(0.399)
-0.255
[-1.175***]
(0381)
-0129
[0.594]
(0.455)
-0.103
[-0.473**]
(0.221)
-0.135
[-0621*]
(0.329)
0.062
[0.286]
(0.178)
Unpaid medical leave
With guarantee 
Without and formal 
guarantee plan
0.035
[0.225]
(0 306)
0092
[0 589*]
(0 333)
0.137
[0.877*]
(0 476)
-0073
[-0 469]
(0.409)
-0.002
[-0.013]
(0418)
-0.039
[-0.249]
(0.401)
0.141
[0.904]
(0 572)
-0.018
[-0.081]
(0.204)
-0.065
[-0.414]
(0.295)
0018
[0.112]
(0.184)
-0.288
[-1.361***]
(0.428)
0080
[-0.378]
(0.447)
-0.041
[-0.195]
(0.627)
-0351
[-1 661***]
(0.582)
-0.139
[-0.657]
(0.564)
-0128
[-0 606]
(0501)
0.055
[0.262]
(0.670)
-0.013
[-0531]
(0 420)
-0.005
[-0.022]
(0.492)
0.024
[0.113]
(0.298)
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Table 11 (continued)
Paid medical leave
Variable15
Percentage small in industry
Industry
Agn , mining, const.
Manufacturing
Transportation
Wholesale trade
Retail trade
Unionized
Percent unionized in
industry
Percent female age 16-44,
Managers
Percent female age 16-44,
Nonmanagers
Without 
guarantee
-0.593
[-6.615**]
(2.828)
-0224
[-2 498***]
(0.577)
-0060
[-0.672]
(0.461)
-0.093
[-1 032]
(0.780)
-0.040
[-0.442]
(0.357)
-0.083
[-0 927***]
(0.300)
0.022
[0.249]
(0.460)
0.116
[1.297]
(2.314)
0.038
[.426]
(0.317)
0.074
[0.826***]
(0.285)
With 
guarantee
-1.75
[-8.074**]
(2.136)
-0204
[-0 937***]
(0.312)
-0.065
[-0.299]
(0.351)
0.043
[0.199]
(0.559)
0.021
[-0.097]
(0.239)
-0.177
[-0.814***]
(0 196)
0126
[0.578*]
(0.320)
-0.585
[-2.692]
(1.744)
0117
[.536**]
(0.210)
0.103
[0.474**]
(0.194)
Unpaid medical leave
Without 
guarantee
-0.432
[-2.765]
(2.152)
-0059
[-0.379]
(0.284)
-0.035
[-0.222]
(0.342)
-0.901
[-0 582]
(0.524)
-0.039
[-0.248]
(0.250)
-0.017
[-0.109]
(0.186)
0.008
[0.050]
(0.326)
0.157
[1.005]
(1.610)
0056
[.360]
(0.221)
0.146
[0.930***]
(0.200)
With guarantee 
and formal 
plan
-0.449
[-2.125]
(3.102)
-0.068
[-0.322]
(0.569)
-0035
[0 164]
(0.527)
0.083
[0.394]
(0.806)
0.108
[-0.513]
(0.435)
0.026
[0.125]
(0.339)
0009
[0.042]
(0.464)
0.102
[0.484]
(2.391)
0.103
[0.485]
(0.379)
0.163
| [0.771**]
(0.348)
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Variable15
Percent female in industry
Percent age 55 or more,
Managers
Percent age 55 or more,
Nonmanagers
State unemployment rate
Percent of state population
in rural area
TV
Chi-square
-2 log L
-2 log L (intercept only)
Paid medical leave
Without With 
guarantee guarantee
0.158 -0.278
[-1.766**] [-1.279**]
(0.735) (0513)
0.092 0.184
[1.023***] [0.848***]
(0.335) (0.232)
0.078 -0 047
[-0.867] [-0.215]
(0.581) (0.315)
-0.728 -0.624
[-8.122] [-12.076***]
(6.311) (4.256)
-0 149 0.082
[-1.664**] [0.378]
(0.752) (0.485)
1505
480.657
-1167.943
-1408.271
Unpaid medical leave
With guarantee 
Without and formal 
guarantee plan
-0.119 0.278
[-0.758] [1.315]
(0.486) (0.879)
-0.014 0.094
[-0.091] [0446]
(0229) (0.415)
-0.009 -0.017
[0.050] [-0.078]
(0.280) (0.579)
-0671 -0920
M.292] M.354]
(4.147) (7.151)
0.082 -0.114
[0.521] [-0.537]
(0.491) (0.856)
1590
190.557
-1144.188
-1241.466
a Original logit coefficient in brackets and standard error of original logit coefficient in
parentheses. 
b Excluded categories of categorical variables include: 100 or more employees, sales
volume greater than $50 million annually, Subchapter S Corporations (ownership
type), services (industry), and nonunion workers. 
***significant at the 1% level (two-tailed test).
**significant at the 5% level (two-tailed test). 
*significant at the 10% level (two-tailed test).
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Table 12 Multinomial Logit Estimates of the Probability that a Firm
Provides Paid and Unpaid Medical Leave with and without Job 
Guarantee for Nonmanagers (OLS Equivalent Coefficient)3
Paid medical leave
Variable5
Firm Size
1-15 employees
16-49 employees
50-99 employees
Sales volume
Less than $250,000
$250,000-$ 1,000,000
$1,000,000-$10,000,000
$ 1 0,000,000-$50,000,000
Ownership type
Sole proprietorship
Partnership
Corporation
Without 
guarantee
-0.051
[-0.552]
(0.381)
-0.006
[-0.061]
(0.397)
-0.007
[-0.073]
(0.532)
-0177
[-1.908***]
(0.528)
-0.120
[-1.295**]
(0.518)
-0.102
[-1 103**]
(0.487)
-0.011
[-0.121]
(0.546)
-0.070
[-0.754**]
(0.339)
-0.061
[-0 654]
(0.477)
0.025
[0.270]
(0.245)
With 
guarantee
-0.120
[-0.566**]
(0.283)
0.027
[0 128]
(0.297)
0.110
[0.519]
(0.381)
-0.406
[-1.921***]
(0.400)
-0.326
[-1.541***]
(0.399)
-0.250
[-1 185***]
(0.381)
-0.117
[-0.553]
(0.456)
-0099
[-0.468**]
(0.217)
-0.114
[-0.541*]
(0.317)
0042
[0 198]
(0.176)
Unpaid medical leave
Without 
guarantee
-0.032
[0.198]
(0.306)
0.093
[0571*]
(0.332)
0.141
[0.866*]
(0.475)
-0084
[-0.520]
(0.408)
-0.007
[-0.044]
(0.418)
-0.045
[-0 275]
(0.400)
0.140
[0.861]
(0.571)
-0015
[-0.092]
(0 204)
-0066
[-0.409]
(0.294)
0.017
[0.107]
(0.183)
With guarantee 
and formal 
plan
-0.293
[-1.203***]
(0.428)
-0.076
[-0.314]
(0.451)
-0.042
[-0.173]
(0.641)
-0.311
[_1 277**]
(0 559)
-0.159
[-0.653]
(0.566)
-0.159
[-0.653]
(0.507)
0078
[0.320]
(0.672)
-0.075
[-0.308]
(0 402)
-0.020
[-0.082]
(0 506)
0.042
[0.171]
(0 302)
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Paid medical leave
Variable6
Percentage small in industry
Industry
Agriculture, mining,
construction
Manufacturing
Transportation
Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade
Unionized
Percent unionized in
industry
Percent female age 16-44,
Managers
Percent female age 1 6-44,
Nonmanagers
Percent female in industry
Without 
guarantee
-0.556
[-5.998**]
(2.774)
-0.160
[-1.728***]
(0.487)
-0.053
[-0.575]
(0 438)
-0.085
[-0.919]
(0 755)
0022
[-0.238]
(0.343)
-0101
[-1.086***]
(0.301)
0.018
[0.194]
(0.434)
0.105
[1.133]
(2.177)
0.018
[0.198]
(0 307)
0.090
[0 975***]
(0.271)
-0.119
[-1.283*]
(0 723)
With 
guarantee
-1.769
[-8.370***]
(2.115)
-0182
[-0 860***]
(0.302)
-0034
[-0 163]
(0.341)
0.134
[0.636]
(0 535)
0.010
[0.046]
(0.239)
-0176
[-0.834***]
(0.196)
0.123
[0.582*]
(0.315)
-0.697
[-3.298*]
(1.685)
0.086
[0 409*]
(0.209)
0128
[0606***]
(0.192)
-0.315
[_1.490***]
(0.507)
Unpaid medical leave
With guarantee 
Without and formal 
guarantee plan
-0.458
[-2.821]
(2.151)
-0.056
[-0.346]
(0.284)
-0035
[-0.213]
(0.342)
-0.094
[-0.567]
(0.525)
-0.041
[-0.250]
(0.250)
-0.017
[-0 107]
(0.186)
0002
[0010]
(0.326)
0154
[0.951]
(1.614)
0.059
[0.361]
(0.222)
0.151
[0.928***]
(0.200)
-0.116
[-0716]
(0.486)
-0411
[-1 687]
(3 143)
-0183
[-0.753]
(0.590)
-0.020
[-0.083]
(0.527)
0.062
[0.256]
(0.804)
0.105
[0.432]
(0.424)
0.014
[0.057]
(0.336)
0.076
[0314]
(0.453)
0175
[0.717]
(2.399)
0118
[0.486]
(0 376)
0.193
[0.792**]
0(.345)
0.176
[0.722]
(0.867)
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Table 12 (continued)
Paid medical leave
Variable6
Percent age 55 or more, 
Managers
Percent age 55 or more, 
Nonmanagers
State unemployment rate
Without 
guarantee
0.082 
[0.880***] 
(0.323) 
-0.041 
[-0.437] 
(0.515) 
-1.147 
[-12.378**] 
(6.178)
With 
guarantee
0.146 
[0.692***] 
(0.233) 
-0.005 
[-0.022] 
(0.308) 
-2.351 
[-11.124***] 
(4.208)
Unpaid medical leave
Without 
guarantee
-0.014 
[-0.089] 
(0.229) 
-0.009 
[-0.052] 
(0.280) 
-0.696 
M.283] 
(4.148)
With guarantee 
and formal 
plan
0.092 
[0.377] 
(0.412) 
-0.036 
[-0.147] 
(0.580) 
-0.991 
[-4.073] 
(7.120)
Percent of state population 
in rural area
N 
Chi-square
-2 log L
-2 log L (intercept only)
-0.181 0.037
[-1.959***] [0.175]
(0 723) (0.485)
1512
442.006
-1211.842
-1432.845
0.084 -0.103
[0.514] [-0.425]
(0.491) (0.857)
1590
169.102
-1150.392
-1234.943
a Original logit coefficient in brackets and standard error of original logit coefficient in 
parentheses.
b Excluded categories of categorical variables include: 100 or more employees, sales vol 
ume greater than $50 million annually, Subchapter S Corporations (ownership type), ser 
vices (industry), and nonunion workers
***significant at the 1% level (two-tailed test). 
**significant at the 5% level (two-tailed test). 
* significant at the 10% level (two-tailed test).
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women nonmanagers or the larger the percentage of managers aged 55 
or more in a firm, the more likely a firm will provide paid or unpaid 
medical leave (with or without benefit continuation).
The higher percentage of female managers (aged 16-44) in a firm, 
the more likely that firm will provide unpaid medical leave without 
benefit continuation for both managers and nonmanagers. The per 
centage of women in the industry has significant negative impacts on 
the likelihood that a firm will provide either paid or unpaid medical 
leave to its workers with benefit continuation to its workers.
Finally, the higher the unemployment rate in the state in which the 
firm does business, the less likely it will be to provide paid or unpaid 
medical leave with benefit continuation. The effect of the unemploy 
ment rate on the likelihood that a firm provides paid medical leave with 
benefit continuation is relatively large according to the OLS equivalent 
coefficients—a 1 percent increase in the state unemployment rate vari 
able results in a lowering of the probability that a firm will provide paid 
medical leave for its managers or nonmanagers by more than 2 percent. 
The larger the percentage of a state's population that resides in rural 
areas, the less likely a firm will be to provide paid or unpaid medical 
leave without benefit continuation. Again the OLS equivalent coeffi 
cients indicate that these effects are relatively small.
The story here appears to be that, for paid leave, the reduced form 
demand model fits the data well. Thus, in the paid medical leave with 
benefit and without benefit guarantee equations for managers, the chi- 
square statistics are 513 for managers and 485 for nonmanagers and 25 
coefficients attain statistical significance. In the unpaid medical leave 
equations for managers and nonmanagers, however, the chi-square sta 
tistics are only 164 and 141, respectively, and only six coefficients 
attain significance at conventional levels. The latter chi-square statistic 
(for nonmanagers) is not significant at the 10 percent level. Thus, the 
model performs much better in describing the provision of paid rather 
than unpaid leave. We speculate that the reason for this superior per 
formance is that unpaid leave is a benefit that whose value is difficult 
for both employers (suppliers) and employees (demanders) to assess 
and therefore the "market" for such leave does not fulfill the assump 
tions necessary for the existence of a well functioning market and a 
model of behavior that assumes the existence of such conditions will 
not perform well in describing behavior.
176 Trzcinski and Alpert
Job Guarantees. The overall pattern of relationships observed in 
Tables 9 and 10 for health benefit continuation are also observed in 
Tables 11 and 12, which provide the multinomial logit estimates that 
differentiate between the three choices: no leave, leave without a job 
guarantee, and leave with a job guarantee. This section will focus on 
the small number of variables where differences do occur.
The most noticeable difference in the set firm size variables occurs 
for unpaid leave without a job guarantee in terms of the effects of the 
variables for 16^-9 and 50-99 workers. The results suggest that such 
firms are significantly more likely than firms employing 100 or more 
workers to provide the option of leave without a job guarantee for both 
managers and nonmanagers. It may be that the costs of such an option 
are lower in midsize firms than in larger or smaller firms. Simply put, 
smaller and larger firms might be required to formally replace the 
leave-taker for different reasons. This is necessitated because there is 
no one available to do the leave-takers work in smaller firms, and jobs 
in larger firms are so specialized that such a replacement is required. It 
is only in medium-sized firms where there are enough other workers to 
"cover for" the absent worker and full job specialization has not 
become so pronounced as to make substitutions within the firm's own 
workforce possible. This is consistent with Trzcinski and Alpert 
(1990), in which they found that large firms were more likely than 
small ones to use formal temporary workers.
The second difference occurs in the effects of demographic vari 
ables. In the job guarantee equations, as the percent female of the 
firm's managerial workforce increases, the likelihood also increases of 
leave with a job guarantee relative to the other two options. The per 
cent female of the firm's nonmanagerial workforce has significant 
effects for the two categories of leave with and without a job guarantee, 
but the magnitude of the coefficient is larger for the category, leave 
with no guarantee. This pattern is also observed for the percent of the 
firm's managerial workforce, aged 55 or older. The third and final dif 
ference occurs in the effects of the percent female in the industry vari 
able. In the job guarantee equations, the variable's coefficient is 
significant and negative for leave with and without a job guarantee, 
with the absolute magnitude greater in the case of leave with no guar 
antee.
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Summary
Overall, the variables included in the models tend to predict the 
provision or nonprovision of leave better than they predict the provi 
sion or nonprovision of health benefit continuation or job guarantees. 
What is particularly striking in comparing the results in Table 7 with 
the set of results in Tables 9-12 are the effects of the firm-specific 
demand-side variables. Although Table 7 suggests that unionized firms 
are no more likely than nonunionized firms to provide paid sick leave, 
Tables 9-12 indicate that unionized firms are more likely to provide 
health benefit continuation and job guarantees than are other firms. In 
Table 7, the significant effects of demographic variables are all consis 
tent with the predictions of the model in terms of their effects on influ 
encing the incidence of leave. In the conditions of leave equations, 
however, these variables either did not predict whether leave was pro 
vided with or without health benefit continuation or job guarantees, or 
they tended to have signs that were inconsistent with our expectations. 
As an additional caveat, the reader should bear in mind that several of 
the variables may be acting as proxy variables for income and, hence, 
their coefficients may be biased.
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This chapter explored two aspects of family and medical leave 
with the basic premise that family and medical leave consists of two 
separable analytical components—a wage replacement component and 
a job guarantee component. We found that these components are dealt 
with separately in both Canada and the United States. We examined 
the incidence of leave to verify our hypothesis for both countries. We 
further investigated the correlates of two types of family and medical 
leave for two types of family and medical leave provision in the United 
States.
The central hypothesis is that the factors determining the provision 
of wage replacement during leave differ from the determinants of 
whether or not a job guarantee is provided. In general, this hypothesis 
implies that differences exist in the factors that determine the provision
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of paid versus unpaid leave. Specifically, it is hypothesized that the 
determinants of paid leave are similar to those which account for other 
fringe benefits. It is further hypothesized that the provision of unpaid 
leave will not be as fully explained by the standard reduced form 
demand models specifying fringe benefit determination as will the pro 
vision of paid leave.
Our findings indicate that the standard reduced form demand 
model provides a strong basis from which to predict the provision of 
paid leave, but it is considerably weaker in explaining the incidence of 
unpaid leave and conditions surrounding leave. Our findings thus sug 
gest that different theoretical approaches need to be developed if we 
are to understand the provision of unpaid leave with job guarantees in 
the private sector and if we are to analyze actual effects of exiting leg 
islation and potential effects of future legislative initiates.
Note
1. The clawback operates as follows: 
Net income = $80,000 
UI clawback level $58,110 
Difference $21,890 
30% of difference $6,657 
UI benefits $6,375 
30% of benefits $1,913 
Amount to be repaid to UI $1,913 
(UI clawback is the lesser of $1,913 and $6,657)
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The past 30 years has been marked by rapid growth in mandated 
employer contributions for social insurance programs in both the 
United States and abroad. Payroll taxation is a large and growing 
source of public finance in the United States: 38 percent of federal rev 
enues in 1993 were raised by payroll taxation while this figure was 
only 12.4 percent percent in 1960 (Economic Report of the President 
1992). This corresponds to a similar growth in the reliance on payroll 
taxation in other developed countries. For example, the payroll tax rate 
in Sweden grew from 6 percent in 1950 to 40 percent by the late 1970s 
(Holmlund 1983). At the same time, employer-mandated provision of 
insurance benefits to workers has risen as well, through programs such 
as Workers' Compensation in the United States and maternity leave in 
both the United States and many other nations.
The growth in employer-financed social insurance programs has 
been criticized along a number of dimensions. Perhaps the most 
important criticism has been that payroll taxation and other mandates 
raise labor costs, thereby reducing competitiveness and leading to dis- 
employment. This argument has found casual support in the high level 
of unemployment in Europe, where employer mandates have grown 
rapidly since 1960. Furthermore, payroll taxation and, in particular, 
lump-sum employer mandates have been labeled inequitable relative to 
broad-based income taxation.
The purpose of this chapter is to assess these criticisms of man 
dated employer contributions in the United States. This type of analy 
sis is particularly important now given the recent proposal to finance 
the largest social welfare program of the last 60 years, National Health
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Insurance, through an employer mandate. In the debate over the wis 
dom of employer-mandate-financed health reform, the criticisms noted 
above have taken center stage. Furthermore, as I show below, payroll 
taxes represent the majority of the tax burden for over 80 percent of 
taxpayers in the United States, highlighting the importance of assess 
ing the efficacy of this particular mode of raising revenue.
I analyze payroll taxation and employer mandates in the United 
States in four steps. First, I present a brief overview of payroll tax 
financed and employer-mandated social insurance programs in the 
United States. Second, I discuss the basic theory and evidence on the 
labor-market effects of payroll taxes and employer mandates, high 
lighting the similarity between the two types of interventions. I note 
that while there is a growing body of reduced form literature, suggest 
ing that the costs of mandated benefits and payroll taxes can be shifted 
to wages, we still have not resolved the critical structural question of 
whether this shifting is due to full valuation of these benefits or inelas 
tic labor supply.
I then extend this basic analysis to consider a number of real world 
complications in analyzing the labor-market effects of these interven 
tions: minimum wage constraints on wage shifting; group-specific 
mandates which cause employer costs to rise significantly more for 
some types of workers than for others; and the fact that many mandates 
are a fixed cost of employment which may distort the margin of hours 
choice. Finally, I consider the efficiency and equity implications of 
shifting the financing of federal social insurance programs from the 
payroll tax to the income tax and of removing the current cap on earn 
ings subject to federal payroll taxation.
I conclude with two points. First, while we have learned much in 
recent years about the effects of payroll taxation and mandates on the 
labor market, there remain a number of important unanswered ques 
tions. Second, there is a critical gap in the empirical literature which 
makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions as to the overall efficacy of 
government interventions financed by payroll taxes and mandates: 
information on the benefits of these interventions for the affected par 
ties.
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BACKGROUND ON PAYROLL TAX FINANCED AND 
MANDATED PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES'
Payroll Tax Financed Programs
At the federal level, there are three major payroll tax financed pro 
grams. The first is Social Security (SS), which provides income sup 
port to workers upon their retirement (at age 62 or greater). 2 The 
program is "unfunded;" that is, the benefits paid to current retirees are 
financed by taxation of current workers. Social Security benefit levels 
are not a direct function of the taxes paid by a worker but rather of his 
or her earnings history; earnings in the highest 35 of the 40 earnings 
years from age 21 to age 60, relative to average earnings in the econ 
omy, are used to determine benefits levels. Earnings histories are then 
translated to benefits through a formula that, in effect, favors low wage 
workers. 3 Benefits are paid as an annuity, yielding a fixed amount (in 
real terms) from the point of retirement until death.
Benefits to retirees are financed by equal payroll taxation of work 
ers and firms. Wages, salaries, and self-employment income are tax 
able; other forms of capital income, such as dividends, are not. Both 
sides of the payroll tax are capped at the "Social Security Taxable 
Maximum" earnings, so that the average tax burden is actually decreas 
ing with wages above this maximum. In recent years, payroll tax col 
lections have greatly exceeded benefit expenditures, with the 
difference being used to create a trust fund for financing the retirement 
of the baby boomers. This trust fund is projected to be insufficient to 
meet the needs of future cohorts, however, leading to recent proposals 
to slow the growth of Social Security benefits and/or raise tax rates. 
This highlights the importance of reconsidering the fundamental struc 
ture of social insurance financing.
The second federal payroll tax financed program is Disability 
Insurance (DI), which provides income benefits to workers who have 
become so disabled that they must leave the labor force. The structure 
and financing of DI is very similar to Social Security along a number 
of dimensions: individuals must have worked a minimum number of 
quarters, and benefits are based on past earning history. Unlike Social 
Security, however, there is no age restriction on the receipt of benefits.
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The major restriction, instead, is that individuals be physically or men 
tally incapable of gainful employment. Disability is assessed in a com 
plicated (and highly imperfect) process, which begins with state 
examination boards and which can be ultimately appealed to the fed 
eral level.4
The third program is Medicare, public health insurance for all per 
sons age 65 and above. Medicare consists of two parts. Part A 
finances the hospital expenditures of the elderly (along with some 
copayment by the elderly themselves). This part of Medicare is 
financed by a payroll tax similar to that of Social Security, levied 
equally on workers and firms. The Medicare payroll tax differs in two 
important respects from the Social Security payroll tax, however: it is 
much lower and, in recent years, the taxable maximum has greatly 
exceeded that for Social Security and the cap was removed altogether 
in 1994. The second part of Medicare, Part B, finances physician 
expenditures of the elderly. This portion of Medicare is financed by 
premium payments by elders and from general revenues.
Table 1 presents the history of the tax rates and taxable maxima for 
the major federal payroll tax financed programs. There was a dramatic 
rise in both the tax rate and the taxable maximum from 1950 to 1980. 
Thereafter, both have continued to rise, but at a much slower pace 
(except for the Medicare taxable maximum, which again rose rapidly 
in recent years). The fraction of workers under the taxable maximum 
has remained relatively constant in recent years. The growth in the size 
of these programs is documented in Table 2. Each program has grown 
very rapidly over time, although the growth of Medicare has recently 
been the fastest.
At the state level, the major payroll tax financed program is Unem 
ployment Insurance (UI), which provides limited income support to 
workers who lose their jobs. Qualification for UI is a function of state- 
specific minimum work requirements. Benefits are then paid to indi 
viduals who are laid off, but not (in most states) those who quit or are 
fired for cause. Benefits are a redistributive function of previous earn 
ings, with a minimum and maximum benefit and less than one for one 
conversion of wages to benefits in between, and are generally paid for 
26 weeks. UI is financed by payroll taxation of employers, up to a tax 
able maximum of earnings. 5 Employers tax rates are partially experi-
Table 1 History of the Payroll Tax3
Year
1960
1970
1975
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
SS rate 
(%)
2.75
3.65
4.38
4.52
4.70
4.58
4.78
5.20
5.20
5.20
5.20
5.53
5.53
5.60
5.60
5.60
5.60
DI rate 
(%)
0.25
0.55
0.58
0.56
0.65
0.83
0.63
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.53
0.53
0.60
0.60
0.60
0.60
Medicare rate
(%)
0.60
0.90
1.05
1.30
1.30
1.30
1.30
1.35
1.45
1.45
1.45
1.45
1.45
1.45
1.45
1.45
Total rate 
(%)
3.00
4.80
5.85
6.13
6.65
6.70
6.70
7.00
7.05
7.15
7.15
7.51
7.51
7.65
7.65
7.65
7.65
SS&DI 
maximum 
($)"
4,800
7,800
14,100
25,900
29,700
32,400
35,700
37,800
39,600
42,000
43,800
45,000
48,000
51,300
53,400
55,500
58,000
Medicare 
maximum
($)b
4,800
7,800
14,100
25,900
29,700
32,400
35,700
37,800
39,600
42,000
43,800
45,000
48,000
51,300
125,000
130,200
135,000
% Below 
maximum
72.0
74.0
84.9
91.2
92.4
929
93.7
93.6
93.5
93.8
93.9
93.9
SOURCE: EBRI( 1992).
a Figures in first four columns are tax rates, levied equally on employees and employers.
b Nominal dollars.
SS: Social Security; DI: Disability Insurance.
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Table 2 History of Program Size (in millions of dollars)
Year
1950
1960
1970
1975
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
SS benefit 
payments
961
10,677
28,798
58,517
105,083
123,803
138,806
149,221
157,841
167,248
176,813
183,587
195,454
207,791
222,987
DI benefit 
payments
NA
568
3,085
8,505
15,515
17,192
17,376
17,524
17,898
18,827
19,853
20,519
21,695
22,911
24,829
Medicare benefit 
payments
NA
NA
1,975
4,273
10,635
13,113
15,455
18,106
19,661
22,947
26,239
30,820
33,970
38,294
42,468
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (1991). 
NA = Program did not exist in these years.
ence rated as a function of previous layoff histories; see Anderson and 
Meyer (1993) for details.
Table 3 presents details of UI payroll taxation in 1993 and histori 
cally. UI payroll tax rates, as measured by the maximum rate, are 
fairly high, reaching 10 percent in some states. The tax base, however, 
is fairly small. In 1993, many states had taxable maxima below 
$10,000 of earnings; for the federal FUTA tax, the base was only 
$7,000. The striking historical trend, particularly in comparison to 
Table 1, is the falling coverage of the UI taxable wage base. In 1947, 
over 90 percent of wages were covered in most states; by 1990, many 
states' bases extended to less than 30 percent of payroll.
Employer Mandates for Employee Workplace Benefits6
Along with the payroll tax financed programs discussed above, 
employers in the United States also are mandated to provide a wide
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Table3 The UI Payroll Tax
1993 
Taxable 
State maximum ($)
United States
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorada
Connecticut
Delaware
Dist. of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
7,000
8,000
23,200
7,000
8,000
7,000
10,000
7,100
8,500
9,000
7,000
8,500
23,900
19,200
9,000
7,000
13,100
8,000
8,000
8,500
7,000
8,500
10,800
9,500
14,300
7,000
7,500
14,500
7,000
14,800
7,000
1993 
Maximum 
tax rate 
(%)
NA
674
6.5
5.4
6.0
5.4
5.4
64
8.0
5.4
5.4
8.64
5.4
6.8
6.4
5.7
9.0
5.4
10.0
6.0
6.5
8.1
9.3
100
9.0
6.4
7.8
6.4
5.4
5.4
6.5
1990 Max. 
over avg. 
earnings
0.31
0.34
0.48
0.29
0.36
0.25
0.36
022
0.29
0.21
0.31
0.33
0.55
0.54
0.30
0.28
0.41
0.42
0.33
0.33
0.29
0.25
0.27
0.29
0.39
0.34
0.27
0.65
0.29
0.50
0.27
1960 Max. 
over avg. 
earnings
0.61
0.67
0.87
0.62
0.74
0.65
062
0.59
0.61
0.60
0.67
0.69
0.69
0.67
0.56
0.59
0.63
0.63
0.65
0.64
0.70
0.63
062
0.54
0.59
0.74
0.60
0.67
0.65
0.71
0.70
1947 Max 
over avg. 
earnings
0.84
0.91
0.91
0.89
0.92
0.83
0.86
0.85
0.80
0.82
0.88
0.88
0.89
0.90
0.81
0.86
0.88
0.88
0.90
0.87
0.91
0.87
0.85
0.83
0.85
0.92
0.84
0.90
0.86
0.87
0.91
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Table 3 (continued)
State
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
1993 
Taxable 
maximum ($)
16,100
12,600
7,000
12,500
12,600
8,500
10,400
18,000
8,000
15,600
7,000
7,000
7,000
9,000
15,700
8,000
8,000
18,500
8,000
10,500
11,100
1993 
Maximum 
tax rate
(%)
6.47
5.4
6.4
5.7
54
6.5
6.2
5.4
9.2
8.4
5.4
9.5
10.0
6.0
8.0
8.4
6.2
5.4
7.5
8.9
8.5
1990 Max. 
over avg. 
earnings
0.38
0.41
0.20
0.42
0.39
0.29
0.37
0.49
0.28
042
0.31
0.33
0.31
0.33
0.45
0.31
0.28
0.48
0.31
0.37
0.36
1960 Max. 
over avg. 
earnings
0.57
0.65
0.57
0.73
0.68
056
0.64
0.73
0.60
0.74
0.74
0.67
0.68
0.63
0.62
0.69
0.67
0.60
060
0.58
0.66
1947 Max. 
over avg. 
earnings
0.84
0.91
0.79
0.91
0.88
0.84
0.86
0.87
0.86
0.87
0.92
0.89
089
0.86
0.88
0.91
0.89
0.87
0.87
0.85
0.89
SOURCE: Committee on Ways and Means (1993).
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variety of benefits for their workers. Federal law explicitly mandates 
the provision of maternity leave to most employees in firms with more 
than 50 employees (under the Family and Medical Leave Act). While 
not requiring employers to offer health insurance, federal law regulates 
the structure of insurance for those firms that do offer coverage, man 
dating the inclusion of comprehensive maternity health insurance cov 
erage (under the 1978 Pregnancy Discrimination Act) and continuation 
of coverage benefits (under the 1986 Consolidated Omnibus Reconcili 
ation Act) in health insurance packages. 7
State law in 48 states mandates that employers purchase workers' 
compensation (WC) insurance against workplace injuries. 8 Workers' 
compensation is the oldest and largest mandated benefit in the United 
States, with benefit payments amounting to $37 billion in 1990. This 
program pays both the medical bills of the injured worker and an 
indemnity benefit, which is a redistributive function of their pre-injury 
wage (the benefits structure is similar to that of UI). States legislate the 
level of benefits that must be paid to workers for a variety of different 
types of injuries. Firms can then purchase insurance from either the 
state or private firms to cover these costs or (in most states) they can 
self-insure. Workers' compensation insurance costs averaged 2.1 per 
cent of payroll in 1987, but there was a high variance. Table 4, from 
Gruber and Krueger (1991), shows the level and change in workers' 
compensation costs for the trucking industry from 1978 to 1987. 9 
These costs grew dramatically during the 1980s, due both to rising 
medical costs and to changes in state benefits legislation, and costs 
were over 25 percent of payroll in some states in 1987.
States also mandate that employers include a number of particular 
benefits in their health insurance packages. There are over 1,000 such 
"state mandated benefits," covering benefits ranging from alcoholism 
treatment to in vitro fertilization (see Gruber [1994b] for details). In 
addition, several states mandate the provision of insurance to tempo 
rarily disabled workers. There are also a variety of mandates for mini 
mal levels of workplace safety at both the federal and state levels, in 
addition to the compensation for workplace accidents provided by WC.
Table 4 Workers' Compensation Costs as a Percentage of Payroll
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Dist. of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
1978
4.49
10.55
11.68
15.94
10.04
5.88
6.78
10.45
15.04
17.71
4.70
9.71
6.39
6.01
2.39
5.89
4.59
7.04
1066
1987
10.07
17.41
11.22
10.86
17.26
11.91
12.91
9.79
16.04
15.12
7.73
20.29
15.50
11.45
3.01
8.77
6.85
8.05
10.65
Change3 
1978-87
5.58
6.86
-0.46
-5.08
7.22
6.03
6.13
-066
1.00
-2.59
3.03
10.58
9.11
5.44
0.62
2.88
2.26
1.01
-0.01
State
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
1978
6.27
NA
8.27
504
4.16
7.36
8.60
9.62
2.42
5.32
7.81
14.68
NA
5.15
3.68
5.87
2.88
6.83
4.92
1987
7.98
5.16
25.40
6.47
12.55
7.89
12.23
5.97
5.16
12.20
11.55
23.46
15.97
7.27
8.12
8.22
4.37
9.98
9.23
Change 
1978-87
1.71
NA
17.13
1.43
839
0.53
3.63
-3.65
2.74
6.88
3.74
8.78
NA
212
4.44
2.35
1.49
3.15
4.31
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
7.05
5.85
5.50
9.24
11.50
916
1109
8.48
15.05
20.93
2.11
5.24
2.98
5.81
9.43
Vermont
Virginia
West Virginia
Wisconsin
3.11
4.28
NA
3.41
6.53
6.51
5.67
8.86
3.42
2.23
NA
5.45
SOURCE: Gruber and Krueger (1991) 
a Change is in percentage points.
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THE INCIDENCE OF PAYROLL TAXATION AND 
EMPLOYER MANDATES
Basic Model
Figure 1 displays the standard diagrammatic analysis of the labor- 
market effects of payroll taxation levied on the firm. The market is ini 
tially in equilibrium at the intersection of the labor supply (S0) and 
demand (D0) curves, at the employment and wage package (L0,W0)- 
Payroll taxation of an amount T lowers the amount that the firm can pay 
for a given level of employment, shifting labor demand inward to Dj. 
This reduces the wage that workers are paid to W\, and employment 
falls to LI\ the tax has a deadweight loss equal to the area ABC. The 
difference L0 - LI represents the disemployment effect of payroll taxa 
tion highlighted by critics of this form of revenue raising. This analy 
sis applies equally well to a mandate that costs the employer a fraction 
1 of wages (such as workers' compensation); this mandate raises the 
cost of hiring workers, shifting demand inward and leading to disem 
ployment.
Figure 1 Labor-Market Effects of Payroll Taxation
w
W0
W2
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However, this basic tax incidence diagram misses an important 
feature of payroll taxes and mandates: tax/benefit linkages. Most of 
the payroll taxes described above, such as those for Social Security, 
disability insurance, and unemployment insurance, are financing bene 
fits to the workers who are taxed. Similarly, mandates such as that for 
maternity leave or workers' compensation are providing (potentially) 
valuable benefits to workers in the firms that are affected by the man 
date. This tax/benefit linkage is not perfect; for many workers, one 
more dollar of taxation does not represent one more dollar of benefits. 
The fact that such a linkage exists, however, affects this analysis. The 
key point is that, since some of taxes paid come back to the worker in 
the form of future benefits, the disemployment effects of payroll taxes 
will be reduced because workers will be more willing to accept lower 
wages.
This point is illustrated in Figure 1 . In the presence of tax/benefit 
linkages, workers are now receiving higher net compensation than in 
the pure tax case, because the tax is buying them some benefits. Work 
ers are therefore more willing to work for a given wage, shifting labor 
supply outward to Si . As a result, employment falls only to L^. That 
is, due to this tax/benefit linkage, there is a much smaller distortion 
from payroll taxation: the deadweight loss from taxation has been 
reduced from ABC to DBF.
The extent of the tax/benefit linkage will depend on the extent to 
which workers perceive that the taxes are returned to them as benefits. 
If every dollar of taxes paid were perceived by the worker to be return 
ing in benefits, this would not be viewed as a tax at all, and there would 
be no distortion. 10 This can be readily seen in the simple model used 
by Gruber and Krueger (1991), for the case of a lump sum mandate. 
Suppose that labor demand (Ld) is given by:
(1) 
and that labor supply (Ls) is given by:
(2)
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where C is the cost of the mandate, W is the wage rate, and ocC is the 
employee valuation of the mandated benefit. In equilibrium, the effect 
of the mandate on wages will be:
dWI dC = - (t|D - ari s) / (r| D - t| s) (3)
where T| D and T| s are the elasticities of demand for and supply of labor, 
respectively. It is clear from this equation that, if a = 1, there will be 
full shifting of the cost of the mandate to wages, and no effect on 
employment as a result. On the other hand, for a = 0, this expression 
simplifies to that for the incidence of a payroll tax in the absence of tax 
benefit linkages. The analysis would be similar for a marginal payroll 
tax rather than a lump sum mandate; in that case, a would measure the 
employee's valuation on the margin.
There are two key points that must be noted in reference to this 
analysis and that of Summers (1989). First, the general distinction 
between payroll taxes and mandates is a false one. The salient feature 
is not the form of revenue raising but the extent of tax/benefit linkages. 
In both cases, employers are paying some cost and employees are 
receiving some benefit. This point is made most starkly by contrasting 
Unemployment Insurance, a payroll tax financed benefit, with Work 
ers' Compensation, a mandated employer-provided benefit: in both 
cases, employers pay some fixed portion of their payroll to insure their 
workers. If the perceived benefits of working an additional hour under 
each program is the same, and the payroll cost to the employer for that 
hour is the same, these programs will have exactly the same effect on 
the labor market. Of course, in practice there are some important dif 
ferences, such as the fact that mandates are often lump sum while pay 
roll taxes are not (a point I return to below), but as a matter of general 
principle the two can be analyzed in a parallel manner.
Second, a key determinant of tax/benefit linkages for both man 
dates and payroll taxes will be the extent to which benefits are provided 
to both workers and nonworkers. If equal benefits are provided to non- 
workers, then there is no linkage between taxes paid and benefits 
received, because individuals could have not worked and received the 
same benefit. This point is especially important when assessing the 
efficiency implications of financing National Health Insurance through 
an employer mandate. If, as seems politically likely, coverage is
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extended to the unemployed for free, or at least at a highly subsidized 
rate, it will mitigate any tax-benefit linkages for workers and may 
increase the efficiency cost of financing.
Evidence
Research on the incidence of payroll taxation has a long history. 
Early incidence research involved time-series studies of changes in 
payroll taxes in the United States and abroad. This research produced 
mixed results. Brittain (1972) reported that the payroll tax was fully 
shifted to wages, but his finding was criticized by Feldstein (1972). 
Vroman (1974) found that 1/4 to 1/2 of the payroll tax was shifted to 
wages in United States manufacturing. Holmlund (1983) used the 
time-series data on payroll taxes in Sweden to study a period when the 
payroll tax increased from 14 to 40 percent and found that roughly 50 
percent of the tax was shifted to wages in the short run. A different 
approach was pursued by Hamermesh (1979), who used the variation 
in payroll tax rates due to the Social Security payroll tax limit to esti 
mate wage offsets. His estimates indicated that from 0 to 35 percent of 
the Social Security tax is shifted to wages.
This "first generation" of studies, however, generally suffered from 
being unable to control for important potential omitted variables. In 
the time-series studies, for example, there may have been unobserved 
economic trends that affected both wages and tax-setting institutions. 
What is needed to overcome these problems is variation in employer 
costs within arguably homogenous locations over time, so that both 
time and location omitted variables can be controlled for in the analy 
sis.
More recent research has attempted to follow this approach, using 
variation across U.S. states in the cost of employer mandates and pay 
roll taxes. Gruber and Krueger (1991) studied the incidence of work 
ers' compensation; as noted previously, even though a mandated 
benefit in name, workers' compensation is similar to a payroll tax for 
the purposes of incidence analysis. We model wage incidence by 
exploiting the large change in workers' compensation costs over time 
and across states in several high cost industries during the 1980s. 
Table 4 shows that this variation is quite sizeable in the trucking indus 
try. Using a large sample of workers in these industries from the Cur-
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rent Population Survey, we find that 85 percent of this cost increase 
was shifted to wages. We are able to exactly replicate our micro-data 
findings using aggregate industry/state/year data on wages. Further 
more, using this source of data on employment, we find no significant 
employment decrease from these increases in workers' compensation 
cost.
Anderson and Meyer (1997) focused on the incidence of the 
Unemployment Insurance payroll tax at both the market and firm level, 
using a very large dataset of individual UI wage records from several 
states. UI tax costs differ systematically across markets due to differ 
ences across states in the structure of the experience rating schedule. 
The costs also differ across firms due to different firm locations on that 
schedule (which imperfectly ties a firm's current tax rate to its past lay 
off experience). These tax costs have changed over time at both the 
state and firm level due to legislated changes in experience rating 
schedules. Anderson and Meyer found that there is full shifting of 
market level differences in UI costs but not full shifting of firm level 
differences. Thus, the more recent evidence, which uses legislative 
variation in payroll costs across states, seems to suggest that payroll 
taxes and mandates are fully shifted to wages.
What Can We Learn from the Empirical Work?
This new reduced form evidence, however, leaves an important 
structural question unanswered. In the simple labor-market framework 
above, there are two reasons why increased costs might be shifted to 
wages: because individuals value the benefits that they are getting fully 
or because labor supply is perfectly inelastic. 11 Disentangling these 
alternatives is very important for future policy analysis. Consider the 
example of national health insurance, which is financed by a mandate 
and an additional payroll tax to cover nonworkers. If full shifting is 
due to full employee valuation with a somewhat elastic labor supply, 
then national health insurance will have important disemployment 
effects because supply will not shift for a policy not restricted to work 
ers. If full shifting is driven by inelastic supply, however, then the pop 
ulation receiving benefits is irrelevant. In either case, the costs will be 
passed onto workers' wages, so national health insurance will not 
cause disemployment.
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There is no evidence which bears on this question in Gruber and 
Krueger (1991). Anderson and Meyer (1997) provided some informa 
tion in their firm/market level distinction, but it is not enough to distin 
guish the two structural hypotheses. It seems likely that both the 
elasticity of labor supply between firms is higher than that between 
markets and that employees may not value the extra marginal cost to 
the firm from experience rating. Both of these structural interpreta 
tions would therefore be consistent with their finding. Evidence from 
elsewhere in the empirical labor economics literature suggests that the 
labor supply of prime age males is fairly inelastic, while the labor sup 
ply of secondary earners is somewhat more elastic, but there is consid 
erable uncertainty about the reliability of previous attempts to measure 
this crucial parameter (Heckman 1993).
What is needed to convincingly disentangle these views is some 
variation in one or the other of these dimensions only. For example, is 
the incidence of employer mandates/payroll taxes significantly differ 
ent across groups with plausibly different elasticities of labor supply, 
such as married men and married women? Is there differential inci 
dence with respect to elements of a policy that are likely to be valuable, 
such as cash benefits for work injury, as opposed to elements that are 
less likely to be valued, such as insurance administrative loading fac 
tors?
There are two additional limitations in applying the reduced form 
results from past research to modeling the incidence of future govern 
ment interventions, or even the incidence of other programs. The first 
is that this research has examined the medium to long run incidence of 
the cost of mandates and payroll taxes. 12 The short run incidence is 
much more uncertain. It is often assumed that shifting to wages does 
not occur through nominal pay cuts but, rather, due to worker money 
illusion, through inflation erosion of the real wage. 13 There is little 
work addressing the important questions of whether incidence signifi 
cantly differs in the short and long run or whether it varies according to 
differences in the inflationary environment when the mandate is 
enacted.
Second, the extent of tax/benefit linkages may vary substantially 
across different interventions. National health insurance provided to 
nonworkers is one example of a program with no tax/benefit linkages 
so that the existing incidence studies may not be relevant; this is also
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true for Medicare. For Social Security, the extent of tax/benefit linkage 
varies along a number of dimensions: it is lower for high wage earners 
due to the progressive manner in which earnings are converted to bene 
fits; it is lower (and often zero) for secondary earners because they 
receive the higher of their accrued benefit and 50 percent of their 
spouse's benefit so that often their earnings record is irrelevant; and it 
is zero for workers in the five lowest earning "dropout years," which 
are not used in benefits computation. Furthermore, the perceived tax/ 
benefit linkage may be weaker still because workers may not under 
stand that the "PICA" contribution on their pay stub is actually a form 
of retirement savings. The recently announced policy of informing 
workers as to their retirement savings entitlement under SS might serve 
to improve the efficiency of SS financing, to the extent that it increases 
perceived tax/benefit links. Future work which could cleverly incorpo 
rate these different kinds of linkages could ideally answer the structural 
question posed previously.
Equity
In interpreting the empirical work in this area, it is important to 
understand the goal of government policy. If the government is inter 
vening to correct a market failure and the payroll tax/mandate is simply 
a means of financing that intervention, then shifting to wages can be 
viewed as the "price" that is being paid for government provision of 
insurance. In the case of full valuation, perhaps due to adverse selec 
tion in the private insurance market, government mandates will be an 
efficient and equitable policy; the mandate is a perfect "benefits tax."
If the goal of a mandate is not to correct a market failure, however, 
but rather to provide benefits to some deprived group in society, then 
full shifting to wages may not be viewed as a desirable outcome. 
Rather, this may be viewed as the mandate being "undone" by the 
adjustment of wages. In this case, the additional deadweight loss from 
broad-based financing that does not have tax/benefit linkages may be a 
price that society is willing to pay in order to direct more resources 
towards one group. Thus, it is important to understand the goal of gov 
ernment mandate policy: is it to correct a market failure or to redirect 
resources across groups? 14
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THE MINIMUM WAGE
The analysis above assumed that firms could readily pass on their 
costs of taxation to workers in the form of lower wages. However, if 
workers are already earning the minimum wage, such "shifting to 
wages" is not possible. This is illustrated in Figure 2, for the case 
where the minimum wage is equal to the equilibrium wage pre-tax. In 
this case, a tax on firms causes a much larger fall in employment 
because worker wages cannot be reduced, so that the net compensation 
cost to the firm has risen. Employment now falls to L2 and the pres 
ence of the minimum has increased the disemployment effects of taxes 
levied on firms. This disemployment effect is independent of the valu 
ation of the benefit by workers since equilibrium is determined on the 
demand side of the market; the shift in the supply curve to S\ has no 
effect on employment or wages.
How important is this effect quantitatively? Recent research (Card 
1992a,b; Katz and Krueger 1992; Card and Krueger 1994) has shown 
that changes in the minimum wage cause no significant decrease in 
employment and may actually cause increases. 15 There are two possi 
ble interpretations of these findings, both of which suggest that the 
minimum is a less important consideration for the incidence of 
employer taxation than is implied by Figure 2.
The first, which takes the employment increase estimates seriously, 
is that the neoclassical model is not appropriate and that low-wage 
labor markets are more precisely described by a monopsony model. 
The effect of payroll taxation or mandates in such a model is shown in 
Figure 3. Demand is described by curve D0, supply is curve SQ , and the 
marginal factor cost is curve MFC0 . The competitive wage is Wc, and 
the competitive employment level is Lc ; the monopsony wage is Wm 
and the monopsony employment level is Lm . When a minimum wage is 
imposed at Wmm , employment rises for the monopsonist to Lmm . This is 
the positive employment effect estimated by some of these studies.
In such a model, a small mandate or payroll tax shifts demand to 
Dj. There is no effect on employment from this change; it is paid out 
of employer profits. Thus, a small mandate or payroll tax acts as a pure 
profits tax in this model. A larger policy change, however, can have 
real effects. If demand falls all the way to D2 (if the increased cost to
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Figure 2 Labor-Market Effects of Payroll Taxation, with an Effective 
Minimum Wage
= Wmln
Figure 3 Labor-Market Effects of Payroll Taxation, with an Effective 
Minimum Wage under Monopsony
MFC0
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the employer is larger than the difference between the competitive 
wage and the minimum wage), then employment will fall to the same 
level as in the competitive case (L2). The employment change, how 
ever, will still be smaller than in the competitive case because some of 
the cost of the mandate has still been absorbed in profits.
The second interpretation of the new minimum wage research is 
that it provides evidence of fairly inelastic labor demand in the low 
wage labor market. Indeed, even the traditional time series studies of 
the effects of the minimum wage suggested elasticities of demand as 
low as 0.1 (Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen 1982). In this case, once again, 
the minimum will not cause mandates to have significant disemploy- 
ment effects, as the cost primarily is paid from profits or prices. So, 
under either interpretation, the "new" minimum wage research sug 
gests that the minimum wage may not be an important impediment to 
the shifting of mandate costs to wages.
GROUP-SPECIFIC MANDATES
Analytical Framework
The previous analysis has highlighted the parallels between 
employer mandates and payroll taxation. However, there are many 
important differences between these two forms of regulation in prac 
tice. The first is that, unlike payroll taxes, which are generally uniform 
across all workers, mandates may cause employer costs to rise signifi 
cantly more for one group of workers than for another. This can arise, 
for example, because the mandate is explicitly group specific, as in the 
case of maternity leave legislation. Alternatively, it can arise due to 
experience rating in private insurance markets, which raises the costs 
of insuring some workers above the costs of others. For example, man 
dated workers' compensation insurance in an experience-rated firm 
costs much more for a very accident-prone worker than for a safe one. 
Similarly, mandated health insurance costs significantly more for 
sicker workers, as well as for married workers and those with large 
families. Such problems could arise with payroll taxation in theory, 
but payroll tax costs rarely vary by worker characteristic. 16
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Group-specific differences in costs may complicate the analysis of 
a mandate's effects. If the group that benefits from the mandate (group 
A) fully values the intervention at the cost to the employer and if 
employers are able to shift those costs to group-specific wages, then 
there will be no effect of the mandate on either that group or on other 
groups (group B). That is, for group A, the analysis will be the same as 
above; since the employer costs have not changed for group A, there is 
no spillover onto other segments of the market. 17
There may, however, be a number of barriers to full group-specific 
shifting not present in this simple model. Most obviously, there are 
antidiscrimination regulations that prohibit differential pay for the 
same job across groups or that prevent differential promotion decisions 
by demographic characteristic. 18 Furthermore, workplace "norms," 
which prohibit different pay across groups, or union rules about equal 
ity of relative pay may have similar effects as antidiscrimination rules. 
These will not be important considerations for workplace-wide man 
dates or payroll taxation.
Barriers to group-specific adjustment operate in exactly the same 
fashion as the previously discussed minimum wage effects for the 
group benefiting from the'mandate. Returning to the competitive 
model, there will be disemployment of group A if there are such barri 
ers because wages cannot adjust to offset the new employer costs. As a 
result, if there is some substitutability between groups A and B, 
employers will substitute towards group B. Fears of group-specific 
disemployment were at the heart of the debate over mandated mater 
nity leave—since the cost of employing women of child-bearing age 
would rise, opponents claimed that employers would discriminate 
against this group in hiring. Thus, even with full valuation and no 
explicit regulatory barrier such as the minimum wage, there can be a 
distortion from a group-specific mandate.
Previous Evidence
Evidence on the incidence of a group-specific mandate is provided 
in Gruber (1994a). In that paper, I studied the effects of state and fed 
eral mandates that employers include comprehensive coverage for 
maternity in their health insurance plans. A commonly accepted fea 
ture of health insurance benefits before the mid 1970s was limited cov-
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erage for childbirth. Maternity coverage was sometimes excluded 
from basic health benefits; if included, it was often subject to flat rate 
cash amount limits, regardless of the cost of delivery. This differential 
coverage was widely perceived as discriminatory (Leshin 1981; Alan 
Guttmacher Institute 1987). Many states responded to this perception 
in the 1975-1978 period by passing laws prohibiting treating preg 
nancy differently from "comparable illnesses" in health insurance ben 
efits. Then, in October 1978, the Federal Government passed the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), which prohibited any differen 
tial treatment of pregnancy in the employment relationship.
These laws affected a readily identifiable group, women of child- 
bearing age and their husbands (under whose insurance these women 
may have been covered), so that I was able to study the impact of these 
laws based on observable characteristics. They were also fairly costly 
for these individuals, due both to the widespread existence of differen 
tial maternity benefits before 1978 and the large fraction of health 
insurance costs which are accounted for by maternity benefits for 
women of child-bearing age. I found that there was full group-specific 
shifting: the wages of the affected groups fell by enough to offset the 
cost of the mandate to their employers. As a result, there was no effect 
on their net labor supply. Since women are generally modeled as hav 
ing much more elastic labor supply than men, the fact that there was 
full shifting for this group is suggestive that such shifting arose from 
movements in the supply curve and not from demand shifts along an 
inelastic supply curve.
Further evidence on this point is provided by Olson (1993), who 
examined the wages and health insurance coverage of single men, rela 
tive to single women and married males, during the era that saw 
increased incidence of AIDS. Olson did find a significant narrowing of 
the positive wage gap between single men and single women over this 
era, although he found no effect on the relative wages of single and 
married men. He also found that there was a drop in employer-pro 
vided health insurance for single men relative to both control groups. 19
This work suggests that employers can shift mandated costs to the 
wages of demographically identifiable groups within the workplace. 
However, it leaves unanswered the important question of how finely 
employers can shift mandated increases in benefits costs. Did the shift 
ing estimated in Gruber (1994a) arise from reduced average wages in
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firms with a high proportion of women of child-bearing age or from 
shifts in the wage structure within the workplace? In the latter case, 
how finely can the wage structure be manipulated to shift group-spe 
cific costs? The extent to which within-workplace shifting is possible 
is an important question for analyzing employer-mandated national 
health insurance. In a small firm with one very sick worker and, as a 
result, very high medical costs, it will almost certainly be impossible to 
shift these high costs to the wages of that single worker. As a result, it 
will be in the firm's interest to discriminate in the hiring of sick work 
ers. On the other hand, an entire workplace of sick workers could pre 
sumably be paid less to compensate for employer insurance costs 
differences. How large does the group of sick workers have to be 
before employers are able to shift their excess costs of health insurance 
to them? It would be useful to understand the trade-off made by firms 
between shifting costs to very small groups in the workplace and dis 
criminating in their hiring.
One means of addressing the first of these questions is to return to 
my earlier analysis and model the effect of the mandates on both indi 
vidual and firm average wages. If the earlier findings are driven by 
lower average wages in firms with many women of child-bearing age, 
then including the fraction of firm employment that is in this demo 
graphic group, or the average cost to the firm, should explain all of the 
drop in wages for this group. If there is within-workplace shifting, 
however, then the individual measure will still enter the model signifi 
cantly because there will be some explanatory power for the deviation 
of individual from firm average costs.
New Evidence—Individual or Workplace-Specific Shifting?
The data used for this analysis is the May Current Population Sur 
vey (1978) for the years 1974, 1975, 1977, and 1978. I focus on 3 of 
the 23 states that passed "maternity mandates" in the 1975-1979 
period: Illinois, New Jersey, and New York (the "experimental" 
states). 20 I also use a set of "non-experimental" states designed to cap 
ture any regional shocks to the experimental states. For Illinois, the 
control states used are Ohio and Indiana; for New Jersey and New 
York, the controls are Connecticut, Massachusetts, and North Carolina. 
The data consist of observations on all individuals in these set of exper-
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imental and non-experimental locations, for two years before the legis 
lation (1974, 1975), and two years after the legislation (1977, 1978).
The goal of the empirical work is to identify the effect of laws 
passed by certain states ("experimental states") which affected particu 
lar groups of individuals ("treatment group"). Identifying this effect 
requires controlling for any systematic shocks to the labor-market out 
comes of the treatment group correlated with, but not due to, the law. I 
do so in three ways in the estimation. First, I include year effects, to 
capture any national trends in the earnings of the treatment group. Sec 
ond, I include state effects, to control for secular earnings differences 
in the states that passed the laws and those that did not. Finally, I 
include state-by-year effects to control for state-specific shocks corre 
lated with the passage of these laws over this period; that is, I compare 
the treatment individuals in the experimental states to a set of control 
individuals in those same states and measure the change in relative out 
comes. This change is then compared to the change in relative out 
comes in states that did not pass maternity mandates to control for 
national shocks to the relative earnings of these groups. The identify 
ing assumption of this "differences-in-differences-in-differences" 
(DDD) estimator are fairly weak: it simply requires that there be no 
contemporaneous shock that affects the relative outcomes of the treat 
ment group in the same state-years as the law.
The treatment group here are those insured workers who are "at 
risk" for having a child, or whose health insurance covers someone 
who is at risk of having a child. The controls are other individuals who 
were directly unaffected by the law. However, the CPS (before May 
1979) contained no information on health insurance coverage. I am 
thus unable to exactly identify the employees for whom this was a 
costly mandate.
I address this problem in two ways in the empirical work. First, I 
use women aged 20-40 as the treatment group. This group will con 
tain the individuals for whom the mandate was most costly. My con 
trol group is all individuals over 40 and single males aged 20-40. I 
exclude 20^K)-year- old married males, who may also be affected by 
the laws if their insurance covers their wives. This "treatment dummy" 
approach has the virtue that it is relatively "nonparametric."
Second, I use data on insurance coverage from other datasets to 
model the likelihood that individuals were covered by insurance and
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the type of insurance coverage that they receive, and I assign each indi 
vidual a cost of the mandate based on these predictions and outside 
data on the cost of maternity health insurance. This approach has the 
advantage that I use individual variation, rather than differences across 
broad demographic groups, to identify the impact of the law. However, 
it has the disadvantage that it imposes strong parametric assumptions. 
If the functional form for the expected cost of the mandate is incorrect, 
then the demographic group dummy may be a more effective means of 
capturing the law's impact. Thus, in the empirical work, I rely on both 
the treatment group dummy and the individually parameterized cost 
measure.
I estimate regressions of the form:
Wljt = a + (Uy, + (32T, + P3o, + hTREAT, + |35o, • T, (4) 
+ p6T, • TREAT, + fadj • TREAT, + pg8, • lt • TREAT,
where i indexes individuals
j indexes states (1 if experimental state, 0 if non-experimental)
t indexes years (1 if after the law, 0 if before)
W is the log real hourly wage
X is a vector of observable characteristics
57 is a fixed state effect
T, is a fixed year effect
TREAT is a dummy for treatment group (1 if treatment, 0 if con 
trol), and 
• denotes interaction between effects
In this regression, the fixed effects control for time-series changes 
in wages (J32), the time-invariant characteristics of the experimental 
states (J33), and the time-invariant characteristics of the treatment group 
((34). The second-level interactions control for changes over time in the 
experimental states (|35 ), changes over time for the treatment group 
nationwide (b6), and time-invariant characteristics of the treatment 
group in the experimental states ((37). The third-level interaction ((38) 
captures all variation in wages specific to the treatments (relative to
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controls), in the experimental states (relative to the non-experimen- 
tals), and in the years after the law (relative to before the law). This is 
the DDD estimate of the extent of shifting of the cost of the mandate to 
group-specific wages. The set of demographic covariates used 
includes years of education, experience and its square, sex, marital sta 
tus, a marital status by sex interaction, a dummy for nonwhite, a con 
trol for union status, dummies for 15 major industries, and separate 
year dummies for 1974 and 1978.
Table 5 presents the estimates from Eq. 4. In the first column, I 
show that there is a significant fall in the wages of women of child- 
bearing age in the state that passed the mandate, relative to the control 
groups of single men and older workers, of 4.4 percent. This is some 
what larger than the average cost of the mandate for this group; I inter 
pret these magnitudes in more detail below. The coefficients on the 
demographic covariates (not reported) are of their expected signs and 
magnitudes. There is a 1.2 percent fall in wages for the within-state 
control group (the coefficient on "After»Experimental," the state-by- 
year effect). This finding has one of two implications: either the exper 
imental states, on average, saw a negative shock over this period or the 
effect of the mandates are "spilling over" onto the control group. 
These two interpretations cannot be fully distinguished within this 
framework, although the latter seems unlikely given the finding of full 
shifting to group-specific wages.
This regression is unable to disentangle whether this shifting to 
wages is the result of within-workplace wage adjustments or drops in 
average wages in firms with a high proportion of women of child-bear 
ing age. Unfortunately, I cannot precisely distinguish these alterna 
tives either because I do not have information on the firms in which 
these women work. However, I can use information on their occupa 
tion and industry to create "synthetic firms" of individuals with the 
same occupation/industry type. I do so by dividing the data into 15 
major industries and 10 major occupations, and then calculating the 
fraction of workers in each cell who are 20-40-year-old women. 21 I 
then use this in place of the individual treatment dummy in the DDD 
regression framework of Eq. 4.
The results of doing so are reported in the second column of Table 
5. In fact, there is a negative coefficient on the third level interaction in 
this regression although it is only significant at the 13 percent level.
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Table 5 New Evidence on the Incidence of Maternity Mandates3
After
Experimental 
state
After* 
experimental
Treatment/cost
Treatment/cost* 
after
Treatment/cost* 
experimental
Treat/cost»after 
•experimental
Firm treatment/ 
cost
Firm treat/cost 
•after
Firm treat/cost 
•experimental
Firm T/C »after 
•experimental
N
(1) 
Treat 
dummy
0.009 
(0.009)
0.101 
(0.007)
-0.012 
(0.011)
0.077 
(0.012)
0.003 
(0013)
0.040 
(0.013)
-0.044 
(0.018)
0.075 
(0.033)
30,862
(2) 
Treat 
dummy
0.018 
(0.013
0.090 
(0.012)
-0.003 
(0.017)
-0.147 
(0.027)
-0.022 
(0.034)
0.040 
(0.036)
-0.069 
(0.046)
30,862
(3) 
Treat 
dummy
0.019 
(0.013)
0.091 
(0.012)
-0.005 
(0.017)
0.078 
(0.013)
0.009 
(0.014)
0.033 
(0.015)
-0.041 
(0.020)
-0.138 
(0.029)
-0.037 
(0.037)
-0.023 
(0.050)
30,862
(4) 
Mandate 
cost
-0.003 
(0.008)
0.094 
(0.007)
-0.006 
(0.010)
2.321 
(0.428)
0.341 
(0.511)
3.052 
(0.529)
-2.476 
(0.756)
40,895
(5) 
Mandate 
cost
-0.007 
(0.023)
0.120 
(0.022)
-0.006 
(0.031)
16.15 
(2.067)
1.542 
(2.598)
-0.530 
(2.530)
-2.126 
(3.551)
40,895
(6) 
Mandate 
cost
-0.005 
(0.023)
0.120 
(0.022)
-0.007 
(0.031)
2.048 
(0.433)
0.253 
(0.523)
3.148 
(0.540)
-2.393 
(0.772)
16.24 
(2.096)
1.111 
(2.660)
-3.098 
(2.584)
0.143 
(3.626)
40,895
a Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions also include years of education, experi 
ence and its square, sex, marital status, a marital status by sex interaction, a dummy for 
nonwhite, a control for union status, dummies for 15 major industries, and separate year 
dummies for 1974 and 1978. "After" is dummy for being after mandate; "Experimental" 
is dummy for being in a state that passed a mandate. In columns 1-3, "Treatment" is a 
dummy for being a woman between 20 and 40 years old, and "Firm treatment" is the per 
centage of 20^0-year-old females in the worker's industry/occupation cell, regressions 
exclude married men In columns 4-6, "cost" is the predicted cost of mandate for the 
worker, and "Firm cost" is the average predicted cost in the worker's industry/occupation 
cell.
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The coefficient is actually more sizeable than that from the individual 
treatment regression; it implies that a workplace entirely made up of 
20-40-year-old females would see wages fall by almost 7 percent. In 
the individual regression, such a workplace would see wages fall by 
only 4 percent. Once again, however, this regression is unable to dis 
entangle whether workplace-wide shifting or within-workplace shift 
ing is the driving force behind this fall in wages.
In order to distinguish these views, I include both the individual 
and industry/occupation measure in column 3. If the results are a 
result of workplace-wide shifting, the inclusion of the average "firm" 
cost should significantly weaken the individual cost coefficient. In 
fact, the individual DDD coefficient is roughly unchanged, while the 
industry/occupation DDD coefficient falls to -0.023. Thus, the results 
imply that it is not just drops in average wages at workplaces with 
many women that is driving the basic finding. The latter estimate, 
however, is very imprecise, and one could not reject that it was either 
zero or much larger than the individual DDD coefficient.
The second empirical approach discussed above was to individu 
ally parameterize the cost of the mandate. Gruber (1992) described the 
methodology for generating individual-specific predicted increases in 
insurance costs from the mandate. The cost averages 2 percent of 
wages for the treatment individuals, but it ranges up to 28 percent of 
wages. The cost is normalized by hours per week and by predicted 
wages to yield a cost as a percentage of hourly wages, which is readily 
interpretable in this log wage framework. 22 The individually parame 
terized cost measure can be introduced in place of the treatment 
dummy in Eq. 4; to the extent that my estimate of the cost of the man 
date is correct, a coefficient of -1 on the third-level interaction would 
indicate full shifting to wages.
The results using this individual parameterization at both the indi 
vidual and the industry/occupation level are presented in columns 4-6 
of Table 5. For the individual cost regressions, there is a sizeable and 
negative coefficient that is significantly different from zero and not sig 
nificantly different from one. For the industry/occupation level cost 
measures, the coefficient is similar. When the two measures are 
entered together, the individual-level cost coefficient is essentially 
unchanged, while the industry/occupation-level cost coefficient is zero.
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Once again, however, there is a very large standard error on the indus 
try/occupation-level cost.
Thus, this work provides some evidence that the shifting to wages 
uncovered in my earlier paper arises from within-workplace changes in 
the wage structure. This evidence is only preliminary, however, due 
both to my very rough proxy for "firms" (industry/occupation cells) 
and the large resulting standard errors on the estimates. In particular, 
these findings may only be demonstrating that the individual is a better 
proxy for their own firm than is their industry/occupation cell. Future 
work, perhaps with true firm data, could fruitfully refine these esti 
mates.
COMPOSITION OF LABOR SUPPLY
Another important difference between mandates and payroll taxes 
in practice is that mandates are often lump-sum benefits, such as with 
mandated health insurance, whereas payroll taxes are paid as a fraction 
of wages. Since mandates represent an increase in the fixed costs of 
employment, they will be more costly for employees working fewer 
hours. If employers are able to shift the cost to wages in a lump-sum 
fashion and if the benefit is fully valued by employees, then there will 
be no effect on desired hours for either employees or employers. But, 
if such lump-sum shifting is impossible, then a natural employer reac 
tion to fixed cost mandates would be to increase hours and reduce 
employment. This would enable the employer to reduce the cost per 
hour of the mandate while leaving total labor input unchanged.
There may be forces, however, working in the opposite direction. 
Consider the case of a health insurance mandate. Since part-time 
workers may be readily excluded from health insurance coverage, 
employers would like to replace full-time employees with their (rela 
tively less expensive) part-time counterparts. 23 In this case, hours 
would fall and employment would rise, and total labor input would 
remain unchanged. Furthermore, the desired supply response to these 
mandates from the individual perspective is for increased employment 
among those out of the labor force and for part-time workers to 
increases their hours in order to qualify for health insurance, so that
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both employment and hours rise. Thus, the effect on hours and 
employment are uncertain, even if the cost of the mandate is able to be 
shifted to wages on average.
Evidence on this question is provided in Gruber (1994a) and Cutler 
and Madrian (1996). Gruber found that, while the cost of the "mater 
nity mandates" of the 1970s was fully shifted to wages on average with 
no effect on total labor supply, there was some compositional effect on 
labor supply: employment fell and hours of work rose, as would be 
expected under the first scenario above. This suggests that employers 
could not shift the cost of the mandates in a perfect lump sum manner 
so they adjusted on the margin using the composition of the work 
schedule. Cutler and Madrian showed that hours rose in those indus 
tries which saw the greatest rise in health care costs during the past 
decade, once again suggesting that employers are adjusting to these 
increased fixed costs using the hours margin.
Even this difference between mandates and payroll taxes, however, 
is not as large as it appears because payroll taxes are generally capped. 
For UI taxes, as noted previously, these caps can be quite low; with 
very low caps, payroll taxes essentially operate as lump-sum mandates. 
If employers can shift the proportional payroll tax cost to wages below 
the cap only and not to wages above the cap, then there will be no 
incentive to change hours for either the employer or employee. But if 
employers cannot, they may have to reduce wages proportionately for 
all workers, regardless of their position relative to the cap. In this case, 
there will be opposite hours of work incentives for employers and 
employees. Employers will see higher costs below the cap and would 
therefore like to increase work above the cap and reduce employment; 
employees will see net benefits below the cap (once again assuming 
full valuation) and only net taxes above it, so they would like to reduce 
hours and increase (below cap) employment. It would be fruitful to 
investigate the effect of payroll tax caps on the choice of hours vs. 
employment, as has been done for health insurance.
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REFORMING PAYROLL TAXATION
In this section, I consider two reforms to the current system of pay 
roll taxation. I do not discuss alternatives to mandates because the 
alternative generally is simply to not have the policy. In the final sec 
tion, I return to the overall question of whether such policies should 
exist and be financed through employers.
Financing Social Security and Disability Insurance Through 
the Income Tax
A natural alternative to financing social insurance programs 
through payroll taxation is to finance them through general revenues. 
In this section, I contrast the economic effects of payroll taxes with 
those of one form of general revenue raising, the individual income 
tax.24 In doing so, I hold the benefits side of these programs constant. 
For example, I assume that the Social Security benefits paid to retired 
workers remain a function of their lifetime work experience in the 
same way that they are under earmarked payroll taxation. In terms of 
efficiency, this implies that the tax/benefit linkage-induced shift in 
labor supply previously discussed will remain under income taxation— 
that is, so long as benefits are calculated based on past earnings histo 
ries, regardless of the source of financing, tax/benefit linkages will 
operate. Once again, the key in Summers' (1989) analysis is not the 
form of revenue raising, but that benefits are restricted to be a function 
of work effort.
In terms of equity, this approach means that I am not considering 
the net equity implication of these programs as a whole, but rather only 
the differential impact of alternative sources of finance. For example, 
the SS program as a whole may be progressive, even as the tax that 
finances this program is regressive. In this case, moving to more equi 
table income taxation would be a further increase in progressivity.
Efficiency. The deadweight loss from financing a social insurance 
program from two alternative revenue sources is a function of two fac 
tors: the breadth and the elasticity of the relative tax bases. The distor 
tion of raising a given amount of revenue will be smaller as the tax 
base is more inelastic. At the same time, if a tax base is small, the tax
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rate must be higher to raise the requisite funds; because the deadweight 
loss from a tax rises as the square of the tax rate, a higher rate will lead 
to a higher distortion. Thus, for a given level of elasticity, the dead 
weight loss will also fall as the tax base is more broad.
Income taxes offer a potentially much larger tax base than payroll 
taxation because of the inclusion of unearned income and the fact that 
payroll taxes are capped while income taxes include all wage and sal 
ary income. However, this simple intuition is rendered incorrect by the 
nature of the income tax system in the United States. The income tax 
base has a large number of exclusions (such as those for dependents, 
charitable giving, and mortgage payments) that make it a very incom 
plete measure of total income in the United States.
The base for income taxation, total taxable income, is reported by 
Internal Revenue Service. I use data from the Treasury Department's 
Individual Tax Model, along with the NBER's TAXSIM program, to 
measure the base of taxable payroll below the Social Security maxi 
mum. This data provides information on the tax returns for a large 
sample of taxpayers, and TAXSIM calculates the tax rates paid by 
those taxpayers.25 I use data from 1989, the last year for which data are 
available.
The total taxable income base was $2.173 trillion in 1989. In con 
trast, the taxable base of wage and salary earnings below the taxable 
maximum was only $12.9 million smaller, which is trivial relative to 
the size of the social insurance programs under discussion. Thus, the 
relative sizes of these tax bases are virtually equal. Capped earnings 
may be a smaller base for taxation compared with a comprehensive 
income definition, but capped earnings provide a base of roughly the 
same size compared with income taxation as it is carried out in the 
United States.
Furthermore, the elasticity of the income tax base is almost cer 
tainly higher than the elasticity of the payroll tax base. As noted ear 
lier, although controversial, the empirical literature on labor supply 
suggests that the labor supply of prime age males is fairly inelastic and 
that the labor supply of secondary earners is somewhat more elastic. 
On the other hand, other forms of income taxed under the personal 
income tax (e.g., capital gains) appear to be much more elastic with 
respect to taxation, although this evidence is also controversial (Auer- 
bach 1988). Similarly, charitable deductions, which lower the taxable
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income base, are also very sensitive to tax rates (Clotfelter 1990). 
Recent evidence also suggests that overall taxable income is more elas 
tic with respect to the tax rate than is labor income alone (Feldstein 
1993; Navratil 1994). 26
Thus, it seems clear that income taxation would be a more ineffi 
cient source of revenue raising than payroll taxation: the size of the tax 
base would be no larger, and the tax base would be more elastic.
Equity. The other important consideration for examining income 
versus payroll taxation is the distribution of the tax burden across tax 
payers. A standard criticism of payroll taxation, relative to broader 
income taxation, is that it is less equitable. This criticism is true for 
two reasons. First, unearned income is distributed in a much more pro- 
rich fashion than earned income so that a tax on all income is more 
progressive by definition. Second, payroll taxation is capped, so that 
high-income individuals escape this tax burden on income above the 
cap. In order to contrast the equity of payroll and income taxation, I 
compare the effective tax rates paid by taxpayers of different income, 
once again using data from the Treasury model and TAXSIM. Follow 
ing the evidence provided above, I assume that all of the tax is borne by 
workers in the form of lower wages. The base for my definition of 
income is "total positive income"—the sum of the positive income ele 
ments reported on tax returns, with negative elements being set to zero. 
This approach is taken to avoid the problem that much of the negative 
income reported on tax forms is tax shelter activity, rather than true 
economic losses.
The left side of Table 6 compares the distribution of effective tax 
rates across income groups under the current system for the income 
tax, the payroll tax, and the combination of the two. As expected, the 
income tax is found to be much more progressive than the payroll tax. 
For the bottom 5-10 percent of taxpayers, the effective income tax rate 
is actually negative due to the presence of the Earned Income Tax 
Credit, which subsidizes labor supply for low earners. The average 
rate then rises gradually, reaching a maximum of 17.4 percent for the 
top 5 percent of taxpayers.
In contrast, the effective payroll tax rate is virtually flat for the bot 
tom 80 percent of taxpayers. Note that for this group, payroll taxation
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Table 6 The Progressivity of the Income and Payroll Taxes3
Current system
Income 
group
0-5%
5-10%
10-20%
20-30%
30-40%
40-50%
50-60%
60-70%
70-80%
80-90%
90-95%
95-100%
Income 
tax
03
-0.4
1.3
3.0
3.7
6.6
8.4
9.8
10.6
11.7
13.9
17.4
SSDI 
tax
10.6
12.6
11.3
11.3
11.5
11.9
123
12.7
12.7
12.3
10.1
6.4
Combined
11.0
12.2
12.7
14.3
15.2
18.5
20.7
22.5
233
24.0
24.0
23.8
Uncapping tax base
Income 
tax
0.3
-0.4
1.3
3.0
3.7
6.6
8.4
9.8
10.6
11.7
13.9
17.4
SSDI 
tax
10.6
12.6
11.3
11.3
11.5
11.9
12.3
12.7
12.7
12.3
12.5
10.7
Combined
11.0
12.2
127
14.3
15.2
18.5
20.7
22.5
23.3
24.0
26.4
28.1
a Author's tabulations using U.S. Department of Treasury tax data and NBER TAXSIM 
model.
represents the majority of their tax bill. For the top 20 percent of tax 
payers, payroll tax rates actually decline. Payroll taxes are therefore 
much less equitable than income taxes, and this becomes a key equity 
consideration when payroll taxes represent the majority of taxes paid 
for such a high fraction of taxpayers. Thus, the consideration of pay 
roll vs. income taxation comes down to the classic trade-off between 
efficiency and equity.
Of course, this discussion has taken the structure of income and 
payroll taxes as given. If the income tax base were widened, for exam 
ple, by the removal or limitation of the deduction for mortgage interest, 
the attractiveness of income taxation would rise for three reasons. 
First, the tax base would be larger, so that there would be a lower effi 
ciency cost per dollar of revenue raised. Second, the income tax base 
would be less elastic. The increased elasticity of income taxation rela 
tive to payroll taxation described above derives largely from the fact 
that, under the income tax, there are a number of ways to protect 
income from taxation, such as the mortgage interest deduction. Limit 
ing these exclusions would reduce the extent to which reported income
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can be lowered in response to higher taxes and thus limit the efficiency 
cost of income taxation. Finally, income taxes would become even 
more equitable in many cases. This is because any deduction from tax 
able income is regressive because tax rates rise with income. Thus, 
removing the mortgage interest deduction would make the income tax 
system more progressive. 27
Raising the Taxable Maximum for Payroll Taxation
An alternative to shifting to income taxation would be to change 
the structure of payroll taxation to make it more equitable. A natural 
means for doing so would be to remove the cap on taxable earnings for 
SS and DI, which was removed for Medicare beginning in 1994. 
Under the principle of maintaining some tax/benefit linkages, if bene 
fits are not going to be paid based on earnings above this level, then 
taxes must be limited as well. However, the tax/benefit linkages are 
likely to be small for this top group of earners because the benefits for 
mula used by SS only converts each dollar of earnings to 15 cents of 
benefits at the top of the earnings distribution.
The efficiency consequences of uncapping the payroll tax are 
mixed. On one hand, it substantially increases the payroll tax base. If 
all wage and salary income were subject to the payroll tax, the tax base 
would rise from $2.16 trillion to $2.61 trillion (based on calculations 
using the Treasury data and TAXSIM), an increase in the tax base of 
over 20 percent. In 1989, the total tax rate used to finance SS and DI 
was 12.12 percent. If the same revenues were raised by an uncapped 
tax, this combined tax rate could have been reduced to 10.03 percent. 
Using the rule that the efficiency cost of a tax rises with the square of 
the tax rate, the efficiency cost of financing these programs could have 
been reduced by 32 percent by extending the tax base to all wages and 
salaries.
On the other hand, the wage and salary income of top earners may 
be more elastic than that of earners lower down the income distribu 
tion. High-income individuals receive more fringe benefits and other 
diverse sources of compensation, allowing for more discretion in the 
form in which compensation is paid. For example, if the payroll tax 
were uncapped, executives might switch from cash compensation to 
stock options. While other workers have some opportunity for this
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type of arbitrage using fringe benefits such as health insurance, the 
opportunities are more abundant for top earners. Feenberg and Poterba 
(1993) documented that wage and salary income for the top 1 percent 
of taxpayers rose dramatically after the Tax Reform Act of 1986 low 
ered marginal tax rates on earned income. And Navratil (1994) also 
found that the wage and salary income of top earners (more than 
$50,000 per year in 1980 dollars) is much more elastic with respect to 
tax changes than is that of all earners.
Furthermore, to the extent that high wage earners reduce their 
reported earnings in order to avoid increased payroll taxation, there is a 
spillover into the revenues collected under the ordinary income tax. 
Since the marginal income tax rate on top earners is over three times as 
high as the marginal payroll tax rate would be, reduced earnings by top 
earners could quickly mitigate any potential gains from extending the 
payroll tax.
Navratil (1994) estimated an elasticity of earned income with 
respect to payroll taxation for high-income earners of approximately 
one. One can use this estimate, along with information on the revenues 
collected from both the payroll and income taxes, to estimate the reve 
nue effect of uncapping the payroll tax. In fact, the net revenue 
increase from uncapping the payroll tax would only be $11.7 billion, or 
21 percent of what would be assumed based on naive application of the 
12 percent payroll tax to the incremental $450 billion in revenues 
because the tax would raise only $43.2 billion in payroll tax revenues 
but would cost $31.5 billion in income tax revenues. 28 This policy 
could therefore have a relatively high efficiency cost per dollar of reve 
nues raised.
Table 6 explores the equity implications of uncapping the tax base 
by presenting the payroll and total tax burdens, by income class, under 
the current system and with the tax base uncapped. There is no effect 
of this policy on the bottom 90 percent of the income distribution. 
However, there is a large net increase in taxes paid for the wealthiest 
taxpayers; the top 5 percent would experience and increase in their 
effective tax rate of approximately 20 percent. Thus, uncapping the SS 
tax may raise a relatively small amount of revenues, but it would sub 
stantially raise taxes on the very upper end of the distribution of earn 
ings.
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Uncapping payroll taxes for UI would have larger effects since, as 
documented in Table 3, the current taxable maximums are so low. It is 
difficult to replicate the calculation performed above for uncapping UI 
taxes, however, because we do not have a good estimate of the elastic 
ity of earned income for lower wage earners, nor is there readily avail 
able data on the marginal UI tax rate faced by workers at different 
income levels. Undertaking this kind of calculation could be useful for 
assessing the implications of uncapping UI taxes as well.
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has tried to highlight what we know and what we 
don't know about the labor-market effects of payroll taxation and 
employer mandates in the United States. While recent evidence sug 
gests that mandates and payroll taxes are fully shifted to workers' 
wages with little disemployment effect, there remains important ques 
tions and complications that must be explored by future research. In 
addition, I discuss the benefits and costs of shifting from payroll taxa 
tion to income taxation, as well as of uncapping the payroll tax.
There is a larger question avoided by this discussion: should pay 
roll tax financed and mandated employer benefits exist at all? There 
are three components to the welfare analysis of social insurance inter 
ventions: the deadweight loss from financing, other distortions to 
behavior from the existence of public insurance, and the benefits for 
the party on whose behalf the intervention is occurring. This chapter 
has focused on the first of these components. There is also a large liter 
ature on the second, which has explored the distortive effects of the 
perverse incentives inherent in a number of different social insurance 
programs. However, there is little work on the third area—the benefits 
of social insurance interventions. Without evidence on this front, we 
cannot conclude as to the optimal level of government intervention in 
private insurance markets.
Consider the case of workers' compensation. Gruber and Krueger 
(1991) showed that there is little deadweight loss from financing this 
program. Meyer (1990) and Krueger (1990, 1992) showed that there 
are important distortions to worker injury reports and duration of job
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absence, but there is little evidence on the benefits of WC. To what 
extent does WC reduce the deadweight loss that would otherwise be 
incurred through the tort system as workers and firms tried to resolve 
workplace injury cases? To what extent does it smooth the consump 
tion of myopic or liquidity constrained workers who would otherwise 
see a large drop in their standard of living when they were truly injured 
on the job? Until these benefits are measured, we have no way of 
assessing the optimal level of government intervention in this market; 
how else can we assess whether the distortions measured by the earlier 
work are "large"?
Similar problems exist in evaluating the optimal level of the Social 
Security program. In this case, we don't necessarily even know the 
deadweight loss from financing. There are a number of reasons, noted 
previously, why the results from previous incidence research may not 
apply to Social Security. Once again, there is a long line of research on 
the distortive effects of the program to savings and retirement behavior 
by Feldstein (1974), Burtless (1986), and Diamond and Hausman 
(1984). In this case, however, there is also only sketchy evidence on 
the benefits of the program. There has been some attention paid to 
issues of benefit adequacy; see Diamond (1977), Kotlikoff, Spivak, and 
Summers (1982), and Hamermesh (1984) for somewhat different con 
clusions on this adequacy issue. None of these studies, however, has 
been able to assess convincingly the effects of varying Social Security 
benefits on the welfare of retirees because they have not been able to 
fully model the alternative consumption smoothing opportunities avail 
able to the retiree in the absence of Social Security. Feldstein (1985) 
conjectured on the optimal Social Security benefit level using a model 
where some fraction of the population is myopic and concluded that 
the optimal program should be quite small. This work could be use 
fully extended by incorporating liquidity constraints and other capital 
market failures into the model and, more convincingly, by providing 
empirical evidence on how the living standards of the elderly change as 
Social Security benefits vary.
Perhaps the most complete picture can be painted for unemploy 
ment insurance. The evidence in Anderson and Meyer (1997) suggests 
that there is little deadweight loss at the market level from the financing 
of UI, although there may be a distortion at the firm level. Meyer 
(1990) showed that there is a large distortion of generous UI benefits to
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unemployment durations, and Feldstein (1978), Topel (1983), and 
Anderson and Meyer (1994) showed that there are also distortions of 
imperfect experience rating to firm layoff decisions. On the other hand, 
there are two forms of benefit of this program for individual workers. 
The first is that it helps to subsidize efficient search by liquidity con 
strained unemployed workers. But recent research has shown that the 
longer search induced by more generous unemployment insurance ben 
efits does not result in better job matches, as measured by the ultimate 
wage received (Meyer 1989; Woodbury and Speigelman 1987). The 
second is that it smooths the consumption of individuals who, due 
either to myopia or some capital market failure, are unable to smooth 
their own consumption during unemployment spells. 29 Some prelimi 
nary evidence on this front is provided by Gruber (1997, 1998), who 
found that the consumption of those becoming unemployed falls signif 
icantly more if there is less generous UI. In that paper, I attempted to 
use a simple optimal benefits model to compare the costs and benefits 
of UI into a simple optimal benefits model, but there is clearly room for 
more systematic incorporation of the costs and benefits of social insur 
ance programs in order to assess optimal intervention levels.
Notes
I am grateful to Jeff Liebman for research assistance.
1. The description of these programs is current as of 1993. Most information is from 
Committee on Ways and Means (1993) and Employee Benefits Research Institute 
(1992).
2. The normal age of retirement under Social Security is 65. Individuals can retire 
as early as age 62, but benefits are then adjusted downwards to reflect the fact that 
they are received for a larger number of years. Similarly, individuals can retire 
after age 65, and benefits are adjusted upwards, through a "delayed retirement 
credit." If individuals wish to both continue working and receive benefits, they 
can do so, but benefits are taxed away at a rate of $1 of benefit for every $3 of 
earnings [above some minimum threshold ($10,560)]; this is known as the "earn 
ings test."
3. Although, for past cohorts, the system actually redistributed (in total dollar terms) 
towards higher income workers; see Stuerle and Bakija (1994) for an overview. 
This trend is projected to end for future generations, as the program becomes 
more progressive.
4. The problems in defining disability for the purposes of Disability Insurance are 
well known; see Parsons (1991) for a detailed discussion of these issues
Payroll Taxes, Employer Mandates, and the Labor Market 223
5. While this is primarily a state-run program, employers are obligated to pay a 0 6 
percent payroll tax to the federal government (FUTA tax).
6. It is difficult to decide where "mandates" end and other workplace regulations 
begin. The dividing line chosen here is that mandates are government regulations 
of the provision of employee benefits; thus, particular regulations pertaining to 
health insurance benefit plans are mandates, while workplace antidiscrimination 
rules are not. It remains unclear whether government regulations of workplace 
safety should be counted as a mandate in this context
7. Continuation of coverage benefits provide that the employee can continue to pur 
chase health insurance from the firm at the average group rate following his or her 
voluntary or involuntary termination. See Gruber and Madrian (1993) for more 
details on these laws.
8. Workers' compensation is not mandatory in New Jersey, South Carolina, and 
Texas. See Deere (1994) for an analysis of the implications of voluntary workers' 
compensation in Texas.
9. These are the "manual rates," which provide the basis for firm insurance pay 
ments. The actual cost of insurance may differ from these rates for some firms 
due to within-industry experience rating; see Burton et al. (1985) for details.
10. One may wonder why, if this program is fully valued by workers, a government 
mandate is required. As Summers (1989) discusses, a variety of different market 
failures (such as adverse selection in the choice to insure) may make it difficult for 
these type of arrangements to emerge in the free market even if there is full valua 
tion; government intervention may improve welfare in this case.
11. A third alternative for full shifting to wages would be perfectly elastic demand, 
but this would imply much larger disemployment effects than those found by Gru 
ber and Krueger (1991).
12. The variation in payroll costs in Gruber and Krueger (1991) is over a 10-year 
period; for Anderson and Meyer (1997), there is a 6-year window.
13. Whether this assumption of money illusion is warranted, of course, is the subject 
of a large macroeconomics literature not addressed here.
14. Vergara (1990) showed that, if the social welfare function values poor individuals 
more highly, it will in general be optimal to have some degree of public provision 
financed by income taxation instead of having all of the intervention financed by a 
mandate.
15. These findings have not been without their critics; see Neumark and Wascher 
(1992), and the debate between Neumark and Wascher (1994) and Card, Krueger, 
and Katz (1994).
16. For example, the costs of unemployment insurance are roughly equal across all 
workers, unless some workers are "layoff-prone."
17 Even if the costs can be shifted on average, however, if there is not perfect lump- 
sum shifting, there will still be a distortion to the hours margin which may spill 
over to other groups. This is discussed further below.
18. See Ehrenberg and Smith (1987) for a discussion of U.S. antidiscrimination legis 
lation, which was in place well before the mid 1970s In this discussion, I focus
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only on laws prohibiting discrimination in rates of pay and/or promotion. In fact, 
if there are also binding restrictions on relative hiring practices, then employers 
may be forced to bear the cost of the mandate. If discrimination rules are only 
binding on the hiring side, then they will not impede group-specific shifting in the 
case of full valuation.
19. These findings highlight another margin of employer response not emphasized 
here: reducing other (nonmandated) benefits when there are increases in man 
dated benefits. This margin has the advantage that existing benefits are often 
lump sum, so that they provide a natural means of offsetting new lump-sum costs 
imposed on employers.
20. In Gruber (1994a), I discuss the motivation for my choice of these states as well 
as a large range of empirical issues that are mentioned only briefly here.
21. The results are similar if I use other methods of creating synthetic firms. This 
approach allows for a relatively fine division of the data without creating many 
cells which have just a few women.
22. The pros and cons of this approach, as well as the robustness of the results to 
functional form, are discussed in Gruber (1992).
23 Under the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act (ERISA), employers 
who offer health insurance must make that insurance available to any worker who 
works 1,000 hours per year or more.
24. Of course, there are other forms of revenue raising available to the government, 
such as corporate taxation or federal excise taxation. However, the taxation of 
individual incomes is the dominant source of revenue at the federal level, so it 
provides a natural point for comparison; this analysis could readily be extended to 
consider alternative forms of taxation. I only consider the Social Security and 
Disability Insurance payroll tax because the structure of the Medicare payroll tax 
is now fundamentally different (since there is no taxable maximum).
25 Earnings is defined as wage and salary earnings plus self-employment earnings 
plus farm income Where these elements are reported to be negative, I replace 
them with zero, under the assumption that negative earnings reflects tax shelter 
behavior.
26. This is true for a number of reasons, including the following- a less elastic behav 
ioral response of labor supply than of other forms of economic activity, more 
scope for relabeling other forms of income to avoid taxation than is possible with 
labor income (i.e., shifting from dividends to capital gains when the capital gains 
tax rate is lower), and more scope for evasion with other forms of income (i.e., 
claiming artificially high chantable contributions).
27. While the first two comments apply to the removal of any exclusion in the tax 
code, the last does not; some tax breaks, such as the earned income tax credit, are 
progressive.
28. This calculation is done as follows. Assume that the currently marginal tax rate 
on earnings in the uncapped range is 35 percent. Uncapping the payroll tax would 
raise that rate to 47 percent. Navratil finds that the elasticity of earnings with 
respect to after-tax shares is one. Since the after-tax share is reduced by 20 per-
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cent, this would mean that the additional $450 billion in earnings in the uncapped 
range would be reduced to $360 billion. Thus, the uncapped payroll tax would 
raise an additional $43.2 billion, but income tax revenues would be reduced by 
$31.5 billion.
29. A third traditional justification for UI is that it serves as an automatic stabilizer, 
reducing the seventy of recessions by redistributing from good times to bad. 
There is little direct evidence on the automatic stabilization properties of UI. A 
finding that UI smooths consumption at the level of the individual, discussed 
below, may provide indirect evidence on its success as an automatic stabilizer.
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5 Fringe Benefits and Employment
Masanori Hashimoto 
Ohio State University
The past few decades have witnessed dramatic growth in the fringe 
benefits component of total labor compensation in the United States 
and other countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
Development (Hart et al. 1988). According to the conventional wis 
dom, an exogenous increase in nonwage labor costs adversely impacts 
employment. For instance, researchers have linked increases in quasi- 
fixed labor costs with reductions in employment.' Often overlooked, 
however, is the fact that voluntarily provided fringe benefits have 
grown by as much as legally required fringe benefits over the past 40 
years, with the voluntary component in fact outpacing the legally 
required component after the early 1980s. Although legally required 
fringe benefits may be viewed as exogenous for the purposes of model 
ing, voluntarily provided fringe benefits must be treated as endogenous 
in any comprehensive analysis. 2 In this chapter, we undertake just such 
an analysis. In particular, we discuss a market level model in which 
wages and employment are permitted to respond to changes in the 
demand for and the cost of fringe benefits and in which increases in 
legally mandated fringe benefits are permitted to alter the market equi 
librium.
Anticipating the results, the employment and wage effects of 
increases in nonwage payments vary with the source of the increase. 
We analyze the following three such sources: 1) an increase in worker 
demand for benefits, 2) a reduction in the cost of providing benefits, 
and 3) an increase in legally mandated benefits. Although these are 
obvious sources, the literature does not seem to have taken them into 
account. Our analysis is conducted primarily in a model in which no 
distinction is drawn between the number of workers and the hours of 
work or between straight-time and overtime hours. The final sections 
discuss how the results are altered by incorporating such distinctions 
and offer some concluding remarks.
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BACKGROUND
Figure 1 shows that, in the United States, both legally required and 
voluntary fringe benefits grew significantly over the past 40 years, with 
the voluntary component outpacing the legally required component 
after the early 1980s. As Table 1 makes clear, growth in Social Secu 
rity was the single most important factor behind the upsurge in legally 
required fringe benefits between 1951 and 1994. As for voluntary 
fringe benefits, growth in health and medical insurance far outpaced 
growth in any other component. Table 2 depicts industry differences in 
the changes in nonwage payments from 1966 to 1994. In general, the 
percentage of nonwage labor costs in total labor costs rose steadily 
during this period, with growth for all industries combined reaching 
almost 48 percent. This rate of increase varied among industries, rang 
ing between 1.2 percent in finance to 67.9 percent in wood products. It 
was higher for manufacturing industries overall (over 50 percent) than 
for nonmanufacturing industries (39 percent).
The observed increase in the importance of nonwage labor costs 
most likely affected the relative attractiveness of various labor inputs, 
for example, part-time versus full-time workers or additional hiring of 
full-time workers versus additional hours worked by incumbent work 
ers. In particular, the existing analyses predict that part-time workers 
should have become more attractive than full-time workers and that 
additional hours should have become more attractive than additional 
hiring.
It is unclear whether these predictions are supported by the data, at 
least on the aggregate correlation level. Figure 2 indicates that there is 
no discernible relationship across industries between changes in the 
ratio of full-time to total employment and changes in the importance of 
nonwage labor costs. Figure 3 shows that, if anything, hours worked 
per employee decreased in industries that experienced increases in 
nonwage labor costs, a finding that seems at odds with the theoretical 
prediction. Although a multivariate analysis using a more comprehen 
sive data set is needed to test these predictions rigorously, the market- 
level theory discussed in this essay suggests that such ambiguous find 
ings are to be expected.
Figure 1 Fringe Benefits of Workers in Firms Surveyed by the Chamber of Commerce 
(Indices of Benefits as a Percent of Total Compensation, 1951=100)
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Table 1 Components of Fringe Benefits in Firms Surveyed by the Chamber of Commerce. Indices of Benefits as a 
Percent of Total Compensation (1951=100)
Legally required
Social Security
1951
1955
1959
1963
1967
1971
1975
1979
1984
1988
1992
1993
1994
100.00
174.81
172.74
240.98
315.88
360.71
439.47
435.71
494.36
522.56
517.48
495.39
514.29
Workers' 
comp.
100.00
87.41
138.16
120.49
157.89
160.34
198.50
249.06
179.51
166.73
221.80
172.18
165.98
Other
100.00
58.27
69.11
100.44
52.63
40.10
56.70
82.83
89.91
43.80
34.59
30.33
30.39
Retirement
100.00
102.04
115.20
110.50
114.10
126.95
141.81
138.36
117.42
126.29
152.80
15798
175.65
Voluntary
Insurance
100.00
174.81
207.33
240.98
263.25
360.71
42528
477.16
62152
711.84
805.83
83994
788.06
Inside payroll
Misc.
100.00
145.741
115.16
160.65
140.41
146.93
132.33
152.13
144.17
46.37
54.20
76.50
93.98
Paid rest
100.00
16.54
138.22
140.60
157.96
173.68
189.04
179.82
92.92
117.11
123.18
110.03
107.83
Paid leave
10000
104.93
117.50
126.55
126.40
144.31
155.97
143.18
138.52
16007
155.25
149.35
141.87
SOURCE: See Appendix A.
Table 2 Indices of Nonwage Labor Costs as a Proportion of Total Labor Compensation by Industry (1966=100)
Industry
All
Manufacturing
Food, tobacco
Textiles, apparel
Wood products
Printing & publishing
Chemicals
Petroleum
Rubber and plastics
Stone, glass
Metals:
Primary
Fabricated
Machinery
Electrical
Other
1966 
Values
(0.198)
(0.191)
(0.214)
(0.159)
(0 169)
(0.174)
(0.215)
(0.219)
(0.201)
(0.188)
(0.200)
(0.186)
(0.192)
(0.194)
1966
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
1971
118.7
122.5
116.4
120.1
130.8
123.6
118.6
120.1
115.9
126.6
129.0
119.9
118.8
119.1
1976
135.4
142.4
1252
141.5
150.3
148.9
140.5
132.4
136.8
142.0
151.0
147.3
139.6
140.7
1981
137.4
144.5
127.6
149.1
157.4
154.6
140.9
140.6
134.8
146.3
151.0
147.8
142.2
143.3
1985
138.4
148.7
132.7
153.5
154.4
146.6
140.0
128.3
142.3
135.1
166.0
159.1
146.4
147.4
1988
136.4
139.7
123.4
157.1
149.1
134.0
118.5
144.1
144.9
1391
149.9
152.2
135.3
137.3
1992
144.8
152.8
145.5
146.6
164.2
165.7
134.8
132.3
166.7
144.5
149.6
169.1
150.7
149.9
1993
147.6
150.4
121.4
158.9
167.9
1642
144 1
1325
148.6
143.9
1446
1585
148.0
144.1
1994
146.1
153.3
127.4
143.6
161.4
169.1
130.7
130.2
145.9
152.8
127.4
149.2
163.4
154.2
(continued)
Table 2 (continued)
Industry
Transportation equip.
Instruments, other
Nonmanufacturing
Utilities
Trade
Department stores
Other
Finance
Insurance
Hospitals
Other
1966 
Values
(0.188)
(0.192)
(0.212)
(0.212)
(0.188)
(0.194)
(0.243)
(0.213)
(0.204)
(0.252)
1966
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
-
-
1971
137.8
123.4
111.8
115.6
103.7
101.5
108.2
113.1
-
-
1976
149.5
132.3
124.5
134.0
128.7
121.1
117.3
99.1
100.0
100.0
1981
148.9
145.8
125.5
139.2
124.5
120.6
114.4
130.5
116.2
98.4
1985
155.9
152.6
125.5
137.7
125.0
123.7
105.8
128.2
125.5
100.4
1988
149.0
134.7
128.4
140.2
136.4
153.2
99.5
120.2
121.6
107.4
1992
163.3
127.2
134.3
140.0
128.9
143.8
100.5
132.5
123.8
116.8
1993
162.0
139.8
138.8
148.6
123.4
153.7
101.2
136.8
134.7
116.6
1994
187.6
144.2
136.0
148.4
152.2
144.6
98.3
134.6
131.9
109.5
SOURCE: Calculated from Table 6 of Employee Benefits (Chamber of Commerce of the United States, various years) by taking 
l/(l+(100/x)), where x is employee benefits.
Figure 2 Manufacturing Industries (U.S. Chamber of Commerce Survey)
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THEORY AND PREDICTIONS
In contrast to the conventional approach of analyzing a single 
firm's decision, we consider a model that addresses the effects of 
increased fringe benefits on market wages and employment. To focus 
on the bare essentials of the analysis, we restrict ourselves to a simple 
model that abstracts from the distinction between the size of the work 
force and the hours of work per worker. Following this simple model, 
we consider the implications from an extended model that includes 
such a distinction.
Beginning first with a firm level analysis and then extending to the 
market level analysis, suppose that an industry consists of identical 
firms whose production functions are given by
Q = F(n) (1)
where Q is output and n is a firm's level of employment. The market 
level of employment is then given by E = kn, where k is the total num 
ber of firms. Each firm faces a labor expense function,
Q = Q(n,h,G) = whn + C(G,n)n, (2)
where w is the wage and G is the quantity of fringe benefits per worker. 
Equation 2 is assumed to satisfy
Ci > 0, Cn > 0, C2 ^0, C12 = C21 ±0, C22 = 0,
so that the marginal cost of G is positive and rising (Cj > 0, Cn > 0). 
Equation 2 allows for the existence of either internal diseconomies or 
economies in providing fringe benefits. Thus, as the firm expands its 
workforce, the cost per worker of providing fringe benefits might 
increase or decrease, depending upon whether scale diseconomies (C2 
> 0) or economies (C2 < 0) exist. More importantly, the sign of C12 = 
C21 is critical to the analysis. We interpret C12 < 0 as an indicator of 
cross-economies of scale and C12 > 0 as an indicator cross-disecono 
mies of scale. Cross-economies of scale (diseconomies of scale) imply
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that the marginal cost of G falls (rises) with the size of the workforce. 
For simplicity, we assume that C22 = 0.
The /th employee is assumed to view G as having a constant mar 
ginal value of A, dollars, making her indifferent between receiving A, 
dollars in w or in G. To simplify, we assume that all employees have 
the same marginal value, A. As a result, 8w/3G = -A from the 
employer's perspective; if G is increased by one unit, all employees are 
willing to work for A dollars less in w.
An employer selects the optimum n and G by solving the following 
problem:
Max ji(n, G) = pF(n) - [ w + C(G, n)]n, ., .
n,G (J)
where p is the product price. The first order conditions are given by
= pF'(n) -[w + C(G, n) + nC2 ] = 0 and (4a)
= 0. (4b) 
A firm's labor demand is traced by Eq. 4a, rewritten as:
w = pF'(n) - [C(G, n) + nC2 ]. (4a*)
The optimum quantity of G is given by Eq. 4b, implying that the mar 
ginal cost of G is equal to A dollars at the optimum point.
Allowing for the product price changes that occur as all firms 
change outputs, the market demand curves for labor can be obtained by 
horizontally summing the firms' demand curves. To facilitate the anal 
ysis, we linearize the market demand curves as follows (see Appendix 
B for the details of this linearization).
where w* is the employers' wage offer, w is employment, and a, t|, p, 
and P are parameters. The expression represents the cost of providing 
G, and P depends on G if there are cross-scale effects in providing the 
benefits. Equations 2 and 4a* imply the following restrictions:
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P/dG2 =0, (6)
where the condition d$ldG^ 0 corresponds to C, 2 JO and the condi 
tion J2p / dG2 = 0 corresponds to C12 = 0 (see Appendix B). Figure 4 
depicts the demand curves associated with three different quantities of 
G. If the marginal cost of G slopes upward, the demand curves diverge 
as G is increased, reflecting the rising cost of fringe benefits.
The supply side of the model is straightforward. As emphasized 
earlier, workers are assumed to be homogeneous while w and G are 
assumed to be perfectly substitutable at a rate of A dollars per unit of 
G. As a result, the market supply of labor depends upon w + AG. 
Because workers are assumed homogeneous, the supply curve depicted 
as a function of w is horizontal and shifts down as G is increased 
according to the following equation.
ws = y - AG, (7)
where w5 is the asking wage and y (>0) and A (>0) are parameters. 
Figure 5 depicts the supply curves.
The competitive market equilibrium is the solution that maximizes 
the sum total of the surpluses for both employers and employees. The 
process of reaching this equilibrium involves two steps. First, the mar 
ket optimizes on the E associated with various quantities of G. This 
optimization generates a locus of the intersections of demand and sup 
ply curves corresponding to different values of G. Second, the market 
chooses the optimum quantity of G by equating the marginal cost of G 
with its marginal value. By doing so, the market in effect selects a 
point on the intersection locus that maximizes the sum of the surpluses. 
Figure 6 depicts the demand and supply curves together for three dif 
ferent levels of G as well as the corresponding intersection points on 
the intersection locus L.
The market equilibrium—the intersection of demand and supply 
that maximizes the joint surplus Z—is obtained by solving the follow 
ing optimization problem:
£
MaxZ= j[v/(e)-v/
E, G
= [a - (t|G + pG2 )- y + KG\E + 0.5(3E2 + Constant.
240 Hashimoto
Figure 4 Demand Curves
w
Figure 5 Supply Curves
W
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The first order conditions are given by
0 and (9a) 
- -[r| + 2pG - Q.5(d$ /dG)E]E + kE = 0 (9b)
Equation 9a optimizes Z with respect to E, resulting in a locus of inter 
sections between the demand and supply curves for different values of 
G. Equation 9b optimizes on G, equating the marginal cost (the first 
term) with the marginal value (the second term). Equations 9a and 9b 
together describe the point of market equilibrium. 3
Figure 7 portrays the market equilibrium for three cases: no cross- 
scale effects (dft/dG = 0) cross-economies of scale (d$/dG > 0), and 
cross-diseconomies of scale (dft/dG < 0). The L curve is the locus of 
the intersections of the demand and supply curves for the different lev 
els of G. There is a unique L curve associated with each of these three 
values of d$ldG; however, in Figure 7, only one L curve is depicted to 
conserve space. Moving downward along this locus, G is increased 
and w is decreased. We should point out that the market equilibrium 
level of employment is not necessarily at its maximum attainable level. 
In particular, Figure 7 shows that if there are cross-scale effects (d$l 
dG * 0), equilibrium employment is less than the maximum feasible 
level of employment on the relevant L curve.4 Only in the absence of 
cross-scale effects (d$/dG = 0) is equilibrium employment at its maxi 
mum feasible level (see Appendix C for a proof).
We are now in a position to evaluate the effects of nonwage pay 
ments on employment. Since G is endogenous in our model, changes 
in its magnitude must be traced to changes in worker demand for, and 
the cost of, G. These exogenous factors are represented by K and r|, 
respectively. In addition, we evaluate the effects of changes in legally 
required fringe benefits on employment and wages.
Changes in the Demand for G
A secular increase in nonwage payments can arise as a result of an 
increase in the demand for fringe benefits. Such an increase in demand 
occurs if, for example, a new law taxes nonwage benefits less heavily 
than wage earnings or if real income grows and fringe benefits are
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Figure 6 Intersection Locus
Figure 7 Market Equilibria
w
B (dp/dG > 0)
A (dp/dG = 0) 
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superior goods. An increased demand for G is represented by an 
increase in A,, yielding the following comparative statics results:
dGld\ = (1 /|//|)[-P + 0.5G(d(3 / dG)]E (10a)
dEldk = (1 /|//|)[2pG + 0.5E(d$ I dG)]E, (lOb)
Clearly, if there are no cross-scale effects (d$ldG = 0)or if there are 
cross-economies of scale (d$ldG > 0), both equations are positive so 
that both G and E increase with A. In other words, an increase in 
worker demand for fringe benefits increases both the amount of bene 
fits provided and the level of employment. If a secular increase in non- 
wage payments is the result of an increased demand for these 
payments, such an increase in benefits should have the effect of stimu 
lating employment.
If there are cross-diseconomies of scale (dft/dG < 0), conditions 
lOa and lOb seem to suggest that either G or £ or both could decrease 
when A, increases. Such an outcome seems implausible, however, 
because it would imply that, as employers expand G in response to the 
increased demand for it, cross-diseconomies cause the cost of provid 
ing fringe benefits to rise, forcing employers to reduce the quantities of 
both G and E. For cross-diseconomies to remain operative, however, 
the aggregate amount of G must rise. On the basis of this argument, 
we conjecture that G, and possibly E, increase even in this case.
Because w = ws = w at the point of equilibrium, the effect on 
the wage is ascertained by evaluating the effect of a change in A, on ws, 
or
G (10c)
Equation 10 implies that, if G and E increase in response to an 
increase in the demand for G, then dwld\ is negative and the wage 
falls. Employees, in effect, trade their wages for larger benefits.
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Changes in the Cost of G
Nonwage payments may also increase as a result of a decrease in 
the cost of providing fringe benefits. A change in the cost of G is rep 
resented here by a change in rj. Not surprisingly, the comparative stat 
ics analysis reveals that cost effects are mirror images of demand 
effects. In other words,
and (lla)
If (dfi/dG > 0) both G and E increase when r| falls. Thus, if the 
observed increase in nonwage benefits is the result of a decrease in the 
cost of providing benefits, employment as well as benefits should rise. 
As in the case of increased demand for fringe benefits, even if there are 
cross-diseconomies (d$ldG < 0), we conjecture that G, and possibly E, 
increase when costs fall.
The wage effect is evaluated from the following equation:
dw/dn = A,(dGdn). (lie)
The term dw I dT\ is positive when (dfi/dG > 0). If a decrease in r\ is 
the cause of the observed increase in nonwage payments, then, as G 
and E increase in response, w should decrease.
Effects of Government Control of G
As Figure 1 demonstrates, legally required benefits have risen over 
time. If a government regulates the quantity of employer provided 
fringe benefits, then G in the previous analysis is replaced by the man 
dated quantity, G . Given that dw I dG = —A, < 0, it is clear that the 
wage will fall unambiguously when G is increased. The effect on 
employment is not clear-cut, however.
To begin, E is now the only endogenous variable, making 
3Z/8E1 = 0 the only first-order condition. This first-order condition 
yields the following optimum level of employment: 5
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31 (12)
The effect of an increased G on employment is given by
(13)
+ (d{3 / dG) x (a positive term).
Suppose the market is initially at its competitive equilibrium so 
that G = G*, where G* is the competitive equilibrium level of the 
benefits. In this case, the term (V| + 2pG - A,)/(37 is zero because 
(r| + 2pG)and A, are, respectively, the marginal cost and marginal 
value of G. We already know that in the absence of cross-scale effects 
(d(3 I dG = 0), the competitive equilibrium corresponds to the maxi 
mum feasible level of employment. 6 It is clear, therefore, that the 
introduction of legally required benefits lowers employment regardless 
of whether the mandated G is larger or smaller than G * . In other 
words, there is little that the government can do to increase employ 
ment by regulating G.
If there are cross-economies of scale (d$ I dG > 0), employment 
increases because dE * / dG = (d(3 / dG) x (a positive term) > 0. The 
government in effect forces the market to experience cross-economies 
of scale beyond what is efficient. If there are cross-diseconomies of 
scale (d$/dG<0), employment decreases because 
dE*/dG= (d$ I dG} x (a positive term) < 0 • In this case, the govern 
ment in effect forces the market to experience cross-diseconomies 
beyond what is efficient.
Now assume that legally required fringe benefits already exist. 
What happens to employment if G is increased? Consider the case of 
no cross-scale effects (dft/dG = 0). If G is already set above the mar 
ket equilibrium level, then the marginal cost is above the marginal rev 
enue so that (t| + 2pG) > A. As a result, dE * /dG < 0, implying that 
employment decreases when G is increased. On the other hand, if G 
is initially set below the market equilibrium level, then the marginal 
cost is lower than the marginal revenue so that (T| + 2pG) < A . As a 
result, dE* IdG > 0, implying that employment increases when G is 
increased. With respect to the latter of these policy moves, the govern 
ment forces G to move closer to the market equilibrium level.
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Allowing cross-scale effects to exist complicates the analysis. 
Suppose there are cross-economies of scale (d$ldG > 0). If G is ini 
tially set above the competitivejnarket level, then the effect of changes 
in employment of changes in G is ambiguous given that dE*ldG can 
not be signed. In this case, there are opposing forces at work. On one 
hand, the government forces G to increase beyond its already ineffi 
ciently high level, thereby adversely affecting employment. On the 
other hand, an increase in G forces the market to enjoy cross-econo 
mies of scale, thereby positively affecting employment. The net out 
come depends upon the relative strength of the opposing forces. If G 
is initially below the competitive market level, then employment unam 
biguously increases because dE * IdG < 0. In this case, the govern 
ment forces the market to move towards the competitive level of G, 
thereby reinforcing the stimulating effect on employment originating 
from cross-economies of scale.
_ Turning to the case of cross-diseconomies of scale (d$ldG < 0), if 
G is initially above the competitive market level, then employment 
declines unambiguously when G isjncreased because (d$ldG < 0). 
In this case, the government forces G to move further away from the 
competitive equilibrium, thereby reinforcing the disemployment effect 
caused by cross-diseconomies of scale. If G is initially below the 
competitive market level, then employment effects are ambiguous 
given that dE * IdG cannot be signed. The government forces G closer 
to the market equilibrium level, causing employment to expand, but 
cross-diseconomies of scale cause employment to decline. The net 
effect is uncertain.
To summarize, if an increase in nonwage payments is caused by an 
increase in the legally required benefits, wages fall unambiguously; 
however, employment effects are ambiguous. An important result is 
that, even in the case of an exogenous increase in legally required 
fringe benefits, employment can increase rather than decrease as con 
ventionally thought. Whatever happens to employment, an increase in 
legally mandated fringe benefits tends to be inefficient. An exception 
is when the fringe benefits level is initially set below the competitive 
equilibrium level. In this case, it is obvious that an increase in fringe 
benefits increases efficiency so long as the increase does not overshoot 
the competitive equilibrium level.
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AN EXTENSION: A MODEL WITH OVERTIME HOURS
Previous analyses assume that the relevant range of hours of work 
includes only the standard hours, omitting consideration of overtime 
hours and the potential ramifications of the overtime wage premium. 
Our model may be extended by assuming that the equilibrium num 
ber of hours of work incorporates overtime hours. Such an extension 
is important if exogenous changes in nonwage payments affect the 
marginal cost of increasing the labor input via increases in the hours 
of work beyond the standard hours. We are also interested in the 
effects of changes in the standard hours (or in the overtime wage pre 
mium) on employment and fringe benefits. For a fuller exposition on 
the technical aspects of such an extended model, the reader is referred 
to a companion paper (Hashimoto and Zhao 1996). Here, we simply 
outline some of the key predictions that emerge from this extended 
analysis.
The predictions discussed in the preceding section are generally 
unchanged in the extended model. We do, however, obtain additional 
predictions. First, suppose the government increases the standard 
hours of work. If there are no cross-scale effects, neither fringe bene 
fits nor hours of work are affected by the changes in standard hours. 
Employment increases if the positive effect of the increased standard 
hours on labor demand dominates the negative effect on labor supply; 
it decreases otherwise. The effects on hours of work and fringe bene 
fits depend on how the slope of the labor demand curve, (3, changes. 
The straight-time wage rate rises as a result of an upward shift of the 
worker supply curve. The effects of an increase in the overtime wage 
rate are opposite of the effects of an increase in standard hours.
CONCLUSION
The importance of nonwage payments has risen noticeably in the 
United States over the past 40 years. Contributing to this trend are 
increases in both voluntarily provided and legally required fringe bene 
fits. Furthermore, since the early 1980s, the growth of the voluntary
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component has outpaced that of legally required component. These 
developments suggest the importance of evaluating how employment 
and wages are affected by the demand and supply forces that lead to 
increases in voluntarily provided fringe benefits. This chapter has 
addressed this issue. We find that predictions based upon the conven 
tional firm-level analysis in which nonwage payments are assumed to 
be exogenous are misleading. In particular, contrary to the conven 
tional wisdom, an increase in nonwage payments does not necessarily 
imply any adverse effects on employment and wages.
This outcome depends jointly on the source of the increase and the 
existence of cross-scale effects in the cost of providing fringe benefits. 
If the increase in nonwage payments is the result of either an increase 
in employee demand for fringe benefits or a decrease in the cost of pro 
viding benefits, employment may increase and the wage rate may 
decrease. More importantly, employment effects are ambiguous even 
when legally mandated fringe benefits are involved. To be sure, wages 
always fall when legally required fringe benefits are increased; how 
ever, employment may fall or rise depending on the initial condition 
and the existence and the nature of cross-scale effects.
In the special case in which there are no cross-diseconomies of 
scale, there is no presumption that an increase in nonwage benefits 
reduces employment so long as competitive market forces are respon 
sible for such an increase. If new legally required fringe benefits are 
introduced into a labor market that is already at a competitive equilib 
rium, employment decreases regardless of whether the mandate is to 
increase or decrease such benefits. In this case, a government cannot 
increase employment by manipulating the levels of legally required 
fringe benefits.
Incorporating the distinction between standard hours of work and 
overtime hours of work does not change these results. Not surpris 
ingly, we find that there is a symmetry of effects with respect to the 
standard hours and the overtime premium. In particular, the effects 
of increased standard hours of work on employment, wages, and 
fringe benefits are opposite of the effects of an increased overtime 
premium.
We end with a discussion of some of the restrictions and limita 
tions imposed on the analysis of this paper. Relaxing these would 
undoubtedly make the model more complete. Given, however, that
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our objective is to demonstrate that making nonwage payments endog 
enous changes some of the conventional results, we have chosen to 
use a simplified model here. In any event, four limitations warrant 
mention.
First, we abstract from the worker's choice of the number of hours 
to work. Incorporating such a decision, while making the model more 
complete, would greatly complicate our analysis. The same may be 
said with respect to the second limitation of our analysis—namely, our 
treatment of all nonwage labor as quasi-fixed benefits that are indepen 
dent of the number of hours of work. Thus, we are talking about a 
quasi-fixed wage component that is approximately 20 percent of total 
labor compensation. Third, we abstract from higher order terms in the 
linearly specified demand and supply functions. More complicated 
specifications of the demand and supply curves may be desirable, 
although such extensions are likely to make the predictions ambiguous. 
Fourth, we assume that all employees are homogeneous with respect to 
the marginal value of fringe benefits. If they were made heteroge 
neous, the supply specification would need to incorporate distribution 
parameters determining the taste for fringe benefits. Relaxing these 
four restrictions is the subject of future research. In this chapter, how 
ever, our goal is simply to demonstrate that some of the conventional 
predictions are modified once analysis is conducted in a more general 
equilibrium framework.
Notes
I thank Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Susan N. Houseman, Todd Idson, Jacob Mincer, Hajime 
Miyazaki, James Peck, Sherwin Rosen, Jingang Zhao, and participants at the Labor 
Economics Seminar at Columbia University and the 1995 Seventh World Congress of 
the Econometric Society for useful comments and suggestions. I also thank Tracy Foe- 
rtsch for research assistance
1. When models of employment-hours decisions are expanded to allow for changes 
in capital, many of the results concerning hours become ambiguous; however, 
the fixed-cost effect on employment remains intact (Hamermesh 1993; Hart 
1984).
2. Almost all existing analyses focus on the behavior of firms for which it is reason 
able to assume that fringe benefits are strictly exogenous. For example, see Rosen 
(1968), Ehrenberg (1971), Hamermesh (1993), and Hart (1984).
250 Hashimoto
3. The second order conditions are given by 32Z/8G2 = -2p£ < 0 and |H| = -2$pE 
-\Q.5E(d$ I dG)]2 > 0,and where |H| is the determinant of the Hessian matrix. It 
is straightforward to show that if the demand curves are all parallel to one another, 
i.e., d$/dG = Q, the above conditions are implied by the assumptions made with 
regard to the demand and supply curves If they are not parallel, these conditions 
must be imposed on the model.
4. Since the L curve is unique to the value of dB/dG, the maximum employment 
level is different for each case.
5. The equilibrium point corresponds to the intersection of the respective demand 
and supply curves. The second order condition is satisfied because d Z*/3E
= p<o.
6. This can be seen from d2 El(dG] =2p/p<0 when G = G*.
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Appendix A
Table A, an extension of Table 1 in Woodbury (1983), gives the data on 
which Figure 1 is based. This appendix describes the procedures used to com 
pute the entries in Table A and in Table 1 of the text. To simplify our exposi 
tion, we begin with a discussion of the construction of Table A.
Woodbury used two sources in demonstrating the growth of employee ben 
efits from 1965 to 1978: the U.S. Chamber of Commerce publication Employee 
Benefits (various years) and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) bulletin Em 
ployee Compensation in the Private, Nonfarm Economy (1974). It is helpful to 
discuss each of these sources individually.
The data available in Employee Compensation in the Private, Nonfarm 
Economy is the product of the Employer Expenditures for Employee Compen 
sation survey (EEEC). This survey was discontinued in 1977; however, begin 
ning in March of 1987, the BLS started publication of Employment Cost 
Indexes and Levels (ECI), which includes a measure of "Employer Costs for 
Employee Compensation." 1 The data provided under this heading appears to 
be comparable to that provided in the older publication, from which Table 1 in 
Woodbury (1983) is derived. The one significant difference stressed in Nathan 
(1987) concerns its means of measuring these costs. In particular, the EEEC 
focuses upon past expenditures—or, the actual money an employer spends on 
compensation during a specified time. The compensation levels given in the 
new BLS publication rely upon current costs—or, the annual costs based upon 
the current price of benefits under current plan provisions. Aside from this 
measurement difference, however, the ECI and EEEC appear quite similar, 
with both covering virtually the same benefits and, more importantly, reporting 
costs on the same per hour basis. 2 In addition, the ECI preserves the scope of 
the EEEC by reporting survey coverage of the private, nonfarm workforce.
Derivation of the entries given in the last three columns of Table A simply 
entails the application of the per hour costs reported in the ECI to the defini 
tions utilized by Woodbury in his calculations. These per hour costs are sub 
sequently expressed as a percent of total compensation per hour and indexed to 
equal 100 in 1966.
With respect to the Chamber of Commerce data, a comparison of this table 
with that of Woodbury shows that the pre-1983 entries have been recalculated. 
This is done for reasons of data availability. In particular, the Table 19 that 
Woodbury used to construct his numbers is no longer included in Employee 
Benefits. To construct similar numbers for this table, it is necessary to use other 
sources within the publication. Two of these are selected. The first is a table 
giving wage data by industry (Table 17 in 1967 and 1969, Table 18 through
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Table A Trends in Wage and Nonwage Compensation, 1951-1995 
(benefits expressed as indices of % total compensation)
1951
1953
1955
1957
1959
1961
1963
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975C
1977
1979
1980
1982
1984
1986
(Chamber
Total
comp. 
per hr.
($)a
1.88
2.02
2.15
2.43
2.72
2.85
3.12
3.33
3.57
4.09
4.69
5.65
6.63
7.60
9.06
9.85
12.08
13.00
15.89
Compensation 
of Commerce,
Compensation 
1951=100) (BLS, 1966=100)
Benefits Total Benefits
comp. 
Legally per hr. Legally 
required Voluntary13 ($)a required Voluntary5
100.00
93.10
102.19
103.13
115.36
131.97
150.78
131.66
157.99
168.65
167.08
199.69
208.15
214.42
228.53
222.88
233.54
238.87
222.38
100.00
118.46
127.18
133.68
131.97
143.93
147.86
138.63
3.43 100.00 100.00
148.38
3.90 92.76 115.45
150.43
4.54 96.57 127.68
174.87
5.23 105.52 139.48
17556
6.32 120.57 156.22
190.77
207.01
203.76
204.79
198.12
216.92
229.06
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Compensation 
(Chamber of Commerce, 1951=100)
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
Total 
comp. 
per hr,
($)a
16.49
17.44
18.41
19.64
2051
20.81
22.67
22.66
Benefits
Legally 
required
226.33
224.76
217.87
220.38
220.06
226.02
209.09
214.42
Voluntary15
222.91
209.74
218.29
228.03
239.15
241.54
259.32
264.79
Total 
comp. 
per hr.
($)a
13.40
13.77
14.26
14.93
15.37
16.11
16.68
17.09
17.07
Compensation 
(BLS, 1966=100)
Benefits
Legally 
required
157.71
165.90
167.05
168.38
169.71
171.43
173.52
177.14
174 10
Voluntary13
195.28
194.85
194.21
197.00
203.86
213.09
221.24
225.97
21245
a Total Compensation includes legally required contributions to Social Secunty, federal 
and state unemployment insurance, and Workers' Compensation.
b Benefits provided voluntarily by the employer include private insurance (life, health, 
and accidental), privately sponsored retirement and savings plans (pensions, savings 
and thrift plans), as well as other items (severance pay, supplemental unemployment 
benefits, and other miscellaneous benefits).
c Comparable BLS benefits data are unavailable for the period extending from 1975- 
1986.
1984, Table 16 after 1988); the second is a chart detailing average annual em 
ployee benefits and earnings (Chart 2 in all publications). The first of these, 
Table 16, gives average gross payroll for all private industries included in the 
survey not only on an annual basis but also on an hourly basis. That gross pay 
roll is expressed on a per hour basis is important because such a frequency 
makes it possible to construct entries that are compatible with those provided 
by Woodbury (1983). Chart 2 categorizes employee benefits and earnings in 
the following manner: 1) benefits are the sum of outside payroll and inside 
payroll. Inside payroll encompasses paid vacations and holidays, employee 
rest periods, and lunch breaks; outside payroll is made up of legally required 
payments, pensions, insurance, and other agreed upon items, and other bene 
fits; and 2) earnings include total pay for all time worked; they comprise 
straight-time and premium-time pay, a shift differential, production bonuses, 
and other agreed upon items.
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It should be noted that Woodbury could easily make comparisons among his 
entries for the various years because the Table 19 he used in their construction 
was a summary of employee benefits for only those companies submitting data 
over the entire interval of 1957-1977. The entries given in Table A are con 
structed for all companies reporting data in the various years listed. Because 
of changes in the number and composition of companies reporting benefits be 
tween 1951 and 1992 (N = 736 and N = 1194, respectively), these entries are 
not strictly comparable. They do, however, indicate the trend in benefits over 
time. In addition, Woodbury's calculations for supplements (% of total) in 
1967 through 1977 are larger because the average benefits of the few compa 
nies included in the old Table 19 are somewhat higher than those for the full 
sample. The reason for this lies in the fact that those companies reporting over 
the entire period have larger, more established benefits programs than those 
companies included in the full sample but excluded from the Table 19 sample.
A two-step procedure is utilized to construct the entries shown in the first 
three columns of Table A. To begin, the information in Table 16 regarding av 
erage annual and average hourly gross payroll is used to determine the average 
number of hours for which an employee is paid. Given this information, Chart 
2 is employed to determine the average benefits received per hour per employ 
ee. 3 After calculating such benefits on per hour basis, these are applied to 
Woodbury's definitions of the three entries; the results reported in Table A are 
expressed as a percent of total compensation per hour and are indexed to equal 
100 in 1951.
The entries given in Table 1 of the text are derived in a similar manner. In 
this case, however, we take from Table 7 of the Employee Benefits publications 
estimates of the average hourly employer contributions to the following com 
ponents of legally required, voluntary, and inside payroll labor costs: 4 1) So 
cial Security, workers' compensation, and other legally required benefits 
(unemployment insurance, state sickness benefits, etc.); 2) pension plan premi 
ums and retirement savings plan contributions; contributions to employee life, 
death, and medical (and medically related) insurance, as well as miscellaneous 
voluntary benefits (supplemental unemployment insurance, employee dis 
counts on company goods and services, employee meals, childcare, and other 
benefits payments); and 3) paid rest (coffee and meal breaks, setup and wash 
up time, travel time, etc.) and paid leave (paid vacations and holidays, sick 
leave, parental leave, etc.). These benefit costs per hour are in turn expressed 
as a percent of total compensation per hour using data from the first column of 
Table A; the results are subsequently indexed to equal 100 in 1951.
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Notes
1. The ECI was only implemented in stages. Beginning in 1976, published statistics 
covered only quarterly changes in wages and salaries of private, nonfarm workers. 
In 1978, the BLS expanded the survey to include 13 additional statistical series 
(e.g., union/nonunion, manufactunng/nonmanufactunng); by 1980, it had incor 
porated into the survey the publication of quarterly changes in total employee 
compensation. What the BLS Handbook of Methods (Chapter 8, p. 56) terms the 
third stage in the development of the ECI involved the expansion of the survey to 
state and local (not federal) government employees Finally, the most recent 
development in the ECI involves the inclusion of actual compensation costs on a 
per hour basis; the BLS has included these measures in the ECI since March of 
1987.
2. These benefits include paid leave (vacations, holidays, sick leave, and other), sup 
plemental pay (premium pay for overtime and for work on weekends and holi 
days, nonproduction bonuses), insurance benefits (life, health, sickness and 
accident insurance), retirement and savings benefits (pension and other retirement 
plans, savings and thrift plans), legally required benefits (Social Secunty, Work 
ers' Compensation, Unemployment Insurance, and other), and other benefits (sev 
erance pay, supplemental unemployment plans, and employee merchandise 
discounts in department stores).
3. In other words, average benefits received per hour equal the ratio of average 
annual benefits to average hours for which the employee is paid per year.
4. All entries after 1979 are computed from Table 7 of the Employee Benefits publi 
cation (Chamber of Commerce of the United States, various years) for the corre 
sponding year; all pre-1980 entries are computed from Table 7 of Employee 
Benefits Historical Data, 1951-1979 (Chamber of Commerce of the United States 
1981).
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Appendix B
Derivation of Market Labor Demand Function
Assume that F and C are both quadratic as follows:
F(n) = 1/2 Fnn2 + 6
C(G,ri) = 1/2 Q {G2 + Cl2Gn +
We first show that the individual labor demand functions have the following 
form:
where
A = /?Fn -2(C12G + <|>2 ),
To prove the above, note that we have the following expressions:
l
3C > 
C2 = -r— = C12G + §2 = 0. 
on <
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Now, the firm's labor demand function given by Eq. 4a* is expanded so that
= \pFn - [l/2 Q jG2 + CuGn + (j
= [PFn - (l/2 C, !G2 + <hG + <|)o) - 2(C12G + 4>2 )n
As a result,
n = i ("~ Q) (B2)
is the firm's new labor demand function. Note that
so that the right hand side of Eq. B2 is a function of w, parameterized by G and
P-
Next, we show that if all K firms are identical and if the price feedback is
given by p = p(E), pf < 0, , where E = Kn, then the inverse market labor 
demand function has the form
w = T(G) + P(G)E + e(G, E), (B3) 
where
T(G) = [const. - 1/2 q tG2 - (j)^], (B4)
l ], (B5) 
and e(G,£) is an error term.
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To prove the above, note that since p=p(E) is a function off, the right-hand 
side of Eq. B2 contains the term E. This implies that the market labor demand 
function cannot be obtained by simply multiplying Eq. B2 by K. Instead, one 
must first gather all the E terms on the left-hand side as follows:
Multiplying Eq. B2 by K, we have
= — (w-Q).
As such,
Substituting Fn = Fnn + Q ,, and p(E) = p0 +p'E+ . . . into the above ex 
pression, we obtain
w = const. —
where e(G,£) is an error term containing all higher order terms of £. Letting 
T(G) = a0 + a(G),we have fl(G) = (co«5?. - 1/2 CUG2 - <J>iG). Thus
CB6)
2C12 (B7)
/<:
d 2Note that Eq. B3 is approximated by Eq. 5 as w = a - (TjG + pG ) + p(G)£.
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Appendix C
This appendix describes the logic behind Figure 7. Let us first prove the 
proposition that the competitive equilibrium occurs at the maximum feasible 
level of employment on the L curve only when d$/dG = 0. By solving Eq. 9a 
for E and computing dEldG = 0 to select the maximum employment point, we 
obtain
(t| + 2pG-X)-£(</P/dG) = 0. (Cl)
Now, the competitive equilibrium point on the L curve is now obtained by com 
bining Equations 9a and 9b to obtain
(Tj + 2pG - X) - 0.5E(d$ I dG) = 0. (C2)
Clearly, Equations Cl and C2 are equivalent only when d$/dG = 0; therefore, 
the competitive equilibrium employment level is the maximum employment 
level only when d$/dG = 0.
We now demonstrate the locations of points A, B, and C in Figure 7. Rear 
ranging Eq. 9b, we obtain
(TJ + 2pG - X) = Q.5E(d$ I dG) = 0. (C3)
Assuming that fiPpYdG2 = 0, an increase in G increases the left-hand side of Eq. 
C3; as a result, the right-hand side must also increase. If dft/dG > 0, the right- 
hand side will increase only when E rises. This result implies that, in this case, 
we are at point B in Figure 7. Similarly, if d$/dG < 0, E must decrease when 
G increases; in this case, we must be at point C in Figure 7.

Part III
Labor Market Adjustment 
and Equity
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6 Family Health Benefits 
and Worker Turnover
Dan A. Black 
Syracuse University
One of the major differences between the labor markets in the 
United States and Canada lies in the treatment of health benefits. 
While Canada relies on government provision of health care, employ 
ers in the United States provide health insurance to most of the 
employed. The U.S. government's role is primarily to provide health 
insurance to those over 64 years of age through the Medicare system 
and to the poor through the Medicaid system. Despite the recent calls 
for health care reform in the United States, the reliance on employer- 
provided benefits appears to be a feature of the U.S. system for some 
time to come. The Clinton health care proposal of 1994 and the 
numerous Congressional alternatives rely on employer-provided health 
benefits.
In this chapter, I examine the impact of employer-provided health 
benefits on job turnover. I focus on a peculiar aspect of employer-pro 
vided health benefits: because many employer-provided plans extend 
coverage to a worker's entire family, the value of an employer's 
employment offer to a worker depends on whether the worker's spouse 
provides the family with health benefits. If a worker's spouse has 
employer-provided health insurance for his family, the worker will 
value employment offers with and without health insurance benefits 
differently than a worker whose spouse does not have employer-pro 
vided health benefits. Importantly, this distortion arises from the reli 
ance on employer-provided benefits and is independent of any 
preexisting conditions clauses or issues concerning the portability of 
health plans. As I show in a later section (p. 273), this is potentially a 
large distortion. According to the April 1993 Supplement of the Cur 
rent Population Survey (CPS), among full-time workers, at least 23
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percent of the women and 12 percent of the men have coverage from 
their spouses.
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
There is no obvious reason why employers should provide health 
benefits. While health insurance is less expensive in groups, there is no 
particular reason the groups should be based on place of employment. 
Indeed, the initial growth in employer-provided health was the result of 
firms offering health insurance to their workers during World War II to 
avoid wage controls. As Long and Scott (1982) and Woodbury (1983) 
emphasized, the U.S. tax codes provide the major impetus for the 
employer provision of health and other benefits. The magnitudes of 
the tax savings are surprising. Consider a university in the Common 
wealth of Kentucky that offers an insurance policy whose market value 
is $131 a month to a college professor who has a 28 percent marginal 
tax rate for the federal income tax (family income between $36,900 
and $89,150 for married couples filing jointly). How much would it 
cost to increase the professor's after-tax income by $131 per month in 
1993? Assuming the professor's wages are not over the social security 
cap of $57,600 and taking into account Kentucky's 6 percent state 
income tax and the deductibility of state income taxes from the federal 
tax bill, the university would have to pay more than $250 a month.
As a result of the substantial tax savings associated with the 
exemption of health benefits from federal and state taxation, employers 
have become the major providers of health benefits in the United 
States. The tax expenditures for the tax deductibility of employer 
health care premiums now exceed tax expenditures on the home mort 
gage deduction. 1
Economists have long recognized that the association of fringe 
benefits and employment may affect the employment relationship. 
Lazear (1979, 1981) argued that firms use defined-benefit pensions to 
defer compensation in jobs with agency problems or in jobs with large 
investments in specific human capital. In jobs with agency problems, 
the deferred compensation deters the worker from shirking; while, in 
jobs with specific human capital, the deferred compensation reduces
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job turnover.2 Thus, employers in the United States may use their pen 
sion plans to improve the efficiency of labor contracts, an option that 
many Canadian employers do not have. Lazear and the literature that 
his papers generate (e.g., Ippolito 1985; Hutchens 1987; Dorsey 1987) 
recognized that deferred compensation is not without its costs and may 
have to be implemented with other policies such as restrictions on 
hours and mandatory retirement to mitigate those costs. 3
Firms are not, however, perfectly able to tailor the parameters of 
their pension plans to meet contracting needs of individual employees. 
As Scott, Berger, and Black (1989) and Scott, Berger, and Garen 
(1995) emphasized, the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) requires 
firms to offer fringe benefits in a manner that does not discriminate 
against the firm's low-wage employees. If the firm wishes to offer an 
executive a defined-benefit pension plan that defers compensation, the 
firm must offer her secretary a similar plan. Thus, firms are not able to 
structure fringe benefit packages to match perfectly the optimal con 
tract for each employee.
The requirement that fringe benefits be offered in a nondiscrimina- 
tory manner has a special bite in the provision of health benefits. 4 
While firms may tie pension benefits to the earnings of the worker, the 
firm must offer all full-time workers the same health benefits, which 
has the predictable consequence that high-wage firms will avoid hiring 
low-wage workers (Scott, Berger, and Black 1989). Madrian (1994) 
identified another possible distortion that employer-provided health 
benefits create: the possibility that workers will be locked into their 
jobs because they or family members have preexisting conditions and 
would lose their medical coverage if they changed employers. Using 
the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey, she estimated that job 
lock reduces voluntary job turnover by 25 percent as compared with a 
system of perfectly portable health insurance. Madrian's results are 
controversial. Holtz-Eakin (1994) found no evidence of job lock. 5 If 
her results are correct, however, Madrian has identified a potentially 
important distortion in the U.S. labor market that employer-provided 
health insurance creates. Obviously, labor markets in Canada, with its 
perfectly portable health insurance, are free from such distortions.
Madrian argued that job lock arises from coverage gaps that preex 
isting conditions clauses and length-of-service provisions create. If a 
worker must wait, say, six months before being covered by a new
268 Black
employer's plan, then the worker may choose not to switch employers. 
Because this coverage gap is unrelated to the efficient allocation of 
labor, such a reduction in mobility is inefficient. She suggested that 
eliminating preexisting condition clauses and increasing the portability 
of health insurance would largely eliminate the inefficient reduction in 
job turnover. In the next section, I offer a theoretical model that chal 
lenges this suggestion. I show that when dual-earning couples con 
sider employment offers, the value placed on a job offer will depend on 
the coverage of the spouse's health plan. As I demonstrate in the next 
section, this difference in valuation may explain the turnover pattern 
that Madrian uncovered.
JOB SEARCH WITH THE POTENTIAL FOR DOUBLE 
COVERAGE OF HEALTH BENEFITS
In this section, I construct a simple model to examine the impact of 
the double coverage of health benefits on labor turnover. To abstract 
from other issues, I will assume that there are no preexisting conditions 
provisions and no length-of-service provisions. If a worker finds 
employment at an alternative employer who is offering health insur 
ance, the coverage begins immediately.
To begin, first consider a worker who has no spouse. The worker is 
currently employed at a firm paying wage w0 and a health plan indexed 
by the value h0. I assume that all health plans may be indexed by a sin 
gle value, h, and that workers always strictly prefer plans with a greater 
h. Workers without health coverage have a plan with the value of h0 = 
0. Let the worker have a utility function u(») that depends on the level 
of wages, WQ, and the level of health benefits, /i0 , or
V°= W(w0 ,^). (1)
The value of current employment, V°, forms the reservation utility for 
all subsequent employment offers. The worker has worked for the cur 
rent employer for one period and will work, at most, one additional 
period for the employer. In Figure 1,1 depict an indifference curve for
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Figure 1 Indifference Curve for Worker's Utility Function
W
h
the worker's utility function as a convex function. If firms could indi 
vidually tailor their fringe benefit packages to the needs of a worker, 
the worker would simply pick the amount of health benefits he desires. 
If the worker had adequate coverage from another source, he could 
simply elect to take all compensation as wages. Unfortunately, IRS 
regulations preclude such a design.
Before beginning employment in the second period, the worker 
entertains employment offers from other employers, which I assume 
are exogenously determined. The worker's utility in the second-period 
is
V = max[«(wfl ,/ifl ),V0 ]. (2)
where u(wa,ha) is the utility associated with the best alternative offer. 
In Eq. 2, the set of acceptable offers is simply all combinations of (w,/z)
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that are above the indifference curve V° depicted in Figure 1. The 
probability that a worker leaves his current employer, therefore, 
depends on the joint distribution of wages and health benefits offered.
Now consider a worker with a spouse. Let hs denote the value of 
the worker's coverage under his spouse's health plan. If the worker has 
no such coverage, then hs = 0. The worker's utility from employment 
in the first period is
V°=M[w0 ,max(/?0 ,/iJ )]. (3)
Again, before beginning employment in the second period, the 
worker entertains offers from alternative employers. The utility from 
second-period employment is
(4)
The value of the right-hand sides of Eq. 3 and Eq. 4 depends on the 
value of hs. Spouse-provided health care benefits, therefore, alter the 
value of current employment and thus alter the value of alternative 
offers.
Figure 2 illustrates how the coverage by a spouse's plan affects the 
worker's job mobility decision. In Figure 2A, I consider the case 
where hs < hQ , or the worker's own plan is more generous than his 
spouse's plan. The indifference curve V° denotes a worker's indiffer 
ence curve if hs = 0, with the point (w0, /z0) denoting the worker's cur 
rent contract. From Eq. 3, spouse-provided coverage (h0 > hs > 0) 
clearly does not alter the value of current employment, but it may 
affect the value of alternative offers. To see why, consider the point 
(WP/ZJ), where ws is implicitly defined as
V° = u(ws ,hs ). (5)
The wage ws leaves the worker indifferent to his current position and 
the job offering ws and consuming his spouse's health insurance. Any 
job that pays a wage greater than ws will be strictly preferred to his cur 
rent position. Thus, the area under the indifference curve V° and above
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Figure 2 Indifference Curves for Worker's Utility Function When 
(A) Worker's Own Benefits are More Generous (hs < HQ) 
and (B) Spouse's Benefits are More Generous (hs
Panel A
Panel B
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the wage ws, denoted as A in Figure 2A, becomes a part of the set of 
acceptable offers. For workers with spouse-provided coverage, there 
fore, the likelihood of turnover unambiguously increases whenever hs < 
h0 . Unlike the analysis of Madrian, this result does not depend on the 
lack of portability of benefits but is the direct result of the increase in 
the acceptable offer set that double coverage provides.
In Figure 2B, I consider the case in which hs > h0 , where the 
spouse's benefits are more generous than the worker's own. Again, 
the indifference curve V° corresponds to the worker without coverage 
by his spouse's benefits, or hs = 0. When a worker's spouse provides 
access to more generous benefits, the worker's utility increases. The 
indifference curve V 0 ', depicts the worker's indifference curve when 
hs > h0 . In comparing the values of current employment of workers 
with and without spouse-provided coverage, there are two regions of 
interest. First, the area under the indifference curve V0 ' and above V°, 
denoted as region B, represents offers that would be acceptable to 
workers without spouse-provided coverage but that are not accept 
able to workers with spouse-provided coverage. Thus, one effect of 
spouse-provided coverage, when hs > hQ , is to reduce this portion of 
the acceptable offer set. The second region of interest, however, off 
sets this result. The region that lies above vv0 and below the indiffer 
ence curve V°, denoted as region C, represents an area of offers that 
are acceptable to the workers with spouse-provided coverage but are 
unacceptable to workers without spouse-provided coverage. As the 
worker does not use his own health benefits, any job that offers a 
wage greater than w0 is strictly preferred to his current situation, 
regardless of the level of health benefits associated with the job. For 
workers with hs > hQ , therefore, spouse-provided coverage has an 
ambiguous impact on turnover probabilities.
My analysis has abstracted from the search decision of the 
worker's spouse. When allowing for joint search decisions, the 
worker's valuation of his current job and alternative offers depends not 
only on his spouse's current position but also her best alternative offer. 
While the impact of the spouse-provided coverage on a worker's turn 
over probabilities is ambiguous, the impact on efficiency is unambigu 
ous—having a worker's valuation of an employment offer depend on 
his spouse's health insurance plan only limits the efficient allocation of 
labor.6
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Of course, my analysis has not considered the possible responses 
of firms. One obvious response to double coverage is to offer employ 
ees the ability to select other benefits or cash in the place of health care 
benefits. The Revenue Act of 1978 permitted establishment of such 
cafeteria plans. The economic rationale for offering such plans is obvi 
ous: by allowing employees who already have other sources of cover 
age to select from other benefits or cash payments, firms may reduce 
their turnover.
Another way in which firms may counter the problem of dual cov 
erage is to attempt to specialize in the hiring of workers of one type of 
coverage or another. For instance, a firm may seek to hire only work 
ers with access to alternative forms of health care coverage by offering 
jobs with higher wages and no health benefits. Another firm may seek 
to specialize in the hiring of workers who wish to provide coverage to 
their entire families by offering low wages but a generous health plan 
with family coverage. See Dye and Antle (1984) for a model of such a 
separating equilibrium applied to fringe benefits.
COVERAGE, DOUBLE COVERAGE, AND REFUSAL OF 
EMPLOYER-PROVIDED HEALTH BENEFITS
In this section, I present an overview of employer-provided health 
benefits from the April 1993 Supplement to the CPS. The supplement 
provides detailed information about employee benefits. I limit my 
sample to workers between the ages of 18 and 64 for all of the tables. 
In addition, I report most statistics for full-time workers, which I define 
to be those who usually work at least 35 hours a week and those who 
work at least 47 weeks a year. I demonstrate that neither the use of caf 
eteria plans nor sorting strategies on the part of firms have solved the 
problem of double coverage. I show that a significant portion of the 
population has double coverage, that a surprising number of people 
turn down coverage, and that among those who turn down coverage, 
most do so without explicit compensation.
Nearly 90 percent of the male workers and 90 percent of the 
female workers have health insurance from some source (Table 1). For 
female workers, 88.0 percent reported that they are at a firm that offers
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Table 1 Mean Coverage Rates for Employer-Provided Health Benefits for 
Full-Time Workers
Female Male
Benefit situation (%) (%)
Covered by some form of health insurance
Employed at firm that offers health insurance
Eligible for employer-provided health insurance
Covered by employer-provided health insurance
Refused employer-provided health insurance
Covered by spouse's health insurance
Sample size
90.7
88.0
83.7
72.5
11.2
22.0
6,987
89.6
88.5
85.0
79.5
5.6
10.7
9,023
SOURCE: April 1993 Supplement to the CPS.
health insurance to at least some workers at the firm, and 88.5 percent 
of males responded similarly. Firms can place some restrictions on 
who may qualify for insurance. Often times, temporary, part-time, or 
leased employees may not be eligible for health benefits. Also, many 
firms require length-of-service requirements a worker must complete 
before qualifying for health benefits. To see who is and is not eligible 
for health benefits, I identify workers as eligible for health benefits if 
they reported that their firm offers health insurance to some of its 
workers and either reported that they received those benefits or explic 
itly stated that they declined those benefits. Using this definition, 83.7 
percent of female workers and 85.0 percent of male workers reported 
that they are eligible for benefits.
Looking at the coverage rate of employer-provided health plans, 
79.5 percent of all men but only 72.5 percent of women reported that 
they have employer-provided health benefits. Thus, gender differences 
in wages understate the true compensation difference. Nearly 8.2 per 
cent of women and 10.1 percent of men do not receive health insurance 
from their employers but do receive it from another source. The differ 
entials between the eligibility rates and the coverage rates suggest that 
many workers refuse health insurance coverage and, indeed, 11.2 per 
cent of all women and 5.6 percent of all men decline coverage from 
their employers. 7 Among full-time workers, 22.0 percent of all women
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and 10.7 percent of all men reported that they have health insurance 
under their spouse's plan. 8
The CPS Supplement also gives us an opportunity to examine 
another issue: the health insurance coverage of the self-employed. 
Folklore suggests that the spouses of the self-employed provide the 
health coverage for the family. I examine this issue in Table 2 by com 
paring the rate at which the spouses of the self-employed provide 
health insurance to their spouses as compared with the rate at which 
the spouses of wage and salary workers provided health insurance to 
their spouses. In Panel A we see no evidence supporting this folklore. 
The husbands' provision of health insurance to their wives is indepen 
dent of their wives' self-employment status, which is surprising. In 
contrast, in Panel B wives are more likely to provide self-employed 
husbands with health insurance than are wives of wage and salary 
workers. Women with self-employed spouses are 66 percent more 
likely to provide their husbands with health insurance than are women 
whose spouses are not self-employed.
Table 2 Spouse's Provision of Employer-Provided Health Benefits by 
Self-Employment Status
Spouse is not Spouse is 
Insurance provision self-employed self-employed n
Panel A: Husband's provision of health insurance to spouse 
by wife's self-employment status
Husband does not provide spouse 56.6% 56.3% 4006 
with employer-provided insurance
Husband provides spouse with 43.4% 43.7% 3077 
employer-provided insurance
n 6387 696 7083
Panel B: Wife's provision of health insurance to spouse 
by husband's self-employment status
Wife does not provide spouse 84.5% 74.0% 7297 
with employer-provided insurance
Wife does provides spouse with 15.5% 26.0% 1527 
employer-provided insurance
n 7314 1510 8824 
SOURCE: April 1993 Supplement to the CPS.
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The model presented in the previous section suggests that employ 
ees whose spouses also have employer-provided coverage may value 
job offers differently than employees whose spouses do not have such 
coverage. For dual coverage to have an important effect on labor-mar 
ket transitions, however, there must be a sizable portion of the working 
population that may have double coverage. To determine what fraction 
of dual-earning couples have dual health coverage, I matched hus 
bands' and wives' responses to the April Supplement for those house 
holds in which both members are full-time, full-year workers. In Table 
3, I present evidence about the possibility of double coverage. For 
males, 80.3 percent of the men from dual-earning households are eligi 
ble for health insurance from their employers, and their spouses are also 
eligible for family benefits. Thus, over 80 percent of these males could 
be covered by their wives' plans, and 38.5 percent of these men have 
wives who elect to provide family benefits. Similar stories arise for 
men whose employers offer family coverage: 80.6 percent of men who 
are eligible for family coverage have wives whose employers offer fam 
ily plans. Interestingly, 38.0 percent of men from dual-earning house 
holds who are eligible for family health plans have wives who provide 
family health plans, representing a sizable segment of the married, 
dual-earning families. Workers with spouses who have their own 
employer-provided health benefits may value family health benefits dif 
ferently than workers whose spouses do not have employer-provided 
health benefits: 84.9 percent of these male workers have spouses who 
are eligible for employer-provided health benefits, and 62.4 percent 
have spouses who receive employer-provided health benefits.
Table 3 presents similar statistics for full-time female employees: 
84.6 percent of women in dual-earning households who are offered 
health insurance have spouses who are eligible for family plans, and 
58.6 percent have spouses who provide family health benefits. Thus, 
women are more likely to have access to health benefits from multiple 
sources than are men. Of women who are eligible to provide family 
health benefits, 84.9 percent of their spouses are eligible for family 
health benefits, and 58.0 percent provide such benefits. Finally, of 
women in dual-earning households who are eligible for family health 
benefits, 87.7 percent are married to men who are eligible for health 
benefits, and 76.5 percent are married to men who have employer-pro 
vided benefits.
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Table 3 Dual Health Care Coverage of Married, Full-Time Couples3
Coverage Percentage n 
Husband's employer offers
Health benefits and spouse is eligible for family 80.3 2636 
health benefits
Health benefits and spouse provides family health benefits 38.5 2636
Family health benefits and spouse is eligible for family 80.6 2630 
health benefits
Family health benefits and spouse provides family 38.0 2630 
health benefits
Family health benefits and spouse is eligible for health 84.9 2650 
benefits
Family health benefits and spouse receives health benefits 62.4 2645 
Wife's employer offers
Health benefits and spouse is eligible for family 84.6 2650 
health benefits
Health benefits and spouse provides family health benefits 58.6 2222
Family health benefits and spouse is eligible for family 84.9 2085 
health benefits
Family health benefits and spouse provides family 
health benefits
Family health benefits and spouse is eligible for health 
benefits
Family health benefits and spouse receives health benefits
58.0
87.7
76.5
2085
2636
2636
SOURCE- April 1993 Supplement to the CPS.
a To be included in this sample, workers must be working full-time and eligible for
employer-provided health benefits. Spouses may or may not be eligible for health
benefits but must be full-time workers.
When employers only partially pay for health benefits, employees 
have an incentive not to accept health benefits when they receive cover 
age from their spouses' plans. The refusal of health benefits is not 
uncommon; 11.2 percent of all female workers and 5.6 percent of all 
male workers decline employer-provided health benefits (see Table 1). 
In Table 4,1 examine the incidence of workers from dual-earning 
households refusing employer-provided health benefits by whether or 
not the workers' spouses are eligible for family health benefits. The
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table indicates that 3.1 percent of male workers whose spouses are not 
eligible for family health benefits refuse coverage, but 12.9 percent of 
workers whose spouses are eligible for family health benefits refuse 
coverage. Thus, male workers who have spouses who are eligible for 
family health coverage are more than four times more likely to refuse 
employer-provided health benefits than are men whose wives are not 
eligible for family health benefits. The impact for females is even 
more dramatic. Only 4.1 percent of women whose spouses are not eli 
gible for family health benefits refuse employer-provided benefits, but 
26.7 percent of women whose spouses are eligible for family health 
benefits refuse employer-provided benefits. Thus, women whose hus 
bands have access to family health benefits are six times more likely to 
refuse health benefits than women whose husbands do not have access 
to family health benefits.
Table 4 Full-Time, Married Couple's Refusal of Employer-Provided 
Health Benefits"
Decision
Spouse is not eligible 
for family 
health coverage
Spouse is eligible 
for family 
health coverage n
Panel A: Husband's decision to accept or refuse 
employer-provided health insurance
Husband accepts employer- 
provided insurance
Husband refuses employer- 
provided insurance
n
96.9 %
3.1%
451
87.1%
12.9%
1835
2035
251
2286
Panel B: Wife's decision to accept or refuse 
employer-provided health insurance
Wife accepts employer- 95.9% 73.3% 1707 
provided insurance
Wife refuses employer- 4.1% 26.7% 515 
provided insurance
n 343 1879 2222
SOURCE: April 1993 Supplement to the CPS.
a To be included in this sample, workers must be working full-time and eligible for
employer-provided health benefits. Spouses may or may not be eligible for health
benefits but must be full-time workers.
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When husband and wife search for employment and employers 
offer health insurance coverage for the whole family, my theory pre 
dicts that the husband's and wife's health care coverage decision 
should be negatively correlated. Thus, controlling for other factors that 
affect the demand for health insurance coverage, we should see the 
likelihood of a worker choosing employer-provided health insurance 
declining when his spouse has selected employer-provided health 
insurance. To test this hypothesis, I estimate a bivariate probit model 
that allows for correlation between the husband's and wife's decisions. 
I limit the sample to couples where both are full-time, full-year work 
ers. 9 For covariates, I use a vector of race dummies (whites are the 
excluded category), a vector of education variables (high school gradu 
ates are the excluded category), the number of children in the house 
hold less than 18 years old, a quadratic in the worker's age, a quadratic 
in the worker's tenure at the firm, and a dummy variable indicating that 
the worker's tenure is less than a year. The method of estimation is full 
information, maximum likelihood. The starting values were taken 
from probits on the individual equations, and the starting value for the 
correlation coefficient, p, is zero.
The estimated coefficients on the covariates provide few surprises 
(Table 5). Workers of both genders have strong tenure effects. It seems 
unlikely that length-of-service requirements would account for the 
strong tenure-health benefits relationship, so the strong relationship 
may simply reflect the fact that matches that offer health benefits tend 
to survive while those that do not offer health insurance do not survive, 
a point that Mortensen (1989) and Garen (1988) made in examining 
the wage-tenure relationship. Workers with at least a BA degree are 
more likely to have health insurance than less educated workers. A 
larger number of children reduces the likelihood of having employer- 
provided health insurance for women, while the relationship is not sta 
tistically significant for men. Interestingly, hispanic wives are more 
likely but hispanic husbands are less likely to have employer-provided 
health insurance than similar whites. Similarly, black wives are more 
likely to have employer-provided health insurance than are white 
wives.
Controlling for the worker's own characteristics, there is a strong, 
negative correlation between husbands' and wives' health care deci 
sions. The estimated correlation coefficient is -0.35 and the z-statistic
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Table 5 Health Insurance Coverage for Dual Earning Couples, 
Estimated Coefficients from a Bivariate Probit Model
Worker is Hispanic
Worker is Black
Worker is Asian
Worker is Native American
Worker's age
Age squared /1 00
Worker has less than one year of tenure
Worker's tenure
Tenure squared / 100
Number of children
Worker did not begin high school
Worker did not complete high school
Worker attended college but has no degree
Worker has a vocational degree from junior 
college
Worker has an associate's degree
Worker has a bachelor's degree
Worker has a master's degree
Female
0.273 
(2.06)
0.230 
(2.03)
-0.011 
(0.08)
0.716 
(1.52)
-0.028 
(1.27)
0.018 
(0.63)
-0.231 
(2.40)
0.090
(7.29)
-0.194 
(4.13)
-0.069
(2.54)
0.058 
(0.27)
0.067 
(056)
0.069 
(0.96)
0.038 
(0.34)
0.272 
(1.97)
0.289 
(3.84)
0.300 
(2.68)
Male
-0.289 
(2.29)
0.090 
(0.77)
0.246 
(1.32)
0.020 
(004)
0.019 
(0.84)
-0.031 
(1.13)
-0.271 
(2.69)
0.092 
(7.80)
-0.180
(4.75)
-0.025 
(0.82)
-0226 
(1.26)
-0.209 
(1.78)
0.137 
(1.68)
-0.067 
(0.56)
0.020 
(0.12)
0.154 
(1.87)
0.265 
(2.04)
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Worker has a Ph.D. degree
Worker has a professional degree
Constant
P
Female
0.161 
(0.39)
0.431 
(1.46)
0.681 
(170)
-0.350 
(9.03)
Male
0.623 
(2.31)
0.542 
(1.95)
0.001 
(0.00)
Likelihood function 
Number of observations
-2798.59 
2600
NOTE- Mean of the dependent variable for females 0.6465 and for males is 0.7727. 
Absolute values of z-statistics are given in parentheses.
is -9.03. Thus, the data overwhelmingly reject the hypothesis that the 
health care decisions of dual-earning couples are independent and 
accept the hypothesis, which my theory implies, that the decisions are 
negatively correlated. Husbands and wives appear to coordinate their 
search activities, presumably looking for other forms of compensation 
when their spouses provide health benefits. Thus, within households, 
there is some evidence that workers do indeed trade off health benefits 
for other forms of compensation.
DOES SPOUSE-PROVIDED HEALTH INSURANCE AFFECT 
TURNOVER PROBABILITIES?
The analysis earlier suggested that coverage under a spouse's 
health insurance plan alters the worker's likelihood of accepting an 
offer. If the spouse's plan is less generous than the worker's own 
health insurance plan, then coverage by the spouse unambiguously 
increases the likelihood that a worker will accept another offer. In 
equilibrium, therefore, we should see such workers more likely to 
change jobs than workers without spouse-provided coverage. When 
the spouse's plan is more generous than the worker's own plan, there is
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an ambiguity, but it remains possible that spouse-provided coverage 
would result in higher turnover rates.
Unfortunately, the CPS is a less than ideal data set to use to exam 
ine job transitions. Because the CPS is a short panel and provides few 
details about a worker's employers, it is often impossible to spot job- 
to-job transitions. In the April 1993 Supplement, however, workers 
were asked directly if they have less than one-year tenure, and answers 
to this question allow me to identify those individuals who have 
changed jobs in the last year. It is not possible, however, to determine 
whether the transition was a result of a quit, layoff, or dismissal.
The CPS provides only workers' current health insurance and not 
their coverage at the time of their job transitions, which causes a poten 
tially serious problem. If workers who have recently had an involun 
tary job transition (layoff or dismissal) are likely to enroll in their 
spouses' health care plans, then there is a correlation between current 
health care coverage under a spouse's plan and turnover that is unre 
lated to any search story. In addition, the CPS provides no information 
about the generosity of workers', or their spouses', health care plans. 
As the generosity of the two plans affects the likelihood of turnover in 
my model, this data limitation is particularly serious. Finally, the CPS 
provides no information about tenure on the previous job. As virtually 
all research has found that hazard functions for employment spells 
exhibit duration dependence (e.g., Farber 1994), the failure to include 
tenure in a turnover equation may cause a specification bias. 10
With these caveats in mind, I can examine the relationship between 
job transitions and health insurance coverage provided by a worker's 
spouse with the equation:
Pi(job change) = F(Xfi + Sfi + ut ). (6)
where Xt is a vector of controls, (3 is the corresponding vector of 
parameters, Sl is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the worker 
is covered by his spouse's plan and zero otherwise, 8 is the correspond 
ing parameter, u, is the error term that I assume is identically and inde 
pendently distributed, and F(«) is a logistic distribution function.
Because males and females may have much different patterns of 
turnover, I run separate equations for male and female workers. In addi-
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tion to controls for whether the spouse is employed or self-employed, I 
use the same control variables as those I use in Table 5 except, of course, 
I use no controls for tenure. In column 1 of Tables 6 and 7,1 present the 
estimates for Eq. 6 for male and female workers. I limit my sample to 
workers who are married, full-time, full-year workers who have at least 
two years of potential experience, where potential experience is defined 
to be age minus years of schooling minus six. This restriction should 
exclude most school-to-work transitions, which presumably occur 
regardless of the spouse's provision of health benefits. 11
A common feature of the results from both samples is that having 
an employed spouse substantially reduces the likelihood of workers 
changing jobs. (This result remains regardless of whether I control for 
coverage by the spouse's health insurance plan.) Spouse-provided 
coverage has a large impact on the likelihood of turnover for male 
workers; evaluated at the mean, spouse-provided coverage increases 
the likelihood of a male worker changing jobs from about 0.10 to 
0.16. 12 For females, the impact is smaller but still large; evaluated at 
the mean, spouse-provided coverage increases the likelihood of a 
female worker changing jobs from about 0.10 to 0.14.
My estimates for males are somewhat higher than those of 
Madrian (1994), who found that not having other health insurance cov 
erage lowered male job transitions by about 26 percent. 13 Importantly, 
Madrian was able to control for whether the job transition was volun 
tary, and I am unable to do so. 14 To guard against the possibility that 
spouse-provided coverage is somehow indicative of an involuntary 
transition from the last job, I reestimate the equation, limiting my sam 
ple to those workers who report that they are eligible for employer-pro 
vided health insurance (see column 2 of Tables 6 and 7). For this 
sample, workers who made job transitions at least have the option of 
taking their employer-provided plan. While clearly this does not pre 
clude a worker from having been laid-off or dismissed from his past 
position, this does eliminate any workers who have spouse-provided 
benefits because they have no alternative source of health care. With 
this sample restriction, the coefficients on the spouse-provided cover 
age are reasonably stable. Evaluated at the means, spouse-provided 
coverage increases the likelihood of a male worker changing jobs from 
0.07 to 0.11 and the likelihood of a female worker changing jobs from 
0.07to0.12. 15
Table 6 Turnover Propensities and Health Insurance Coverage Status, Married Males
Worker is Hispanic
Worker is Black
Worker is Asian
Worker is Native American
Worker' sage
Age squared /1 00
Worker did not begin high school
Worker did not complete high school
Worker attended college but has no degree
Worker has a vocational degree from junior college
Means
0.066
0.054
0.028
0.006
40.9
1772
0.034
0.069
0.187
0.052
All workers 
(1)
0.336
(2.03)
0.417
(2.38)
0.178
(0.68)
-0.089
(0.16)
-0157
(4.52)
0.123
(2.86)
0.162
(0.62)
0.382
(2.29)
0.150
(1.18)
0.119
(0.59)
Means
0.051
0.051
0.027
0.005
413
1804
0.026
0.057
0.0188
0.053
Workers eligible for 
health insurance
(2)
0.407
(1.83)
0527
(2.48)
0.361
(1.23)
-1.045
(1.01)
-0.125
(2.83)
0.089
(1.63)
0.037
(0.09)
0286
(1.21)
0.156
(0.97)
0222
(0.90)
Worker has an associate's degree
Worker has a bachelor's degree
Worker has a master's degree
Worker has a Ph.D. degree
Worker has a professional degree
Number of children
Spouse is employed
Spouse is self-employed
Worker is covered by spouse's plan
Worker is covered by other plan
Constant
Likelihood function
Number of observations
0.0300
0.186
0.075
0.017
0.018
1.152
0.629
0.045
0.149
0.070
-
0.082
(0.30)
0.088
(0.67)
0.192
(1.00)
-0.104
(0.24)
0065
(019)
-0047
(112)
-0.487
(5.68)
-0.177
(0.77)
0.762
(6.28)
1.045
(7.33)
1.818
(283)
-1839.97
6235
0.031
0.198
0.082
0.020
0.019
1.152
0.635
0.046
0.129
0.051
-
0.506
(1.76)
0.202
(1.28)
0.492
(2.35)
0.199
(0.45)
0.540
(1.52)
-0.062
(1.18)
-0.430
(3.44)
-0.023
(009)
0.697
(4.58)
1.095
(5.63)
0.775
(0.93)
-1304.81
5457
NOTE: Mean of the dependent variable for column (1) is 0.096 and for column (2) is 0.069. Absolute values of z-statistics are given in 
parentheses.
Table 7 Turnover Propensities and Health Insurance Coverage Status, Married Females
Worker is Hispanic
Worker is Black
Worker is Asian
Worker is Native American
Worker's age
Age squared /1 00
Worker did not begin high school
Worker did not complete high school
Worker attended college but has no degree
Worker has a vocational degree from junior college
Means
0.055
0.065
0.032
0.008
39.4
1652
0.021
0.054
0.194
0.054
All workers 
(1)
-0234 
(0.89)
-0.329
(1.31)
0.248
(0.85)
0.366
(0.72)
-0.029 
(0.58)
-0.041 
(0.63)
-0.172 
(0.58)
0.688 
(3.25)
-0.302 
(1.85)
-0.190 
(0.75)
Means
0.048
0.065
0.031
0.007
39.5
1656
0.015
0.046
0.197
0.057
Workers eligible for 
health insurance
(2)
-0.029 
(0.09)
-0.563
(1.66)
-0.135
(0.33)
-0.043
(0.06)
-0.044 
(0.70)
-0.033 
(0.39)
-0.091 
(0.12)
0.567 
(1.87)
0.008 
(0.04)
0.120 
(0.41)
Worker has an associate's degree
Worker has a bachelor's degree
Worker has a master's degree
Worker has a Ph.D. degree
Worker has a professional degree
Number of children
Spouse is employed
Worker is covered by spouse's plan
Worker is covered by other plan
Constant
Likelihood function
Number of observations
0039
0.174
0.066
0.006
0.009
0.885
0.980
0365
0058
_
0.122
(0.46)
-0.062
(0.40)
-0.194
(0.74)
0.422
(0.67)
-1.277
(1.25)
0.014
(0.25)
-0.834
(2.75)
0.527
(4.55)
0.471
(1.98)
0049
(0.05)
-1179.74
3940
0.038
0.184
0.072
0.008
0.009
0.866
0.983
0.339
0.040
0.346
(1.08)
0.179
(0.94)
0.187
(0.63)
0.929
(1-45)
-0.693
(0.67)
0.002
(0.03)
-0.284
(0.63)
0.693
(4.92)
0.792
(2.42)
-0.547
(1.18)
-820.36
3320
NOTE: Mean of the dependent variable for column (1) is 0.097 and for column (2) is 0.074. Absolute values of z-statistics are given in 
parentheses.
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Thus, the CPS data seem to support the conclusion that spouse- 
provided coverage does encourage job transitions, and the results are 
largely consistent with those of Madrian (1994) for workers with dual 
coverage. Her interpretation, however, is that workers without dual 
coverage are possibly "locked-out" of jobs that offer insurance with 
preexisting conditions clauses or length-of-service requirements. 
Health care reform that eliminates preexisting conditions clauses and 
length-of-service requirements and requires employers to offer health 
insurance would virtually eliminate job-lock. Unless the employer 
mandate also eliminates variations in the type of employer-provided 
coverage, my analysis suggests that the turnover that spouse-provided 
coverage creates is likely to persist. Ideally, therefore, we would like 
to be able to distinguish my search explanation from her job-lock 
explanation and be able to decompose the turnover effect into a search 
component and a job-lock component.
That is likely to prove a difficult task. Gruber and Madrian (1994) 
and Holtz-Eakin (1994) contended that most job-lock appears to be a 
short-run problem, presumably arising more from the length-of-service 
requirements than from preexisting conditions. 16 Individuals without a 
preexisting condition, however, have the option of purchasing insur 
ance from the private market, or, as Gruber and Madrian emphasized, 
some workers may purchase health care from their previous employers 
to bridge the gap in coverage that length-of-service provisions create. 
This solution to a coverage gap is expensive: the worker loses the tax 
exemption of health care insurance premiums, and, if purchasing 
health insurance from the private market, individual policies are often 
more expensive. Yet for these workers, a solution does exist, and a suf 
ficiently generous offer will induce the worker to change jobs. 
Because this solution is expensive and because workers with spouse- 
provided coverage avoid these costs, workers differ in their valuation 
of offers from alternative employers, which, of course, is the essence of 
my search explanation for the turnover effect from spouse-provided 
coverage. In my view, distinguishing between these two explanations 
would be difficult.
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POLICY IMPLICATIONS
My results support the findings of Madrian (1994) and Gruber and 
Madrian (1994) that employer-provided health insurance does affect 
the turnover propensities of workers. Indeed, the magnitude of my 
results for male workers is somewhat larger than Madrian's estimate, 
and I find that female workers are similarly affected. While I have 
offered no formal welfare analysis of this effect, it is difficult to believe 
that a policy that makes a worker's turnover propensity dependent on 
the health care policy of his spouse would improve the efficiency of 
labor markets.
Why have employer-provided health insurance? Friedman (1993) 
argued that many firms initially offered health care as a fringe benefit, 
as a means of avoiding the wage-price controls of World War II. As the 
IRS did not initially count fringe benefits as a part of taxable income, 
the tax system encouraged firms to offer health care, and Congress 
eventually codified the tax exemption. As health benefits are income 
elastic (Woodbury and Huang 1991), the tax exemption favors those 
with high earnings. Therefore, equity concerns suggest that a change 
is in order as well. When efficiency and equity concerns agree, one 
hopes that economists would find the course of action uncontroversial.
The political appeal of continuing the employer-provision of 
health benefits or the expansion of the system through mandates seems 
to arise because the costs remain hidden from consumers. Gruber 
(1994) and Gruber and Krueger (1992) suggested that most, if not all, 
costs of mandated benefits are passed through to the workers as lower 
wages, but if the mandated program is sufficiently small, these wage 
pass-throughs may be difficult for workers to perceive. Moreover, the 
tax expenditure that arises from the exemption of employer-provided 
health insurance is not readily apparent. Those of us who are benefi 
ciaries of the tax expenditure probably do not appreciate the largesse of 
the U.S. government, at least not until the exemption is threatened.
Unfortunately, any elimination of the tax subsidy of health insur 
ance benefits would not be invisible. Consider a reform along the lines 
that Diamond (1992) suggested, but one without any tax subsidy for 
middle-class families. In such a plan, employer-provided health insur 
ance is replaced with a system of mandatory coverage where, at least
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for most middle class households, consumers pay the full cost of their 
health insurance. Those workers who previously had employer-pro 
vided health insurance should receive a nice increase in compensation. 
Under Diamond's proposal, regional "HealthFeds" negotiate several 
different policies with insurance companies, and consumers within the 
region choose among the approved policies. When consumers begin 
looking at the prices of the various policies, however, they will notice 
that, even if firms increased their compensation by the exact cost of the 
previously provided health insurance, the increase in their compensa 
tion is not enough to allow them to purchase an insurance plan of com 
parable quality to their employer-provided plan. Because the tax 
subsidy is eliminated, the income and substitution effects presumably 
would move most consumers to purchase less generous insurance 
plans. Woodbury and Huang's simulation results suggest that the full 
taxation of health benefits may result in up to a 15 percent decline in 
the amount of health insurance. They calculated these estimates for the 
1986 U.S. tax codes, and marginal tax rates have increased since then. 
Forcing consumers to understand fully the costs of health care may not 
be good politics but, in my view, it is good economics.
Notes
I thank Susan Black and Mike Clark for research assistance. Paul Anglin, Michael 
Baye, William Custer, Daniel Hamermesh, and seminar participants at the University 
of Kentucky provided useful comments. The National Institutes for Health provided 
research support.
1. Statistical Abstract of the United States 1993, Table 515. The tax expenditure on 
employer-provided pension plans is the largest single tax expenditure ($70.5 bil 
lion), followed by employer contributions to health insurance ($63.2 billion), and 
the mortgage interest deduction ($48.1 billion).
2. See Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1993) and Luzadis and Mitchell (1991) for 
recent evidence.
3. The U.S. government no longer allows firms to use mandatory retirement provi 
sions.
4. Hutchens (1986) presented evidence that pensions, when coupled with the nondis- 
criminatory provision of the IRS codes, causes firms not to hire older workers. 
Scott, Berger, and Garen (1995) argued that health benefits may dissuade firms 
from hiring older workers as well.
5. Monheit and Cooper (1994), who also used the National Medical Expenditure 
Survey, found evidence of job lock using a much different methodology than
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Madrian. Using SIPP data, Gruber and Madrian (1994) found evidence that the 
1985 COBRA legislation that allows workers to buy insurance from past employ 
ers as well as earlier state legislation that also allowed limited portability 
increased labor turnover and substantially mitigated job lock.
6. My analysis ignores many other issues that concern most search models. To name 
but a couple, I have not considered the distinction between unemployed and on- 
the-job search, nor have I considered the intensity at which workers attempt to 
generate new offers. Given the underlying ambiguity about the impact of double 
coverage on the workers' turnover decisions, these extensions would not appear 
too useful. Perhaps more important, for simplicity, I do not consider the joint 
search problem of a wife and husband. In a model with such a joint search deci 
sion, a worker may refuse a job with a higher wage and more health benefits if it 
will allow his spouse to take a sufficiently attractive offer.
7. Not all workers decline extra coverage: 12.1 percent of all women and 8.7 percent 
of all men in the sample of full-time workers reported that they have coverage 
from at least two sources.
8. This estimate of 10.7 percent differs considerably from Madrian's estimate of 
33.5 percent using the National Medical Expenditure Survey, although it is condi 
tional on being married. Of course, our two samples differ considerably because I 
am requiring males to be full-time, full-year workers to be in the sample. As a 
consistency check on the data, I matched the husbands and wives in the April Sup 
plement. Among married males, 15.1 percent reported that their spouses' plans 
cover them; 30.8 percent of spouses of these men, however, reported that they 
chose a family health insurance plan, which is clearly closer to Madrian's estimate 
of 33.5. It is important to keep in mind, however, that offering a family plan does 
not imply that this coverage is free. Employers may charge the employee some or 
all of the additional costs for obtaining family coverage.
9. Olson (2000) looked at the labor-supply decision and how it may be affected by 
the spouse's health insurance coverage.
10. The CPS is not the only data set that suffers from these limitations. To my knowl 
edge, no data set with good labor-market information provides detailed analysis 
of health insurance benefits. As Madrian (1994) notes, the National Medical 
Expenditure data lack measures of worker tenure; workers' insurance coverage 
can only be determined at two points in time, 7 to 15 months apart, and not at the 
time of job transition. As she notes, there are similar problems with the use of the 
PSID and NLSY. I am currently working with my colleagues Mark Berger and 
Frank Scott to use the SIPP data set to examine the impact of insurance coverage 
on worker turnover. While the SIPP does contain continuous information on 
health insurance coverage, it does not contain information about the generosity of 
workers' health care plans nor of their spouses' plans.
11. I am grateful to Daniel Hamermesh for this suggestion.
12. Recall that, in logit models, the change in the probability of the dependent vari 
able equals one for a change in they'th independent variable is, for the ith worker,
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13. In her specification, Madrian included health care coverage from any source, not 
simply spouse-provided coverage. As sources of coverage other than the worker's 
spouse include Medicaid and Champus, I was afraid that these individuals may be 
different from the population as a whole. For this reason, I use dual coverage aris 
ing from some source other than a spouse as a separate variable.
14. It is by no means obvious that we should exclude involuntary transitions. If 
spouse provision of employer-provided allows workers to accept jobs in riskier 
occupation, higher involuntary turnover rates may be an outcome of spouse-pro 
vided health benefits.
15. These results are robust to various other specification checks. For the male por 
tion of the sample, I divided the sample into age categories and reestimated the 
equations for each category. Despite the relatively small cell size, the coefficients 
on spouse-provided coverage are always positive and generally statistically signif 
icant. Similarly, if I include a family income variable, undoubtedly endogenous, 
the coefficient remains statistically significant and of similar magnitude to that 
reported in Table 4. Moreover, if I included nonmarried workers, the coefficient 
remains statistically significant.
16. Among full-time employees who have changed jobs within the last year and have 
jobs with firms that offer health insurance, 14 percent report that they are ineligi 
ble for coverage because they have not completed a "probationary period," which 
I interpret as a length-of-service requirement. In contrast, 0.7 percent claim to be 
ineligible because of a preexisting condition, and another 3.0 percent report that 
they have a preexisting condition not covered by their health care plan.
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7 Part-Time Work, Health
Insurance Coverage, and the
Wages of Married Women
Craig A. Olson 
University of Wisconsin-Madison
One of the most significant and persistent differences between the 
behavior of men and women in the U.S. labor market is the greater 
variability in hours worked per week by women. In 1991, the median 
number of weekly hours worked by women in the labor force who 
were 18-60 years old was 40 hours, with substantial variation around 
this median. The first decile of the hours distribution for working 
women was 20 hours per week and the first quartile was 32 hours. This 
distribution has remained basically unchanged since at least 1979.'
The dominant factor thought to account for the greater variability 
in hours worked among women is gender specialization in household 
production activities, with women choosing to adjust the intensity of 
their labor-market activities in response to the demands placed on their 
time by other household members. In a simple labor-supply model, 
womens' wages are taken as exogenous to their labor-supply decisions, 
and women select hours of work based on other household income and 
the relative value of their market and household time. Thus, as the 
value of household time changes relative to market activity, the simple 
theory predicts that adjustments will be made in hours worked. How 
ever, research in recent years suggests that adjusting hours worked in 
response to changing labor-supply preferences is costly for women 
because of employer constraints on hours worked and incomplete 
information about the wage-hour combinations available in the market 
(e.g., Blank 1988; Altonji and Paxson 1988, 1991; Dickens and Lund- 
berg 1993). These constraints call into question the assumption that 
the wage rate is exogenous to the labor-supply decision.
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This chapter investigates a different demand-side constraint that 
may influence the labor-supply decisions of married women and that 
has not been previously investigated. I investigate how the correlation 
between hours worked per week and the structure of the compensation 
package offered by employers alters the labor-supply decisions of mar 
ried women in the United States. This study focuses on employer-pro 
vided health insurance and investigates how the demand for health 
insurance by married women alters their labor-supply decisions. 2 I 
hypothesize the demand by a married woman for a job with health ben 
efits is greater among those wives whose husbands do not have 
employer-provided health insurance as compared with households 
where husbands have jobs that provide health benefits. Because health 
insurance is typically not available to employees working less than 35 
hours per week, married women without spousal health insurance cov 
erage adjust their labor-supply decisions to obtain health benefits. To 
test this prediction, I use data on weekly hours worked and employer- 
provided health insurance (EPHI) for 1982 and 1992 as reported in the 
1983 and 1993 March Current Population Survey (CPS).
The results in this paper show that in 1992, married women whose 
husbands lacked employer-provided health benefits worked more hours 
per week than wives in households where their spouses had health 
insurance. In contrast, the 1982 estimates show no effect of husbands 
health insurance coverage on the labor supply decisions of wives. The 
differing results for the two time periods is explained by the decline in 
employer provided health insurance among married males between 
1982 and 1992. In 1982 some wives seeking a job with employer pro 
vided health insurance because their husbands lacked these benefits 
would have worked full time even if their husband had a job with 
EPHI. However, the decline in EPHI coverage among married males 
over the 1982-1992 time period from 0.67 to 0.62 caused working 
wives in some households in 1992 to seek full-time jobs with health 
benefits. By 1992 this included some households where the wife 
would have preferred to work part time if her husband had a job that 
provided health benefits. Thus, the employer constraint that full-time 
work is required to obtain health benefits was not binding on married 
women in 1982 but became binding by 1992 because of the decline in 
married male health insurance coverage.
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Compensating wage theory predicts that women choosing to work 
full time to obtain health insurance receive a lower wage compared to 
what they could earn if they accepted a full-time job without health 
insurance. Using the husband's health insurance coverage as an instru 
ment that is correlated with his wife's health insurance coverage but 
assumed to be uncorrelated with his wife's wage. I find the predicted 
negative relationship between the hourly wage of wives working full 
time and their estimate suggests that married women working full time 
accept about a 10 percent wage reduction in exchange for employer- 
provided health benefits.
EMPLOYER-PROVIDED HEALTH INSURANCE: THEORY 
AND EVIDENCE
The application of standard compensating wage theory to fringe 
benefits predicts that workers differ in their demand for employer-pro 
vided benefits and sort themselves across firms so the mix between 
wages and fringe benefits matches their preferences. Holding human 
capital and other variables influencing wages constant, workers that 
receive more generous fringe benefits receive a lower wage than com 
parable workers that prefer fewer fringe benefits (Rosen 1986). The 
standard figure illustrating this prediction is shown in Figure 1, where 
workers maximize their utility subject to a budget constraint that is 
defined by the human capital and ability levels. Worker A prefers a 
compensation package without any fringe benefits and Worker B 
accepts a job that provides both wages (WB) and fringe benefits (FBB).
This standard story of the relationship between wages and fringe 
benefits is complicated in the case of employer-provided health bene 
fits because of the private information employees and potential 
employees have about their demand for health care. Private informa 
tion held by individuals about their demand for health care creates an 
adverse selection problem for the firm if all employees are charged the 
same price for health insurance through an identical wage adjustment. 
There are several ways firms may respond to this adverse selection. 
Firms could individually adjust worker wages ex post based on the pat 
tern of health expenditure claims observed as worker tenure increases. 3
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Figure 1 Wage-Fringe Benefit Trade-off
Wages
W(a)
W(b)
Worker A
FB(b)
Worker B
Fringe Benefits
Firms could also create rate classes based on expected health care costs 
(e.g., younger versus older workers) and adjust wages differently for 
workers in the different rate classes. 4 Although it is unclear which 
alternative firms will select, I hypothesize that most firms simply 
charge all employees the same price for health benefits in the form of 
lower wages and, like an insurance company, screen out less healthy 
workers and try to create a workforce with homogenous health 
demands that minimizes the subsidies from healthy to less healthy 
workers. This approach, of course, provides less healthy workers with 
a strong incentive to seek employment in firms that offer health insur 
ance so they can receive health benefits at a price that is less than their 
expected health care expenditures.
One strategy firms follow to screen out workers with high demand 
for health care is to limit health insurance coverage to full-time work 
ers. Such a policy reduces adverse selection in two ways. First, the 
ability to work full time may screen out workers with costly health care
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problems because these same health problems may preclude full-time 
employment. Second, limiting health insurance to only full-time 
workers ensures health care benefits are a small share of total compen 
sation. Health benefits are a relatively larger share of total compensa 
tion when they are provided to part-time workers, and this may cause 
some workers with very high demands for health insurance to work 
part time just for the health benefits.
Table 1 reports data from the health insurance questions in the 
1983 and 1993 March CPSs; the data show a strong positive relation 
ship between hours worked per week and health insurance coverage. 
The probability of having a job that provided health insurance 
increases modestly with hours worked up to 30 hours per week, 
increases substantially for those working 30-34 hours per week, and 
then increases very significantly at 35 or more hours per week (full- 
time employment).
Table 1 Employer Health Insurance Coverage by Hours Worked, 1982 
and 1992 (%)
Usual hours per week
1-10
11-20
21-30
30-34
>35
1982
9.8
17.4
27.7
47.6
73.1
1992
14.3
17.9
24.6
38.8
64.2
SOURCE: Author's tabulations from the March 1983 and 1993 CPS.
More direct evidence showing how employer policies prevent part- 
time workers from receiving health benefits is provided by the Fringe 
Benefit Supplement to the April 1993 CPS. This supplement included 
questions asking the reasons why respondents were not covered by 
employer-provided health benefits. Thirty-one percent of those work 
ing were not covered by employer-provided health benefits. Among 
those uncovered, 81 percent worked for an employer that did not pro 
vide health insurance to any of its employees and 19 percent were 
uncovered even though they worked for an employer that offered insur 
ance to some employees. Of the 19 percent uncovered, 11.17 percent 
(more than half) were ineligible because of their status as part-time
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employees. To summarize, the data suggest firms hiring part-time 
workers frequently do not offer health insurance to any employee or do 
not extend health insurance to the part-time workers in their workforce. 
I hypothesize this discrimination reflects firm efforts to minimize 
adverse selection by part-time workers who, for reasons unobserved by 
the firm, have a high demand for health insurance.
THE DEMAND FOR HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE 
AMONG MARRIED FEMALES
The prediction that married women adjust their labor-supply deci 
sions based on their husbands' health insurance coverage assumes the 
demand by wives for jobs with employer-provided health benefits is 
influenced by spousal coverage. In this section, I test this assumption 
and report estimates of the effect of husbands' health insurance cover 
age on the probability that wives have health insurance coverage 
through their employers. Table 2 shows the two by two table of own 
employer health coverage for working couples. The percentage of cou 
ples where neither individual had own employer health insurance 
increased slightly from 15.8 percent in 1982 to 17 percent in 1992. In 
1982, 31 percent of the sample included couples where both the hus 
band and wife were covered by their respective employers. By 1992, 
this percentage had dropped to 24.2 percent. Over the 10-year period,
Table 2 The Joint Distribution of Own Employer Health Insurance 
Coverage For Working Couples (%)a
_______Husband's coverage from own employer_______ 
Uncovered Covered
Wife's coverage
from own employer 1982 1992 1982 1992
Uncovered
Covered
15.77
(2,523)
16.62
(2,661)
17.03
(3,170)
20.79
(3,870)
36.70
(5,872)
30.80
(4,943)
38.0
(7,086)
24.21
(4,491)
'The top number is the cell percentage. The number in parentheses shows the cell 
sample sizes.
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there was also a slight increase in the share of couples where only the 
husband had coverage and a larger increase, from 16.6 to 20.8 percent, 
in the share of couples where only the wife had own employer cover 
age. This increase is consistent with data from other years (Olson 
1995) and suggests coverage through the wife's employer became a 
more important source of family coverage over the 10-year period.
One statistical model for describing the relationship between spou 
sal health insurance coverage is a binary probit model where the equa 
tion describing a wife's health insurance coverage from her own job 
includes her husband's coverage through his job as a covariate. Unfor 
tunately, the estimates from this single equation approach are likely to 
be biased because of the correlation between unobservables affecting 
the demand for health insurance coverage for both the husband and wife. 
To overcome this problem, I jointly estimate the husband's and wife's 
coverage and include the husband's coverage on his job in her health 
insurance equation. This model, a bivariate probit model with a struc 
tural shift (Heckman 1978), is described by the following equations:
$H +eH (1)
HI*W - Xw $w + aHIH + zw (2)
HI, = 1 if ///*, > 0, otherwise HI, = 0 where i = H or W (3)
) (4)
The subscripts in each equation refer to the husband (//) or wife 
(W), and HI*t is a latent variable indicating the propensity that a job 
provides health insurance. HI*, is a function of a set of observable 
exogenous factors and an unobserved, normally distributed error term. 
In this recursive model, a husband's health benefit status directly 
affects the probability that his wife has a job with health benefits, and 
a describes the causal effect of the husband's health benefits on the 
probability his wife has a job with health benefits. I hypothesize that 
a < 0. In other words, own employer coverage by the husband lowers 
the wife's demand for coverage through her job.
This model permits a nonzero correlation between the error terms 
in Eqs. 1 and 2 and is identified if there is at least one variable in Eq. 1
302 Olson
that is excluded from Eq. 2. This exclusion restriction is satisfied by 
assuming the characteristics of the husband (e.g., education, age, race) 
that affect the probability that he has health benefits on his job do not 
directly affect HI*W The Xl matrices include individual characteristics 
typically used in an earnings function: years of completed education, 
age, age2, age3 , three race and ethnic variables, the number of children 
in the household under the age of 6, the number of children aged 6-17 
years old, and three region dummies. The data for each year were con 
structed by creating separate data files from the 1983 and 1993 March 
CPSs for husbands and wives and merging these files using the house 
hold, family, and individual identification codes.
The results in Table 3 show health insurance coverage increases 
with age and level of education and is lower for minorities than for 
white workers. The coefficient on husband's health insurance coverage 
is in the expected negative direction in both 1982 and 1992, and the 
parameter estimates are virtually the same. The negative coefficients 
on husband's coverage imply that women married to husbands without 
health benefits were more likely to be working on jobs that provide 
health insurance than working wives whose husbands had health bene 
fits. In 1993, the predicted probability that an "average" working wife 
had a job with health benefits was 0.533 if the husband did not have 
health benefits and 0.302 if the husband had a job with health benefits. 5
Alternatives to the Bivariate Probit Model
The recursive structure of the bivariate model describes by Equa 
tions l~4 is a necessary assumption of the statistical model because of 
the cross-sectional data and the latent variable formulation of health 
insurance coverage. As Heckman (1978) showed, a simultaneous 
latent variable model where each individual's health insurance cover 
age casually affects the coverage of his or her spouse is logically 
inconsistent. However, there is another recursive model, alternative to 
Equations 1-4, which reverses the recursive structure and assumes a 
wife's coverage is exogenous and has a causal effect on the coverage of 
her husband. Such a model may be appropriate for some couples, and 
the model reported in Table 3 is obviously misspecified for these cou 
ples. Choosing between these two alternative recursive models is diffi 
cult. The best solution is to have sample information (e.g., longitudinal 
data) that could be used to identify which spouse's coverage is exoge-
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Table 3 Bivariate Probit Estimates of Own Employer Health Benefit 
Coverage For Married Couples
1982
Variable
Constant
Kids < 6
Kids 6-17
North central
South
West
Education
(years)
High school
Some college
College
Graduate school
Black
Hispanic
Other race
Age
Age2/100
Wife's 
coverage
-3.538
(0.504)
-0.249
(0.018)
-0.207
(0.012)
-0.185
(0.031)
-0.005
(0.030)
-0.085
(0.032)
0.050
(0.004)
-
-
-
-
0.327
(0.043)
0.194
(0.039)
0.024
(0.058)
0.291
(0.041)
-0.737
(0.107)
Husband's 
coverage
0.477
(0.392)
0.033
(0.018)
0.031
(0.012)
-0.095
(0.032)
-0.121
(0.032)
-0.158
(0.033)
0.067
(0.004)
-
-
-
-
-0.034
(0.045)
0.042
(0.042)
-0.290
(0.063)
-0.100
(0.029)
0.354
(0.067)
1992
Wife's 
coverage
-4.563
(0.566)
-0.209
(0.018)
-0.181
0.011)
-0.067
(0.028)
0.003
(0.028)
-0.056
(0.029)
-
0.297
(0.038)
0.392
(0.040)
0.598
(0.044)
0.823
(0.052)
0.171
(0.040)
0.019
(0.035)
-0.033
(0.046)
0.359
(0.045)
-0.869
(0.113)
Husband's 
coverage
-0.934
(0.394)
-0.015
(0.017)
0.004
(0.011)
-0.002
(0.028)
-0.122
(0.027)
-0.076
(0.029)
-
0.414
(0.033)
0.498
(0.034)
0.638
(0.037)
0.698
(0.042)
-0.066
(0.040)
-0.165
(0.035)
-0.185
(0.049)
-0.042
(0.028)
-0.042
(0.062)
(continued)
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Table 3 (continued)
Variable
Age3/10,000
Husband's///
P
N
-Log!
1982
Wife's 
coverage
0.572 
(0.090)
-0.634 
(0.104)
0.311 
(0 065)
15,999
20107.1
Husband's 
coverage
-0.371 
(0.050)
_
_
1992
Wife's 
coverage
0.663 
(0.093)
-0.602 
(0.134)
0.092 
(0.085)
Husband's 
coverage
-0.010 
(0.045)
_
_
18,617
24142.9
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.
nous and then estimate different recursive models for the two types of 
couples. Unfortunately, this sample separation information is not 
available in the March CPSs.
An alternative method of investigating the sensitivity of the esti 
mates obtained from the recursive structure defined by Equations 1-4 
is to use Two-Stage Least Squares (TSLS) and estimate a two equation 
simultaneous equation model of husbands' and wives' coverage where 
the coverage of each spouse affects the coverage of the other. Each 
equation in this two equation system is identified because the hus 
band's (wife's) individual characteristics (age, race, and education) are 
assumed to be exogenous to the own employer health coverage of the 
wife (husband). TSLS avoids the recursive structure constraint 
required of the bivariate probit model because it ignores the latent vari 
able formulation. However, like a single equation linear probability 
model, the TSLS does not account for the fact that health insurance 
coverage can only take on a value of 0 or 1. The coefficients are, how 
ever, unbiased if the exclusion restrictions are appropriate.
The TSLS model estimates in Table 4 suggest a wife's coverage 
does affect her husband's coverage, and the point estimate of this effect 
was larger in 1982 than in 1992. However, the estimated effect of the 
husband's coverage on the wife's coverage was much larger than the 
effect of wife's coverage on husband's coverage in both years—nearly 
twice as large in 1982 and almost three times larger in 1992. In addi-
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Table 4 TSLS Estimates of Wives and Husbands Own Employer Health 
Insurance (HI) Coverage3
Dependent variable 
Wife's HI Husband's HI
Independent 
variable 1982
Wife's HI
1992 1982
-0.1775 
(0.0622)
1992
-0.1055 
(0.0458
Husband's HI -0.3205 -0.2953 
(0.0461) (0.0500)
'Each model also includes the variables reported in Table 3. Standard errors are in 
parentheses.
tion, the coefficient of-0.295 on husband's coverage in 1992 implies an 
almost 30 percentage point effect of a husband's coverage on the prob 
ability that his wife is covered by health insurance from her employer. 
This value is close to the predicted 23.1 percentage point difference 
(0.533 - 0.202) previously reported from the bivariate probit estimates 
for an average couple.
These TSLS results suggest that there are some couples where the 
husband's coverage is affected by his wife's coverage. However, the 
more common occurrence appears to correspond to the model 
described by Equations 1-4, where the husband's coverage is exoge 
nous. While the joint determination of spousal coverage deserves addi 
tional research with better data, these results support the conclusion 
that, for many couples, a wife's demand for employer-provided health 
insurance is causally affected by her husband's coverage.
Coverage Versus Eligibility for Health Insurance
The health insurance questions in the two March CPSs solicit 
information on whether or not household members are covered by 
employer-provided health insurance obtained from an employer. As 
previously discussed, there are two distinct subgroups among uncov 
ered workers. An uncovered individual could be ineligible for insur 
ance because the employer does not offer insurance or because he/she 
works for an employer that offered health insurance but, for various
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reasons, the individual was not eligible for coverage. It is also possible 
an uncovered individual is eligible for employer-provided health bene 
fits but voluntarily decides not to accept the coverage, perhaps because 
of the cost of health insurance (e.g., substantial premium copayments) 
or because of spousal coverage.
The distinction between uncovered individuals who are ineligible 
for coverage but select out of coverage is critical for this analysis. The 
bivariate probit and TSLS estimates show wives whose husbands are 
uncovered by health benefits are more likely to be covered by own 
employer health benefits. I interpret this estimate to mean a husband's 
coverage affects a wife's demand for a job where she is eligible for 
insurance, and it is this demand for health insurance eligibility that 
leads some women to adjust their labor supply and shift from part-time 
to full-time employment. In the March CPS data, it is impossible to 
distinguish between this explanation and the alternative explanation 
that wives with spousal coverage choose not to accept coverage even 
though they are eligible because of their husbands' insurance coverage. 
If this latter explanation is the dominant causal explanation, then the 
estimates in Table 3 are biased estimates of the effect of husbands' 
coverage on the labor-supply decisions of wives.
While the March surveys do not identify the reasons individuals 
are not covered by employer health insurance, this information is avail 
able from the April 1993 CPS. Figure 2 shows a tree diagram of the 
distribution of coverage and eligibility for working wives included in 
the April survey. Of those not covered by own employer health insur 
ance, 62.4 percent are ineligible for coverage through their employer. 
The remaining share of uncovered wives are eligible for coverage but 
have not taken advantage of the health benefits. Most (87.8 percent) of 
those that elect no coverage are covered by their husband's employer- 
provided health insurance (EPHI); overall, 29 percent of those not cov 
ered by their own EPHI are covered by their husband's EPHI.
Fully modeling the joint decisions of couples that determine both 
coverage and eligibility is beyond the scope of this paper. However, I 
did estimate the bivariate probit model described by Equations 1-4 
using the April data, for which the dependent variable for the wife indi 
cates eligibility for coverage. The coefficient on spouse's coverage in 
the wife's eligibility equation was -0.6975 with a standard error of 
0.260, very similar to the estimates reported in Table 3. These results
Figure 2 Health Insurance Coverage and Eligibility for Wives in the Labor Force, April 1993 
(EPHI=Employer-provided health insurance)
0.728
Covered By 
EPHI
Wife is...
0.689
Eligible for 
Own EPHI
0.311
NoTEIigible for 
Own EPHI
0.033
0.878
Elected not to
accept 
coverage
0.121
Not covered 
for other 
reasons
Covered By 
Spouse's EPHI
Not Covered
By Spouse's
EPHI
SOURCE: Author's calculations from the April 1993 CPS (n = 5077 married couples).
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suggest that the effect of spousal coverage reported in Table 3 is domi 
nated by the effect of husband's coverage on eligibility and not seri 
ously biased by wives who are eligible through their employers for 
coverage but decide to decline coverage.
LABOR SUPPLY DECISIONS OF WORKING WIVES
The estimates in Tables 3 and 4 show spousal health insurance cov 
erage significantly increases a working wife's demand for a job with 
health benefits. To meet this demand, I hypothesize that some wives 
lacking spousal coverage work full time to obtain health insurance but 
would have preferred to work fewer hours if their husbands had jobs 
with health benefits. This labor-supply adjustment occurs because of 
the limited supply of part-time jobs offering health insurance.
Table 5 provides simple descriptive statistics from the 1983 and 
1993 March CPSs that are consistent with this hypothesis. The table 
shows hours worked per week by working, married women as a func 
tion of husband's health insurance coverage. The mean number of 
hours worked per week was 33.9 in 1982; the median was 40 hours per 
week and two-thirds of the wives in the sample usually worked 35 or 
more hours per week. Rows 2 and 3 of the table breakdown the sample 
based on husband's health insurance coverage. The mean number of 
hours worked per week in 1982 was 1.5 hours greater for wives whose
Table 5 Wives' Average Hours Worked per Week by Spousal Health 
Insurance Coverage, 1982 and 1992
All married females
Husband's
Husband's
HI
HI
= l a
= 0
Mean 
hours
33.9
33.4
34.9
1982
Median 
hours
40
40
40
Fraction 
> 35 hours
0.667
0.649
0.703
Mean 
hours
35.7
34.9
37.0
1992
Median 
hours
40
40
40
Fraction 
> 35 hours
0709
0.678
0.759
SOURCE: Authors calculations from 1983 and 1993 March CPS. 
a If HI = 1, the husband has health insurance; if HI = 0, he does not.
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husbands did not have health insurance. In addition, the percentage of 
wives working 35 or more hours per week was 64.9 percent for house 
holds where the husband had health insurance and 70.3 percent in 
households where the husband lacked health insurance. The difference 
by spousal health benefit coverage in the fraction of married women 
working 35 or more hours per week had increase in 1992 to 8.1 per 
centage points.
While other factors correlated with labor supply and husbands 
health insurance coverage (e.g., husband's income) are not controlled 
for in Table 5, a simple difference-in-difference estimator calculated 
over the time period suggests spousal coverage had an effect on the 
labor-supply decisions of some wives. Specifically, the change over 
the 10 years in the fraction of married women working full time (e.g., 
35 hours/week) was 0.0423 and the fraction of husbands with health 
insurance declined by 0.054. This implies a one point decline in the 
fraction of husbands without health benefits led to 0.78 point increase 
in the percentage of wives working full time (e.g., 0.0423 / -0.0541). 
The other noteworthy fact from Table 5 is the difference in the fraction 
of wives working full time by spousal coverage may have had a bigger 
effect on labor supply in 1992 than in 1982.
The inferences that can be drawn from Table 5 obviously do not 
control for individual and family characteristics that influence labor 
supply and are possibly correlated with husbands health insurance cov 
erage or change in the status of husbands health insurance coverage. 6
To address this concern, Table 6 reports ordinary least square 
(OLS) estimates of the hours worked per week in 1982 and 1992 as a 
function of education, three race/ethnicity dummies, age, the presence 
and age of children in the household, husbands income, and whether or 
not the husband has health insurance on his job. 7 The parameter esti 
mates on the control variables are all in the expected direction and con 
sistent with prior research. The estimate on husband's health insurance 
coverage is also in the predicted negative direction in both years. How 
ever, the estimated parameter is smaller in 1982 and is not significantly 
different from zero at the 0.05 level. In 1992, however, the coefficient 
is much larger and more precisely estimated. The 1992 estimate sug 
gests that married women whose husbands did have health insurance 
worked an average of 1.5 hours less per week relative to women whose 
husbands did not have health insurance. I interpret this estimate as the
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Table 6 OLS Estimates of Hours Worked per Week by Wives in the 
Labor Force
Variable
Constant
Kids < 6
Kids 6-17
Education
High school
Some college
College
Graduate school
Black
Hispanic
Other race
Age
Age 2/100
Age 3/10,000
Husband's HI
Husband's salary ($1,000) 
R2
N
1982
23.237 
(4.530)
-3.316 
(0.158)
-1.610 
(0.103)
0.083 
(0.039)
_
_
_
_
2.901 
(0.389)
2.878 
(0.349)
3.094 
(0.525)
1.078 
(0.374)
-2.602 
(0.972)
0.180 
(0.081)
-0.351 
(0.230)
-0.062 
(0.008)
0.0517
15,999
1992
23.980 
(4.749)
-2.988 
(0.143)
-1.879 
(0.092)
-
0.549 
(0.312)
0.595 
(0.324)
2.007 
(0.351)
4.517 
(0.413)
2.100 
(0.347)
1.168 
(0.288)
2.138 
(0.400)
1.058 
(0.378)
-2.126 
(0.961)
0.109 
(0.079)
-1.458 
(0.182)
-0.036 
(0.004)
0.0634
18,617
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.
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average labor-supply response of women caused by the effect of spou 
sal coverage on the choice between a part-time job without health ben 
efits and a full-time job with benefits.
There are several alternative explanations for the results in Table 6. 
First, husband's health insurance coverage may simply index "better" 
jobs. Thus, in households where the husband has a better job as mea 
sured by the presence of health insurance, the wife works fewer hours 
per week because her husband has a "good" job. This alternative 
explanation could conceivably explain the difference between the esti 
mated effect of husband's health insurance coverage in 1982 and 1992 
because there was a decline in health insurance coverage among men 
over this time period that was most pronounced among less educated 
men with little work experience (Olson 1995). Thus, health insurance 
coverage in 1992 was a better predictor of "good" jobs than health 
insurance coverage in 1982. While it is difficult to rule out this alterna 
tive explanation, I think it is an unlikely explanation for the results 
since the model also controls for husbands earned income. Therefore, 
this explanation requires that the distinction between "good" and "bad" 
jobs is correlated with health insurance coverage after conditioning on 
husband's income.
A second explanation for the results in Table 6 is that the effect of 
husband's health insurance coverage on the labor supply simply 
reflects the income effect of these health benefits. However, the mag 
nitude of the coefficient on husband's health coverage in 1992 is sim 
ply too big for this explanation to be plausible. Ten thousand dollars in 
husband's income in 1992 produces a predicted 0.4 hour decline in the 
work week. If the effect of husband's health coverage was due only to 
the income effect, the estimate of 1.458 on the health coverage variable 
corresponds to an income effect equivalent to about $40,000 (e.g., 
1.458 / 0.036). Since health insurance is substantially less expensive 
than $40,000, the estimated effect of husband's health insurance in his 
wife's labor supply cannot be accounted for by the income effect of the 
benefit. This explanation is more plausible in 1982 because the coeffi 
cient on husband's health insurance implies the income value of health 
benefits was about $5,600 (e.g., 0.351 / 0.062). While group health 
insurance in 1982 was also less expensive than this point estimate, 
given the standard errors around the parameter estimates, it is possible
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that a husband's health insurance had an effect on his wife's labor sup 
ply in 1982 due primarily to the income effect.
What accounts for the different effect of husband's health insur 
ance coverage on their wives' labor-supply decisions in 1982 and 
1992? One explanation is that the relative increase in the cost of health 
care between 1982 and 1993 increased household demand for health 
insurance because the higher cost of health care raised the risk of not 
having health insurance. This increase in demand caused more wives 
without health insurance to work full time to obtain employer-provided 
health insurance. While this explanation is intuitively appealing, it is 
not consistent with the bivariate probit results reported in Table 2. If 
this explanation accounted for the differing results, I would have 
expected husbands health insurance coverage to have a bigger effect on 
the probability a wife held a job with health benefits in 1992 than in 
1982. As discussed above, this is not the case; the coefficient on hus 
band's health insurance coverage in the wife's health insurance equa 
tion is virtually the same for the two time periods.
The differing effect of a husbands coverage on his wife's hours 
worked in the two time periods is more easily explained by the decline 
in health insurance coverage among married males. The probability 
that husbands in the sample had employer-provided health benefits 
declined from 0.67 in 1982 to 0.62 in 1992. This fact suggests that 
wives who worked full time in 1982 and were married to husbands 
without coverage would have worked full time even if their husbands 
had held a job with health insurance. In 1992, however, the decline in 
health insurance coverage among husbands meant that more house 
holds were faced with the prospect of not having any employer-pro 
vided health insurance. This new segment of potentially uninsured 
households included families where the woman would have preferred 
to work part time if her husband had a job with health benefits but 
increased her work week to full time to obtain health benefits. This 
explanation suggest the full-time hours constraint that had to be met to 
obtain health insurance was not binding on wives in 1982 but was 
binding on the labor-supply decision of some wives in 1992. 8
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QUANTILE REGRESSION AND MULTINOMIAL LOGIT 
ESTIMATES OF HOURS WORKED
The OLS estimates reported in Table 6 will not adequately capture 
the changes in the hours distribution resulting from differences in hus 
band's health insurance coverage if the impact of spousal coverage var 
ies at different values of the hours distribution. The OLS estimates for 
1992 that describe a simple mean shift in the conditional hours distri 
bution by the 1.5 hours is not sufficient to move workers from part- 
time to full-time status except for those workers already very close the 
margin between full-time and part-time employment. Moreover, it is 
likely that those women close to the margin between full-time and part- 
time work were most affected by their husbands' health insurance sta 
tus because a full-time job with health insurance involves only a mod 
est increase in hours worked.
This suggests the difference in the hours distribution between 
wives with and without spousal health benefits will look like Figure 3 
if the employer constraint hypothesis is correct. Compared to house 
holds where the husband has health benefits, in households where the 
husband does not have health insurance, the distribution has less mass 
immediately below full-time employment and more mass at full-time 
employment (e.g., 35-40 hours per week). However, the tails of the 
two distributions are similar for two reasons. First, the lower tails of 
the hours distributions are similar because of the high cost of full-time 
employment for wives that would otherwise prefer to work substan 
tially less than full time. The upper tails do not differ by husbands 
coverage because working substantially more than 35-40 hours per 
week has no impact in the probability a woman has a job with health 
benefits. The OLS estimates cannot capture the differential behavioral 
responses of women at different points of the hours distribution.
Quantile regression was used to test if the impact of husbands cov 
erage on the distribution of hours worked by married women is consis 
tent with Figure 2. 9 Separate quantile regression models were 
estimated for the 10th, 15th, 20th, 25th, 30th, 35th, 40th, and 90th per- 
centiles of the conditional hours distribution, where each model 
included the same exogenous variables used in the OLS estimates. A 
comparison of the coefficients on husband's health insurance coverage
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Figure 3 Predicted Effect of Husband's HI on f(hours) 
for Working Wives
f(hours/wk)
Husband has HI 
Husband has no HI
20 40
Hours/wk
across these different quantile regressions identifies the portion of the 
conditional hours distribution most affected by husband's health insur 
ance overage.
Table 7 reports the key results from the quantile regressions for 
each of the two years. Consistent with the OLS results, the coefficient 
estimates for 1982 are all insignificant and show husbands health 
insurance had no impact on any point of the hours distribution for mar 
ried working women. In contrast, the negative and significant coeffi 
cients for 1992 show fewer women worked part time when their 
husbands did not have health insurance. Furthermore, the larger (in 
absolute value) coefficients at 21-30 hours suggest that the lack of 
spousal coverage had the biggest impact on women that were already 
working more than half time. However, at the 40th percentile (about 
40 hours per week), there was only a very modest difference (0.7 of an 
hour) between those with and without spousal health insurance. This 
pattern of results is consistent with the hypothesized effect summarized 
in Figure 3, where the differences in the distribution become very mod 
est once the full-time threshold is reached.
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Table 7 Summary of the Quantile Regression Estimates of the Effect of 
Husband's HI on Hours Worked by Spouse
1982
Estimated 
quantile
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.90
Hours worked 
per week at 
this quantile
16
20
24
27
30
35
36
40
Coeff. on 
husband's HI
0.775
(0.582)
0.284
(0.432)
0.441
(0.513)
0.049
(0.486)
0.021
(0.442)
0.001
(0.291)
0.086
(0.202)
-1.587
(0.190)
1992
Hours worked 
per week at 
this quantile
20
21
25
30
35
36
40
45
Coeff. on 
husband's HI
-1.939
(0.466)
-2.843
(0.364)
-2.738
(0.416)
-2.253
(0.324)
-2.084
(0.238)
-.307
(0.191)
-0.678
(0.125)
-1.023
(0.254)
NOTE: Each quantile regression includes controls for education, race, age, children in 
the family, and husband's earning. Standard errors are in parentheses.
I next estimated separate quantile regressions for points of the 
cumulative hours distribution over two ranges—(0.01, 0.46) and (0.87, 
0.95)—to more fully describe the impact of husband's health benefits 
on hours worked by women in 1992. 10 Models were estimated at 0.01 
intervals, and the results were then used to predict and plot the esti 
mated cumulative conditional weekly hours distribution for two work 
ing wives that were identical except for husband's health insurance 
benefits."
Figure 4 shows that, among women with average sample charac 
teristics, those wives most likely to increase hours from part time to 
full time because their husbands lack coverage were wives who would 
have been working close to full time even if their husbands had health
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benefits. 12 Figure 4 shows that about 29 percent of those without spou 
sal health insurance would have worked 30 or fewer hours. In contrast, 
about 33 percent of those with spousal coverage would have worked 30 
or fewer hours per week. Note, however, that the distributions are very 
similar up to about 15 hours per week and then converge once again at 
about 37 hours per week. These differences correspond to the hypoth 
esized differences in the probability density functions shown in Figure 
3. In other words, the estimates suggest that in 1992 the lack of spou 
sal coverage caused a small fraction of wives to work full time and 
obtain a job with health insurance instead of working 15-35 hours per 
week without health benefits.
Figure 4 shows the predicted marginal effect of husband's cover 
age on hours worked for a wife with average sample characteristics. 
The position of this predicted conditional density of hours worked by 
spousal coverage will differ from Figure 4 for women with different 
characteristics. For this reason, Figure 4 cannot be interpreted as the 
average effect in the sample of spousal coverage on hours worked but 
only the marginal effect for wives with the average characteristics.
Estimates from a multinomial logit model of hours worked can be 
used to obtain an estimate of the average effect of husband's coverage 
on hours worked for the sample, which does permit husband's cover 
age to have a different effect on different portions of the hours distribu 
tion (e.g., Figure 3). This is accomplished by dividing the hours 
distribution into non-overlapping intervals and predicting the effect of 
spousal coverage on the probability that hours of work for wives fall in 
each interval.
Such a model was estimated for 1992 using the same independent 
variables included in the OLS and quantile regression models. The 
dependent variable was constructed by classifying the hours worked by 
wives into one of the following ranges: 1-10 hours, 11-20 hours, 21- 
30 hours, 31-34 hours, 35-39 hours, exactly 40 hours, and more than 
40 hours.
To conserve space, I have not reported the coefficients for the mul 
tinomial model. 13 However, the hypothesis that husband's health insur 
ance has no effect on wife's coverage was easily rejected, as was the 
hypothesis that husband's coverage had the same effect on the proba 
bility of being in each interval of the hours distribution. 14 Table 8 illus 
trates the predicted effect of husband's coverage on wife's coverage
Figure 4 Predicted Conditional CDF (Hours) for an Average Wife
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 
CDF(Hours Worked/Week)
0.8 0.9 1
Husband's Hl=0 — Husband's Hl=1
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Table 8 Predicted Average Effect from Multinomial Logit Model of 
Husband's Coverage on Hours Worked by Wives, 1992
Predicted percentage in each weekly hours range 
Hours/week range_____Husband is covered_____Husband is uncovered
I-10 4.70 4.36
II-20 12.42 9.33 
21-30 12.75 10.31 
31-34 2.79 2.48 
35-39 10.23 10.85 
Exactly 40 44.20 47.51 
>40 12.92 15.16 
Total_________________100.00_____________100.00_____
NOTE: These predictions are based on a multinomial logit model that includes all of 
the variables reported in column 2 of Table 3.
obtained from the multinomial logit model. The estimates were used 
to calculate two probabilities for each person—one where husband's 
coverage is set equal to 0 and a second probability where husband's 
coverage is set equal to 1. The probabilities for each hours range were 
then averaged over the entire sample and are reported in Table 8. The 
differences between columns 1 and 2 of Table 8 show the predicted 
average effect of spousal coverage on the probability wives worked in 
each hours range. For example, the first row shows husband's cover 
age had a very small effect (4.7 - 4.36) on the probability wives 
worked 1-10 hours per week.
Overall, the results reported in Table 8 are consistent with the theo 
retical predictions and the OLS and Quantile regression estimates. The 
average effect of spousal coverage on the probability a wife works full 
time (35 or more hours) was 6.17 percentage points (e.g., 47.51 + 
15.16 + 10.85 - 44.20 - 12.92 - 10.23). As rows 2 and 3 of the table 
show, this shift to full-time work was generated primarily by a reduc 
tion in the probability of working 11-30 hours per week.
The estimates reported in Table 8 were used to generate an esti 
mate of the impact of husband's coverage on the expected number of 
hours worked by wives. This was obtained using the midpoints of each
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hours range to calculate a weighted average for hours worked using the 
estimates in each column as weights. 15 This exercise produced the fol 
lowing values:
E (Hours \HIH =l) = 34.31 
E (Hours !#/„ = 0) = 35.74
The difference between these two values, 1.43 hours, is an estimate 
of the average effect of husbands' coverage on wives' labor supply. 
This is about a 4 percent effect (1.43/34.31) and very close to the 1.5 
hours obtained from the OLS model.
ESTIMATES OF THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN WAGES 
AND HEALTH BENEFITS
In this section I report estimates of the wage-health benefit trade 
off faced by married women predicted by compensating wage theory. 
To estimate this trade-off, I confined the sample to married women that 
were in the Outgoing Rotation Group subsamples in the March 1993 
CPS and that worked 35 or more hours per week. The sample was lim 
ited to wives working 35 or more hours per week because this appears 
to be the threshold between full-time and part-time employment 
(Hotchkiss 1991). Restricting the sample to the Outgoing Rotation 
Group allowed use of union status and usual weekly earnings ques 
tions. The latter question permits a better measure of the hourly wages 
than that which is available for the entire March CPS.
The usual empirical strategy for determining the magnitude (and 
existence) of the wage-fringe benefit trade-off is to estimate a standard 
earnings equation and include as one of the independent variables the 
presence or absence of health insurance. Frequently, however, this 
strategy does not provide results consistent with the theory, and the 
usual explanation is that the fringe benefit dummy is correlated with 
the error term in the wage equation because of unobserved factors 
(e.g., unobserved human capital) that have an impact on both wage lev 
els and health insurance coverage (Smith and Ehrenberg 1983). The
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OLS estimate reported in Table 9 suffers from this problem. The OLS 
coefficient on wife's coverage in a standard wage model is positive, 
highly significant, and implies married women with coverage receive a 
17.8 percent wage premium. 16
Table 9 OLS and IV Estimates of the Trade-Off between Wages and 
Health Insurance for Wives in the Labor Force, 1992
Constant
North Central
South
High school
Some college
College
Grad. school
Black
Hispanic
Other race
Age
Age 2/100
Age 3/20,000
Wife's HI
Union
R2
OLS estimates
-0.213
(0.454)
-0.103
(0.022)
-0.143
(0.021)
-0.037
(0.023)
0.386
(0.031)
0.611
(0.033)
0.742
(0.037)
-0.029
(0.030)
-0.088
(0.026)
-0.041
(0.036)
0.147
(0.036)
-0.327
(0.091)
0.241
(0.075)
0.164
(0.016)
0.088
(0.020)
0.327
IV estimates
-0.255
(0.479)
-0126
(0.024)
-0.147
(0.022)
-0.030
(0.024)
0.418
(0.034)
0.665
(0.038)
0.801
(0.043)
-0.041
(0.032)
-0.000
(0.039)
-0.073
(0.038)
0.161
(0.038)
-0.364
(0.097)
0.273
(0.080)
-0.113
(0.084)
0.135
(0.025)
0.252
N = 2,790.
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.
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An unbiased estimate of the health insurance/wage trade-off can be 
obtained using an instrument correlated with wife's coverage but 
uncorrelated with the error term in her wage equation. The variable I 
used as an instrument for her coverage is her husband's coverage 
through his employer. 17 As the estimates in Table 2 show, husband's 
health insurance coverage has a strong effect on the probability his 
wife has health insurance on her job. Using this variable as an instru 
ment for HIW , the coefficient on HIW is negative and implies women 
with health insurance earn about 11 percent less than comparable 
women without health insurance. This estimate is consistent with the 
theory of compensating wage differentials.
SUMMARY
The primary purpose of this study was to investigate the relation 
ship between employer-provided health insurance and the labor-supply 
decisions of married women. I argue that the demand by a married 
woman for a job with health insurance is heavily influenced by 
whether or not her husband has health insurance through his employer. 
Where husbands lack health insurance coverage, married working 
women are more likely to be found in jobs that provide health benefits. 
This bivariate estimates using both 1982 and 1992 data strongly sup 
port this prediction.
Employer efforts to minimize adverse selection in the provision of 
health benefits limits the supply of part-time jobs that provide health 
benefits. As a result, individuals typically have to work full time to 
obtain a job with health insurance. This constraint implies husbands 
health insurance coverage will have an effect on the labor supply deci 
sions of working wives without spousal coverage who seek health 
insurance through their employer. The estimates for 1982 fail to sup 
port the hypothesis that spousal health insurance coverage changed the 
labor supply of women in 1982. In contrast, there was a small but sig 
nificant increase in hours worked in 1992 by those women married to 
men without health insurance. The differing results for the two time 
periods is explained by the decline in employer-provided health insur 
ance among husbands. In 1982, the requirement that wives worked full
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time to obtain health insurance was not binding, but the decline in cov 
erage among husbands became binding by 1992 and caused some 
wives to shift from part-time to full-time employment to obtain health 
coverage.
The quantile regression and multinomial logit estimates for 1992 
suggest that most of the shift in hours occurred among women who 
would have preferred to work 10-35 hours with spousal coverage but 
increased their work week to 35-50 hours per week to obtain health 
insurance. The multinomial logit estimates suggest that, on average, a 
change in husband's coverage alters the probability his wife works full 
time by about 9.2 percent.
Finally, estimates of the determinants of the hourly wage for mar 
ried women working full-time in 1993 supports the trade-off between 
wages and health benefits that is predicted by compensating wage 
theory.
Notes
The author has benefited from helpful comments by Ron Ehrenberg, Jonathan Gruber, 
Doug Hyatt, and seminar participants at Princeton University and Columbia Univer 
sity.
1. This statement is based on my tabulations of the usual weekly hours from the 
1979-1991 Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG) file of the Current Population Sur 
vey. The data were from the National Bureau of Employment Research CD 
extract of the ORG.
2. The analysis focuses on hours worked per week conditional on participation in the 
labor market. I do not investigate the impact of health benefits on the labor-force 
participation decision.
3. This approach is not without problems. First, it may take considerable time 
before the firm is able to distinguish between claims due to purely random health 
shocks and claims that reveal information about the underlying but unobserved 
health status of the individual and other family members. Second, if the external 
labor market doesn't observe the information on health status that is revealed to 
the firm, the firm may be unable to retain the worker because his or her total com 
pensation net of the firm's estimate of expected health claims will fall below the 
worker's opportunity wage in the external market.
4. The firm may face discrimination charges if it adjusts wages based on certain pre 
dictors of health claims such as age and sex.
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5. By "average" I mean a 30-year-old, white, high school-educated, working wife 
living in the Northeast with one child under the age of 6 and one child 6 to 17 
years old.
6. For example, the difference-in-difference estimator calculated from changes of 
the 10-year period will substantially overstate the effect of husband's coverage on 
the fraction of wives working full time if, between 1982 and 1992, broader 
changes in the commitment of wives to full-time employment were occurring. 
The difference-in-difference estimator would mistakenly attribute the impact of 
these changes to the decline in husband's health coverage.
7. Whether or not the wife has health insurance on her job is not included in her 
labor-supply equation because health insurance coverage and hours worked are 
assumed to be jointly chosen by the wife, given the employer constraints that full- 
time work is required to receive health benefits. Therefore, this labor-supply 
equation is most appropriately thought of as a "reduced form" equation where 
husband's health insurance coverage influences both the wife's coverage and her 
labor-supply decision.
8. Another explanation for the differing results is that firms were less likely to offer 
health benefits to part-time workers in 1992 and, therefore, the hours constraint 
became binding on more households. The results in Table 1 do not support this 
explanation.
9. Quantile regression is most commonly used to estimate how exogenous variables 
influenced the median of the dependent variable.
10. Approximately 41 percent (0.87 - 0.46) of the sample worked exactly 40 hours 
per week, which was the median for virtually all groups in the sample. Thus, dif 
ferences in the exogenous variables had no impact on this mass point in the hours 
distribution, and models for values in the (0.47, 0.86) range were not "identified."
11. The predictions were based on a 30-year-old, white, high school-educated woman 
living in the Northeast with one child under 6 and another child between 6 and 17 
years old.
12. Note that the axes in this graph are reversed from what is customary. The cumula 
tive distribution function (CDF) of hours worked is on the horizontal axis and the 
vertical axis plots the predicted hours worked at each point of the CDF.
13. These coefficients are available from the author upon request.
14. A likelihood ratio test of the hypothesis that husband's coverage had no effect on 
wife's coverage produced an ^ value of 77.82, and the critical value for 6 d.f. and 
0.001 significance level is 22.5. The likelihood ratio test of the hypothesis that 
husband's coverage has an equal effect on the chances of being in each hours 
interval produced an £ value of 76.78, and the critical value for 5 d.f. and 0.001 
significance level is 20.5.
15. For the over 40 hours per week category, I used the average number of hours
worked for those working more than 40 hours per week (e.g., 50.33 hours). 
16 The premium is equal to exp. (0.1636) - 1.
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17. The estimate of p, the correlation between the error terms in the two health insur 
ance equations reported in Table 2, is not different from zero in 1992. This sug 
gests husband's health insurance coverage is a plausible instrument.
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In this chapter, we investigate whether alternative methods of pro 
viding health insurance have consequences for the labor market. In the 
United States, public policy relies heavily on incentives to enhance the 
ability and willingness of employers to voluntarily purchase group 
health insurance for workers and their families. This approach con 
trasts with that of Canada, where all persons are eligible for a mini 
mum health benefit, which can be supplemented but not supplanted by 
additional employer-provided benefits. Effectively, the U.S. system 
bundles relatively high-wage full-time work with the health insurance 
benefits, while in Canada work and health care coverage remain largely 
independent. How these two disparate approaches to the provision of 
health care affect the labor-force decision, hours of work, and the com 
pensation mix is a largely unexplored subject, and it is the focus of this 
research.
Ideally, we would like to empirically model and directly compare 
the Canadian and the U.S. systems of health care provision and financ 
ing to see how each affects the allocation of time between market and 
nonmarket activities. However, differences in institutions and social 
insurance provisions, along with data limitations, make such direct 
comparisons impossible. Instead, we use U.S. data to draw conclu-
325
326 Hunt-McCool, McCool, and Dor
sions about the two systems by analyzing two groups of U.S.workers. 
In the first group, members are covered by health insurance whether or 
not they are employed ("virtual Canadians") but, in the second, mem 
bers must work to obtain equivalent insurance.
Canada has a system characterized by minimum basic coverage 
available to everyone independent of work effort. Additional coverage 
can be purchased on a tax-preferred basis, either through the employer 
or individually. However, this additional coverage cannot compete 
with the minimum benefits, so the private insurance purchased repre 
sents a different set of goods and services. In the United States, a sub 
set of the population operates under a similar system: persons who 
obtain health insurance coverage through the employment of their 
spouses. If one spouse has insurance, the other's labor supply is less 
conditioned on and possible independent of the insurance decision. 
For our purposes, such individuals will be used to simulate the Cana 
dian experience.
Two aspects of the health insurance market are likely to affect 
labor-market behavior. First, because of problems of adverse risk 
selection, individually purchased insurance tends to be extremely 
expensive or to have fewer benefits relative to employer-purchased 
insurance. Second, employers usually require that employees work 
close to full-time hours on the job as a condition for health insurance 
eligibility. Taken together, when one spouse is not offered health 
insurance at work, the other must generally work full time to obtain 
such coverage.
The options of full-time employment with coverage and part-time 
employment without health benefits may create a particularly difficult 
choice for an individual who must provide both health insurance and 
home production for the family. The full-time alternative may be 
selected even if it results in a sub-optimal allocation of time in the 
household. Thus, by comparing two groups of married women—those 
covered by spousal insurance and those who are not—we can simulate 
labor-supply responses under the U.S. and Canadian systems and try to 
isolate the importance of this effect.
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EFFECTS OF HEALTH INSURANCE PROVISION ON HOURS 
WORKED AND COMPENSATION
The effects of employment-based health insurance on hours of 
work follow from broad studies of the division of compensation 
between fringe benefits and earnings. In competitive markets, firms 
will only provide a more generous benefit, such as health insurance or 
pensions, at the expense of wages that are lower than usual for workers 
of a given skill level. Evidence on the trade-off can be found in Wood- 
bury (1983) and Woodbury and Huang (1991).
Evidence of the effect of health insurance on labor supply has been 
inconclusive and has generally tried to relate health status to work 
effort. Women are disproportionately low-wage workers and, on aver 
age, are less likely to be offered employment-based health insurance 
than men. 1 Moffitt and Wolfe (1990) have examined the role of public- 
and employer-provided insurance on the work effort of female heads of 
households. They found that there would be significant entry into the 
labor force by women currently on Medicaid if employer benefits were 
expanded. They estimate that a one-third increase in insurance offers 
by employers would reduce Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) rolls by 6 percent and raise labor-force participation by 12 
percent. While this effect is largely confined to AFDC households with 
relatively high demand for medical care, the pull into the workforce 
from employment-related insurance also shows up more generally for 
female household heads. Other labor-supply effects may be present for 
another set of female workers, namely women in dual-earner house 
holds. In related work, Wolfe and Hill (1992) simulated the effects of 
mandated benefits for low-wage mothers under different health states 
and varying hours of work. Health insurance appears to create a stron 
ger work incentive than either a wage increase or a child care subsidy 
when these women or their dependents are in poor health.
Changes in labor-supply behavior are also implied by studies of 
job lock or immobility due to preexisting health conditions that would 
limit coverage or make workers ineligible for health insurance benefits 
in a new firm (e.g., Madrian 1994). Monheit and Vistness (1995) 
showed that spouses appear to take efforts to avoid problems of risk 
selection due to poor health. Among dual earners, if one is in poor
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health, the other tends to be the primary holder of employment-based 
health insurance. On its face, recent legislation also seems based on 
the assumption that labor-force effort and employment prospects are 
constrained in the United States by tying insurance to the job. The 
Kennedy-Kassenbaum Act of 1996 allows former employees to main 
tain their health insurance indefinitely at the full-employment-based 
premium, replacing COBRA legislation (Consolidated Omnibus Bud 
get Reconciliation Act of 1985) that limited this option to about two 
years.
Our analysis extends this research to the general case of health 
risks, rather than existing health needs, and makes explicit the mecha 
nisms that limit labor hours. Figure 1 shows the general case, based on 
the household production model of Grossman (1972) in which health is 
produced using time (h) and market-purchased medical inputs (M). 
Further, total time in a week is limited to 168 hours, so hours not 
devoted to home production (e.g., health production) must be used in 
market-labor supply («). Given the shadow value of nonmarket time, 
(w, usually the wage rate) and the market price of medical care PM , the 
budget constraint for health is illustrated by the line h^M^. If all avail 
able time is spent in nonmarket activity (Hl = 168, n { = 0), no medical 
care is affordable. As we move down the budget constraint, more 
hours are worked so more purchasing power is available for medical 
care but fewer hours are available to provide health care services to the 
family.
Because it can reduce the problem of adverse selection, group-pur 
chased health insurance is cheaper than that purchased by individuals. 
The lower price per unit of medical care paid for through employer- 
provided insurance rotates the budget constraint to h lM2 , allowing 
greater purchases of medical care for a given amount of work. Thus, 
the indirect purchase of health insurance as a component of compensa 
tion effectively results in an in-kind transfer of medical care to the 
worker because the benefits of the price reduction accrue only if medi 
cal care is consumed.
To obtain insurance, however, the worker generally has to commit 
to a minimum work schedule. This convention may be imposed on 
small firms by insurance companies to avoid expensive family cover 
age that is disguised as employee coverage. Because health insurance 
benefit premiums are somewhat indivisible, firms may also need a
Figure 1 Wage/Benefit Trade-off: Health Insurance and Work
Market-labor
supply, Time, 
n h
nt = 0
\/
, = 168
h, = 133
Health production: H = H (h,M)
Time constraint: T = h + n
Eligbility constraint: n ;> 35
1C
Market-purchased 
medical inputs, 
M
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large commitment of hours of work to cover the premium expendi 
tures. In Figure 1, we set the constraint at 35 hours per week. Effec 
tively, the budget constraint becomes kinked at this point and shifts by 
the amount of the subsidy (ab). The new budget constraint with health 
insurance provided by the firm is the kinked line h labM2 . Therefore, 
an individual may be forced to work more hours than he or should 
would normally desire in order to obtain health insurance. Any indif 
ference curve such as 1C touching point h with a slope flatter than the 
budget line represents such a worker.
We compare this case to that of a worker who has access to insur 
ance whether or not he or she works. Such access would have two 
effects on the budget constraint. It would clearly shift the constraint 
out because even if one did not work, medical care would be available. 
However, for our purposes, the more important effect is that the budget 
constraint loses its kink because there is no longer a need to work a 
minimum number of hours to qualify for insurance. Most of our atten 
tion is focused on the effects of removing that kink. Provision of 
health insurance through some mandatory scheme financed by taxes, as 
in Canada, is equivalent to this latter effect. The slope of the budget 
constraint would depend upon the exact funding mechanism for the 
mandatory health insurance scheme or the effect on net wages in the 
employer-provided mechanism and any differences in the relative effi 
ciencies of the two systems.
In both cases, the minimum hours constraint is removed and the 
worker may choose to reallocate hours of work. Given a high value of 
nonmarket time, the incentive created by the need to work full time to 
qualify for insurance is no longer as compelling. We would expect to 
see hours worked fall for a person who had previously worked too 
many hours for the purpose of obtaining health insurance coverage.
DATA AND MODEL SPECIFICATION
To empirically test the proposition that the presence of employer- 
provided health insurance can affect labor-supply decisions, we evalu 
ate the job characteristics of two samples of wives. In the first sample, 
husbands hold employment-based health insurance. In the second
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sample, husbands are not covered by a job-related health policy. We 
use a two-stage process to determine if there is self-selection of wives 
into jobs with health insurance and whether self-selection differs 
according to health insurance coverage of the spouse.
In the first stage, wives face a trichotomous choice of no work, 
work without insurance, and work with health insurance coverage. 
Using a multiple logit model, we estimate probabilities of working 
with and without health insurance for both groups of wives (husbands 
with and without coverage). The estimator we use is described in Trost 
and Lee (1984) and Lee (1983).
We use the first-stage results to create selectivity adjustment terms 
for our second-stage models of labor compensation. The signs and sig 
nificance of the selection terms provide information on whether self- 
selection differs according to the spouse's coverage. In particular, the 
second stage estimates hourly wages, annual earnings from the current 
job, and two separate indicators of the share of annualized compensa 
tion received in the form of health insurance. The shares consist of the 
total premium and the employer-purchased premium. We expect that 
the value of health insurance for wives whose husbands do not have 
insurance would be greater than for wives whose husbands are cov 
ered. We also expect to observe an inverse relationship between the 
value of health insurance and other compensation (shown as a negative 
sign on the selection term) if insurance is the result of deliberate selec 
tion. This latter is the well-known compensation trade-off required if 
labor markets are competitive. 2
The main advantage of this two-step approach is that the estimator 
is consistent with theory. The hours and compensation mix are treated 
as jointly determined by the introduction of the trichotomous selection 
terms that condition the second-stage coefficients. Further, rigidities in 
the work schedule are implicit in the first-stage estimation of work 
choices.
The main disadvantage is that the estimator does not allow us to 
measure the magnitude of the trade-off between total compensation 
and health insurance, if one exists. The effects of the characteristics 
that affect the probability of working with insurance are highly nonlin 
ear. Thus, measuring the unit change in compensation associated with 
a fixed-interval change in the selection term (or its underlying odds) is 
highly artificial. However, this procedure may still be preferred to
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attempts to estimate the trade-off without attention to self-selection of 
hours and jobs. Any trade-offs observed otherwise may be biased 
upward because only persons who choose insurance are observed, and 
their preferences for insurance are likely to be higher than those whose 
compensation consists of wages only. Additionally, the data we use 
have limitations for trying to estimate the magnitude of compensation 
trade-offs because we do not observe pension accrual benefits. Thus, 
we are forced to omit an important component of compensation against 
which health benefits could be exchanged.
Data and Sample Characteristics
Table 1 contains the variable symbols and definitions of the inde 
pendent variables in the first-stage logit models, the characteristics 
used to develop the dependent variables in the second stage, and the 
independent variables of the second-stage analysis. The data on indi 
vidual health insurance and labor-market characteristics were obtained 
from Round 4 of the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey 
(NMES) and the supplemental Health Insurance Provider Survey, 
1987. The NMES household survey uses a national probability sample 
of the civilian, noninstitutionalized population. In the provider survey, 
employers reported information on the kinds of insurance offered and 
held by household respondents. It also contains data on total premi 
ums and employee and employer share of total premiums. Individual 
data are augmented by state and county level characteristics of firms 
and state insurance regulations from Area Resource File, County-City 
Data Book (Census Bureau), and from state Medicaid and insurance 
regulation files. Area Resource Files contain a composite of survey 
results pertaining to the health care market at the county level and are 
produced biennially by the Bureau of Health Professions. State insur 
ance regulations have been collected annually by Blue Cross and Blue 
Shield. Medicaid data by state is made available from the Health Care 
Financing Administration.
We included persons whose job or family status did not change 
during the round (the quarter year) but, within this group, we focused 
on married women between the ages of 19 and 62 whose husbands 
were employed. For empirical purposes, this group was further 
divided according to whether or not the husband had employment-
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Table 1 Variable Definitions
Variable Variable definition (data source)
Dependent variables
First stage logit 
WORK= 1,2,3
Second stage 
HOURLY WAGE ($) 
EARNINGS ($)
COMP ($)
PREMIUM/COMP (%)
EMPLOYER CONTRIBUTION 
Independent variables
NONEARNED INCOME ($)
DEP
ADL
AGE (years) 
BLACK (0, 1) 
EDUCATION (years) 
PROF(0, 1) 
TENURE (years) 
RISK POOL (0, 1)
CONVERSION^, 1) 
TAX RATE (%)
Wife does not work outside home; works with no 
employer-provided insurance; works with 
insurance, respectively
Annual earnings/annual hours of work
Annual earnings (actual, dependent upon wages, 
weeks, and hours per week)
Annualized earnings plus annual insurance 
premium calculated as if wife worked full time 
and full year
Total annual health insurance premium as a 
percent of COMP
($)The employer portion of the premium
All other household income reported in 1987 
Number of dependents
Number of limitations of activities of daily living 
of the wife (health limitations such as walking, 
bathing, etc.)
Wife's age in years
Wife's race is Black
Wife's years of education
Wife is in professional occupation
Years at current job of wife
State where wife resides has a high-risk pool to 
covered uninsurable persons (Blue Cross Blue 
Shield data)
State has a mandate requiring conversion to 
private insurance if job loss occurs (Blue Cross 
Blue Shield data)
Tax rate applied to insurance premiums by state 
(Blue Cross Blue Shield)
(continued)
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Table 1 (continued)
Variable Variable definition (data source)
MEDICARE CHARGE ($) Prevailing health care cost index by geographic
area (HCFA data)
PER K INCOME ($) Income per capita in state where wife resides
(area resource files)
MDS PER CAPITA (ratio) Physicians per capita in state (area resource files)
COUNTY POP Population of county of wife (city and county
data book)
MS A (0, 1) Wife resides in metropolitan statistical area
(large urban area)
SOUTH (0, 1) Wife resides in South 
LAMBDA Selection term in second state
based health insurance from his firm or union. Employment was by far 
the major source of coverage for all of these households. Only 32 hus- 
bands had health insurance from other private sources. 
The sample characteristics are described in Table 2. Of interest are 
the lower wages, earnings, and job tenure of uninsured female workers 
as compared with insured females. Since this table provides only the 
analytic variables under investigation, data on hours or type of insur 
ance are not provided. However, such data provide additional insight 
about the way health insurance may influence work decisions. As 
expected, there were differences in hours of work based on insurance 
status. Within the group of women who received insurance, just over 
80 percent worked more than 35 hours per week, averaging 39 hours 
per week. By contrast, those who worked without insurance averaged 
only 32 hours per week. Similarly, when dual health insurance cover 
age occurred, 45 percent of sample women chose an individual over a 
family plan. This contrasts with women who were the sole suppliers of 
health insurance to their families. Only 19 percent of these women 
chose individual coverage.
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics of the Samples of Employed Wives: Means (Standard Errors)
Husband insured
Variable
Sample size
HOURLY WAGE ($)
EARNINGS ($)
COMP ($)
PREMIUM ($)
EMPLOYER CONTRIBUTION ($)
NONEARNED INCOME ($)
DEP
ADL
AGE (years)
BLACK (0, 1)
EDUCATION (years)
PROF (0, 1)
MANUF(0, 1)
TENURE (years)
RISK POOL (0, 1)
CONVERSION (0, 1)
Wife - no insurance
974
7.32 (4.9)
4,294 (5,067)
25,200 (21,908)
1.6 (1.40)
0.01 (0.1)
36.7 (10.1)
0.16 (0.4)
13.0 (3.0)
0.12 (0.3)
0.10 (0.3)
4.3 (6.6)
0.17 4
0.9 (0.3)
Wife insured
816
9.04 (4.60)
7,208 (12,342)
9,368 (13,010)
1,965 (1,573)
1,631 (1,261)
35,206 (24,267)
1.31 (1.30)
0.01 (0.1)
37.7 (10.1)
0.21 (0.4)
13.2 (2.8)
0.12 (0.3)
0.12 (0.3)
7.8 (6.8)
0.16 (0.41)
0.9 (0.3)
Husband not insured
Wife - no insurance
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7.8 (4.6)
4,781 (10,211)
26,672 (23,934)
1.56 (1.5)
0.01 (0.2)
36.2 (10.3)
1.56 (1.5)
12.7 (3.1)
0.18 (0.4)
0.16 (0.4)
1.56 (1.5)
0.19 (0.4)
0.87(0.3)
Wife insured
547
8.95 (4.5)
7,047 (11,888)
9,191 (11,955)
2,526 (1.862
1,941 (1,392)
27,624 (22,720)
1.38 (1.2)
0.01 (0.2)
36.7 (9.9)
0.17 (0.4)
13.0 (3.0)
0.15 (0.4)
0.6 (0.2)
7.3 (6.6)
0.19 (0.4)
0.87 (0.3)
(continued)
Table 2 (continued)
TAX RATE (%)
MEDICARE CHARGE ($)
PER K INCOME ($)
MDS PER CAPITA
COUNTY POP
MSA (0, 1)
SOUTH (0, 1)
Husband insured
Wife - no insurance
1.80 (0.8)
27,600 (5,100)
14,727 (3,540)
0.01 (0.1)
776,550 (1,487,000)
0.25 (0.4)
0.34 (0.5)
Wife insured
1.85 (0.8)
28,008 (5,345)
14,883 (3,776)
0.01 (0.1)
798,533 (1,450,790)
0.28 (0.4)
0.36 (0.5)
Husband not insured
Wife - no insurance
1.81 (0.8)
27,289 (5,519)
14,168 (3,327)
0.01 (0.1)
885,441 (1,924,000
0.25 (0.4)
0.40 (0.5)
Wife insured
1.82 (0.8)
27,261 (5,465)
14,524 (3,465)
0.01 (0.1)
868,240 (1,648,652)
0.27 (0.4)
037 (0.5)
SOURCE: Authors' tabulations of the 1987 National Medical Care Expenditure Survey and Health Insurance Provider Survey.
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RESULTS
First-Stage Multinomial Logit
Separate logit models were estimated for each of the two subsam- 
ples. For brevity, we describe only the results for wives whose hus 
bands worked with insurance. 3 Regression coefficients are reported for 
those who work with insurance (Table 3) and those who work without 
insurance (Table 4). These coefficients are calculated relative to those 
who do not work.4 In multinomial logit estimation, the signs of coeffi 
cients are not necessarily those of the marginal probabilities, so mar 
ginal probabilities are calculated if the coefficients are statistically 
significant.
The independent variables include both person-specific character 
istics and area or market characteristics. Some of these variables are 
excluded from the second-stage regressions so that they also fulfill the 
theoretical requirement of model identification. Statistical identifica 
tion is insured because of the nonlinear first-stage technique in which 
the selection terms are created.
Table 3 shows that nonearned income, education, and per capita 
income significantly and positively increase the odds of working with 
insurance (relative to not working) and without insurance (relative to 
not working). The number of dependents tends to encourage working 
without insurance. Some area variables such as per capita income 
affect both working groups while others, the prevailing Medicare 
charge structure (a proxy for medical care costs), affect one group and 
not the other.
Second-Stage Results
We estimate the second state as a function of personal and area 
characteristics. Personal characteristics include the number of depen 
dents, nonearned income, education, race, age, a measure of health sta 
tus (the number of ADLs), 5 MSA residency, and job-related traits: 
industry and occupation (MANUF and PROF), job tenure, and location 
(South). The education and tenure variables should account for a sig 
nificant part of skill formation on the job and its associated "internal
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Table 3 Multinomial Logit Results of the Work Decision of Married 
Women: Husbands with Health Insurance on the Job
Work with insurance Work without insurance
Variable
Coefficient 
(f-statistic) Marg. prob.
Coefficient 
(f-statistic) Marg. prob.
CONSTANT
NONEARNED INCOME
DEP
EDUCATION
BLACK
MSA
SOUTH
COUNTY POP
PER K INCOME
RISK POOL
CONVERSION
UNEMPLOY
TAX RATE
MEDICARE CHARGE
MD PER CAPITA
-4.65
(-8.22)
1.8E-04 0.000045
(-6.38)
-0.35 -0.079
(-8.67)
0.21 0.030
(9.77)
0.55 0.143
(3.56)
-0.215
(-1.54)
10.52 0.096
(1.68)
-9.7E-08 -2E-08
(-2.30)
1. IE-04 l.OE-05
(4.51)
0.153
(1.06)
0.69
(-0.41)
-2.05
(-0.79)
-0.009
(1.42)
4.4E-05 9.0E-06
(3.22)
-30.66
(-0.61)
-2.56
(-49.1)
-6.E-06
(-3.41)
0.0125
(7.05)
0.125
(7.08)
-0.171
(-0.80)
-0.172
(-1.37)
10.32
(1.25)
-8.2E-09
(-0.219)
1. IE-04
(4.92)
0.204
(1.597)
-0.23
(-1.62)
-0.68
(-0.29)
-0.088
(-1 58)
1.7E-06
(0.14)
-56.69
(-1.24)
-2.5E-05
0.048572
0.002632
-0.11262
l.OE-08
l.OE-05
a Marginal probabilities are calculated for statistically significant coefficients.
Dep var. = 1 
= 2 
= 3
-21ogL 
Chi-square
925
1,384
1,099
-3,110
30
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Table 4 Multinomial Logit Results of the Work Decision of Married 
Women: Husbands Have No Health Insurance on the Job
Work with insurance Work without insurance
Variable
Coefficient Coefficient
(f-statistic) Marg. prob.a (/-statistic) Marg. prob.
CONSTANT
NONEARNED INCOME
DEP
EDUCATION
BLACK
MSA
SOUTH
COUNTY POP
PER K INCOME
RISK POOL
CONVERSION
UNEMPLOY
TAX RATE
MEDICARE CHARGE
MD PER CAPITA
-4.429
(-5.32)
-4. IE-06
(-1.59)
-0.207 -0.041
(-3.90)
0.240 0.039
(8.35)
-0.091
(-0.15)
-0.29
(1.20)
10.53
(1.23)
-8.4E-08
(1.35)
1.7E-04 0.00001
(4.11)
-0.19
(-0.96)
-0.31
(-1.26)
-0.397
(-0.12)
-0.095
(-0.95)
-8. IE-06
(0.39)
73.30
(0.98)
-2.70
(-3.27)
-1.9E-05
(-0.69)
0.03
(-0.67)
0.11
(4.05)
-0.59
(-2.11)
-0.61
(-2.41)
10.58
(1.24)
1.8E-07
(2.95)
1.3E-03
(3.2)
-0.13
(0.21)
-7.9E-01
(0.25)
0.35
(3.31)
-0.18
(-1.83)
-9.3E-06
(-0.43)
17.42
(0.227)
0.002
-0.120
-0.109
3E-07
0.112
-0.030
1 Marginal probabilities are calculated for statistically significant coefficients.
Dep var. = 1 
= 2 
= 3
-2 log L 
Chi-square
572 
462 
420 
-1,288 
594
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wage rate." The final variable in the regressions is the selection term 
that is derived from the first-stage results.
Tables 5 and 6 contain the results for the sample of women whose 
husbands have health insurance. The results for women whose hus 
bands work without insurance are presented in Tables 7 and 8. Tables 
5 and 7 present results for wives without insurance. In these cases, the 
attributes of the job that are estimated are confined to the hourly wage 
and the earnings on the present job. For wives with insurance, addi 
tional dependent variables include total annualized compensation and 
two compensation share equations. The first of the two share equation 
is the total annual health premium as a proportion of annualized com 
pensation and the second is the employer contribution to the premium 
as a proportion of annualized compensation.
An important reason to elect nonwage compensation may be its 
nontaxed status. If taxes, which are unmeasured but correlated with 
income, influence this decision, their effect should appear in the latter 
measure, which considers only the tax-shielded portion of the insur 
ance premium. Presumably, both the demand for health and the desire 
for a tax shield increase with income.
For wives married to husbands with insurance, no coefficient on 
any selection term is statistically significant in either Table 5 or 6. In 
the case of dual coverage, Table 6, we observe only the standard human 
capital effects on hourly compensation, earnings, and total compensa 
tion. MSA residency, education, tenure, and professional status 
enhance earnings, while women from the South have lower average 
hourly wages than other women. There is also a positive relationship 
between wages and nonearned income, which includes earnings of the 
husband as well as household nonwage income. Generally, this corre 
lation occurs because of marriage between persons with similar human 
capital and socioeconomic backgrounds, rather than as a pure income 
effect.
When we evaluate the shares of annualized compensation attrib 
uted to health insurance and to the employer's contribution to insur 
ance in Table 6, we observe an inverse relationship to tenure and a 
positive relationship to dependents. Earnings increase faster than pre 
miums with tenure, but education raises the premium relative to total 
compensation. The former result suggests the limitations of trading 
benefits for wages as total compensation increases. The latter result
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Table 5 Regression Results of Compensation 
Equations: Wives Without 
Insurance and Husbands With 
Insurance, Coefficients (^-statistics)3
Variable
CONSTANT
NONEARNED 
INCOME
DEP
ADL
AGE
BLACK
EDUCATION
PROF
MANUF
SOUTH
MSA
TENURE
LAMBDA
R2
n
Hourly wage
2.49 
(2.67)
4.4E-05 
(8.07)
-0.139 
(-1.32)
037 
(0.33)
-0.007 
(-0.49)
-0.181 
(-0.42)
0.22 
(4.29)
1.92 
(5.13)
0.37 
(0.33)
-0.57 
(-1-95)
142 
(4.65)
0.132 
(4.89)
-0.34 
(-1.37)
0.10 
974
Earnings
-9,390.85 
(-5.02)
0.065 
(5.94)
-431.49 
(-2.04)
-879.22 
(-0.35)
-15.03 
(-0.49)
8.83 
(0.01)
672.46 
(6.35)
1,712.02 
(2.33)
-80.45 
(-0.09)
800.55 
(1.37)
1,693.37 
(2.78)
224.24 
(440)
540.48 
(1.09)
0.17 
974
a The model contains a dummy variable for missing 
data on TENURE.
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Table 6 Regression Results of Compensation Equations: Wives With 
Insurance and Husbands With Insurance, Coefficients 
(^-statistics)3
Variable
CONSTANT
NONEARNED 
INCOME
DEP
ADL
AGE
BLACK
EDUCATION
PROF
MANUF
SOUTH
MSA
TENURE
LAMBDA
R2
n
Hourly 
wage
212 
(2.03)
2.2E-05 
(3.51)
-0.14 
(-1.41)
1.32 
(0.95)
0.01 
(0.47)
0.55 
(1.51)
0.36 
(6.12)
1.08 
(2.41)
-0.24 
(-0.69)
-0.91 
(-3.08)
0.91 
(2.86)
0.12 
(5.09)
-0.18 
(-0.29)
0.19 
816
Earnings
-168.62 
(-5.79)
0.08
(4.77)
-3.02.22 
(-0.37)
8,712.42 
(0.37)
50.92 
(1.09)
1,119.67 
(1.07)
1,359.11 
(8.14)
-117.18 
(-0.11)
-1,455.08 
(-1.48)
-3.02 
(-0.37)
1,966.65 
(2.18)
186.22 
(2.76)
^28.36 
(0.29)
0.23 
816
Comp
-2,954.70 
(-3.64)
0.06 
(2.48)
142.28 
(0.31)
-892.58 
(-0.44)
3.98 
(0.37)
987.53 
(2.16)
1,285.97 
(6.34)
55.16 
(0.64)
-887.97 
(-0.74)
-376.89 
(-0.38)
2,208.22 
(1.89)
978.53 
(0.72)
-417.08 
(-0.22)
0.24 
584
Employer 
share
0.15 
(6.64)
-5.4E-08 
(-0.44)
4.0E-03 
(1.67)
-0.02 
(-0.37)
l.OE-03 
(0.33)
l.OE-03 
(-1.82)
-0.34 
(-0.24)
-0.002 
(-1.41)
-0.01 
(-0.37)
-0.01 
(-0.37)
-0.05 
(-0.54)
-0.01 
(-2.20)
0.0002 
(0.24)
0.22 
565
Premium/ 
comp
0.02 
(6.55)
3.01E-08 
(0.21)
0.02 
(1.70)
-0.01 
(-0.42)
5.5E-05 
(0.13)
0.01 
(0.45)
4.0E-03 
(3.07)
-0.02 
(-1.71°
(0.01 
(-0.42)
-0.10 
(-0.42)
-3.04E-04 
(-0.40)
-1 OE-04 
(-1.83)
0.0003 
(0.24)
0.06 
634
a The model contains a dummy vanable for missing data on TENURE.
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implies more educated women may demand greater amounts of cover 
age on the job. We have controlled for age, the wife's disabilities 
(measured by ADLs), and other income sources. Thus, the link 
between education and selecting higher levels of coverage appears as a 
direct one. Such a link is consistent with research on consumption of 
medical services, suggesting that the higher productivity in health pro 
duction caused by additional education is offset by greater demand 
(see, for example, Newhouse 1993).
In Tables 7 and 8, we examine the outcomes for uninsured women 
married to men without health insurance. Since no feasible substitute 
exists, household demand for insurance must be met through the wife's 
job. These women should be more responsive to the offer of insurance 
than wives whose families obtain insurance through the husband's job. 
First, we look at uninsured women in Table 7. Again, we do not find 
the selectivity term to be significant, and standard human capital fac 
tors explain hourly wages or earnings (e.g., education, tenure, MS A 
residency). Earnings on the current job are also positively related to 
other income.
The most interesting effects of employment/insurance choices are 
found in Table 8. They pertain to insured women married to men with 
out health insurance. The selection terms are significant in all equa 
tions, those explaining elements of compensation and those explaining 
premium shares. In each case the selection term is signed depending 
upon the covariance of working with insurance and the continuous 
dependent variable in the second stage. All elements of compensation 
fall with greater values of LAMBDA, suggesting a willingness to trade 
compensation for access to health insurance. The coefficient of 
LAMBDA, the selection term, is negative in the equation explaining 
the employer share of total compensation but positive for the ratio of 
total premiums to compensation. Because the difference between total 
premiums and the employer share is paid by the employee, it appears 
that at least some of the net gain accruing to women who select longer 
hours shows up in the employee's (taxable) portion of the premium. 
Taken together, these results imply that wives who select jobs that are 
tied to insurance earn less than the would otherwise earn and receive 
lower annualized compensation than they would otherwise attain. 
Moreover, they are even willing to settle for a relatively smaller portion 
of compensation in the form of nontaxed employer spending on health
344 Hunt-McCool, McCool, and Dor
Table 7 Regression Results of Compensation 
Equations: Wives Without Insurance 
and Husbands Without Insurance, 
Coefficients (^-statistics)3
Variable
CONSTANT
NONEARNED 
INCOME
DEP
ADL
AGE
BLACK
EDUCATION
PROF
MANUF
SOUTH
MSA
TENURE
LAMBDA
R2
n
Hourly wage
3.14 
(2.21)
1. IE-05 
(109)
-0.16 
(-1.17)
-1.09 
(-0.28)
-0.02 
(-084)
-0.39 
(-0.61)
0.23 
(3.09)
1.54 
(2.00)
0.27 
(0.42)
0.43 
(0.92)
1.25 
(2.23)
0.39
(3.21)
-0.46 
(-0.42)
0.06
323
Earnings
-1,689.98 
(-1.05)
0.02 
(1.97)
-166.29 
(-1.06)
-102.67 
(-0.25)
-7.82 
(-0.32)
368.62 
(0.51)
184.83 
(2.17)
35.97 
(0.04)
1,156.92 
(1.59)
-105.16 
(-0.20)
-133.80 
(-0.21)
155.83 
(2.04)
-277.37 
(-0-19)
0.18 
292
1 The model contains a dummy variable for missing 
data on TENURE.
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Table 8 Regression Results of Compensation Equation: Wives With 
Insurance and Husbands Without Insurance, Coefficients 
(^-statistics)3
Variable
CONSTANT
NONEARNED 
INCOME
DEP
ADL
AGE
BLACK
EDUCATION
PROF
MANUF
SOUTH
MSA
TENURE
LAMBDA
R2
n
Hourly 
wage
-0.08 
(-0.06)
1.9E-05
(2.52)
0.15 
(1.06)
-3.17 
-(0.95)
-0.04 
(-2.06)
-0.04 
(-0.08)
-0.08 
(-0.06)
0.39 
(0.87)
090 
(2.08)
-1.11 
(-3.17)
-1.25 
(-3.16)
016
(5.57)
-2.97 
(-2.42)
0.30 
547
Earnings
-11,283 
(-3.09)
0.05
(2.22)
370.09 
(-0.95)
-334.32 
(-0.17)
27.47 
(0.49)
^,440.41 
(-3.30)
-1-.511.63 
(-8.18)
-286.05 
(-0.23)
2,737.21 
(2.71)
376.63 
(0.39)
3,025.24 
(2.71)
255.56 
(3.14)
-17,013 
(-5.01)
0.28 
497
Comp
-9,558.97 
(-2.11)
0.06
(2.48)
142.28 
(0.31)
-892.58 
(-0.44)
-17.86 
(-0.27)
-3,479.51 
(-3-47)
1,598 63 
(6.72)
-1,515.59 
(-1.04)
2,621.28 
(1.69)
519.69 
(0.46)
3,079.95 
(2.30)
230.18 
(2.42)
-16,487 
(-4.03)
0.29 
395
Employer 
share
8.02 
(7.67)
-9.8E-08 
(-0.97)
-0.01 
(-0.75)
-0.03 
(-1 57)
-0.01 
(-4-32)
-0.01 
(-1.03)
-0.08 
(-7.05)
-0.01 
(-0.66) •
9.0E-04 
(0.08)
0.01 
(0.66)
0.01 
(0.72)
1.9E-05 
(0.03)
-0.07 
(-1.99)
0.11 
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Premium/ 
comp
0.32 
(8.37)
-2.3E-06 
(-2.71)
-3.0E-04 
(-0.02)
-0.85 
(-0.70)
2.0E-05 
(0.09)
0.04 
(0.93)
-0.05 
(-6.51)
0.04 
(0.93)
-0.01 
(-0.16)
-0.10 
(-0.18)
-0.02 
(-0.46)
-0.10 
(-0.18)
0.39 
(2.12)
0.06
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a The model contains a dummy variable for missing data on TENURE.
346 Hunt-McCool, McCool, and Dor
insurance premiums. When given the choice, women whose husbands 
are not covered on the job will prefer jobs tied to insurance offers, 
despite certain costs. It appears that at least one motivation for select 
ing such jobs is access to health insurance.
CONCLUSIONS: IT'S AS EASY TO FALL IN LOVE WITH A 
MAN WITH HEALTH INSURANCE ...
Our findings confirm the important work of Moffitt and Wolfe and 
the suggestions of others that labor supply is affected by insurance 
offerings. Women in the United States appear to have two options to 
obtain covers, the "correct" marriage or full-time work. Thus, the 
Canadian system appears to be less intrusive than the U.S. system of 
health care delivery, at least in terms of labor supply and, therefore, the 
household's optimal division of time.
While health benefits in the United States and Canada have both 
suffered from rising costs, the U.S. system also leaves prominent gaps 
in coverage (see, for example, Levitt, Olin, and Letsch 1992; Wood- 
bury and Bettinger 1993). We have investigated only part of this prob 
lem—the necessity to constrain hours of work to some minimum 
before a worker becomes eligible for health insurance. Indirect evi 
dence about the sufficiency of full-time work as a means of obtaining 
insurance may be discerned by comparing wives who hold insurance 
with wives who do not. Part-time versus full-time work also predicts 
the returns to education in the form of wages. Wages range from about 
22 to 23 cents per hour per year of schooling for wives working with 
out insurance (Tables 5 and 7). In contrast, for other wives, a year of 
schooling generates 36 to 50 cents extra an hour (Tables 6 and 8). 
Arguing that obtaining insurance through full-time work is a viable 
option for all women may be equivalent to arguing that all women can 
attain high-wage jobs.
What we have been able to demonstrate is that health insurance 
affects the labor-supply decision and that a trade-off appears to occur 
between insurance and wage compensation—at least for one U.S. pop 
ulation subgroup, wives who are the sole source of health insurance for
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their families. Presumably, they represent the conditions under which 
the majority of U.S. workers operate.
Since their complement, wives whose husbands have health insur 
ance, depict the Canadian case, we conclude that at least some Canadi 
ans are likely to choose to work fewer hours than their U.S. counter 
parts, other things equal. The equality of other things depends particu 
larly upon whether, in which direction, and by how much the health 
insurance financing scheme in Canada affects labor compensation. 
Crude evidence suggests that U.S. workers do spend more time than 
Canadians in labor supply. If a part of this extra effort results from 
constraints of the health delivery system, social welfare is also 
reduced.
Notes
The views in this chapter do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. General Account 
ing Office. We are indebted to William Alpert and Paul Menchik, whose careful com 
ments and advice contributed substantially to the development of this chapter.
1. In fact, more women than men are covered by health insurance in the United 
States. The disproportionate coverage by women occurs through public coverage. 
Adult enrollers in Medicaid and Medicare are disproportionately female, and 
women are more often than men covered as dependents on group policies.
2. Until recently, little empirical evidence has supported its existence. High-wage 
workers also tend to have generous benefits, and it is difficult to disentangle all 
aspects of employment in secondary databases (see Ehrenberg and Smith 1983).
3. In the example we present, we do not deal with issues of joint labor supply by 
family members. Instead, we act as if male labor supply decision is predeter 
mined and see how this insurance coverage affects the wife's decision to work.
4. We also tested the effect of the husband's health insurance coverage on the wife's 
labor supply using an alternative multinomial choice model. All wives were 
pooled and the choices they faced involved full-time work, part-time work, and no 
work. A dichotomous variable for the insurance status of the husband was 
included as an explanatory variable. Coverage for the husband was found to be a 
significant inverse predictor of female labor supply. Because we can only observe 
insurance premiums for those who obtain insurance, we could not use such a 
model to determine if trade-offs between wages and health insurance exist, as we 
can in the alternative approach presented here.
5. ADLs stands for Activities of Daily Living. These include maintenance activities 
such as bathing, dressing, and eating. The number of ADLs is the number of 
activities a person is unable to perform and is therefore a measure of disability.
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Changes in the size distribution of income during the 1980s have 
resulted in a proliferation of new research on the distribution of income 
and earnings (for a review of the work through the 1980s, see Levy and 
Murnane 1992). Most of the recent work has focused on explaining 
increased earnings inequality in the United States during the 1980s, 
although Raj and Slottje (1994) found that the trend of increasing ine 
quality extends back further.
Far less is known about the size distribution once employer-pro 
vided nonwage benefits are taken into account. It is well-known, how 
ever, that employee benefits are a significant part of total compen 
sation—voluntarily provided employee benefits such as pensions, 
health insurance, and life insurance accounted for 9.2 percent of all 
employer expenditures for employee compensation in 1994, and 
legally required employee benefits such as Social Security, unemploy 
ment insurance, and workers' compensation accounted for another 7.4 
percent of compensation expenditures (U.S. Department of Commerce 
1998). Two issues need to be explored: 1) whether the picture of 
income inequality would change if employee benefits were taken into 
account and 2) whether changes in the mix of total compensation have 
occurred concurrently with changes in income inequality, hence alter 
ing the picture of changes in inequality over time.
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The basic difficulty faced by researchers who would like to include 
employee benefits in estimates of income distribution is that few exist 
ing household surveys record the employer contribution in dollar terms 
for major voluntarily provided benefits, such as health insurance and 
pensions. It is now relatively common for household surveys to record 
whether a worker is covered by an employer-provided health insurance 
or pension plan—for example, the Current Population Survey (CPS), 
National Longitudinal Surveys, and Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
all include questions on health insurance and pension plan coverage at 
least periodically. Coverage data are little help, however, in gaining an 
understanding of how employer provision of benefits (or changes over 
time in that provision) might bear on the size distribution of income (or 
changes over time in that distribution).
The lack of household data on employer contributions for fringe 
benefits explains the scarcity of research on how benefits bear on the 
size distribution of income. In what is, to our knowledge, the first 
attempt to examine the issue, Tim Smeeding (1983) linked establish 
ment data on benefit contributions from the Survey of Employer 
Expenditures for Employee Compensation (EEEC) to household data 
from the CPS, thereby imputing the dollar benefit contributions made 
in behalf of individual workers. Lack of data directly linking a worker 
to employer contributions in that worker's name necessitated such an 
imputation procedure, although it is clearly a less than ideal way of 
understanding how benefits bear on income distribution.
In this chapter, we attempt to improve on Smeeding's work in three 
ways. First, we make use of two household surveys that provide data 
on concurrent health insurance contributions, accumulated pension 
contributions made by an employer in a worker's name, or the pension 
benefits that a worker can expect to receive from participation in the 
pension plan of a current or past employer. The direct link between a 
worker and his or her employee benefits is clearly a desirable improve 
ment. Second, we examine inequality in both the joint distribution of 
total compensation and the marginal distributions of the income com 
ponents. In particular, we present a decomposition of the Gini inequal 
ity coefficient that gives a rough idea of the contribution of each 
component of compensation to overall inequality. Third, by using 
more recent data, we are able to draw inferences on whether and how
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the role of benefits in contributing to income inequality changed over 
the decade of the 1980s.
Others have attempted improvements on Smeeding's work as well, 
although most have focused exclusively on the effect of pensions on 
the distribution of income and wealth. For example, Benedict and 
Shaw (1995) used the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) to 
examine how annual pension accruals (calculated as the annual 
increase in the present value of pension wealth) affect the distribution 
of earnings. They found that pensions increased annual income ine 
quality slightly in 1983. (Our work using the 1983 and 1989 SCF, 
reported below, differs from that of Shaw and Benedict by focusing on 
pension wealth—and changes in pension wealth—between 1983 and 
1989.) Several others, including Weicher (1997), Wolff (1994), and 
Kennickell and Sunden (1997), have done work yielding results that 
can be compared with those in our fourth section, and we draw those 
comparisons below.
The chapter is organized as follows. In the first section, we briefly 
describe the measures we use to make inferences about inequality. In 
particular, we develop the decomposition of the well-known Gini coef 
ficient. We show that inequality can be decomposed by component of 
compensation into inequality within each component of compensation 
and inequality across components. We use the Gini coefficient to make 
these decompositions meaningful within and across components of 
compensation.
The second section presents results on the distribution of compen 
sation using current contributions to health insurance and pensions 
from an old establishment data set—the 1977 EEEC survey. Oddly 
enough, the EEEC remains the most recent establishment-level data 
available. (The establishment-level data underlying the Employment 
Cost Index have never been made available to researchers.) Although 
dated, the 1977 EEEC do provide a useful benchmark because they are 
the data on which Smeeding's inferences were based.
The third section examines the distribution of personal income and 
employer contributions to health insurance plans using the 1977 
National Medical Care Expenditure Survey (NMCES) and the 1987 
National Medical Expenditure Survey (NMES). These two surveys 
were fielded to improve understanding of a broad array of health care 
issues, but they can also be used to obtain estimates of the extent to
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which employer contributions to health insurance plans increase or 
decrease the distribution of compensation.
In the fourth section, we develop estimates of wealth inequality 
using the 1983 and 1989 SCF. Much previous work on wealth inequal 
ity has been based on the SCF (see, for example, Kennickell and 
Sunden 1997; Weicher 1995, 1997; Wolff 1987, 1994, 1996), and we 
attempt to expand on this work by adding private pension wealth and 
Social Security wealth to the measurement of wealth inequality. We 
argue that, for two reasons, wealth holdings provide the proper context 
in which to examine the influence of employer-provided pensions on 
inequality in the distribution of compensation. First, annual pension 
contributions in behalf of an individual worker are frequently unob- 
servable (as with defined-benefit plans). Second, when annual contri 
butions are observable (as with defined-contribution plans), they may 
vary from year to year in ways that have little to do with the ultimate 
generosity of the retirement income to be derived from a pension plan. 
(The argument for using pension wealth and Social Security wealth in 
gauging the extent to which pensions contribute to inequality is similar 
to the argument for using Social Security wealth and pension wealth in 
analyzing retirement incentives; see, for example, Burkhauser and 
Quinn 1983; Quinn and Burkhauser 1983.)
One disclaimer needs to be made at the outset. We have not 
attempted to adjust the dollar contributions to health insurance or pen 
sion plans to reflect the "value" to the worker of those contributions. 
Since there are both tax advantages and scale advantages to receiving 
health insurance and pensions from an employer, dollar contributions 
by an employer may understate the value to workers of employer-pro 
vided nonwage benefits (see, for example, Smeeding 1983, pp. 243- 
245; Famulari and Manser 1989). We defer an examination of these 
valuation issues for the time being.
INEQUALITY MEASURES AND A DECOMPOSITION OF 
THE GINI COEFFICIENT
In this chapter, we use three measures of inequality: 1) the percent 
age of compensation (or a component of compensation) received by
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the top 5 percent, 10 percent, and 20 percent of the size distribution, 2) 
the coefficient of variation, and 3) the Gini coefficient, including a 
decomposition of the Gini. Although other measures of inequality 
could be used, all three of these measures (except for the Gini decom 
position to be developed next) are well understood and should provide 
useful estimates of the extent of inequality of total compensation and 
its components. (For an accessible discussion of a variety of other ine 
quality measures, see Cowell 1977.)
As already mentioned, a decomposition of the Gini coefficient is 
useful in showing how changes in the distribution of employee benefits 
have influenced the distribution of total compensation. Yitzhaki (1983) 
has shown that the Gini coefficient can be written as:
G(JC) = 2 cov[jt, F(*)] / n* (1)
where F(x) is the cumulative distribution of x, and \LX is the mean of jc. 
Note that this formulation is similar to the coefficient of variation: writ 
ing the variance as cov(jc, jc), the coefficient of variation is cov(;t, x)m -r
M*-
Suppose now that total compensation (x) is composed of wage and
salary earnings (w) and employee benefits (b}\
x = w + b (2)
Since cov(w + b, z) = cov(w, z) + cov(b, z), where z is a random vari 
able, the Gini coefficient can be decomposed as follows:
G(JC) = 2 cov[w, F(*)] / M* + 2 cov[fc, F(jt)] / \JLX (3) 
Now multiply the first term by the following well-chosen 1,
cov[w, F(w)](lvv / cov[w, F(w)]\iw (4)
where |ix is the mean of w, and multiply the second term by a similar 
well-chosen 1,
, F(b)] M* (5)
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where [ib is the mean of b, and rearrange terms to obtain
cov[w, F(x)] 2 cov[w, F(w)] \iw (6)Lf(X) = ——————————• ———————————— •—— v '
cov[w,
| c
cov[b, F(b)] \\, b (I x
The first part of the first term {cov[w, F(x)] I cov[w, F(w)]} is the 
Gini correlation coefficient of w (wage and salary earnings) with x 
(total compensation), which we denote R^ This correlation has a mix 
ture of properties of the Pearson and Spearman rank correlation coeffi 
cients. Specifically, it is Pearson in w and Spearman in x. The second 
part of the first term (2 cov[w, F(w)] I \\,w ] is the Gini coefficient of w, 
which we denote Gw. The third part of the first term (\\,w I \JLX) is the 
share of wage and salary earnings in total compensation, which we 
denote S^ Defining Rb as the Gini correlation coefficient of employee 
benefits (b) with total compensation, Gb as the Gini coefficient of 
employee benefits, and Sb as the share of employee benefits in total 
compensation, we can rewrite Eq. 6 as follows:
That is, the contribution of each component of compensation to the 
inequality of total compensation equals the Gini correlation between 
that component and total compensation (/?,), multiplied by that compo 
nent's Gini coefficient (G(), multiplied by that component's share of 
total compensation (5,).
FINDINGS FROM THE SURVEY OF EMPLOYER 
EXPENDITURES FOR EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION (EEEC)
The EEEC was a survey of establishments conducted by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics from 1966 through 1977. The 1977 EEEC 
sampled 3,320 establishments of all sizes in order to obtain detailed 
data on wages and employer contributions to employee benefit plans.
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From our standpoint, the main advantage of the EEEC is that it 
includes data on dollar expenditures by the employer on health insur 
ance and pension plans, as opposed to just employee benefit coverage. 
Hence, it allows one to examine inequality in the distribution of three 
components of compensation: wages and salaries (or payroll), 
employer contributions to health insurance (a category that includes 
life insurance in the EEEC), and employer contributions to pensions.
We derive inequality estimates from a sample of 5,714 groups of 
workers from the 1977 EEEC. It is important to understand that, 
although the EEEC are establishment-level data, we actually observe 
workers disaggregated into two groups in each establishment: blue-col 
lar workers and white-collar workers. Hence, the unit of observation is 
not the establishment per se, but either a group of blue-collar workers 
or a group of white-collar workers observed in an establishment 
included in the EEEC survey.
Table 1 displays the basic results on the distribution of total com 
pensation from the 1977 EEEC. The average payroll per worker of 
establishments in the survey was just over $12,500, average contribu 
tions to health and life insurance were nearly $550, and average pen 
sion contributions were just over $550. As Table 1 shows, the median 
level of each of the three components is lower than the mean, suggest 
ing positively skewed distributions.
All the measures of inequality—shares of the top 5 percent, 10 per 
cent, and 20 percent, as well as the coefficient of variation and the 
Gini—suggest that payroll earnings are the most equally distributed 
component of compensation and that pension contributions are the 
least equally distributed component. This finding accords with Smeed- 
ing's (1983) basic finding although, as already noted, Smeeding linked 
the EEEC data with individual CPS data.
The evidence suggests that health insurance and pension contribu 
tions are highly correlated with total compensation—the Gini correla 
tion coefficient between health contributions and total compensation is 
0.75, and that between pension contributions and total compensation is 
0.76. The findings suggest, then, that health and pension contributions 
both tend to increase the overall inequality of total compensation: the 
Gini coefficient for payroll is 0.265, whereas the Gini for total com 
pensation is slightly higher, 0.277.
Table 1 Distribution of Total Compensation, 1977
Share of total
Mean ($) _______ % Share of _______ Coefficient Gini Gini compensation 
____________ (std. dev ) Median ($) Top 5% Top 10% Top 20% of variation correlation coefficient ____ (%) 
Total compensation 13,688 n^ lu ^ ^ Qm _
™ n '898 10- 8 19 - 3 34 - 2 °-481 °-995 0265 91.9 (6,040)
Health and life , . . >44- 
insurance 423 177 29.7 48.4 0.899 0.749 0473 4.0
contributions
PenS1°" . ^l, 267 26.5 42.6 64.7 1383 0.760 0657 4.1 contributions (770)
SOURCE: Authors' tabulations of 1977 EEEC data on 5,714 worker groups in 3,320 establishments.
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FINDINGS ON HEALTH INSURANCE FROM THE MEDICAL 
EXPENDITURE SURVEYS
In this section, we examine two surveys that combine data on the 
income of individuals with data on employer contributions to health 
insurance that were made for an individual. The first is the 1977 
National Medical Care Expenditure Survey (NMCES), and the second 
is the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey (NMES). Our goal 
is to understand the distribution of employer contributions to health 
insurance and the extent to which that distribution adds to or subtracts 
from overall inequality in the distribution of compensation.
Data Sources
The National Medical Care Expenditure Survey (NMCES) is a 
1977-1978 survey of roughly 14,000 households. It was designed to 
obtain data on the health status, access to health care, and health insur 
ance coverage of a representative sample of the civilian, noninstitu- 
tional U.S. population. The NMCES has two parts. The first part—a 
household survey—contains standard data on demographic character 
istics and personal income, as well as the data on health status and 
access to health care that were the primary reasons for conducting the 
survey (Kasper, Walden, and Wilson 1983). The second part—the 
Health Insurance/Employer Survey (or HIES)—is a supplement to the 
NMCES that is highly unusual in that it includes data obtained from 
employers on premiums paid for the health insurance of each covered 
worker in the sample (Cantor 1986).
The National Medical Expenditure Survey (NMES) is a 1987 sur 
vey of roughly 14,000 households whose purpose was the same as the 
1977 NMCES (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1991). 
Like the NMCES, the 1987 NMES includes both a household survey 
and a supplement—the Health Insurance Plan Survey (or HIPS)—that 
includes data on the characteristics of the employer-provided health 
insurance (if any) covering each worker in the sample. As with the 
NMCES, these data were collected from employers and include the 
premiums paid by employers for health insurance.
Data on workers' wages and salaries are nonexistent in the 1977 
NMCES sample and limited in the 1987 NMES sample, a drawback
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when using these data sets for the purposes we have in mind. We are 
forced to use personal income from all sources as a proxy for wage and 
salary earnings. The availability of accurate data on employer contri 
butions to health insurance is the overriding reason for using these data 
sets.
To examine how employer-provided health insurance contributed 
to inequality in the distribution of compensation, we select samples of 
workers aged 25 and over who were employed full-year from the 1977 
NMCES and 1987 NMES. We have attempted to create samples that 
are as comparable as possible, but the questions on employment in the 
two surveys differ somewhat. Specifically, the 1977 NMCES includes 
a single variable indicating whether a worker was "continuously 
employed," whereas the 1987 NMES includes a series of questions 
(and variables) in each of four survey rounds on whether the worker 
was employed or unemployed and the number of weeks of employ 
ment. For the 1977 NMCES, we have included workers in the sample 
who are defined as "employed all year." (The definition of this variable 
is rather problematic. It appears to include both workers who were 
employed continuously during 1977 and workers who were employed 
at some time during 1977 but whose employment continuity was 
unknown.) In the 1987 NMES, we have included individuals who 
worked 48 or more weeks during 1987. It is impossible to know pre 
cisely how comparable these two sets of inclusion criteria are, but we 
believe that, given the survey questions, we have created two samples 
that are as comparable as possible. Ultimately, we have used a sample 
of 7,963 workers from the 1977 NMCES and a sample of 6,009 work 
ers from the 1987 NMES. (For the 1977 NMCES, we use the WTINSP 
weight; for the 1987 NMES, we use the INCALPER weight.)
Findings
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics and various measures of the 
inequality of employer contributions to health insurance, personal 
income, and total compensation for 1977 (from the NMCES) and 1987 
(from the NMES). As already noted, because the NMCES does not 
include information on wage and salary earnings, we define total com 
pensation here as personal income plus employer contributions to 
health insurance.
Table 2 Distribution of Personal Income and Employer Contributions to Health Insurance, 1977 and 1987
NMCES (1977)
Total compensation
Personal Income
Employer 
contributions to 
health insurance
NMES (1987)
Total compensation
Personal income
Employer 
contributions to 
health insurance
Mean($) 
(std. dev.)
14,120 
(13,238)
13,705 
(13,141)
415 
(527)
27,547 
(24,598)
26,334 
(24,265)
1,213 
(1,321)
Share of total 
% Share of Coefficient Gmi Gmi compensation
Median ($) Top 5% Top 10% Top 20% of variation correlation coefficient
11,683 19.8 296 44.9 0.938 - 0.403
11,150 20.2 30.1 45.4 0.959 0.999 0.407
243 22.7 37.4 60.4 1.270 0.434 0634
23,000 17.6 27.4 42.9 0.893 - 0.375
21,802 18.1 28.0 43.5 0.921 0998 0.381
873 19.4 32.7 54.1 1.088 0.479 0.569
(%)
100.0
97.1
2.9
100.0
95.6
4.4
SOURCE: Authors' computations from samples of workers aged 25 or older and employed "full-year" in the 1977 National Medical 
Care Expenditures Survey (Af=7,963) and the 1987 National Medical Expenditures Survey (Af=6,009).
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In 1977, the average personal income of full-year workers aged 25 
and over in the NMCES was about $13,700 (in current dollars), and the 
average employer contribution to health insurance was slightly over 
$400. In 1987, the average personal income of full-year workers aged 
25 and over in the NMES was about $26,300 (in current dollars), and 
the average employer contribution to health insurance was about 
$1,200. Thus, in 1977 employer contributions to health insurance 
made up 2.9 percent of what we are denning as total compensation 
(personal income plus employer contributions to health insurance), 
whereas in 1987 employer contributions to health insurance were 4.4 
percent of total compensation. This roughly 50 percent growth in the 
share of compensation accounted for by health insurance closely mir 
rors the economy-wide growth in the share of total compensation 
accounted for by employer contributions to health insurance observed 
in the National Income and Product Accounts from 1977 to 1987 (U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis 1998).
In both 1977 and 1987, the median personal income and the 
median employer contribution to health insurance are well below the 
means for either of these variables in both years, suggesting positively 
skewed distributions.
Figures on the share of personal income and of contributions to 
health insurance going to workers in the top 5 percent, 10 percent, and 
20 percent of the size distribution clearly show that, in both 1977 and 
1987, personal income was more equally distributed than employer 
contributions to health insurance. The coefficients of variation and the 
Gini coefficients for personal income and employer contributions to 
health insurance provide the same inference.
However, total compensation is more equally distributed than 
either personal income or employer contributions to health insurance. 
The Gini coefficients for personal income are 0.407 (in 1977) and 
0.381 (in 1987), and the Ginis for employer contributions to health 
insurance are 0.634 (in 1977) and 0.569 (in 1988). The Ginis for total 
compensation, however, are slightly lower than the Ginis for either 
component—0.403 (in 1977) and 0.375 (in 1987). That is, even 
though employer contributions to health insurance were more 
unequally distributed than personal income in both 1977 and 1987, 
health contributions were distributed so as to slightly lower overall ine 
quality. Similar inferences follow from an examination of the coeffi-
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cients of variation and shares of total compensation going to the top 5, 
10, and 20 percent of individuals. The distribution of health insurance 
contributions reduces the inequality of the distribution of total compen 
sation, even though it is less equally distributed than personal income.
The finding that total compensation is more equally distributed 
than its components suggests both the importance of micro data in 
drawing inferences about compensation inequality and the usefulness 
of the Gini decomposition. Also, it accords with the rather low correla 
tions between total compensation and health contributions—the Gini 
correlation coefficients of health contributions with total compensation 
are just 0.434 (in 1977) and 0.479 (in 1987).
The finding from both the NMCES and the NMES that health con 
tributions are more unequally distributed than personal income accords 
(in a rough way) with the finding from the EEEC establishment data 
that health contributions are more unequally distributed than is payroll. 
But the conclusion from the NMCES and NMES that health contribu 
tions decrease overall inequality is counter to the analogous finding 
from the EEEC establishment data. The result suggests both the 
importance of micro data in drawing inferences about compensation 
inequality and the usefulness of the Gini decomposition.
In contrast to many studies of wage and income inequality in the 
1980s, the NMCES and NMES suggest that the distribution of personal 
income became somewhat more equal between 1977 and 1987. (On 
the distribution of earnings, see Levy and Murnane 1992; on the distri 
bution of personal income, see Raj and Slottje 1994.) Given the pre 
ponderance of evidence that the distribution of earnings and income 
became less equal during the 1980s, we are unwilling to place much 
weight on this interyear comparison. It seems likely that the result is 
due to the difficulty we had in creating comparable samples of workers 
from the NMCES and NMES. In other words, the finding that personal 
income inequality fell between 1977 and 1987 should probably be 
viewed as an artifact of the way we had to draw our samples.
To summarize, employer contributions to health insurance in both 
1977 and 1987 were far less equally distributed than personal income 
among full-year workers aged 25 and older. However, although very 
unequal, the distribution of employer contributions to health insurance 
was such that it slightly lowered the distribution of total compensation
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(defined as the sum of personal income and employer contributions to 
health insurance).
FINDINGS ON RETIREMENT BENEFITS AND WEALTH 
DISTRIBUTION FROM THE SCF
In analyzing the EEEC data, we took the annual employer contri 
bution to the pension plan as an accurate reflection of the pension 
plan's generosity. But the annual contribution may vary from year to 
year depending on changes in the performance of the pension plan's 
assets or in changes in actuarial assumptions. Hence, the annual con 
tribution to a pension plan may be a poor reflection of the plan's gener 
osity, understood as the stream of retirement income that the pension 
plan ultimately will yield. In order to obtain a more accurate picture of 
how pensions contribute to individual inequality, it is necessary to con 
sider the asset value of a pension plan—that is, the present value of the 
promised future income stream to be derived from the pension.
In this section, we use the 1983 and 1989 Surveys of Consumer 
Finances (SCF) to examine the distribution of retirement and nonretire- 
ment wealth (Kennickell and Shack-Marquez 1992; Fries, 
Starr-McCluer, and Sunden 1998). We construct estimates of both pri 
vate pension wealth and Social Security wealth and compare the distri 
bution of these with the distribution of other more conventional forms 
of wealth, such as housing and business assets. Our premise is that 
wealth holdings provide the proper context in which to examine the 
influence of employer-provided pensions on inequality.
Data Sources and Variable Construction
The 1983 and 1989 SCFs are a natural choice for studies of the dis 
tribution of wealth, and they have been used in previous work on 
wealth inequality (Wolff 1987,1994, 1996, 1998; Weicher 1995, 1997; 
Kennickell and Sunden 1997). The SCF is an extensive survey 
designed to estimate the wealth holdings of a representative sample of 
households in the United States. It includes information on pensions 
and retirement wealth, as well as data on conventional asset holdings
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such as property and financial wealth. In addition, the SCF includes 
retrospective data on the employment histories of both the respondent 
and spouse (if present).
The main strength of the SCF, from our standpoint, is its data on 
asset holdings and coverage by private pension plans. Although asset 
holdings and pension coverage are self-reported, inspection of the 
questionnaire and the asset and pension data themselves suggest that 
considerable lengths were taken to obtain a consistent picture of house 
holds' assets and pension expectations. Also, the SCF's employment 
data are sufficient to construct a reasonable approximation to Social 
Security wealth, as described below.
We draw samples of households from the 1983 and 1989 SCFs that 
mirror those used by Feldstein (1976) in his pioneering study of Social 
Security wealth. That is, we examine all households in which there 
was a male aged 35 to 64 present. This basic selection criterion yields 
samples of 1,721 households in 1983 and 1,572 in 1989.
Three forms of wealth are of main interest to us: 1) private pension 
wealth, 2) Social Security wealth, and 3) nonretirement wealth. The 
first two are the main forms of retirement wealth held by households, 
and the third includes all forms of conventional (or nonretirement) 
wealth. We discuss the construction of variables measuring each in 
turn.
Private Pension Wealth. The present value of expected annual 
pension benefits for which a household is eligible represents that 
household's private pension wealth. Private pension wealth must be 
computed separately for defined-benefit and defined-contribution pen 
sion plans.
For defined-benefit pension plans, we have calculated the present 
value of 1) pension benefits that are expected in the future from current 
employment, 2) pension benefits that are expected in the future from 
past employment, and 3) pension benefits currently being received 
from past employment.
For both men and women expecting to receive a defined-benefit 
pension from a current job or jobs, we use the self-reported age of 
expected pension receipt and the annual pension amount to calculate a 
present value of the flow of future pension receipts from the expected 
age at which benefits begin until age 100. We adjust each year's bene-
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fit amount for the probability of death based on the worker's gender 
and age at which the benefit would be received (National Center for 
Health Statistics 1984). We subtract the present value of employee 
contributions (also adjusted for the probability of death) from the cur 
rent year until the expected retirement age. Benefits and contributions 
are discounted back to the present (1983 or 1989) at a rate of 9 percent 
(the Federal Funds rate in both 1983 and 1989).
For both men and women expecting to receive a defined-benefit 
pension from a past job or jobs, the procedure is similar. We again cal 
culate a present value of the flow of future pension receipts from the 
age when benefits are expected to begin until age 100, adjusting for the 
probability of death in each year. We subtract the present value of 
employee contributions (again adjusted for the probability of death) 
and again use a discount rate of 9 percent.
For both men and women who are currently receiving pensions, we 
calculate a present value of the flow of future pension receipts from the 
current age until age 100, using a 9 percent discount rate and adjusting 
for the probability of death in each year.
For defined-contribution pension plans, we follow Wolff (1987), 
McDermed, Clark, and Alien (1989), and Kennickell and Sunden 
(1997) in using the current amount reported in a worker's defined-con 
tribution account as the measure of pension wealth. The dollar amount 
in any profit-sharing plan held by the individual is also included as 
pension wealth. The 1983 SCF includes information on one 
defined-contribution plan from a current employer for each individual 
(respondent and spouse) and up to three plans (either defined-contribu 
tion or defined-benefit) for each individual from past employers. The 
1989 SCF includes information on up to three defined-contribution 
plans from a current employer for each individual (respondent and 
spouse) and up to six defined-contribution plans for each individual 
from past employers.
To arrive at a summary measure of private pension wealth for each 
household, we sum the pension assets from all sources except for Indi 
vidual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and Keogh plans. We treat IRAs 
and Keogh account balances as a separate category of retirement 
wealth, using the current account balances as the measure of wealth in 
each.
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Social Security Wealth. The present discounted value of the Social 
Security old-age benefits for which a household is eligible represents 
the household's Social Security wealth. We compute Social Security 
wealth in a way resembling the method Feldstein (1976) used with the 
1963-1964 Survey of Financial Characteristics of Consumers, a survey 
that is similar to the SCF used here.
For a respondent and spouse who are not currently receiving Social 
Security benefits, we impute the expected annual Social Security 
old-age benefit by assigning a Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) based 
on the relative position of the individual's earnings in the earnings dis 
tribution of workers of his or her age and gender. (Five-year age 
cohorts of workers were used to avoid using distributions based on 
very small samples.) Specifically, we use the worker's current earnings 
unless the worker was not currently employed, in which case we use 
the highest earnings from past jobs and bring them forward to the cur 
rent year (either 1983 or 1989) using the wage index factor used by the 
Social Security Administration (Social Security Administration 1984). 
For each respondent and spouse, we obtain the relative position in the 
earnings distribution that the individual occupied in his or her gender 
and five-year age cohort. If this relative position in the earnings distri 
bution did not change over the working life, then the individual would 
be at the same relative position in the benefits distribution at the time of 
retirement. Each worker's Social Security benefit was imputed from 
the distribution of benefits paid for newly retired workers using the rel 
ative position of each worker in the earnings distribution.
Each household's Social Security benefits are then computed from 
individual Social Security benefits. For a single-worker household, we 
sum the worker's benefit amount and the spouse's benefit amount 
(one-half the worker's benefit). For a two-worker household, we take 
the larger of 1) the sum of the benefit amount of the worker with higher 
benefits and the corresponding spouse's benefit amount or 2) the sum 
of the two workers' imputed benefit amounts.
To convert each household's benefit amount into household Social 
Security wealth, we calculate a present value of the flow of future 
Social Security benefits from age 65 until age 100. We adjust each 
year's benefit amount for the probability of death based on the 
worker's gender and age. (Also, we take account of expected widow's 
or widower's benefits by calculating the joint probability that the
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worker will be deceased and the spouse will be alive and by applying 
this probability to the worker's benefit amount*.) We assume that the 
annual benefit amount grows at 4 percent per year from the current 
year onward, and we discount benefits back to the present (1983 or 
1989) at a rate of 9 percent.
For all households currently receiving Social Security old-age or 
disability benefits, we use current benefit amounts to calculate a 
present value of the flow of future Social Security benefits from the 
current age until age 100. We adjust for the probability of death in 
each year, allow benefits to grow at an annual rate of 4 percent, and 
discount to the present at a rate of 9 percent.
Nonretirement Wealth. Most forms of assets and wealth as con 
ventionally defined are included in nonretirement wealth. In particular, 
we consider the following six types of wealth.
1) Housing wealth, which we divide into two components: a) 
equity in the principal residence and b) equity in other real estate, 
including up to four (in 1983) or three (in 1989) additional properties, 
plus the amount owed to the household for land contracts (less the 
amount owed on land contracts). For each property, we compute 
equity as the difference between the current market value of the prop 
erty and the amount owed on that property (using up to two mort 
gages).
2) Business assets, or the net value of the household's share in up 
to two (in 1983) or three (in 1989) businesses in which someone in the 
household had an active management role, plus the net value of the 
household's share in businesses in which no one in the household had 
an active management role.
3) Life insurance, the value of which was calculated by taking the 
cash value of straight (or whole life) insurance and subtracting the 
amount of borrowing against the policy. (The face value of term insur 
ance was excluded because term insurance is not a financial asset, in 
that it cannot be borrowed against.)
4) Liquid assets, or the sum of the average balance in all checking 
accounts, all money market accounts, and all saving accounts, plus the 
dollar value of short-term certificates and certificates of deposit.
5) Stocks and bonds, or the sum of a) the market value of all 
stocks, call money accounts, and stock and other mutual funds held, b)
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the face value of U.S. savings bonds, government bonds and Treasury 
bills, state and municipal bonds, and corporate or foreign bonds held; 
and c) the value of trust accounts and managed investment accounts 
held.
6) Other assets, comprising cars (net of outstanding car loans) and 
tangible assets (such as gold, jewelry, and other objects).
Our results leave out debt that is not part of any of the other wealth 
category; that is, consumer loans, home improvement loans, credit card 
debt, and other lines of credit are not taken into account in any way.
Findings
Tables 3 and 4 report descriptive statistics and various measures of 
the inequality of wealth distribution from the 1983 and 1989 Surveys 
of Consumer Finance. It is useful to first examine the shares of the 
individual components of total wealth. The largest single component 
of wealth is housing (27 percent in 1983, 30 percent in 1989), followed 
by business assets (19 percent in both 1983 and 1989), private pension 
wealth (17 percent in 1983,14 percent in 1989), Social Security wealth 
(17 percent in 1983, 15 percent in 1989), and stocks and bonds (9 per 
cent in 1983, 8 percent in 1989). The other main forms of wealth—liq 
uid assets, life insurance, IRA/Keogh plans, and other assets—each 
account for 5 percent or less of total wealth. In aggregate, retirement 
wealth made up 35 percent of total wealth in 1983, 32 percent of total 
wealth in 1989, and was split roughly evenly between private pension 
wealth and Social Security wealth in both years.
The computed Gini coefficients suggest that all forms of assets are 
distributed highly unequally, except for Social Security wealth, which 
has Ginis of 0.334 in 1983 and 0.352 in 1989. Principal residence 
housing is next most equally distributed, with Ginis of 0.561 in 1983 
and 0.615 in 1989. Private pensions are the third most equally distrib 
uted form of wealth, with Ginis of 0.739 in 1983 and 0.765 in 1989. 
The distributions of business assets, stocks and bonds, and other real 
estate appear to be most unequal, with Gini coefficients of 0.90 or 
higher. Life insurance, liquid assets, and other assets have Ginis that 
are in the middle of the pack. Substantially the same inferences can be 
drawn from the share figures and the coefficients of variation.
Table 3 Distribution of Wealth by Component, 1983
Total wealth
Retirement wealth
Private pension 
wealth
Social security 
wealth
IRA/Keogh plans
Nonretirement 
wealth
Housing
Principal 
residence
Other real estate
Business assets
Mean ($) 
(std. dev.)
262,643 
(916,406)
92,786 
(107,363)
45,790 
(91,122)
43,628 
(27,346)
3,369 
(23,421)
169,857 
(891,456)
71,830 
(190,049)
49,584 
(74,409)
22,246 
(158,257)
49,128 
(553,086)
Median ($)
147,273
60,469
10,644
36,666
0
64,072
42,082
37,098
0
0
Top 5%
36.3
22.3
356
13.5
705
49.5
35.0
26.2
67.6
82.6
% Share of
Top 10%
47.0
35.2
534
23.5
83 1
61.0
47.0
38.4
83.4
93.8
Top 20%
61.4
53.2
75.8
40.2
955
73.8
63.0
55.7
97.4
99.8
Coefficient 
of 
variation
3.489
1.157
1990
0.627
6953
5.248
2.646
1.500
7.114
11258
Gmi 
correlation
-
0796
0.726
0.632
0.768
0.955
0.873
0.800
0.819
0.916
Gim 
coefficient
0.578
0.489
0.739
0.334
0910
0.713
0.619
0.561
0.910
0.948
Share of 
total 
wealth
(%)
100.0
35.3
17.4
16.6
1.3
64.7
27.4
18.9
8.5
18.7
Life insurance
Liquid asset
Stocks/bonds
Other assets
4,626
(19,103)
12,881
(43,906)
24,533
(490,904)
6,859
(28,831)
0
3,009
0
3,650
55.2
45.4
88.2
43.4
725
61.2
95.3
54.9
89.2
78.9
99.0
69.3
4.130
3.409
20010
4204
0.503
0730
0930
0621
0.852
0.761
0.963
0719
1.8
4.9
9.3
2.6
SOURCE Authors' tabulations of 1983 SCF data on 1,722 households with a male aged 35 to 64 present. See text for variable definitions.
Table 4 Distribution of Wealth by Component, 1989
Total wealth
Retirement wealth
Private pension 
wealth
Social security 
wealth
IRA/Keogh plans
Nonretirement 
wealth
Housing
Principal 
residence
Other real estate
Business assets
Mean ($) 
(std. dev )
362,183 
(1,643,389)
114,887 
(149,094)
51,519 
(123,461)
53,558 
(35,312)
9,809 
(40,350)
247,297 
(1,611,928)
107,766 
(512,182)
68,825 
(133,577)
38,941 
(459,591)
69,280 
(1,203,050)
Median ($)
185,571
72,646
10,000
44,329
0
89,809
52,409
41,000
1,409
0
Top 5%
42.4
242
41.3
139
58.2
55.0
41.9
30.0
75.8
91.4
% Share of
Top 10%
52.7
36.9
591
23.9
739
65.6
53.6
43.3
88.3
98.1
Top 20%
65.7
54.2
78.3
410
91.5
76.6
68 1
59.8
966
100.0
Coefficient 
of 
variation
4537
1.298
2.396
0.659
4.114
6.518
4753
1.941
11.802
17.365
Gim 
correlation
-
0.824
0751
0.594
0.773
0.969
0.894
0.796
0869
0928
Gim 
coefficient
0.622
0.500
0.765
0.352
0.869
0743
0.676
0615
0.928
0.972
Share of 
total wealth
(%)
100.0
31.7
14.2
148
2.7
68.3
29.8
19.0
10.8
19.1
Life insurance
Liquid asset
Stocks/bonds
Other assets
5,886 
(39,619)
17,865 
(116,921)
28,351 
(383,716)
18,148 
(180,269)
0
2,800
0
6,000
59.8
58.8
85.5
56.4
74.1
72.7
94.1
672
91.8
855
987
78.4
6.731
6.545
13.534
9.933
0.546
0.799
0.915
0.786
0886
0.824
0.954
0.774
1.6
4.9
7.8
5.1
SOURCE. Authors' tabulations of 1983 SCF data on 1,722 households with a male aged 35 to 64 present. See text for vanable definitions
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Comparison of the Gini coefficients for overall retirement wealth 
(0.489 in 1983 and 0.500 in 1989) with the Ginis for overall nonretire- 
ment wealth (0.718 in 1983 and 0.753 in 1989) suggests that retirement 
wealth is considerably more evenly distributed than is nonretirement 
wealth. The relatively equal distribution of Social Security wealth is 
mainly responsible for this result. The Ginis for private pension wealth 
(0.739 in 1983 and 0.765 in 1989) are similar to those for nonretire 
ment wealth overall (0.713 in 1983 and 0.743 in 1989). Social Secu 
rity wealth (with Ginis of 0.334 in 1983 and 0.352 in 1989) clearly 
reduces inequality in the distribution of total retirement wealth. Again, 
the share figures and coefficients of variation are consistent with the 
Ginis.
However, the influence of private pension wealth on overall ine 
quality is not simple. Substantially less private pension wealth is con 
centrated in the top 5 and 10 percent of private pension holders than is 
the case for nonretirement wealth overall. Also, the coefficient of vari 
ation of private pension wealth is lower than that of nonretirement 
wealth overall. But, as already noted, the Gini coefficients of private 
pension wealth are slightly higher than those of nonretirement wealth 
overall. It follows that private pension wealth tends to even out the 
high end of the wealth distribution, but increases inequality below the 
20th percentile or so of the wealth distribution.
A comparison of Tables 3 and 4 suggests that, overall, the distribu 
tion of wealth grew more unequal between 1983 and 1989. With the 
exception of IRA/Keogh plans and stocks and bonds, the Gini coeffi 
cient of every category of wealth increased between 1983 and 1989. 
The Ginis of principal residence housing, liquid assets, and other assets 
increased especially sharply. The Ginis for both Social Security wealth 
and private pension wealth increased moderately during the 1980s, and 
the share figures suggest that much of the increased inequality of pri 
vate pension wealth occurred because of greater concentration of pen 
sion wealth at the very high end of the distribution (that is, above the 
10th percentile).
It is useful to compare the findings in Tables 3 and 4 with other 
empirical findings on the distribution of wealth. Kennickell and 
Sunden (1997), Weicher (1995, 1997), and Wolff (1994) used the 1983 
and 1989 SCF to examine nonretirement wealth and all found slight 
increases (comparable to that which we displayed in Tables 3 and 4) in
Employee Benefits and the Distribution of Income and Wealth 373
the Gini coefficients of nonretirement wealth between 1983 and 1989. 
Kennickell and Sunden, Weicher, and Wolff all used more heteroge 
neous samples that we do—we restrict our sample to households with a 
male aged 35 to 64 present—and hence obtained higher Gini coeffi 
cients than we do. The changes in the Ginis from 1983 to 1989 are 
similar, however.
Other researchers have used the 1992 interview of the Retirement 
History Survey (RHS) to examine the impact of Social Security and 
private pensions on wealth inequality. Gustman et al. (1997) found 
that Social Security reduces overall wealth inequality, whereas private 
pensions increase overall wealth inequality. Gustman et al. found that 
pensions account for 23 percent and Social Security about 27 percent 
of total wealth—figures that are far higher than ours using the SCF. 
McGarry and Davenport (1997) concluded that private pensions have 
only slightly increased overall wealth inequality. Apart from the rela 
tively high proportion of wealth that is accounted for by Social Secu 
rity and private pensions (Gustman et al. 1997), the findings from the 
RHS studies are broadly similar to those from our work with the SCF.
To summarize our results, Tables 3 and 4 show that there are five 
major forms of wealth holding in the United States: housing (both prin 
cipal residence and other real estate, which account for 27-30 percent 
of all wealth), business assets (19 percent of all wealth), private pen 
sions (14-17 percent), Social Security (15-17 percent), and stocks and 
bonds (8-9 percent). The figures show clearly that business assets, 
stocks and bonds, and real estate other than the principal residence are 
the strongest contributors to overall wealth inequality (all have Gini 
coefficients of at least 0.9), whereas Social Security wealth is the main 
contributor to greater equality in the distribution of wealth (with a Gini 
of 0.33 to 0.35).
Principal residence housing plays an intermediate role in the distri 
bution of wealth. Principal residence housing has a Gini coefficient 
(around 0.6) that is close to that of the total wealth distribution (when 
Social Security wealth is included), although inspection of the wealth 
share figures suggests that the distribution of principal residence hous 
ing is equalizing at the high end of the total wealth distribution and dis- 
equalizing at the low end.
This leaves private pension wealth, which results essentially from 
employer contributions to pension plans. The Gini coefficients associ-
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ated with private pension wealth (around 0.75) suggest that private 
pensions do increase inequality in the total wealth distribution, when 
total wealth is defined to include the present value of future expected 
Social Security benefits. However, the Gini correlation of private pen 
sion wealth with total wealth is relatively low: only the Gini correla 
tions of life insurance and (in 1989) other assets with total wealth are 
lower. Also, as noted above, the distribution of private pension wealth 
tends to smooth out the high end of the wealth distribution. That is, 
although the Gini coefficients of private pension wealth are slightly 
higher than for nonretirement wealth overall, the coefficients of varia 
tion of private pension wealth and the shares of private pension wealth 
going to the top 5 and 10 percent of the distribution are lower than for 
nonretirement wealth overall. This finding suggests that private pen 
sions play an intermediate role in determining the distribution of 
wealth. Although they clearly fail to help equalize the overall distribu 
tion of wealth (as Social Security does), neither are private pensions a 
driving force behind increased wealth inequality, as are business assets, 
stocks and bonds, and real estate other than the principal residence.
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
We have attempted to address a rather simple question: do 
employer contributions to health insurance and pensions increase or 
decrease inequalities in the distribution of compensation, income, and 
wealth? Most existing evidence—and intuition informed by the obser 
vation that highly paid workers tend to receive more generous nonwage 
benefits—suggests that employee benefits tend to increase inequality, 
but the answers we found are a bit more complicated.
First, we find that employer contributions to health insurance are 
far more unequally distributed than is personal income (most of which 
is earnings). Nevertheless, health insurance contributions are distrib 
uted in such a way that they slightly reduce inequality in the overall 
distribution of income (defined as the sum of personal income and 
employer contributions to health insurance). We would not make too 
much of this finding because the reduction of inequality accounted for 
by health insurance contributions is small. It is clear, however, that
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health insurance contributions made by employers, despite their highly 
unequal distribution, do not exacerbate inequalities of compensation 
and income. This is an unexpected result but one that is robust in both 
the 1977 NMCES and the 1987 NMES (see the third section above).
Second, we find that employer contributions to pension plans are a 
major form of wealth holding, about equal to Social Security wealth as 
a proportion of total wealth, and surpassed only by housing wealth and 
business assets. Stocks and bonds, the other major form of wealth 
holding, are less significant than private pensions or Social Security. 
Our main conclusion on the role of private pensions in the distribution 
of wealth can be summarized in two parts. First, private pensions are 
not one of the driving forces behind increased wealth inequality. 
Rather, business assets, stocks and bonds, and real estate other than the 
principal residence are the main contributors to wealth inequality. Sec 
ond, it is clear that, when total wealth is defined to include Social Secu 
rity wealth, private pensions do increase overall inequality in the total 
wealth distribution. However, the distribution of private pension 
wealth is quite different from that of overall nonretirement wealth. 
Private pension wealth clearly smooths the high end of the wealth dis 
tribution, increasing wealth inequality only below the 20th percentile 
of the wealth distribution. Private pensions, then, seem to play an 
intermediate role in determining the distribution of wealth. Although 
they do not help to equalize the overall distribution of wealth (as does 
Social Security), they are not one of the driving forces behind 
increased wealth inequality, and they reduce inequality at the high end 
of the wealth distribution.
What are the implications of these findings? Employer contribu 
tions to both health insurance and pension plans receive favorable 
treatment under existing tax law, and the continued favorable tax treat 
ment of each is a key part of the ongoing debate over fundamental tax 
reform (see, for example, Woodbury 1997 and the references cited 
there). The main finding from the medical expenditure surveys—that 
health insurance contributions have a slightly equalizing effect on the 
distribution of income—tends to argue for continued favorable tax 
treatment of employer-provided health insurance. It is not a strong 
argument because the equalizing effect of employer contributions to 
health insurance is not great. Moreover, the argument must be weighed
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against the various arguments for taxing employer contributions to 
health insurance, most of which are based on efficiency considerations. 
There were two main findings from the Surveys of Consumer 
Finances: Social Security is the great equalizer of wealth and private 
pensions are not a major force behind increasing wealth inequality. 
There are two implications. First, Social Security's central role in 
decreasing wealth inequality could well be an overriding reason to 
avoid full privatization of Social Security because full privatization 
would almost surely reduce the tendency of Social Security to equalize 
the wealth distribution. Second, in that private pensions are not a 
major force behind increasing wealth inequality, taxing employer con 
tributions to pension plans would be a less effective wealth equalizer 
than policies directed toward business assets, stocks and bonds, and 
real estate other than the principal residence. Also, any increases in 
wealth equality that might be achieved by taxing pension contributions 
would need to be weighed against the decline in savings that would 
likely result (Gale 1995).
Note
We are grateful to the William H. Donner Foundation and the WE. Upjohn Institute for 
support.
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Increased attention is being paid to the similarities and differences 
between Canada and the United States in a variety of areas of social 
policy. The similarities provide elements of a natural experiment to 
facilitate controlling for the myriad of observable and unobservable 
factors that can affect behavior. They also make it more likely that the 
experiences in one country have relevance for the other country. The 
differences provide variation in a number of factors that are of interest 
for their possible impact on behavior. The differences are especially of 
interest when they involve variables that are subject to a degree of pol 
icy control.
These similarities and differences have been exploited in a number 
of areas of social policy. Card and Freeman (1993) analyzed the 
impact of differences in labor-market and social policies on various 
outcomes, including wage and income inequality, poverty, union den 
sity, unemployment, and immigration. Chiswick (1992) looked at the 
impact of differences in immigration and language policies on such 
factors as immigrant assimilation, fertility, domestic earnings, lan 
guage fluency, and the economic returns to that fluency.
The purpose of this chapter is to outline important similarities and 
differences between Canada and the United States in public pension 
plans. While the focus is on public pension plans, brief mention is 
made of private pensions, so as to put the public plans in perspective. 
Particular attention is paid to the potential redistributive and incentive
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effects of the public plans, especially as they may shed light on the 
trend towards earlier retirement.
The chapter begins with a description of the different components 
of the Canadian public pension system, emphasizing features that have 
potential redistributive and incentive effects. Private employer-spon 
sored occupational pension plans are briefly discussed, and the impor 
tance of both public and private pension plans are documented as 
sources of retirement income. The extent to which public pension 
plans serve to replace preretirement earnings is documented, as are 
their potential redistributive effects. Intergenerational transfers 
implied by the "pay-as-you-go" financing are then analyzed as is the 
shift in policy emphasis from public to private pensions. A similar but 
briefer description of the U.S. public pension system is provided, and 
the similarities and differences are used to shed light on the trend in 
both countries to reward earlier retirement. The paper concludes with 
a brief summary of the salient points.
PUBLIC PENSION PROGRAMS IN CANADA
The public pension programs provided by the Government of Can 
ada consist of three components: 1) Old Age Security (OAS) payable 
to all Canadians aged 65 and over regardless of means; 2) an incomes- 
tested supplement (the Guaranteed Income Supplement or GIS) pay 
able, upon application, to recipients of the basic OAS pension who 
have little or no other income; and 3) an earnings-related component 
(the Canada Pension Plan or CPP) linked to an individual's average 
lifetime earnings. 1 The basic features of these public pension programs 
are summarized in Table 1. Unlike the situation in the United States, 
health insurance is provided under the universal public programs in 
each of the provinces, and coverage is unaffected by retirement status.
Old Age Security (OAS)
Old Age Security is a demogrant, financed out of general tax reve 
nues and payable to those aged 65 and older and with 40 years of resi 
dence. It is a flat-rate, universal benefit unrelated to work history. It
Table 1 Public Pension Programs: Government of Canada
Program Nature Benefit Financing
Old Age Security (OAS)
Guaranteed Income 
Supplement (GIS)
Canada Pension Plan (CPP)
Demogrant payable to those over 65 Maximum annual pension is General tax revenues 
subject to residency requirement; $3,472; fully indexed to CPI 
benefits reduced for Canadians 
with incomes over $39,911
Income-tested benefit; recipient Maximum annual pension is General tax revenues 
must be over age 65 and in receipt $4,127; reduced by 50% of recipient's 
of OAS pension income in excess of OAS benefits;
not taxable and fully indexed to CPI
Earnings-related; designed to 
replace 25% of average lifetime 
earnings, up to the average 
industrial wage
Maximum annual pension is 
$6,250; fully indexed to CPI
Equal employer/employee 
contributions, set at 2.6% of 
earnings between $3,300 and 
$33,400
NOTE All amounts are expressed in U.S. dollars, at an exchange rate of 75 cents (U.S.) for each Canadian dollar, and pertain to January 
1, 1994. The provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia, Manitoba, Ontano, and Saskatchewan provide income-tested supple 
ments, thereby raising the guaranteed annual income of those aged 65 in excess of OAS/GIS benefits.
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began as a means-tested pension, introduced in 1927, payable to quali 
fying individuals at the age of 70. By 1951, it had become a universal 
flat-rate pension payable at age 70, and the age of eligibility was subse 
quently reduced to 65 in concert with the introduction of the Canada 
Pension Plan. The full OAS benefit is equal to $3,472 per year as of 
1994. 2 (All dollar amounts hereafter are expressed in U.S. dollars, at 
an exchange rate of 75 cents [U.S.] for each Canadian dollar.) Begin 
ning in 1989, the OAS pensions of higher income Canadians have been 
"clawed-back" at the rate of 15 percent after net income of $39,911 in 
1993.
Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS)
The Guaranteed Income Supplement is an income-tested transfer 
payment given to residents of Canada who are in receipt of the basic 
OAS pension and who have little or no other income. The GIS was 
introduced in 1966. Like OAS, GIS is financed from general tax reve 
nues. At the beginning of 1994, the maximum GIS pension was $4,127 
for singles and $5,376 for married couples. The GIS places a floor on 
the minimum income of those aged 65 and over. Unlike OAS and CPP 
pensions, GIS benefits are not subject to income tax. The implicit tax- 
back rate for GIS benefits is 50 percent; that is, for each dollar of 
income (including CPP benefits) in excess of the basic OAS pension, 
GIS benefits are reduced by 50 percent. 3
Canada Pension Plan (CPP)
The Canada Pension Plan (like Social Security in the United 
States) is a mandatory, contributory, earnings-based pension that pro 
vides coverage for the majority of workers. It was established in 
(largely) its present form in 1965. The CPP is designed to replace 25 
percent of a worker's average lifetime earnings for persons whose 
earnings are equal to or less than the average industrial wage. For per 
sons whose earnings are higher than the average industrial wage, the 
CPP is designed to replace a smaller portion of their average lifetime 
earnings. At the beginning of 1994, the maximum CPP benefit was 
$6,248 per year, or approximately 25 percent of the average industrial 
wage of $25,800. The maximum CPP benefit is paid to workers whose
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earnings equal or exceed the ceiling on contributions (the Year's Maxi 
mum Pensionable Earnings, or YMPE) for each year during their work 
lives.
The CPP is financed out of a payroll tax, with equal contributions 
from employers and employees. In 1994, the contribution rate for 
employers and employees was set for both at 2.6 percent of earnings 
between the Year's Basic Exemption ($2,550) and the YMPE 
($25,800).4 The average contribution was $680 in 1991. The contribu 
tion rate is scheduled to rise steadily over the next 25 years, from 5.2 
percent (combined rate) in 1994 to 10.10 percent in 2016 and to 12.73 
percent in 2030.
Prior to 1987, CPP benefits were payable at age 65 (or later, at the 
worker's option). Since 1987, CPP benefits have been payable at age 
60, on an actuarially reduced basis and subject to the requirement that 
the recipient is not working. 5 The actuarially fair reduction is designed 
to exactly compensate for the fact that the pension is received earlier 
and for a longer expected period of time. In January 1992, the majority 
of males who commenced receipt of CPP retirement benefits were 
aged 60 to 64. Indeed, the number of males commencing receipt of 
benefits at age 60 was only modestly less than the number commenc 
ing receipt at age 65. For females, the early receipt of benefits is more 
pronounced, with the number commencing receipt of CPP benefits at 
age 60 exceeding the number commencing receipt at age 65 (Health 
and Welfare Canada 1992, Table 8).
CPP benefits can be delayed until age 70, in which case annual 
benefits are actuarially increased to compensate for the fact that they 
will be received later and for a shorter expected period of time. After 
the age of 70, there is no actuarial adjustment so that there is in effect a 
penalty for delaying receipt after that age.
CPP benefits are fully taxable as a normal source of income. How 
ever, there is no clawback if the person does not retire (after attaining 
age 65) but continues to work and earn income. The only clawbacks 
are indirect: CPP income is subject to income tax and if the person 
continues to work, the person would presumably be in a higher mar 
ginal tax bracket. As well, if the person continues to work, the person 
is more likely to exceed the threshold level of income of $39,111 that 
would subject their OAS income to the 15 percent clawback. More 
importantly, if the person is eligible for the GIS supplement, the per-
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son's GIS benefits would be reduced by the 50 percent "tax-back" that 
applies to income (including CPP income) beyond the OAS 
demogrant.
Private Pension Plans (RPPs and RRSPs)
Canada's public and private pension system is generally described 
as involving three tiers: 1) the universal Old Age Security component 
consisting of the OAS demogrant and the possible GIS income-tested 
supplement; 2) the Social Insurance component involving the manda 
tory, earnings-based CPP which covers most workers; and 3) and 
employer-sponsored, occupational Registered Pension Plans (RPPs). 
The first two tiers are the public pension system, and the third is the 
private pension system.
Private, employer-sponsored RPPs are financed by employers, usu 
ally with employee contributions. 6 In 1992, 38.4 percent of the labor 
force were covered by such occupational pension plans, the coverage 
being slightly higher for males than for females (Statistics Canada 
1994, p. 16). In 1992, 90 percent of plan members were in defined-ben- 
efit plans, with 18 percent being in flat-benefit plans (predominantly in 
the unionized sector) and 72 percent being in earnings-based plans 
(usually dependent upon the individual's final years of earnings). Only 
9 percent of plan members were in defined-contribution plans. 
Although membership in both defined-benefit and defined-contribution 
plans has been growing, membership in defined-contribution plans has 
been growing at a faster rate.
Private, earnings-based pensions also exist in the form of personal 
savings through Registered Retirement Savings Plans (RRSPs) that 
basically involve a deferral of taxes until the pension is withdrawn 
upon retirement. These are earnings-based in the sense that (as of 
1991) individuals are allowed to contribute up to 18 percent of their 
earned income in the previous year. The maximum contribution for 
1991 was $8,625 for individuals who did not have an RPP, or $8625 
less what is known as the "Pension Adjustment" for those who belong 
to an RPP. (The pension adjustment seeks to underscore the value of 
the pension benefit carried during the year by a member of a defined- 
benefit pension plan. Technically, it equals nine times the benefit enti-
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dement less $1,000). In 1991, 24 percent of all tax filers made RRSP 
contributions, averaging $2,172.
Contributions and Benefits from Pension Plans
As indicated in Table 2, among the different contributory pension 
plans, the CPP has the greatest number of contributors, given the man 
datory nature of such contributions. Private RPPs and tax-advantaged 
RRSPs have considerably fewer contributors. The number of contribu 
tors has grown most rapidly, however, for RRSPs. Although the CPP 
involves the greatest number of contributors, it also involves the lowest 
average contribution ($680) compared to average contributions of over 
$2,000 for both RPPs and RRSPs. This smaller average contribution 
for CPPs leads to lower total contributions for CPPs than for RRSPs, 
which—in turn—are less than contributions for RPPs. From 1981 to 
1991, the growth of total contributions has been greatest for RRSPs, 
followed by the CPP and then RPPs. 7
With respect to benefits paid under the different pension plans, 
Table 3 indicates that the CPP and the OAS/GIS have the greatest num 
ber of beneficiaries. Beneficiaries of the CPP have grown the most, 
reflecting the aging of the workforce and the tendency to retire early 
and receive the actuarially adjusted benefits after age 60. Average ben 
efits are greatest for RPPs, followed by OAS/GIS, with CPP benefits 
being the smallest. Total benefits, however, have grown the most under 
CPP, reflecting the highest growth in both the number of recipients and 
the average benefit per recipient.
Pension Income as Component of Retirement Income: Canada
The importance of the three public pension plans in contributing to 
retirement income is shown in Table 4. In 1988, they accounted for 38 
percent of retirement income for men and 50 percent for women. The 
earnings-based CPP, however, constitutes a smaller component for 
women than for men, reflecting the fact that women tend to have lower 
earnings (and less continuous work histories) than do men. The OAS 
and GIS benefits are not linked to labor-market earnings; hence, their 
fixed nature means that, in combination, they constitute a larger portion 
of the retirement income for women (40.0 percent) than for men (22.5
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Table 2 Contributors and Contributions of the CPP Relative to 
Employer Private Registered Pension Plans (RPP) and 
Earnings-Based Registered Retirement Savings Plans (RRSPs) 
in Canada, in 1991
Contributors/contributions
Contributors
Number (millions)
Growth 1981-91
Average contribution
Average ($US)
Growth 1981-91
Total contributions
Total (million $US)
Growth 1981-91
Public 
(CPP)
12.0
9%
680
151%
8,135
173%
Employer-based 
private pension 
(RPP)
5.3
14%
2,411
47%
12,822
68%
Tax advantaged 
savings (RRSP)
4.6
136%
2,172
46%
10,028
245%
Working age population growth 1981-91, 14.5%
Labor force growth 1981-91, 16.8% 
Nominal GDP growth 1981-91, 86.7% 
Consumer price growth 1981-91, 67.2%
SOURCE: Calculations based on data from Statistics Canada (1994, p. 9) Growth 
rates calculated using the following data series from the Statistics Canada CANSIM 
Main base: working age population, D767867; labor force, D767870; nominal GDP, 
128026; and, consumer price index, P490000.
NOTE: All dollar amounts are converted to U.S. dollars, at an exchange rate of 75 cents 
(U.S.) for each Canadian dollar.
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Table 3 Benefits Paid Under Public Pension Plans (OAS, GIS, CPP) and 
Employer-Registered Pension Plans (RPP) in Canada, in 1991
Beneficiaries and benefits
Beneficiaries
Number (millions)
Growth 1981-91
Average benefit
Average ($US)
Growth 1981-91
Total benefits
Total (millions $US)
Growth 1981-91
OAS/GIS
3.3
34%
4,136
63%
13,571
118%
CPP
3.7
108%
3,020
128%
11,171
375%
RPP
1.8
98%
7,328
99%
13,083
294%
SOURCE: Calculations based on data from Statistics Canada (1994, p. 14). 
NOTE: All dollar amounts are converted to U S. dollars, at an exchange rate of 75 cents 
(U.S.) for each Canadian dollar.
Table 4 Public Pension Income as a Percentage of Total Retirement
Income Males and Females Age 65 and Over in Canada, in 1978 
and 1988
1978
% Income derived from
OAS demogrant
GIS supplement
CPP public pension3
(Total public pensions)
Private pensions (RRP, RRSP)b
Investment income
Employment income
Other income
Total retirement income
Men
20.8
5.6
85
(34.9)
16.7
254
19.5
3.5
100.0
Women
36.2
11.0
4.3
(51.5)
8.4
32.6
5.3
2.1
100.0
1988
Men
17.2
5.3
15.9
(38.4)
23.1
21.9
14.0
2.7
100.0
Women
29.1
10.9
10.5
(50.5)
11.6
31.4
4.2
2.4
100.0
SOURCE: Based on data presented in Galarneau (1991, p. 29).
a The CPP benefits include payments to surviving spouses, which amount to 32 percent 
of total CPP payments in 1988.
b Private pension income includes income from employer-sponsored Registered Pen 
sion Plans (RPP) and tax-advantaged private Registered Retirement Savings Plans 
(RRSP).
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percent). This larger portion more than offsets the lower portion from 
CPP income for women, so that overall pension income from the three 
pension programs comprises 50.5 percent of the retirement income for 
women, compared to 38.4 percent for men in 1988.
Because of their higher earnings and greater labor force attach 
ment, the earnings-based occupational pension plans (RPPs) and earn 
ings-based RRSPs also constitute a larger portion of retirement income 
for men than for women. The same applies to employment income. 
Table 5, based on more current and comprehensive data from the 1991 
census, presents a similar picture.
Figure 1 illustrates that, between 1981 and 1991, there was a rela 
tive decrease in the importance of the OAS demogrant and GIS supple 
ment as a source of pension income, in contrast to the increased 
importance of employer-sponsored RPPs and especially the public 
CPP.
Table 5 Public Pension Income as a Percentage of Total Retirement 
Income Persons Age 65 and Over in Canada in 1991
% Income derived from
OAS demogrant/GIS supplement
CPP public pension
(Total public pension)
Private pension (RRP, RRSP)
Investment income
Employment income
Other income
Total retirement income
Average income ($US)
Males
20.0
15.3
(35.3)
22.3
19.1
17.1
6.2
100.0
17,699
Females
36.0
12.6
(48.6)
11.6
25.9
7.6
6.3
100.0
11,255
Both sexes
27.3
14.0
(41.3)
17.4
22.2
12.8
6.3
100.0
14,018
SOURCE: Calculated from the individual files of the Public Use Sample Tapes of the 
1991 Census of Canada, weighted by the Statistics Canada sample weights.
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Figure 1 Components of Pension Income in Canada, 1981 and 1991
1981 1991
OAS/GIS 
52%
The Income Replacement of Public Pension Programs in Canada
The income replacement rate (i.e., the ratio of postretirement to 
preretirement annual income) is a standard measure of the adequacy of 
pension benefits. As indicated previously, the benefits delivered by the 
CPP, the earnings-related component of Canada's public retirement 
system, are modest. The CPP is designed to replace 25 percent of the 
worker's average annual lifetime earnings, with a lower replacement 
rate for persons beyond the average industrial wage. As well, there is a 
maximum on the CPP benefit, equal to $6,248 per year in 1994. The 
target replacement rate of 25 percent for the CPP indicates that the 
CPP is to serve as only one component of the overall replacement rate 
of 70 percent that is widely used in Canada as the goal for retirement 
planning.
This fact, together with the flat pension provided through OAS and 
the income-tested benefit provided by the GIS, implies that income 
replacement rates from public pension programs will be high for low- 
income Canadians, and low for high-income Canadians. This result is 
readily confirmed by examining the income replaced through Canada's 
public pension programs for individuals whose lifetime earnings equal 
different fractions (or multiples) of the average industrial wage (Table 
6). 8
Table 6 Income Replaced by Public Pension Programs in Canada
Individual's earnings, 
preretirement3
Nil
$6,450 (25%)
$12,900(50%)
$19,350(75%)
$25,800(100%)
$51,600(200%)
$129,000(500%)
OAS 
benefits ($)b
3,472
3,472
3,472
3,472
3,472
3,472
3,472
GIS
benefits ($)c
4,127
3,346
2,565
1,784
1,003
1,003
1,003
CPP
benefits ($)
Nil
1,562
3,124
4,686
6,248
6,248
6,248
Total 
benefits ($)
7,599
8,380
9,161
9,942
10,723
10,723
10,723
Replacement 
rate (%)
NA
129.9
71.0
51.4
41.6
20.8
8.3
a The different levels of preretirement earnings represent the indicated fraction (enclosed in parentheses) of the average industrial wage in 
Canada.
bAll amounts are expressed in U.S. dollars, at an exchange rate of 75 cents (U.S.) for each Canadian dollar, and pertain to January 1, 
1994.
c GIS benefits are income-tested and reduced by 50 percent of income in excess of OAS benefits. In these illustrations, the recipient is 
assumed to receive income only from the public pension programs. For the purpose of these illustrations, additional income-tested pen 
sions provided by some provinces are ignored
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For an individual who earns the average industrial wage (i.e., with 
preretirement earnings of $25,800 per year), 42 percent of their prere 
tirement earnings would be replaced by Canada's public pension pro 
grams. This ratio rises to 71 percent for those who earn half the 
industrial wage and falls sharply to 21 percent for those who earn twice 
the average industrial wage. The modest role of the earnings-based 
CPP is further illustrated by the fact that an individual who qualifies for 
the maximum CPP pension will also qualify for (partial) income-tested 
GIS benefits, if the individual has no other source of retirement 
income.
The OAS benefits shown in Table 6 are constant at the maximum 
amount of $3,472 because the individuals are assumed to have no post- 
retirement income other than public pension income and hence are not 
subject to the 15 percent clawback. However, GIS benefits fall as pre 
retirement earnings increase, because higher preretirement earnings 
lead to higher CPP benefits and CPP benefits are included in the 
income that is subject to the 50 percent GIS "tax-back." Therefore, 
GIS benefits fall by 50 percent of the increase in CPP benefits. When 
CPP benefits reach their maximum of $6,248, there is no further reduc 
tion of the GIS supplement and it bottoms out at $1,003 as long as the 
person has no source of income other than public pension income.
As a result of these opposing forces, total public pension benefits 
are relatively flat and do not increase much for persons with higher pre 
retirement earnings. Only earnings-based CPP benefits increase as 
preretirement earnings increase, but these are capped at a fairly modest 
level. The increase up to the cap is subject to the 50 percent "tax-back" 
of the GIS supplement. The fact that OAS benefits are flat and that 
CPP benefits are modest, capped, and effectively subject to the GIS 
"tax-back," means that total public pension benefits do not change sub 
stantially as the individual's preretirement earnings change. This 
means that the income replacement rate is very high for persons with 
low preretirement earnings and very low for persons with high prere 
tirement earnings.
Clearly, the public pension system is very "progressive," yielding 
relatively constant total benefits and hence high income replacement 
rates for low-income individuals. Furthermore, the earnings-based 
CPP component is relatively modest as evidenced by the fact that even 
when the full maximum CPP benefits are received, individuals are still
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eligible for the income-tested GIS supplement if they have no other 
source of income.
Intergenerational Transfers: Canada
The tax rates, explicit or implicit, to finance Canada's public pen 
sion programs will rise sharply in the years ahead, to offset the aging of 
the population and the increasing ratio of pensioners to active workers. 
In 1966, when the CPP was introduced, the total contribution rate was 
set at 3.6 percent, to be shared equally by employers and their employ 
ees. This rate remained in effect until 1986. Since then, the CPP con 
tribution rate has gradually increased, to 5.2 percent in 1994. This rate 
is somewhat higher than the contribution rate that would have been 
forecast for 1993 in 1966, the year that the CPP was introduced. This 
result is due to subsequent benefit enrichments and "unfavorable" 
demographic developments.
The CPP contribution rate is scheduled to rise to 10.10 percent in 
2016, 12.73 percent in 2030, and 13.18 percent in 2040. 9 These 
increases presume there will be no change to the CPP benefit formula. 
However, two points merit attention. First, future generations of work 
ers will be required to pay higher CPP contribution rates than does the 
current generation of workers, with no increase in the benefit formula. 
Second, there are no published forecasts of the implicit tax or contribu 
tion rates for OAS, GIS, and the various provincial "top-ups." Since 
these programs are also financed on a "pay-as-you-go" basis, however, 
it is clear that the implicit tax or contribution rates necessary to finance 
these programmes will rise as well.
With "pay-as-you-go" financing, each generation of workers pays 
for the pensions of the previous generation. The security of CPP (and 
other public pension) benefits is linked, ultimately, to the willingness 
of the next generation of workers to pay the tax or contribution rates 
necessary to finance the level of benefits promised to the current gener 
ation.
Canadians born in 1920—who reached age 65 in 1985—will 
receive far more in benefits from the CPP than they paid in contribu 
tions. Canadians who were born in 1960—who will attain age 65 in 
2025 —will also receive more in benefits than they paid in contribu 
tions but on a more modest scale. For Canadians born after 1980, how-
Public Pension Plans 395
ever, lifetime CPP contributions are likely to equal or exceed CPP 
benefits. The "pension crisis" thus reflects the concern that the next 
generation of workers may choose not to honor the rules of the game 
established by the current generation because the next generation will 
be treated less favorably.
This likelihood of younger generations "breaking" an implicit 
social contract established by older generations who will benefit by 
such a contract is enhanced by a number of other factors. The younger 
generations will also be experiencing greater pressure for health and 
elder-care expenditures, associated with the aging population that is 
also in receipt of the pension income. Pressure may be enhanced by 
the possibility both of inheriting a large government deficit and assum 
ing responsibility for substantial deferred wage obligations being paid 
to public sector workers in the form of generous occupational pensions 
and seniority-based wage increases and job security. Concern that 
labor markets may not be able to absorb traditional immigrant flows 
may lead to reductions in that source of labor-force growth that could 
otherwise sustain pension obligations. The likelihood that the implicit 
pension contract is not adhered to is also enhanced by the fact that the 
"pension crisis" is not an exogenous unforseen event that leaves the 
older generation no time to adjust.
Because of these and related considerations, there has been a pro 
found shift in the past 15 years in the nature of the policy debate 
regarding public pensions in Canada. In the late 1970s, the major issue 
was whether or not to double the size of the CPP, as advocated by the 
Canadian Labour Congress and other groups. This potential initiative 
was debated at length in a National Pension Conference convened by 
the federal government in 1980. In 1991, in sharp contrast, the Organi 
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) held a 
major conference on "Private Pensions and Public Policy." The first 
sentence in the "Foreword" to the conference volume (OECD 1992) 
sets the tone for the current policy debate in Canada:
Government interest in relying more on private arrangements and 
less on public pensions for income in retirement appears to be 
increasing across OECD countries. Old-age pensions currently 
are the largest social policy expenditure in public budgets, and 
their share of public costs is expected to grow in the years ahead.
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Clearly, the potential financial problems and the intergenerational 
transfers associated with public pension plans has redirected attention 
from public to private pensions.
PUBLIC PENSION BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES
A brief treatment of the U.S. public pension system is given here, 
highlighting the main similarities and differences with the Canadian 
system.
Social Security (OASDI)
The United States does not have an equivalent of the first tier of the 
pension system in Canada—a universal demogrant like the OAS and 
income-tested supplement like the GIS. The U.S. Social Security 
through Old Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance (OASDI), cover 
ing over 90 percent of the U.S. workforce, is broadly comparable to the 
second tier of Canada's system, the CPP. OASDI, which dates back to 
1935, consists of three components: Old Age or retirement (OA), Sur 
vivor (S), and Disability (DI) benefits. OASDI is financed by a payroll 
tax with equal contributions by the employer and employee. In 1994, 
the total contribution rate was set at 12.4 percent of earnings up to a 
ceiling of $60,600. 10
The full Old Age Security retirement benefit is available to 
employees who are fully insured by the year of their retirement.'' For 
individuals born in 1937 or earlier, the normal retirement age (that is, 
the age at which unreduced social security benefits are payable) is 65. 
For those born after 1937, the normal retirement age is gradually being 
increased. For those born in 1960 or later, the normal retirement age 
will be age 67. Retirement benefits are available to individuals as early 
as age 62 on an actuarially reduced basis. Benefits are increased for 
those working beyond the normal retirement age, up to age 70.
The pension benefit is based on the worker's Averaged Indexed 
Monthly Earnings (AIME) to which a formula is applied to determine 
the Primary Insurance Amount (PI A). The PI A is subject to an annual 
cost-of-living adjustment. Up to 85 percent of Social Security benefits
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are subject to income taxes for persons whose income exceeds a certain 
threshold amount. The exact proportion subject to taxes depends upon 
such factors as marital/tax filing status, and combined income from 
earnings, tax-exempt interest, and social security.
Those who continue employment after commencing receipt of 
benefits will have their benefit subject to a clawback. For those 
between the ages of 65 and 69, the benefit is reduced by one-third of 
earnings above $11,160 (in 1994). Those under age 65 experience a 
reduction in social security benefits of 50 cents for every dollar of earn 
ings above $8,040.
Fully insured individuals and their spouses qualify for health bene 
fits under Medicare, which covers in-patient hospital care, home nurs 
ing and health care services, and some types of hospice care. 
Deductibles and coinsurance payments apply for certain services. 
Those qualifying for Medicare may also opt (at a fee of $41.10 per 
month in 1994) for supplementary health benefits which cover a num 
ber of services not covered by the basic Medicare plan. There is an 
annual deductible and coinsurance for most charges.
Family members of persons receiving Social Security are also eli 
gible for partial payments. Eligible family members include: spouses 
(including divorced spouses) who are at least 62 years old; spouses of 
any age who are caring for a child under the age of 16 or caring for a 
child who became disabled before the age of 22; unmarried dependent 
children (and sometimes grandchildren) under the age of 18 (under age 
19 if the child is still in high school); and children of any age if they 
became disabled before age 22. The sum of these benefits are subject 
to a Family Maximum Benefit level. If the Social Security recipient is 
deceased, more generous survivor benefits are available to a slightly 
broader group of family members.
Pension Income as Component of Retirement Income: 
United States
Table 7 shows the relative contribution of OASDI benefits to the 
incomes of older Americans in 1979, 1989, and 1992. The median 
income level of those 65 years of age and older was $8,795 in 1979, 
$10,765 in 1989, and $10,200 in 1992. OASDI benefits accounted for 
about 42 percent of retirement income in both 1979 and 1992. The rel-
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Table 7 Contribution of Public Pension Benefits to Incomes of Americans 
Aged 65 and Over, 1979,1989, and 1992
% Income derived from
Public OASDI
Private pension income
Investment income
Employment income
Other income
1979
42.7
14.8
21.5
17.3
3.6
1989
38.6
17.5
25.2
15.8
2.9
1992
41.7
20.1
20.5
14.8
3.0
SOURCE: Yablonski and Silverman (1994, p. 29).
ative share of income from investment was about four percentage 
points higher in 1989 than in the other two years, presumably reflecting 
the relatively high returns on investment vehicles experienced at the 
time.
While definitional differences preclude strict comparisons with the 
Canadian figures given in Tables 4 and 5, some comparisons can be 
suggested. The share of retirement income derived from sources other 
than public pensions are remarkably similar in the two countries. This 
is best seen by comparing Table 5 for Canada with the latest year fig 
ures in Table 7 for the United States. The components are usually 
within 1-3 percentage points of each other. The overall public pension 
components, at about 41 percent of retirement income, are almost iden 
tical between OASDI in the United States and the combined OAS/GIS 
and CPP in Canada. Because the OAS/GIS in Canada is almost twice 
as large as the CPP component, this means that Canada delivers its 
public pensions in a more "progressive" fashion—that is, universal 
(OAS) and income-tested (GIS). As highlighted previously, the earn 
ings-based CPP component in Canada is extremely modest.
The Income Replacement of Public Pension Programs 
in the United States
The effect of this greater progressivity in Canada as compared with 
the United States is highlighted when comparisons are made of the 
extent to which public pensions replace preretirement earnings for 
those who retire and have no further earnings. Like the Canadian sys-
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Table 8 Income Replaced by Public Pension Programs in the 
United States
Individual's earnings,
preretirement OA benefit ($)a Replacement rate (%)
Nil
$6,450 (25%)
$12,900 (50%)
$19,350 (75%)
$25,800 (100%)
$51,600(200%)
$129,000(500%)
5,087
7,346
9,606
11,868
13,764
13,764
78.9
56.9
49.6
46.0
26.7
10.7
'The OA benefit calculation assumes that the worker retired at age 65 in 1994 with 
average indexed annual earnings shown in the first column.
tern, the U.S. Old Age benefit program is designed to replace a greater 
proportion of preretirement earnings for lower income workers. The 
effect of this policy is demonstrated in Table 8, which shows the 
income replacement rates for individuals with preretirement earnings 
levels corresponding to the Canadian levels given earlier in Table 6. 
Individuals earning the average Canadian industrial wage of $25,800 
would have almost 50 percent of their preretirement earnings replaced 
by the OAS benefit. The replacement rate is higher at 79 percent for 
those earning one-quarter of the average industrial wage, and is lower 
at 27 percent for those who earn twice the industrial wage.
While the U.S. public pension system has elements of progressiv- 
ity, it is much less so than the Canadian system. For persons at one- 
quarter of the industrial wage, the Canadian system replaces 130 per 
cent of preretirement income, as compared with 79 percent in the 
United States. For persons at twice the industrial wage, the Canadian 
system replaces only 21 percent of preretirement income, as compared 
with 27 percent in the United States.
Inter generational Transfers: United States
As of 1994, it has been estimated that the OASDI will require 
funding from other government revenues by the year 2013 and will
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become insolvent by 2029 (U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services 1994). An increase in the contribution rate from the present 
12.4 percent to 19.0 percent of earnings by 2070 would be required to 
fund the benefits at current levels. No contribution rate increases have 
been scheduled.
As a result of the 1983 reforms to the Social Security Act, the nor 
mal retirement age of individuals born after 1937 has been gradually 
increased. For those born in 1938, the normal age of retirement is 65 
years and 2 months. For those born in 1960 and after, the normal 
retirement age is 67. Assuming that the normal retirement benefit 
remains at its January 1, 1995 level of $884, the impact of increasing 
the normal retirement age from 65 to 67 has been estimated to result in 
a reduction in the monthly benefit for an individual who chooses to 
retire at age 65, with average indexed monthly earnings of $2,000, 
from $884 to $766. This 13.3 percent reduction is due to the fact that 
those retiring at age 65 will be doing so early, given the increase in the 
normal retirement age to 67, and thus their benefit will be subject to the 
reduction formula applied to the benefits of those who retire prior to 
the normal retirement age. Similarly, those retiring at age 67 will 
receive a 6 percent smaller monthly payment in comparison to the pre- 
reform benefit because the increase in benefits due to late retirement 
would not be applied given the older normal retirement age (Salisbury 
and Silverman 1994).
POTENTIAL INCENTIVE EFFECTS
While a full mapping of the incentive effects of the public pension 
schemes in Canada and the United States is beyond the scope of this 
analysis, some broad characterizations can be suggested. More com 
plete discussions of theory and empirical research into the work incen 
tive effects of social security benefits can be found in popular labor 
economics texts such as Ehrenberg and Smith (1994) and Gunderson 
and Riddell (1993), and they are also contained in broader reviews of 
the pension literature including Mitchell and Fields (1982) and Lazear 
(1986).
Public Pension Plans 401
Work Incentives
An analysis of the financial incentives contained in public (and pri 
vate) pension benefits on the decision to retire from the labor market 
typically begins by calculating the discounted present value of the 
future stream of such benefits, commonly termed "pension wealth," at 
different points in the lifetime of the worker. In essence, pension 
wealth at time t is a measure of the future stream of pension payments 
due to the worker if the worker were to retire or otherwise terminate 
participation in the pension plan at time t. Other factors constant, it is 
assumed that workers seek to maximize their pension wealth.
The period-by-period changes in pension wealth, termed "pension 
accruals," embody the magnitudes of the financial incentives for the 
worker to remain in the labor force earlier in the life-cycle and then 
retire later in the life-cycle. For pension plans based on, for example, 
average earnings over some number of years of pensionable employ 
ment, an additional year of service generally brings about an increase 
in the monthly benefit payable to the worker. This increases pension 
wealth. Working against this, however, is the inevitable fact that every 
year the pension plan member gets a year older and the remaining 
years over which benefits can be received falls. In other words, over 
any period of time, while the monthly benefit payable to the worker 
may increase, the amount of time the worker has left to collect the ben 
efit falls. As workers age, depending on the specific benefit formula of 
the pension plan, the positive impact on pension wealth of labor-mar 
ket work becomes increasingly offset by the reduced amount of time 
remaining to receive the benefit. At some point, which again is influ 
enced by the specific benefit formulae contained in the pension plan, 
pension payments foregone by not retiring are not offset by increased 
monthly benefits, and pension wealth accruals become negative—that 
is, pension wealth falls with increased work. At some point in time, the 
two effects are completely offsetting, at which point pension wealth is 
maximized. Delaying receipt of benefits beyond this point is associ 
ated with negative pension wealth accruals and, clearly, reductions in 
pension wealth (see Kotlikoff and Wise 1987; Lazear and Moore 1988; 
Pesando and Gunderson 1988; and Pesando, Hyatt and Gunderson 
1992). Thus, as long as pension wealth accruals are positive, there is 
an incentive to continue work, or stated differently, there is no pension
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penalty to continued labor market employment. Holding pension 
wealth accruals constant, increases in pension wealth are expected to 
be associated with younger retirement ages.
If Social Security benefits are unexpectedly increased, but the post- 
retirement income clawback, the preretirement labor -market wage and 
other factors are all held constant, economic theory predicts that the 
retirement age will fall—that is, the increase in Social Security benefits 
will have a pure wealth effect, encouraging workers to consume lei 
sure. Anderson, Burkhauser, and Quinn (1986) estimated that unantic 
ipated increase in Social Security wealth significantly increases the 
probability of retiring earlier and significantly decreases the probabil 
ity of retiring later, for a sample of men aged 58 to 63 in 1969. 12
Some public pension plans, like U.S. Social Security, have postre- 
tirement earnings tests such that pension payments are clawed-back by 
some proportion for each dollar of labor-market income (usually over 
some threshold amount). These earnings tests effectively reduce the 
wage net of pension benefit reductions, thereby reducing the opportu 
nity cost of retirement. Policies that reduce the clawback would 
increase time in labor-market work, thereby increasing the expected 
retirement age, but they would also result in greater wealth, thereby 
reducing the expected retirement age. Which of the two effects domi 
nates is an empirical question that Gustman and Steinmeier (1991) 
addressed through a simulation analysis. Their results suggest that 
eliminating the Social Security clawback would have a small positive 
effect on the labor supply of those in the 65-69 age group.
In summary, Social Security can be expected to discourage contin 
ued labor-market work (i.e., encourage retirement) both because the 
income transfer enables the individual to afford to retire and because 
the clawback reduces the net returns to continued work. The income or 
wealth effect may be small because it is largely anticipated and hence 
can affect labor-supply decisions throughout the life-cycle, not just 
when the income is received after the normal retirement age. Never 
theless, income that is guaranteed in the later part of the life-cycle can 
be particularly important in facilitating retirement since it does not 
require the uncertainty of liquidating assets to pay for retirement— 
assets that can be bequeathed if not used and can be used up too 
quickly if one lives longer than expected.
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While Social Security can discourage labor-force participation 
after the age of normal retirement, it can encourage labor-force partici 
pation in earlier stages of the life-cycle to build eligibility for the bene 
fits. Furthermore, the wealth effects emanating from the inter- 
generational transfers can affect retirement decisions. Specifically, the 
older generations who are recipients of the transfers can more easily 
afford to retire. Future generations who are net payers may be less 
likely to afford to retire.
As indicated previously, the Canadian public pension system has a 
different set of incentives. The intergenerational wealth redistribution 
effects are likely to be similar because both involve transfers from 
younger generations to older generations. However, the more progres 
sive nature of the Canadian system implies that lower income people in 
Canada may more easily be able to afford to retire.
More importantly, the absence of direct clawbacks on CPP in Can 
ada means that there are less disincentives to keep working past the 
normal retirement age. 13 For lower income people who would other 
wise receive the GIS supplement, however, the 50 percent clawback for 
that component could discourage continued work. In essence, there 
may be some tendency for the Canadian system to encourage retire 
ment amongst lower income persons, both because the progressive 
nature of the system means that they can afford to retire and because 
the 50 percent clawback of the GIS supplement is likely to discourage 
work most amongst low-income persons. Overall, however, the 
absence of a direct clawback on CPP in Canada should mean that there 
is more incentive to continue working and not to retire.
Interestingly, the United States appears to facilitate continued 
working past the normal retirement age because of the legislated ban 
on mandatory retirement. However, it discourages continued working 
through the clawback of Social Security. In contrast, mandatory retire 
ment in Canada is generally not banned 14 ; however, continued labor- 
force participation is not discouraged through tax-back features of the 
public pension system (except possibly for low-income persons as 
indicated).
404 Gunderson, Hyatt, and Pesando
Payroll Taxes and the Demand for Labor
While most attention on incentive effects focuses on the labor-sup 
ply side, the payroll taxes used to finance the CPP in Canada and 
Social Security in the United States can also have important incentive 
effects reducing the demand for labor. The issue is complicated, how 
ever, by the fact that payroll taxes may be shifted back to labor in the 
form of lower wages in return for the pension benefits that are financed 
by the payroll tax.
Dahlby (1992), based on previous econometric studies, concluded 
that in the short-run, workers bear less than 50 percent of the payroll 
tax burden, increasing to at least two-thirds in the longer term.
Payroll taxes can affect the demand not only for the overall labor 
input but also for the different components of the labor input. Specifi 
cally, the ceilings on the payroll tax mean that the tax does not apply to 
earnings beyond the ceiling. This can create an incentive for firms who 
have employees at the ceiling to work them long hours (since no fur 
ther payroll taxes are incurred) rather than to hire new recruits and to 
incur the payroll taxes. In essence, the ceilings create an element of 
quasi-fixed costs of employment that can discourage new employment 
and encourage firms to demand longer hours from existing employees. 
This can be a contributing factor, for example, to the tendency to work 
incumbent workers overtime hours on a regular basis rather than hiring 
new employees. Since the ceiling on CPP contributions in Canada is 
reached sooner (i.e., at $25,800) than the ceiling on Social Security 
contributions in the United States (i.e., $60,000), this constraint should 
be more binding in Canada than in the United States.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
There is a clear trend to early retirement that exists in both Canada 
and the United States. In both countries, in the immediate post-war 
period, the labor-force participation rates of males aged 65 and over 
were in the neighborhood of 47 percent. By the early 1990s, these had 
fallen to well under 20 percent and closer to 10 percent in Canada. 
Participation rates of older workers have consistently been higher in
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the United States than in Canada. Of note, however, is the fact that 
after 1985, U.S. participation rates began moving upwards, while 
Canadian rates continued their downward trend. Whether this reflects 
the impact of the legislated ban on mandatory retirement in the United 
States (a ban that did not occur in Canada) is an interesting and impor 
tant question.
Overall, the following general conclusions emerge from this analy 
sis.
• In addition to the earnings-based CPP (broadly comparable to 
OASDI in the United States), the Canadian public pension system 
also has a universal demogrant, the OAS, payable to all Canadi 
ans 65 and over, and an income-tested supplement, the GIS.
• As a source of retirement income, the OAS demogrant and the 
GIS supplement are more important than is the labor-market- 
based, earnings-related CPP. In fact, the target income replace 
ment rate of the CPP is designed to be modest, at 25 percent of 
the average industrial wage. As a result, an individual who quali 
fies for the maximum CPP benefit, but who has no additional 
income other than the OAS pension, would qualify for some 
income-tested GIS benefits.
• The U.S. public pension system of OASDI, which is broadly 
comparable to the Canadian CPP, does not have a universal 
demogrant like the OAS, nor an income-tested supplement like 
the GIS. In spite of these differences, the public pension systems 
in both countries are remarkably similar as a source of retirement 
income, accounting for slightly over 40 percent of retirement 
income in both countries. Canada simply delivers more of its 
public pension under universal and income-tested components, 
while the United States delivers its public pension largely through 
the labor-market-related, earnings-based component.
• In both countries, the public pension systems are progressive or 
redistributive in that they involve higher income replacement 
rates for low-income persons and lower income replacement rates 
for higher income persons. In Canada, however, this is much 
more prominent. This reflects the fact that total public pension 
benefits are almost constant with respect to income: the OAS
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demogrant is completely flat and the CPP component, which is 
earnings-related, is modest, capped, and effectively subject to the 
50 percent GIS clawback because CPP benefits are included in 
total income for purposes of that clawback.
• In the United States, the continuation of working past a normal 
retirement age is facilitated by the legislated ban on mandatory 
retirement, but it is discouraged by the clawbacks on Social Secu 
rity that range from 0.33 to 0.50, depending upon age and 
income. In Canada, in contrast, mandatory retirement is not gen 
erally banned, but continued work is also not discouraged in the 
sense that there is no direct clawback from the CPP. There is only 
an indirect clawback for low-income people in the sense that any 
additional income (including CPP income) is subject to the 50 
percent clawback of the GIS supplement.
• Payroll taxes that are used to finance public pensions can reduce 
the overall demand for labor. The ceilings on such payroll taxes 
can also create a quasi-fixed hiring cost that discourages new hir 
ing (that would be subject to the payroll tax) and that encourages 
working the existing workforce long hours (since no further pay 
roll taxes are incurred once the ceiling is reached). The impact of 
such taxes on the demand for labor, and on the demand for hours 
versus new hires, is complicated by the fact that the cost of a 
large portion of the payroll tax is ultimately shifted back to labor.
• In both Canada and the United States, public pension programs 
contain significant intergenerational transfers, to current from 
future generations, creating some uncertainty as to the willing 
ness and ability of future generations to sustain future pension 
"obligations."
These conclusions highlight the substantial degree of variation in 
the key parameters of the public pension systems in the United States 
and Canada. This variation can potentially be exploited to understand 
examine the behavioral effects of public pensions in a way which is 
seldom possible in a single jurisdiction, unless that jurisdiction experi 
enced a major change in policy regimes. This echoes the sentiment 
expressed by Card and Freeman (1993, p. 2) that, "(i)f one wants to 
study the impact of differing unemployment insurance, income mainte-
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nance, or labor laws on economic behavior and outcomes, comparisons 
of Canadian and U.S. experiences hold out the promise of relatively 
straightforward inferences."
There are at least two areas of research on public pensions that 
have the potential to realize some of the promise suggested by Card 
and Freeman. The first is an examination of the comparative labor 
demand effects induced by financing public pensions exclusively 
through a payroll tax, as is the case in the United States, or a combina 
tion of a payroll tax and general revenues, as is the case in Canada. It 
would also be possible to examine the extent of disemployment in Can 
ada that results from the quasi-fixed cost of hiring created by the rela 
tively low payroll tax ceiling in Canada. These features have 
competing implications for employment and hours. This first suggests 
that Canadian firms will hire more workers than U.S. firms, while the 
second suggests that rather than hire new workers, firms will try to 
amortize the quasi-fixed cost of the payroll tax by working its existing 
workforce longer hours. However, as we cautioned earlier, the impact 
on labor demand of a payroll tax depends on the ultimate incidence of 
the tax, which some evidence suggests may fall largely on workers in 
the form of lower wages.
Second, on the supply side, useful research would consider the 
impact of pension generosity on labor-force participation. It would be 
expected that labor-force withdrawal rates would be higher for low 
lifetime income earners in Canada than for their counterparts in the 
United States. Confounding considerations, such as the fact that man 
datory retirement is still permitted in some provinces, would have to be 
addressed in the research design.
Both Canada and the United States have exhibited a dramatic trend 
towards retirement as exhibited by the falling labor-force participation 
rates of males age 65 and older. The role of public pensions (as well as 
private pensions and mandatory retirement policies) in stimulating, or 
facilitating, this trend remains an important topic of future research.
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Notes
1. The Government of Canada also provides an additional tax credit (equal in 1993 
to 54 percent of the basic personal tax credit) for those age 65 or over and addi 
tional tax credit for the first $750 of private pension income. In Quebec, the Can 
ada Pension Plan is replaced by its equivalent, the Quebec Pension Plan.
2. There is also a Spouse's Allowance, which is income-tested and payable from age 
60 to 65 to eligible widows, widowers, and spouses of OAS pensioners. In 1993, 
the maximum annual allowance was $6,160 to spouses and $6,801 to widows and 
widowers.
3. Additional income-tested benefits for those aged 65 and over provided by several 
provinces are also exempt from the GIS tax-back provisions. Indeed, receipt of 
GIS benefits is generally used as the eligibility criterion for these provincial sup 
plements. As an example of a provincial supplement, Ontario paid a maximum 
supplement of $83.00 per month in 1994 to single retirees through its Guaranteed 
Annual Income System (GAINS) program The supplement is scaled down based 
on a formula which takes into account other sources of income, such as interest 
and dividend payments, foreign pensions, CPP benefits, employment income, 
unemployment benefits, workers' compensation payments, and net rents from 
property.
4. The self-employed pay both employer and employee contributions. The CPP also 
contains death (including surviving spouse's) and disability benefits.
5. For those between the ages 60 and 65 who opt for early retirement, the normal 
retirement benefit is reduced by 0.5 percent for each month that early retirement 
precedes normal retirement to a maximum reduction of 30 percent. The worker 
must have substantially ceased working, meaning that the worker's employment 
earnings must be less than the maximum CPP benefit payable at age 65.
6. Of course, these costs can be shifted back to employees in the form of lower com 
pensating cash wages in return for more generous pension benefits. Evidence on 
such cost shifting in union-based flat benefit plans in Canada is given in Gunder 
son, Hyatt, and Pesando (1992).
7. The contribution growth rate is expressed in nominal terms. This facilitates com 
parison with the CPP growth rate, which reflects both increases in the earnings 
base and increases in the contribution rate.
8. The retirement benefit payable under the CPP is linked to the worker's average 
lifetime earnings, updated to the three years prior to the worker's retirement The 
mechanics are as follows: The ratio of the worker's earnings to the YMPE (set 
equal to one if earnings exceed the YMPE) is averaged for each year after the 
worker turned age 18 (or 1996). The resulting fraction (or the value one) is multi 
plied by the YMPE average for the year of retirement and the two previous years. 
This is called the worker's Average Pensionable Earnings (AYMPE). The proce 
dure, in effect, updates the worker's lifetime earnings to their current equivalent. 
The worker's CPP benefit is equal to 25 percent of the worker's AYMPE. (If a 
worker earned more than the YMPE in every year, for, example, the worker's pen-
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sion would equal 25 percent of the YMPE in the years in which the worker was 
63, 64, and 65. If the worker has contributed for more than 10 years, 15 percent of 
the months in the contribution period can be dropped before the worker's AYMPE 
is calculated. In effect, this allows the worker to eliminate the periods of lowest 
earnings.
9. The contribution rates through the year 2016 were set in the 1990-1991 review of 
contribution rates, per agreement among the federal and provincial ministers of 
finance.
10. The self-employed pay both employer and employee contributions.
11. A fully insured individual is one who has (or whose spouse has) earned 40 credits 
in the year in which they reach age 62. In 1994, a credit is earned for every $620 
of employment earnings, up to a maximum of four credits per year. The amount 
of employment earnings required to earn a credit increases annually, to reflect 
changes in the average industrial wage.
12. For an excellent discussion of these issues, see Ippolito (1990). Krueger and Pis- 
chke (1992) find only small effects of increases in Social Security wealth on 
labor-force participation of older workers.
13. As described earlier, to draw CPP benefits before age 65 an individual in Canada 
must have substantially stop working.
14. Except in the federal jurisdiction, which covers about 10 percent of workers, and 
in the provinces of Manitoba and Quebec.
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11 Current Policy Issues towards
Private Pensions in 
Canada and the United States
Stuart Dorsey 
Baker University
Public policies toward private pensions in Canada and the United 
States share a common history and many current issues. Policymakers 
and analysts in both countries view the retirement income program as a 
"three-legged stool," with base incomes established by public pen 
sions, supplemented by private pension benefits and individual retire 
ment saving. Canada and the United States provide similar tax incen 
tives for private pension saving, and both countries have regulations for 
vesting, funding, and fiduciary behavior designed to enforce and pre 
serve private sector pension promises.
Although basic private pension policies are similar, there are 
important differences. Both countries limit tax-deductible contribu 
tions and benefits, but the ceilings established by Revenue Canada are 
considerably lower than those in the United States (although the differ 
ence has shrunk over the past decade). Another significant difference 
is the greater role for personal retirement accounts. Canadian Regis 
tered Retirement Savings Plans (RRSPs) have a longer history and 
enjoy more favorable tax treatment than do Individual Retirement 
Accounts (IRAs) in the United States. An important tax distinction is 
the greater responsibility placed upon actuaries by Revenue Canada to 
determine minimum and tax-deductible contributions to defined-bene- 
fit funds in Canada. Internal Revenue Service rules, in contrast, disal 
low contributions sufficient to fully fund future benefit obligations in 
many plans.
The uniformity of pension regulations is another difference. Non 
tax pension rules are primarily enforced at the federal level in the 
United States, whereas pension regulation is a provincial responsibility
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in Canada. The result is that it is difficult to compare pension regula 
tions in the United States with rules that differ between provinces in 
Canada. Vesting rules, for example, vary between British Columbia 
and Ontario. Also, only Ontario has mandatory pension insurance, 
whereas all defined-benefit pension sponsors in the United States are 
covered by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.
Canada and the United States share several current public policy 
issues. One of the most important is the increasing tension between 
policy goals of encouraging expansion of pension coverage and fund 
ing, and of minimizing revenue loss of preferential treatment of pen 
sion compensation. Both federal governments in recent years have 
established minimum funding requirements, but they also have devel 
oped regulations to discourage "overfunding" as a pure tax shelter. 
There also is concern in both countries that increasing regulation will 
continue to lead to the decline of defined-benefit pension coverage and 
its attendant advantages over the defined-contribution approach. One 
of the biggest public policy differences appeared in response to the 
inflation of the 1970s and early 1980s. The protection of pension ben 
efits during an inflationary environment was the most keenly debated 
public policy issue in Canada. In the United States, in contrast, infla 
tion protection drew very little attention. Public policy in the United 
States has been focused primarily on declining coverage, portability, 
and the effect of the pension tax preferences on the distribution of the 
tax burden.
This chapter compares public policies towards private pensions in 
Canada and the United States and examines relevant policy research 
from both countries. First, I review the evolution of private pensions 
and policies in each country. Although pension policies are similar, 
Canada (especially the province of Ontario) has tended to involve gov 
ernment in the private pension system earlier than the United States. 
Next, I describe and compare the most important pension tax and regu 
latory rules. In the remainder of the paper, I examine four common 
current public policy issues: coverage, portability, tax policy, and infla 
tion indexing. The emphasis of this discussion is a review of relevant 
research on Canadian and U.S. outcomes. The volume of pension 
research has increased dramatically over the past two decades and, 
although most studies have focused on the United States, pension
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research in Canada has made important contributions, especially on the 
issue of mandatory inflation indexing.
The motivation for a joint discussion of private pension issues is 
that a comparison of research may shed light on pension outcomes and 
policy impacts in both countries. The similarities in pension systems 
suggest that outcomes of research in one country will be applicable to 
the other. Further, when possible, I try to identify differences in poli 
cies and institutions that provide an opportunity for comparative analy 
sis. For example, a major issue in the United States is the decline in 
coverage rates. A review of Canadian coverage experience may inform 
the extent to which this decline reflects policy changes or changes in 
employment composition. Similarly, the continued popularity of 
defined-benefit pensions in Canada may suggest reasons why defined- 
benefit coverage has declined in the United States. This issue also is 
relevant in Canada, where many pension analysts are concerned that 
regulations will result in similar trends there.
EVOLUTION OF PENSION POLICY IN CANADA AND THE 
UNITED STATES
Retirement programs and tax and regulatory policies towards pri 
vate pensions have a similar history in the United States and Canada. 
Both countries adopted universal public pension plans, extended favor 
able tax treatment to encourage expansion of private pensions, and 
later enacted broad regulations on pension outcomes. There have been 
important differences, however, in the evolution of private pension pol 
icies.
The first employer-sponsored pension in Canada was introduced 
by the Grand Trunk Railway in 1874, followed a year later by the first 
formal pension plan in the United States, sponsored by the American 
Express Company. Although employment shifts from agriculture into 
manufacturing created new pressures for explicit retirement saving 
vehicles, pension coverage grew slowly in both countries before 1910. 1 
The first legislation in either country to encourage retirement savings 
was the Government Annuities Act of 1908, which authorized the
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Canadian federal government to sell annuities to the public at favorable 
rates.
The period between 1910 and 1930 saw the widespread adoption 
of pension plans by the largest employers in the United States and Can 
ada. Graebner (1980) attributed much of the early growth to manage 
ment's view that pensions could reduce labor costs by lowering turn 
over and encouraging early retirement. The introduction of income tax 
systems during this period also provided a stimulus to coverage in both 
countries. The favorable tax treatment of pension contributions and 
earnings that continues to this day was put in place quickly in the 
United States. Payments to fund current retirement benefits were rec 
ognized as legitimate business deductions at the outset of the corporate 
income tax. The Revenue Acts of 1921 and 1926 explicitly exempted 
the earnings of assets in retirement funds from taxation, and the Reve 
nue Act of 1928 allowed pension sponsors to deduct contributions to 
advance fund benefit accruals.
Employer contributions also were immediately exempted from the 
Canadian corporate income tax. In addition, the 1919 Income Tax War 
Act extended the exemption to employee contributions to pension 
funds.
Rapid growth in pension plans and compensation during World 
War II created fears that pensions were increasingly being adopted for 
the purpose of avoiding income taxation. In the United States, the 
result was the enactment of the first contribution limits in the Revenue 
Act of 1942. This legislation also established the first nondiscrimina- 
tion rules to prevent the adoption of pensions for the primary benefit of 
high-wage employees. Employer contribution limits were first 
imposed in Canada in 1947. Because tax-qualified plan limits on con 
tributions and benefits in Canada have been strict, Canada has not felt 
it necessary to adopt nondiscrimination rules.
A significant difference between tax policies is the more favorable 
treatment of individual contributions to retirement funds in Canada 
than in the United States. In addition to exempting employee contribu 
tions from taxation, Canada established personal retirement accounts 
in 1957. Canadian workers were allowed to make tax deductible con 
tributions to RRSPs even if they were covered by a private pension 
plan. In the United States, IRAs were not generally available until 
1981 and were strictly limited after 1986.
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The existence and generosity of public pension benefits is an 
important factor in private pension coverage. Canada first enacted 
public pensions legislation in 1927. The Old Age Pension Act pro 
vided federal assistance to provinces that delivered means-tested pen 
sions to the elderly. By 1951, the view that means-tested pensions 
were inadequate was widespread, and the Old Age Security Acts autho 
rized a flat, universal retirement benefit. Canada did not adopt a uni 
versal, earnings-related public pension until the Canada/Quebec Pen 
sions Plans in 1965. The Canadian incremental approach is in contrast 
to the United States Social Security program, which has been earnings- 
based since 1938.
Prior to the 1960s, private pension regulation was vested in each 
country's federal income tax codes, which established conditions for 
tax-qualified pension plans. The first important private pension regula 
tions were approved in Ontario in 1963, establishing minimum vesting 
rules, funding requirements and, most notably, requiring all employers 
of more than 15 workers to provide pension coverage. Mandatory cov 
erage was dropped with the revised Ontario Pension Benefits Act in 
1965. However, the vesting standard of 45 years of age and 10 years of 
service was preserved. Most of the provinces subsequently adopted 
the major provisions of the Pension Benefits Act.
Significant pension regulation was not enacted in the United States 
for another decade. The Employees' Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974 (ERISA) was more ambitious than the Pension Benefits Act. 
ERISA established standards for vesting, funding, and fiduciary behav 
ior, as well as establishing a system of mandatory insurance for private 
sector, defined-benefit plans. Ontario is the only province in Canada 
that has mandatory pension insurance.
Several important changes in pension law were implemented in 
Canada during the 1980s. In the late 1970s, interest in private pension 
policy grew, as the ability of the public pension system to provide ade 
quate income support for the elderly came into question. A number of 
government and private sector commissions issued reports containing 
various proposals for comprehensive pension policy reforms related to 
issues of coverage, vesting, tax treatment, and inflation indexing. This 
discussion has been referred to as the "Great Pension Debate," and it 
contributed to the passage of the Ontario Pension Benefits Act of 1987. 
This act reduced the minimum vesting period, required that vested ben-
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efits be locked in, and created options for transferability of benefits 
under defined-benefit plans. All other provinces have adopted similar 
regulatory legislation. A major change in the taxation of pension con 
tributions was enacted in 1990, when the concept of integrated overall 
limits for contributions to defined-benefit plans, money purchase plans, 
and RRSPs was introduced.
Changes in pension policy were less extensive in the United States. 
The President's Commission on Pension Policy (1981) called for man 
datory pensions and improvements in portability. This report was 
largely ignored, however, and there was no explicit national debate, as 
compared with Canada, on the adequacy of retirement income. Pen 
sion tax preferences, instead, were reduced in a piecemeal fashion. 
Contribution limits were lowered several times, most recently in 1993, 
and a controversial funding limit was adopted in 1987. In addition to 
lowering benefit limits, nondiscrimination rules also were tightened. 
The primary motivation for increased taxation of pensions was enhanc 
ing federal tax revenue, and the preference of Congress for broadening 
the tax base over raising marginal income tax rates. Critics of these 
changes warned, however, that their cumulative effect would be greater 
complexity and reduced attractiveness of pensions, especially defined- 
benefit plans.
PUBLIC POLICIES TOWARDS PENSIONS IN CANADA AND 
THE UNITED STATES
Among industrialized nations, Canadian and U.S. pension policies 
are perhaps the most uniform. Tax rules and vesting and funding regu 
lations are broadly similar. There are important distinctions, however. 
Most notable are the integrated contribution limits that allow for 
greater individual retirement savings in Canada than in the United 
States and the provincial system of pension regulation, which allows 
for differences in nontax pension rules within Canada.
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Taxes and Coverage
Tax codes in Canada and the United States both permit deductions 
of employer contributions to pension funds from current income and 
do not tax pension fund earnings until benefits are distributed. Favor 
able tax rules clearly have been a stimulus to the growth of pension 
coverage and assets. There is a tension in both countries, however, 
between the policy goals of encouraging retirement saving and limiting 
revenue losses. Therefore, both countries have ceilings on benefits that 
can be provided under preferential tax status.
In the United States, defined-benefit plans cannot provide partici 
pants with more than the lesser of 100 percent of the highest three-year 
average earnings or $115,641 (in 1993). In addition, there is an overall 
limit on annual compensation that can be used for benefit determina 
tions. The compensation limit was lowered from $235,840 to 
$150,000 in the 1993 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act. Contribu 
tions to pension funds in excess of these limits are not deductible. 
Allowable contributions to defined-contribution plans may not exceed 
25 percent of an employee's compensation or $30,000.
The contributions and benefit ceilings are lower in Canada. Under 
rules adopted in 1990, the old system of separate limits for defined- 
benefit plans, defined-contribution plans, and RRSPs was replaced by 
an overall contribution limit of 18 percent of earnings up to 
Can$15,500. This figure was designed to correspond to a maximum 
annual benefit of just over Can$60,000 per year and allowable compen 
sation of Can$86,000 (Horner and Poddar 1992). An implied contribu 
tion amount is determined for workers who participate in a defined- 
benefit plan. The total of this amount plus contributions to the defined- 
contribution pension could not exceed the 18 percent/Can$15,500 ceil 
ing. (In 1995, the budget plan announced reductions in maximum con 
tributions.) The idea is to apply uniform ceilings to workers, regard 
less of the type of plan provided by their employer.
Both countries also limit employer contributions to fund benefits. 
The Internal Revenue Code allows a deduction for the "normal cost" 
plus amortization of any prior unfunded liabilities. However, contribu 
tions to plans having assets equal to or above 150 percent of current 
liabilities are not deductible. 2 Further, the tax code limits the range of 
actuarial assumptions that may be used to calculate pension liabilities.
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Thus, sponsors cannot avoid the 150 percent funding limit by adopting 
a low discount rate.
Revenue Canada, in contrast, relies more heavily on the judgment 
of professional actuaries in determining deductible pension contribu 
tions. In Ontario, the Pension Commission of Ontario requires 
defined-benefit plans to be evaluated by a pension actuary every three 
years. The actuary's determination of the required contribution for full 
funding is used by Revenue Canada to determine allowable deductions. 
Contributions to pension funds determined to be overfunded are disal 
lowed in Canada, as they are in the United States. It appears, however, 
that the two countries apply different definitions of "fully funded." 
Canadian actuaries are permitted to take into account future salary 
increases as well as possible postretirement benefit increases; that is, 
contributions are allowed to fully fund currently accrued benefits. The 
full-funding limit in the United States, in contrast, applies to current or 
termination liabilities, which can be substantially less than ongoing 
obligations in periods of significant inflation.
Employee contributions in Canada are also generally exempt from 
taxation as current income. In the United States, employee contribu 
tions are deductible only in special 401(k) plans. 3 A more important 
difference is the greater ability of Canadians to contribute to personal 
retirement accounts. The overall contribution limit of 18 percent or 
$15,500 also applies to RRSPs. Workers not covered by an occupa 
tional pension plans may contribute up to this limit to their RRSP; 
allowable contributions, however, are reduced dollar-for-dollar by 
implied contributions to defined-benefit or money-purchase plans on 
the employee's behalf. Contributions to RRSPs have grown rapidly 
over the past decade. The proportion of tax filers who made RRSP 
contributions rose from 13.8 percent in 1982 to 24.2 percent in 1991 
(Statistics Canada 1992).
Individual Retirement Accounts were established by ERISA in 
1974 for workers not covered by an employer-sponsored pension, but 
American workers who were pension participants could not contribute 
to a personal retirement account until 1981. Like Canadian RRSPs, 
IRAs are nonforfeitable, fully portable retirement funds. The Eco 
nomic Recovery Tax Act allowed all workers to make tax-deductible 
contribution to IRAs. However, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 put limits 
on contributions of workers who were otherwise covered by a pension.
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A married couple with adjusted gross income above $50,000 cannot 
make tax-deductible contributions to an IRA.4
The most rapidly growing pension vehicle in the United States is 
the 401(k) plan. Authorized by Congress in 1978, 401(k) plans allow 
employees the option of making tax-deductible contributions to a qual 
ified profit-sharing or stock bonus plan. Typically, the employer 
matches voluntary employee contributions up to a percentage limit. 
The maximum employee 401(k) contribution is $8,994 in 1993; other 
wise, 401(k) plans are subject to the same rules as other defined-contri- 
bution plans.
In summary, contribution limits to tax-qualified pension funds are 
stricter in Canada. Canadian workers, whether or not covered by an 
occupational pension plan, however, have a greater ability to make tax- 
favored contributions to personal retirement accounts.
Vesting and Portability
Although personal retirement accounts are more important in Can 
ada than in the United States, pension wealth overall may be less porta 
ble in Canada due to the dominance of defined-benefit plans. About 
one-third of all private pension assets in Canada reside in RRSPs or 
money-purchase plans (Statistics Canada 1992). In the United States, 
however, defined-contribution plans have grown rapidly and now hold 
nearly 40 percent of pension assets (Turner and Beller 1992).
Portability of benefits has emerged as a major pension issue in both 
countries, with much of the focus on early vesting. In 1987, the 
Ontario Pension Benefits Act and the federal Pension Benefits Stan 
dards Act established vesting after two years of service, and five other 
provinces have since adopted this standard. Three provinces have a 
five-year requirement, and Newfoundland applies the "10 and 45" rule. 
In the United States, all defined-benefit sponsors are subject to the 
same vesting rules, which generally require vesting after five years.
The Ontario Pension Benefits Act also enhanced portability of 
vested defined benefits. Upon termination, the vested worker may have 
the present value of his pension benefit transferred into another plan or 
into a Registered Retirement Savings Plan. Generally, workers do not 
have similar access to lump-sum benefits in the United States. As I dis 
cuss in the next section, however, preserving the value of defined bene-
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fits depends less upon the portability of assets than upon the interest 
rate used to calculate the termination value, and neither country 
requires that distributions index for preretirement wage growth.
Portability outcomes also are a function of policies that encourage 
personal retirement accounts or defined-contribution plans. Tax policy 
in Canada is more favorable to RRSPs, but many analysts have argued 
that tax and regulatory changes over the past decade are responsible for 
the shift towards defined-contribution pensions (Clark and McDermed 
1990). An indirect, and perhaps intended, effect of these policies has 
been to make pension benefits more portable.
PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES IN CANADA AND 
THE UNITED STATES
In this review I examine four public policy issues towards private 
pensions that have been prominent in the United States and Canada. 
The two countries share concerns about coverage, portability and pres 
ervation of benefits, the role of tax policy in promoting pensions, and 
inflation protection. My primary objective is to identify and briefly 
review relevant pension research from both countries. Most of the 
empirical research on private pensions has focused on outcomes in the 
United States. A number of studies, however, on the Canadian system 
have relevance for policy debates in the United States. In addition, 
there may be opportunities for comparative analysis, which exploits the 
different experiences of Canada and the United States, to improve our 
understanding of the private pension system and the effects of tax and 
regulatory policies in both countries. For example, research on trends 
in pension coverage in the United States generally uses time series 
methodology to evaluate the impacts of institutional, demographic, and 
public policy changes. Since Canadian policies and coverage out 
comes have been different, however, a comparative analysis should be 
useful.
The discussion is organized around four policy issues: private sec 
tor coverage, portability and preservation of benefits, pension tax pol 
icy, and inflation indexing. I present an overview of the issue first, 
describing recent or proposed policy changes in each country. A brief
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review of relevant policy research is presented next. Finally, I discuss 
some implications of cross-national comparisons and make some sug 
gestions for further comparative policy research.
Pension Coverage
The most fundamental policy debates in both countries center on 
the level of coverage. Governments in both countries historically have 
promoted private sector pensions with favorable tax policy. Despite 
these incentives, the expansion of coverage begun after World War II 
has stalled, with cross-section coverage rates less than 50 percent in 
both workforces.5 The percentage of employed, private sector workers 
covered under an employer-sponsored pension plan is estimated to be 
39 percent in Canada (Frenken and Maser 1992) and 42 percent in the 
United States (Beller and Lawrence 1992). 6 Incomplete coverage was 
cited as the primary weakness of private pensions during the Canadian 
Great Pension Debate. According to Sayeed (1984, p. 59), "The most 
important issue in the debate on pension reform [in Canada] is whether 
coverage should be improved by an expansion of the public system or . 
. . of the private system." Most of the commission reports recom 
mended expansion of private sector pension coverage, and one called 
for mandatory pensions. 7
Private pensions in the United States also have been criticized for 
incomplete coverage. The President's Commission on Pension Policy 
(1981) recommended mandatory pension coverage, and a 1988 report 
of a Department of Labor advisory group also recommended consider 
ation of, among other options, mandatory coverage. More recent crit 
ics of incomplete pension coverage have made different recommenda 
tions, arguing for repeal of pension tax preferences on the grounds that 
the beneficiaries of pensions and tax preferences are disproportionately 
high-income individuals (Munnell 1991, 1992; Gravelle 1993).
A particular concern in the United States has been the apparent 
decline in private pension coverage since the late 1970s. Table 1 shows 
coverage rates declining slightly between 1979 and 1988. 8 However, 
these averages mask two significant trends: an increase in pension cov 
erage for women and a decline for younger males. Even and Macpher- 
son (1994) calculated that coverage rates for females rose by more than 
6 percentage points between 1979 and 1988; whereas, over the same
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Table 1 Pension Coverage Rates, Canada and the United States (%)
____ ____United States ____ ___ Canada
Civilian, public and Civilian, public and 
Year____Private sector______private sector_______private sector
1979 43 46
1982 46.5
1983 41 43
1984
1986
1988 42
1990
1992
47.3
46.0
42 44.9
44.8
47.5
SOURCE. United States: estimates based on tabulations from May supplements to 
Current Populations Surveys by Beller and Lawrence (1992) for private sector and 
Piacentini (1989) for all civilian workers. Canada- Statistics Canada (1992).
period, the coverage rate fell 1.6 points for males between the ages of 
35 and 55 and 6.6 points for males aged 21-35. Bloom and Freeman 
(1992) reported similar results.
Coverage rates in Canada appear to have been stable in compari 
son. Such a conclusion may be misleading, however. First, the source 
of time-series data on coverage rates in Canada is administrative data 
provided by plan sponsors, and coverage rate estimates from similar 
data in the United States also show stable private-sector coverage rates 
over the past decade, at about 46 percent (Beller and Lawrence 1992). 
Evidence for declining coverage rates in the United States has come 
from household surveys. A comparable trend might be found in Can 
ada if household surveys were regularly repeated. Second, the stable 
coverage rates reported for Canada in Table 1 combine private and 
public sector employees. Unfortunately, an analysis of private sector 
coverage trends is not possible with Canadian data. 9
More directly comparable are coverage rates for all civilians. 
Table 1 shows falling civilian coverage rates in the United States (see 
also Andrews 1985; Parsons 1991) relative to Canada. However, a 
given downward trend in private sector coverage would show less of an 
impact on civilian coverage rates in Canada because the proportion of
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covered public sector workers is greater in Canada than it is in the 
United States.
Why Has Coverage Declined? Several studies have examined the 
decline in male coverage rates in the United States. The two most 
widely cited explanations are structural changes in the labor market, 
and changes in tax and pension policy. The first explanation argues 
that coverage declined because employment shifted to labor markets 
with traditionally low coverage rates: small, nonunion firms in service 
industries. Another possibility, however, is that coverage declined due 
to increased regulatory costs, reductions in marginal tax rates, and the 
introduction of pension plans in which employee participation is vol 
untary. The results of these studies are relevant to Canada. Although 
overall civilian coverage rates have not declined, common trends are at 
work. Coverage rates for Canadian men declined slightly, from 53.7 
percent to 51.8 percent between 1982 and 1992, while the coverage 
rate for females was up about 6 percentage points. There also is con 
cern that new Canadian pension regulations may reduce coverage (see 
discussion in Frenken and Maser 1992).
Investigations of declining coverage in the United States build 
upon cross-section studies of the determinants of pension coverage. 
These studies have consistently shown that the probability of having a 
pension is higher for individuals who are union members and are 
employed by large, manufacturing-based firms (Mitchell and Andrews 
1981; Dorsey 1982; Even and Macpherson 1994; Parsons 1994). 
Although the determinants of pension coverage in Canada have 
received less attention, the cross-section pattern is similar to that of the 
United States (Frenken and Maser 1992; Smith and Meng 1991; Currie 
and Chaykowski 1993).
On the basis of these patterns, Bloom and Freeman (1992) and 
Even and Macpherson (1994) attributed most of the decline in pension 
coverage to shrinking union membership, manufacturing employment, 
and increases in the relative importance of small firms.
Cross-section estimates also suggest that earnings and marginal tax 
rates are important determinants of pension coverage in the United 
States (Alpert 1983; Long and Scott 1982; Woodbury and Bettinger 
1991). Currie and Chaykowski (1993) and Smith and Meng (1991) 
found coverage to be strongly related to earnings for Canadian workers
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as well. These results suggest that reduction in marginal tax rates dur 
ing the 1980s may have lowered coverage rates in the United States. 
Bloom and Freeman argued that tax cuts could not explain the drop in 
coverage for younger, lower income workers because their tax rates 
declined the least. When the pension coverage decision is viewed in a 
lifetime context, however, tax cuts should have the greatest effect on 
younger workers. Older covered workers would have little incentive to 
drop pension coverage, but forward-looking younger workers would 
anticipate lower lifetime tax savings if the tax cuts were viewed as per 
manent.
Woodbury and Bettinger (1991) estimated that the decline in the 
tax price of pensions, due to reductions in marginal tax rates, explained 
about one-third of the drop in coverage between 1979 and 1988 and 
was nearly as important as declining union membership. Reagan and 
Turner (2000) attributed about one-fourth of the decline in coverage for 
young males to tax effects.
Even and Macpherson also argued that much of the fall in coverage 
for young males was due to the introduction of 401(k) plans, which 
allow workers to voluntarily participate. Their estimates indicated that 
the pension offer rate did not decline, but that the acceptance rate, 
given that a pension was in place, fell. Note that this theory also is 
consistent with the view that coverage fell due to an increased regula 
tory burden. Under this view, higher regulatory costs for defined-bene- 
fit plans induced employers to adopt 401(k) plans, indirectly leading to 
lower coverage rates.
This result is relevant for Canada, given the generous contribution 
limits for voluntary RRSPs. There is a corresponding concern that 
higher regulatory costs of defined-benefits will lead to substitution of 
voluntary pension coverage for defined-benefit plans (Hirst 1992), 
which could lead to similar reductions in coverage for young males in 
Canada.
A test of the 401(k) explanation for declining coverage would be a 
comparison of trends in coverage for young males in Canada and the 
United States. This theory predicts that coverage rates for young males 
should have declined less in Canada because RRSP limits were raised 
well after 401(k) plans were introduced. Unfortunately, there are no 
repeated household surveys that allow comparisons of coverage rates 
by age over time in Canada.
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Another factor consistent with greater declines in coverage in the 
United States for all workers is the greater decline in unionization than 
in Canada.
Changes in Coverage Type. The structure of pension coverage 
also has changed dramatically in the United States. The percentage of 
covered workers who had a primary defined-benefit plan fell from 87 
percent in 1975 to 68 percent in 1987. A similar decline has not been 
found in Canada: 94 percent of covered workers had a defined-benefit 
plan in 1982, as compared with 90 percent in 1992. Again, a time 
series on only private sector, defined-benefit coverage rates is not pos 
sible in Canada. But, given that about half of all covered workers are 
private sector employees, a decline in private sector, defined-benefit 
coverage similar to the United States would have lowered the overall 
defined benefit rate by more than 4 percentage points.
The shift in coverage type has become an important policy issue in 
the United States. Some analysts are concerned that the growth of 
defined-contribution plans will yield lower retirement incomes than 
defined-benefit plans, because savings rates are lower for defined-con 
tribution plans and because of the likelihood that lump-sum distribu 
tions will be consumed before retirement (Paine 1993). Although 
defined-benefit coverage has not shrunk in Canada, some are con 
cerned that pension and tax reforms, and especially the issue of the sur 
plus in overfunded plans, may precipitate a similar movement toward 
defined-contribution plans.
The two main explanations for shifts in coverage are changes in the 
structure of employment and changes in sponsor preferences for 
defined-benefit plans. Studies of pension plan type in the United States 
have shown that defined-benefit plans are more common among large 
firms and in unionized, goods-producing industries (Dorsey 1987). 
Consistent with this, Gustman and Steinmeier (1992) estimated that 
over half of drop in defined-benefit coverage between 1977 and 1985 
was due to shifts in the distribution of workers away from sectors that 
traditionally provide defined-benefit plans. Clark and McDermed 
(1990) found, in contrast, that only 21 percent of the decline in firms 
who offer defined-benefit plans is due to employment shifts. They 
attributed the remainder to changes in sponsor preferences and argued 
that changes in the tax and regulatory climate have been the primary
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reason for these shifts. A study by Hay/Huggins (1990) estimated that 
administrative costs per worker increased 181 percent between 1981 
and 1991, but only 99 percent for defined-contribution plans.
An analysis of plan choice in Canada could be instructive in evalu 
ating the relative effects of public policy versus employment shifts. 
Two significant differences in Canadian trends are a smaller decline in 
unionization and, at least during the decade beginning in the late 
1970s, a less dramatic increase in regulatory costs of defined-benefit 
plans.
Portability and Benefit Preservation
The primary reason for encouraging private pensions is to raise 
retirement income, but critics of private pensions point out that even 
workers who are covered frequently receive low benefits due to imper 
fect portability and consumption of pension assets before retirement. 
Canada and the United States both have recently adopted policies to 
enhance portability of benefits and to "lock in" pension assets. Stan 
dards for vesting have been raised to five years in the United States, 
and two years for most Canadian provinces. New legislation provides 
Canadian workers with greater portability of defined-benefit assets 
upon a job change, and vested benefits in Canada also are locked-in. 
Although lump-sum distributions are increasingly common in the 
United States, there is a 10 percent excise tax on assets not rolled over 
into an IRA.
Policy towards portability and benefit preservation raises several 
issues besides the ability of pensions to support retirement consump 
tion. Equity concerns arise because workers who change jobs fre 
quently reach retirement with smaller benefits than those who spend 
their entire career with a single employer. Thus, imperfect portability 
may lower retirement income of females and low-income workers rela 
tive to high-wage males. The effect of pensions on economic effi 
ciency also is relevant. Pensions are sometimes criticized for tying 
workers to jobs, thereby restricting job changes when technology or 
product demands change.
Despite shorter vesting periods, benefit losses when changing jobs 
can still be significant. A Hay/Huggins study (1988) projected that 59 
percent of covered workers would lose pension wealth in a job change
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and that the average loss would be 23 percent of the benefits that would 
have been received if all years of service were credited to their final 
pension plan. The study estimated that immediate vesting would lower 
average portability losses by less than 1 percent. Most portability 
losses arise because very few plans in either country index the earnings 
of workers who separate from the firm before retirement. Thus, a 
worker who is continuously covered by a pension, but changes jobs 
frequently, receives a smaller benefit than a worker with the same years 
of service credited to one plan.
Several proposals have been made to further reduce portability 
losses (Turner 1993). Mandatory indexing of the earnings base, simi 
lar to public pensions, has been suggested in both countries. Such a 
policy would eliminate most portability losses but, of course, would 
raise the cost of funding benefits. Ozanne and Lindeman (1987) esti 
mated that such a policy would increase annual defined-benefit costs 
between 6 and 28 percent. Alternatively, portability losses could be 
reduced by requiring employers to accept service credit earned on a 
previous pension. Clearly, this policy could substantially raise the cost 
of hiring workers who were covered by a pension on a previous job.
Munnell (1991) pointed out that enhanced portability of assets will 
not necessarily lower losses for workers who separate. If the present 
value of benefits is calculated with a nominal interest rate, the assets to 
be transferred do not reflect wage indexing, and the worker is no better 
off than if the credits were left with the original plan. In theory, pen 
sion losses from job change could be eliminated by requiring a prere 
tirement distribution valued at a discount rate that assumes wage 
indexing. The Ontario Pension Benefits Act provides that the present 
value of the deferred pension may be transferred for an employee who 
has terminated, either to another plan or an RRSP. However, it is my 
understanding that the present value is calculated using a nominal 
interest rate. If so, this option would have little effect on benefit losses.
In contrast to recent changes in Canadian regulations, defined-ben 
efit assets generally cannot be distributed prior to the retirement age in 
the United States. Sponsors may cash out job leavers with accrued 
benefits of less than $3,500, however. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 
required such lump sums to be calculated with the interest rate used by 
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. The PBGC rate is less than 
the market rate generally used to determine current pension liabilities,
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and thus portability losses are lower. However, when larger distribu 
tions are permitted, sponsors may use a nominal interest rate.
Requiring sponsors to transfer pension assets of separated workers 
valued with a real interest rate in effect transforms the defined-benefit 
pension into a defined-contribution plan. A more direct policy to 
enhance portability is to encourage defined-contribution plans. Some 
analysts have argued that the increasing regulation of defined-benefit 
plans has been purposeful to encourage defined-contribution plans. 
Unfortunately, one consequence of the growth of defined-contribution 
plans in the United States has been increased consumption of pension 
assets before retirement.
Economic Effect of Enhanced Portability. The impact of policies 
to enhance benefit portability centers on two questions. Would greater 
portability increase retirement income? Second, would these policies 
have adverse effects on employee productivity?
Pesando's (1984a) discussion of pension reform proposals in Can 
ada pointed out that economists and employee-benefit experts widely 
accept the view that higher pension costs must ultimately be borne by 
workers, either in the form of lower wages or less generous pensions. 
Whether retirement income rises on average depends upon whether 
workers understand that benefits are imperfectly portable. If workers 
are fully informed and the expected retirement benefit is consistent 
with their preferences, enhanced portability would lead to lower bene 
fit generosity, and retirement income would not rise. But, if workers 
do not understand that job change lowers real benefits, the policy 
would lead to an increase in pension benefits but lower wages or other 
compensation.
Some have suggested that enhanced pension portability would cre 
ate gains for workers who make frequent job changes at the expense of 
long-tenured employees, but Pesando pointed out that this would occur 
only if employers do not adjust the wage structure. If the reward for 
long tenure is intentional, perhaps to provide incentives for longevity, 
employers will respond by steepening the career wage profile. 10 If so, 
the distributional effects will be minimized. No studies, however, have 
attempted to estimate employer and employee responses to policies to 
reduce pension benefit losses.
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The second question is based upon the premise that potential port 
ability losses reduce employee turnover. Several studies in the United 
States have shown that pension coverage is associated with lower quit 
and layoff rates (Mitchell 1982; Ippolito 1986; Even and Macpherson 
1991; Gustman and Steinmeier 1993; Alien, Clark, and McDermed 
1993). Fewer studies have focused on the determinants of job change 
in Canada, but a study by Osberg, Apostle, and Clairmont (1986) found 
that Canadian workers were less likely to change employers when ini 
tially covered under a pension plan.
The pension-quit relationship has different interpretations, how 
ever. Even and Macpherson (1991) found that workers with defined- 
contribution pension coverage, whose benefits generally are fully por 
table, also were less likely to change jobs. Gustman and Steinmeier 
attributed most of the lower job change associated with pensions to 
wage premiums, rather than the potential portability losses. Their 
results suggest that pensions are associated with an efficiency wage 
and that enhanced portability would not increase quit rates. In con 
trast, Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1993) ascribed the significant 
decline in quits and layoffs to backloaded pension benefits, indepen 
dent of wages.
The question of how policies to enhance pension portability would 
affect labor-market efficiency has received much less attention. For 
some time, analysts have been concerned that nonportable pensions 
would make workers less mobile in the face of demand and technolog 
ical shocks. From this perspective, policies to make pension benefits 
more portable would improve allocative efficiency in the labor market. 
In contrast, most recent labor-market analysis is based upon gains from 
durable employment relationships or implicit contracts. Under this 
perspective deferred compensation plays an important incentive role in 
encouraging firm-specific investments in workers or reducing job 
shirking, and enhanced portability could reduce labor-market effi 
ciency by encouraging worker quits and the loss of firm-specific job 
rents.
I found very little direct evidence on the productivity effects of 
nonportable pensions (Dorsey 1995). However, there is substantial 
indirect evidence that pensions may raise worker productivity. Two 
recent studies have shown that pension coverage is strongly related to 
worker training (Dorsey and Macpherson 1997; Johnson 1996). In
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addition, a number of empirical studies based upon a wide variety of 
data sets have established that pension coverage is associated with 
large wage premiums. To my knowledge, there also have been no stud 
ies of the effect of pensions on productivity in the Canadian workforce.
"Locking In." Proposals to "lock in" pension assets have received 
closer attention in the United States with the growth of defined-contri- 
bution plans. A major difference between defined-contribution and 
defined-benefit plans is that the former typically make lump-sum dis 
tributions to workers who separate prior to retirement. According to 
Turner (1993), consumption of these preretirement distributions results 
in a greater loss in retirement income than do losses due to imperfect 
portability."
Estimates based on the 1988 May Current Population Survey 
showed that 8.5 million American workers reported a lump-sum distri 
bution from a previous pension plan, averaging $8,300 in 1988 dollars 
(Piacentini 1990). Piacentini reported that only 11 percent rolled the 
entire sum over into a tax-qualified retirement plan, while 40 percent 
reported consuming at least a part of the distribution.
In Canada, defined-contribution plans have been less important, so 
presumably preretirement distributions have been quantitatively less 
significant. However, the 1987 Ontario Pension Benefits Act allowed 
separated workers to receive distributions from defined benefit plans. 
To make sure that these assets were used for income support in retire 
ment, the law generally requires that vested benefits be locked in (Con- 
klin 1990). There is no corresponding requirement that distributions in 
the United States be placed in another pension savings vehicle. How 
ever, since 1987, assets not rolled over into another tax-qualified retire 
ment plan are subject to a 10 percent excise tax.
Many pension analysts are concerned that the growth in defined- 
contribution plans combined with the greater likelihood of spending 
lump-sum distributions will lower retirement income. Samwick and 
Skinner (1994), however, estimated that reductions in benefits due to 
consumption of defined-contribution distributions approximately 
matches portability losses from defined benefit plans. Overall, their 
results suggest that, under current policy, the substitution of defined- 
contribution plans will have little effect on retirement income.
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Taxation of Pension Benefits
There is general agreement that the long-standing policy of prefer 
ential tax treatment has been an important factor in the development of 
private pensions in Canada and the United States. However, this basic 
policy has been quietly diluted in the United States since 1982 as the 
federal government looked for ways to raise revenue without raising 
tax rates. A more explicit debate over the advisability of pension tax 
preferences appears to be looming in both countries, reflecting a funda 
mental tension between the goals of encouraging retirement savings, 
horizontal tax equity, and limiting revenue loss.
Benefit and contribution ceilings in the United States have been 
lowered on several occasions since 1982. The Tax Equity and Fiscal 
Responsibility Act (TEFRA) of 1982 lowered limits on the annual ben 
efit a defined-benefit participant could receive, from $136,425 to 
$90,000. The act also reduced the maximum contribution to defined- 
contribution plans. These limits again were lowered by the Deficit 
Reduction Act of 1984 and the Tax Reform Act of 1986. A limit on 
compensation that could be used for benefit calculation became effec 
tive in 1989 and was reduced from $235,000 to $150,000 by the Omni 
bus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1993. Perhaps the most 
controversial policy shift occurred with OBRA 1987, which limited 
pension funding to 150 percent of current pension liabilities, indepen 
dent of contributions needed to fund future benefit promises. This 
change prevented many plan sponsors from making contributions and, 
in effect, required that future benefits be funded with after-tax dollars 
(Ippolito 1991b).
Reduced pension preferences have not been driven by an explicit 
reappraisal of federal retirement income policy, but instead by a con 
tinuous search for additional revenue combined with the perception 
that pension tax policy disproportionately benefits higher income 
workers. According to estimates produced by the Joint Committee on 
Taxation, the annual loss in revenue due to the exclusion of pension 
contributions and earnings was $56.5 billion in FY 1993, the largest of 
the so-called "tax expenditures." This figure has made pensions an 
enticing target for revenue enhancement, especially when a claim can 
be made that taxing pensions both raises revenue and improves hori 
zontal equity. 12
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Many analysts have become concerned that retirement income pol 
icy has become too focused on short-run budgetary concerns, and that 
an explicit comparison of the costs and benefits of pension tax policy is 
overdue (Paine 1993). Two fundamental questions would be addressed 
by such a debate: Do the gains in private pension coverage and benefits 
justify the revenue loss? Are the benefits of current policy distributed 
too unfairly?
This explicit debate over pension tax policy is now being joined. 
Munnell (1991, 1992) argued that private pension coverage is too lim 
ited to justify favorable tax treatment, and she recommended taxing 
pension earnings or assets. Gravelle (1993) also criticized pension tax 
expenditures for disproportionately benefiting high-income individu 
als.
These criticisms have been challenged, however. For example, 
Goodfellow and Schieber (1993) and Salisbury (1993) argued that pri 
vate pension coverage was never intended to be universal but must be 
evaluating according to its contribution to "three-legged" stool. Schie 
ber and Goodfellow also argued that the bulk of pension tax expendi 
tures accrue to middle-income households and that the progressivity of 
the entire retirement income system, including the Social Security sys 
tem, should be considered.
A similar debate proceeded in Canada. During the "Great Pension 
Debate," some labor groups took the position that private pensions 
were fundamentally flawed due to incomplete coverage, nonportability, 
and the lack of indexed benefits. They argued that augmenting public 
pensions is more effective strategy for delivering retirement income. 
The federal and provincial governments elected, instead, to strengthen 
private pensions and individual retirement saving.
Recent changes in tax policy towards pensions in Canada have 
taken a much different direction than in the United States. The 1990 
tax reforms were the result of an explicit debate over the adequacy of 
retirement income and the role of tax policy in encouraging private 
pensions (Horner and Poddar 1992). In other words, changes in tax 
policy have been less piecemeal and ad hoc than they have been in the 
United States. The basic approach was to set a consistent overall limit 
on contributions and benefits for each individual, regardless of whether 
they were covered by a defined-benefit, money-purchase, or individual 
savings plan. This integrated limit establishes a target benefit eligible
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for tax assistance, equal to an annual benefit limit of 18 percent of 
earnings up to a maximum of Can$15,500. Workers who accrue bene 
fits below this limit in a defined-benefit plan or money-purchase plan 
may contribute the difference to a RRSP. Thus, workers who do not 
participate in an occupational pension plan may contribute Can$15,500 
to a RRSP.
Some Canadian pension specialists are concerned that the new tax 
rules, designed to put money-purchase and RRSP plans on an equal 
footing with defined-benefit plans have, in conjunction with the cost of 
new regulations, created a disadvantage for defined-benefit plans (Hirst 
1992). It must be kept in mind, however, that benefit limits still are 
much lower in Canada than in the United States. As a result, horizontal 
equity arguments for taxing pensions have less force in Canada.
Another important difference is that Canada has not adopted ad 
hoc limits on funding, comparable to the 150 percent rule of OBRA 
1987. This represented a fundamental change in policy, for the sole 
purpose of raising revenue. The full-funding limit is difficult to justify 
on equity or efficiency grounds.
The debate over taxation of pensions apparently has begun in Can 
ada. The 1995 budget lowered contribution limits to reduce revenue 
loss. The government has established the principle of limiting tax 
assistance to earnings up to 2.5 times the average wage. A proposal to 
tax investment earnings of pension funds was considered but rejected.
The Effect of Reducing Pension Tax Preferences. The question 
of whether or not the benefits of expanded pension coverage justify the 
revenue loss from pension tax preferences is very complex. What is 
the effect of favorable tax treatment on pension coverage and benefits? 
If tax preferences were eliminated and pension covered declined, 
would individual retirement savings make up the difference? How 
elastic is retirement saving to the after-tax rate of return? Would reve 
nue gained by taxing pensions be used to lower marginal tax rates or 
expand public pensions? Would taxing pensions make the income tax 
code and retirement income programs more progressive?
A number of studies cited previously suggest that pension cover 
age is quite sensitive to its tax price, implying that proposals to tax 
pension contributions and earnings would reduce coverage. A more 
direct prediction is made by Woodbury and Huang (1991). They esti-
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mated a simultaneous model of wages, health insurance, and pension 
benefits, and the results allowed them to simulate policy effects of sev 
eral proposals to tax fringe benefits. Woodbury and Huang estimated 
that treating pension contributions and health insurance benefits as 
fully taxable income would have reduced pension coverage by over 60 
percent in the simulation period. This simulation suggests that a policy 
of taxing only pensions, not other fringes, would have even greater 
effects on pension coverage, as workers would substitute health insur 
ance for pension coverage.
The case that tax incentives matter for the private pension system 
is strong, but whether a decline in private pension coverage would 
lower retirement saving is theoretically ambiguous. Empirical esti 
mates, however, suggest that the trade-off between pension and non- 
pension saving is less than dollar-for-dollar (Munnell and Yohn 1990). 
Ippolito (1986) estimated that at least one-quarter of pension contribu 
tions represents new saving (see also VanderHei 1992). The result 
hinges, in part, on whether savings has a positive interest elasticity. 
Several studies have examined the effect of changes in IRA limits in 
the United States on aggregate saving. Some found that a substantial 
amount of contributions were simply substitutions of other forms of 
savings (Gravelle 1991). However, studies by Venti and Wise (1990) 
and Carroll and Summers (1987) suggested that IRAs did increase net 
savings. Carroll and Summers estimated savings equations for the 
United States and Canada in an attempt to explain why Canadian per 
sonal savings rates increased relative to the United States beginning in 
the mid 1970s. The availability of RRSPs in Canada was found to be a 
statistically significant factor in the divergence of savings rates.
The impact of changes in tax policy on retirement saving depends 
crucially upon how the public pension system responds. It is always 
possible, as some have recommended, to expand the public retirement 
system to counter any loss in private retirement savings. Private pen 
sion advocates argue, in contrast, that one of its principle merits is to 
reduce pressure on public pensions (Paine 1993). The OASI trust fund 
in the United States is projected to face significant shortfalls as the 
baby boom generation begins drawing benefits, and increasing public 
pension generosity seems unlikely.
The equity effect of taxing pensions is also complicated. Given the 
patterns of coverage and progressive income tax rates in both coun-
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tries, a disproportionate share of the pension tax expenditure accrues to 
high-income families, 13 but the treatment of pensions is only one factor 
in the progressivity of the tax code and retirement policies. Elimina 
tion of pension tax preferences may lead to pressure to reduce the pro 
gressivity of the tax code in other areas. Further, public pensions in 
both countries increase the progressivity of the total retirement income 
system. Estimates by Goodfellow and Schieber (1993) suggest that the 
higher share of pension tax expenditures is more than offset by a less 
than fair return on Social Security payroll taxes for high-wage workers. 
The redistributive nature of public pensions may reflect the dispropor 
tionate private pension benefits of high-income workers.
Evidence on Effects of the 1980s Changes. The reduction in ben 
efit and contribution limits in the United States could be described as 
"nibbling at the edges" of the pension tax preference. The basic policy 
remains intact, so it is unlikely that tax policy changes directly reduced 
coverage during the 1980s. 14 Many have argued, however, that fre 
quent changes in tax rules added to the complexity of administering 
defined-benefit plans and contributed to a shift towards defined-contri- 
bution and 401(k) plans. 15 As stated by Utgoff (1991), "It is often diffi 
cult for nonspecialists to comprehend just how complex our pension 
laws have become . . . nondiscrimination laws in particular." Frequent 
changes in nondiscrimination rules appear to have been especially bur 
densome for small employers, among whom the shift away from 
defined-benefit pensions has been the greatest.
The full-funding limit established by OBRA 1987 also has created 
concern. Ippolito (1991b) estimated that the 150 percent funding limit 
establishes, in effect, an excise tax on defined-benefit assets of 3 to 10 
percent per year, with a nominal interest rate of 10 percent. The con 
straint is greatest for companies with a younger workforce and when 
nominal interest rates are higher. Ippolito estimated that, had this limit 
been applied since 1974, funding ratios, especially for growing firms, 
would have been dramatically reduced. It seems clear that this provi 
sion has significantly reduced pension funding. A study by the U.S 
Department of the Treasury found that half of all defined-benefit plan 
assets were affected by the limit.
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Mandatory Inflation Protection
The issues discussed so far have been prominent in both countries. 
The debate over indexing private pension benefits, however, has 
occurred almost exclusively in Canada. The erosion of benefits by 
inflation was seen the principal weakness of private pensions by many 
participants in the Canadian pension debate. Before inflation subsided, 
there was widespread concern that, if private pensions were unable to 
guarantee some form of indexation, the public pension system would 
expand and eclipse private pensions. In response to this challenge, a 
series of studies were undertaken and proposals issued. 16 Public debate 
on indexing private pension benefits in the United States was minimal, 
in contrast, even before inflation declined.
Canadian Proposals and Background Analysis. A 1978 pension 
reform study for the Quebec government first proposed that "surplus" 
investment earnings be used to fund increases in benefits. This "excess 
earnings" approach was adopted by several other studies. The follow 
ing year the Economic Council of Canada recommended that the fed 
eral government assume the risk of variations in inflation by offering 
price-indexed annuities to pension funds. The 1980 Report of the 
Royal Commission on the Status of Pensions in Ontario, however, 
rejected various proposals to mandate inflation protection, arguing that 
indexing would interfere with the more important goal of expanding 
pension coverage. A short time later, four commissions proposed that 
indexing be mandatory and favorably evaluated the excess earnings 
proposal.
Not all reports supported mandatory indexing. Business groups 
were critical of what they saw as an open-ended obligation. A report 
by the Ontario Economic Council (1984) criticized the excess earnings 
approach. Growing doubts about the excess earnings approach caused 
subsequent study groups to favor a partial or capped CPI adjustment. 
For example, an Ontario White Paper proposed a formula of 60 percent 
of CPI.
This flurry of activity had little ultimate effect on policy. 
Although the Ontario government is committed, in principle, to infla 
tion protection for private pensions, inflation adjustments are not man 
datory in any province.
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Much of the economic analysis of mandatory indexing proposals 
in Canada was done by James Pesando (1984a). A series of papers 
focused on the conditions under which pension funds could provide 
inflation protection and remain viable. In his evaluation of the federal 
government's proposals, he noted that a portfolio composed entirely of 
Treasury bills could approximate a portfolio of index bonds, allowing 
sponsors to promise index benefits without assuming inflation risk. 
Pesando suggested that the general absence of such lower return port 
folios, however, suggests that employees may be unwilling to pay the 
market price for avoiding inflation risk.
In this and a later study (Pesando 1988), he was especially critical 
of the excess earnings approach, which pegs inflation adjustments to 
current bond interest rates, not yields. Under this approach, when 
inflation and nominal interest rates rise, pension funds are required to 
increase benefits, even though their value has declined. Although pen 
sion funds could avoid inflation risk by holding only Treasury bills, the 
real interest rate required by the excess earnings proposal was well 
above the equilibrium rate for such a riskless portfolio.
What is the Nature of the Pension Contract? The debate over 
mandatory indexing goes to the heart of a question that is fundamental 
for pension policy. What are the implicit promises of defined-benefit 
sponsors to employees? Is there an implicit promise of a real retire 
ment benefit? While fewer than 5 percent of plan sponsors promise 
automatic indexation, evidence suggests that ad hoc post-retirement 
benefit increases, which sponsors are under no legal obligation to pro 
vide, are widespread but incomplete. Alien, Clark, and Sumner (1986) 
found that 75 percent of retirees in the United States received such an 
adjustment during the 1970s; however, the average increase was only 
about 40 percent of price increases over the period. A later study by 
Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1992) found that fewer plans raised ben 
efits during the 1980s, but inflation adjustment was more complete. 
Conklin (1990) reported that ad hoc adjustments also were common in 
Canada and cited a study suggesting that the average increase offset 
about one-fourth of price increases between 1977 and 1986.
Thus, the evidence is not consistent with a contract that guarantees 
real pension benefits. Periodic adjustments are sufficiently common, 
however, to suggest some kind of implicit agreement. Pesando
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(1984b) and Pesando and Hyatt (1992) have argued against the tradi 
tional notion that the risk of pension fund performance is borne 
entirely by shareholders. They suggest an implicit contract model in 
which workers and, presumably, retirees share in favorable and unfa 
vorable investment performance. The finding that benefits are not fully 
indexed reflects the sharing by workers in a decline in the performance 
of the pension fund.
Evidence for this type of contract is mixed, however. The studies 
by Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1992, 1993) both find that larger 
firms are more likely to provide ad hoc adjustments, consistent with the 
contract model. However, they found no evidence that financial perfor 
mance altered the likelihood that plans would provide benefit increases 
during the 1980s. In addition, strong pension fund performance during 
the 1980s should have made adjustments more, rather than less, likely. 
Pesando and Hyatt (1992), on the other hand, presented informal evi 
dence and case studies to suggest that employees are negatively 
affected by adverse plan performance in Canada, where sponsors are 
required to quickly amortize experience deficiencies through increased 
contributions.
A closely related issue is the appropriate discount rate for valuing 
pension liabilities. If the beneficiaries bear no investment risk, the 
risk-free rate is appropriate, regardless of the assets held by the fund. 
If the implicit contract calls for workers to share in investment risk, the 
appropriate rate is instead related to the risk characteristics of the fund. 
Petersen (1994) attempted to infer from the discount rate chosen by 
plan sponsors the extent to which risk is born by workers. Given legal 
limitations on the choice of discount rates in the United States, an anal 
ysis of rates used by Canadian actuaries may be more instructive, how 
ever.
Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1992) raised the possibility that 
slowing benefit increases during the 1980s may reflect increased pro 
pensity to renege on the implicit contract, by terminating pension plans 
and acquiring surplus assets. Ownership of surplus assets is another 
aspect of the implicit pension contract, which is a matter of legal and 
public policy interest in both countries. Recent legislation in the 
United States has taken the view that pension surpluses belong to 
workers and has imposed large penalties on sponsors who terminated 
plans with surplus assets. The view that surplus assets are owned by
Current Private Pension Policy Issues 441
plan participants is consistent with the view that workers share in the 
investment risk of pension funds. Until recently, plan sponsors in Can 
ada could more easily acquire surplus funds. However, the Pension 
Commission of Ontario has enforced a freeze on surplus assets.
Why is There Less Concern about Indexing in the United States?
A striking difference between the pension policy debate in Canada and 
the United States is has been the attention paid to mandatory indexing. 
Inflation protection was perhaps the central private pension policy 
issue in Canada through the mid 1990s. Indexing of private pensions 
has drawn far less interest in the United States. Given the similarities 
of systems and other policy concerns, what explains the difference in 
emphasis on indexing?
A likely candidate is the conflict between encouraging retirement 
income and minimizing federal revenue losses. This policy trade-off 
exists in both countries and helps explain why indexing proposals have 
not been implemented in Canada. Short-run revenue concerns appear 
to have been more powerful in the United States, however. Utgoff 
(1991) described how any policy to expand private pension benefits 
increases the reported pension tax expenditures and, under current bud 
get rules, requires a spending offset or revenue increase. During the 
1980s, the budget rules were informal but no less binding. In short, the 
U.S. federal budget deficit dominated any pension-related debates.
Second, the "Great Pension Debate" in Canada was largely over 
the adequacy of retirement income, and benefit erosion is clearly a key 
factor. The United States has experienced no similar fundamental 
debate over retirement income policy probably, again, due to the 
immediacy of the revenue concerns.
A reason cited by the Canadian Task Force on Inflation Protection 
is that most of the attention in the United States on retiree benefits was 
focused on health care insurance. More recently, of course, the health 
insurance debate has dominated any policy analysis of employee bene 
fit issues.
Consider also that, at the time that mandatory indexing was being 
debated in Canada, cost-of-living increases for federal workers in the 
United States were being reduced in order to minimize the budget defi 
cit, and various proposals were circulating which would limit indexing 
of social security benefits. Automatic indexing—of retirement benefits
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or the tax code—was viewed quite negatively by much of Congress, as 
part of the entitlement "problem." No doubt contributing to this per 
ception was the "double-indexing" of Social Security benefits during 
the 1970s, which contributed to the solvency problems of the OASI 
trust fund and created very unpleasant transitional problems.
Finally, comparison of the policy debate in both countries gives the 
impression that there is greater consensus in Canada for an active gov 
ernment role in guaranteeing retirement income. A frequently voiced 
concern in Canada was that, unless private pensions could do a better 
job of providing inflation protection, indexed government pensions 
would be likely to expand. In the United States, expansion of the 
Social Security to overcome perceived deficiencies in private pensions 
seems quite unlikely. If anything, private pensions are seen as reduc 
ing the pressure to increase Social Security benefits.
CONCLUSIONS
The policy stance of the governments of Canada and the United 
States towards private pensions is similar. Both view private pensions 
as a primary source of retirement income, along with public pensions 
and individual saving. Tax and regulatory policies are fundamentally 
the same in each country. There are small, but important, differences 
however. One of the most important is that contribution limits are inte 
grated and lower in Canada than they are in the United States. The 
integrated limits establish a greater ability to save for retirement out 
side of an employer-sponsored plan in Canada. The lower overall lim 
its in Canada also have resulted in an absence of nondiscrimination 
rules; the complexity of these rules is cited as an important factor in 
declining defined-benefit coverage in the United States, especially 
among small employers.
The most significant portability policy difference is that preretire 
ment distributions are locked-in in Canada, whereas they only are sub 
ject to a penalty tax in the United States. This is important because the 
consumption of lump-sum distributions has created fears that the shift 
towards defined-contribution plans threatens basic retirement income.
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Canada and the United States share most current pension policy 
issues. The most basic policy issue facing both countries over the next 
decade is pension coverage and, in particular, the appropriate role of 
tax and regulatory policy. There is a fundamental tension in both coun 
tries between the goals of encouraging private pension coverage and 
benefits and minimizing revenue losses. This conflict already has pro 
duced significant effects on pension outcomes in the United States. A 
more explicit debate on fundamental pension tax policy appears to be 
developing in Canada and the United States. In both countries, the 
sides will be drawn between those who believe private pensions are 
fundamentally flawed and favor the expansion of public pensions, and 
advocates who view private pensions as an essential leg of the retire 
ment "stool." Such an explicit debate would be welcome, especially in 
the United States, where recent tax policy has been driven by short-run 
revenue concerns with little regard to impacts on the retirement income 
system.
The two most important trends in coverage in the United States are 
a decline in overall private sector coverage, especially for young males, 
and the dramatic fall in the relative share of coverage provided by 
defined-benefit plans. An unresolved question is whether or not Can 
ada is experiencing similar trends. There has not been an overall 
decline in coverage rates in Canada; however, current data cannot 
address whether there has been a similar large drop in private sector 
coverage for young males, a drop that has been driving the falling cov 
erage in the United States. A comparison of coverage trends for young 
males would be helpful in evaluating the importance of policy changes 
versus employment shifts since there have been differences in the latter 
between the two countries.
A time-series for private sector, defined-benefit coverage is not 
available in Canada; however, it is clear that coverage shifts have been 
much greater in the United States. Again, a comparative analysis may 
shed light on the causes of this trend. A theory of the decline in 
defined-benefit coverage is that it reflects shifts in employment away 
from large, unionized, manufacturing firms. However, Canada has had 
similar shifts, with the exception that unionization rates have fallen 
less. If the shift to defined-contribution plans has been primarily a 
result of changes in tax and regulatory policies, the United States expe 
rience may be relevant in Canada. There is concern that recent regula-
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tory changes in conjunction with expanded contribution limits for 
RRSPs may cause a similar drop in defined-benefit coverage there.
Finally, my overall impression is that there is a greater consensus 
for regulation of pension outcomes in Canada. Canada had earlier and 
stricter vesting standards than the United States and does not allow 
workers to consume vested benefits. Most recently, the seriousness of 
the debate over mandatory indexing stands in contrast to the lack of 
interest in regulating inflation protection in the United States.
Notes
The author wishes to thank Keith Horner for many helpful comments on an earlier 
draft of this paper.
1. The most extensive survey of early pension coverage combined data from the 
United States and Canada (Latimer 1932) It is likely that early trends were simi 
lar in both countries, however According to Ezra (1983), the introduction of pen 
sions in Canada resulted primarily from decisions of firms headquartered in the 
United States.
2. Contributions to these "overfunded" plans are subject to a 10 percent excise tax.
3. While most mandatory contributions are not deductible, interest earnings do accu 
mulate tax-free.
4. However, each working spouse may make up to a $2,000 nondeductible contribu 
tion, and the investment earnings are not subject to taxation.
5. Cross-section coverage rates understate the percentage of workers who earn credit 
for pension benefits at some point in their career, due to the typical life cycle pat 
tern of coverage. Tabulations reported by Goodfellow and Schieber (1993) tabu 
lations from the March 1991 Current Population Survey showed that 61 percent of 
all persons aged 45 to 59, whether working or not, were either participating or 
receiving benefits from a private pension plan in the United States.
6. Estimates of private sector coverage rates can vary significantly in each country. 
One reason is different databases. The Frenken and Maser estimate is based upon 
the 1989 Labour Market Activity Survey. Other coverage rates estimates for Can 
ada are derived from a biennial plan sponsor survey. The latter, however, do not 
allow an estimate of private sector coverage. In the United States, several surveys 
and methodologies are used to calculate coverage rates, and the estimates differ 
by definition of coverage, public versus private sector, and other factors. See 
Doescher (1994) for a comprehensive discussion and comparison of differences in 
pension coverage statistics in the United States.
7. See Sayeed (1984) for a review of pension commission recommendations. Only 
the Canadian Labour Congress opposed expanded private coverage, favoring 
expansion of public pensions instead.
Current Private Pension Policy Issues 445
8. The extent to which coverage has declined in the United States is a matter of some 
debate. Other surveys have shown a larger drop in coverage; for example, see 
Parsons (1994). In contrast, establishment surveys have indicated constant cover 
age rates (Beller and Lawrence 1992). In general, comparisons of coverage and 
trends are quite sensitive to the form of the survey question and population defini 
tion. See Doescher (1994) for a review of pension coverage surveys in the United 
States. Since different surveys yield different results, even with the United States, 
international comparisons of coverage rates should be undertaken with great care.
9. Turner and Dailey (1990) estimate that Canadian private sector coverage rates 
were unchanged between 1970 and 1988. Their figure of 28 percent coverage, 
however, is well below the estimate of 39 percent reported by Frenken and Maser 
(1992).
10. However, as noted by Ippohto (1991a), a steepened career wage is a less efficient 
vehicle for delivering deferred compensation incentives than is a pension.
11. Samwick and Skinner (1994) pointed out, however, that workers may use these 
distributions to purchase consumer durables or to pay down debt, which will 
increase retirement resources. Workers obtain no benefit from portability losses.
12. For example, during the debate on TEFRA, Congressional staff generally referred 
to the reduction in compensation limits as "loophole closers."
13. However, as pointed out by Schieber (1990), the share of tax expenditures always 
is more skewed than the share of pension benefits, given that higher income fami 
lies face greater marginal tax rates. A dollar of benefits provides a larger tax ben 
efit to families with greater tax liability. He also estimated that more than half of 
the benefits accrue to families with incomes less than $50,000 per year.
14. However, as noted above, the decline in marginal income tax rates may have had 
an important effect.
15. As discussed above, the growing popularity of 401(k) plans may have been an 
important factor in declining coverage. To the extent that tax and regulatory 
changes encouraged the adoption of these plans, these policies have indirectly 
reduced pension coverage.
16. A chronology of recommendations from no fewer than 12 study groups is pro 
vided by the Ontario Economic Council (1988).
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12 Labor-Market Effects
of Canadian and U.S.
Pension Tax Policy
James E. Pesando 
University of Toronto
John A. Turner 
U.S. Department of Labor
By providing favorable tax treatment to pensions, as compared 
with other assets, Canadian and U.S. tax policies encourage firms to 
offer pension plans. Such tax policy is common among countries in 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. All 
countries with well-developed pension systems grant tax preferences to 
saving through pensions (Turner and Watanabe 1995).
The tax treatment of pensions results from compromises legislators 
make between competing political goals. Those goals include interper 
sonal equity in tax deductions and deferrals, as well as minimization of 
revenue loss from foregone taxes. While the broad goals of govern 
ments concerning pension tax policy are similar across developed 
countries, major differences occur within this framework.
In this regard, Canada and the United States are particularly inter 
esting to compare. The two countries are similar enough to make com 
parisons of differences useful: both have social security systems with 
moderate benefit levels that leave room for a private pension system to 
develop and both have voluntary private pension systems.
The level of family income in Canada and the United States is 
roughly equivalent. While average family income is slightly higher (by 
2.2 percent) in the United States, median family income is slightly 
lower (by 4.4 percent), reflecting the greater income inequality in the 
United States (Wolfson and Murphy 1994).'
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The elderly in the United States, however, have considerably 
higher income than their counterparts in Canada—19 percent higher 
for couples aged 65 to 74. The mix of income among the elderly also 
differs. Social security benefits are higher in Canada—6 percent 
higher for couples aged 65 to 74, accounting for 40 percent of the 
income of that group—in comparison with 31 percent for U.S. couples 
of that age. Income from private sources (earnings from working, pen 
sions, and savings) is higher in the United States (Wolfson and Murphy 
1994). 2
In both countries, workers in unions, manufacturing, large firms, 
and the public sector are more likely to be covered by a pension plan 
than are other workers. In the United States, the percentage of the pri 
vate sector workforce that is unionized has declined considerably, to 
about 11 percent in the late 1990s. In Canada, the percentage is 
roughly the same or perhaps slightly higher. 3 Public sector employ 
ment is more important in Canada than in the United States.
Because of their proximity and similar income and culture, one 
might think that the two neighbors would have similar tax policy 
toward pensions. In fact, important differences exist that may have 
caused differences in their private pension systems. Insights can be 
gained into the tax treatment of pensions in both countries by examin 
ing the differences.
The tax codes in both Canada and the United States place require 
ments on pension plans to qualify for favorable tax treatment. These 
include the requirement that the pension benefits of plan members 
must vest within a minimum number of years. These requirements 
have a strictly regulatory function, rather than being a revenue-raising 
aspect of tax policy. While regulations influence or determine some 
features of pension plans, we choose to ignore regulatory aspects of the 
tax code. We analyze instead how marginal tax rates affect pensions as 
a form of employee compensation.
OVERVIEW
Employer contributions to pension plans in Canada and the United 
States are treated similarly to wages—both are tax deductible under the
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corporate income tax. Book reserve financing, where an employer 
could receive a tax deduction without having made a contribution, is 
not allowed. 4 Investment earnings in pension funds accumulate tax 
free, and pension assets and liabilities are not taxed. 5
Workers are not taxed at the time their employer contributes to a 
pension fund; however, all distributions from pension funds to workers 
are taxable under the personal income tax. In Canada, retirees receive 
a tax credit for the first Can$ 1,000 of pension income. Pension distri 
butions in both countries are not subject to the social security payroll 
tax. Worker contributions are treated differently in the two countries 
and are discussed later. Both countries also offer workers individual 
plans not tied to a particular employer: Registered Retirement Savings 
Plans (RRSPs) in Canada and Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) 
in the United States.6
The tax system affects the role of pensions in the compensation of 
workers. 8 We examine how the tax treatment of pensions affects four 
pension policy issues: 1) pension coverage rates, 2) the generosity of 
pension benefits, 3) employer versus employee contributions, and 4) 
defined-benefit versus defined-contribution plans. 9
PENSION COVERAGE
The pension coverage rate is the percentage of the workforce cov 
ered by a pension. Although the concept is simple, the coverage rate is 
measured in considerably different ways, producing a range of statis 
tics.
Empirical comparisons of private sector workers in Canada and the 
United States, such as the earlier comparison of the percentage of 
unionized workers, are difficult because the distinction between the 
private and public sector is less clear in Canada than it is in the United 
States. It appears that some public sector Canadian workers who work 
for institutions such as universities, hospitals, and public corporations 
(such as Air Canada), rather than traditional government bureaucracies, 
respond in household surveys that they are private sector workers. 
Because of this, Canadian data for the entire workforce are much more 
reliable than are data that attempt to distinguish between the public and
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private sectors. Because the public sector is relatively larger in Can 
ada, however, and because pension coverage rates are considerably 
higher in the public than the private sector, empirical comparisons 
across the two countries are difficult. The coverage rate for the entire 
workforce has the advantage that it indicates the percentage of the 
workforce in the two countries that has an employer-provided pension 
that supplements social security. It has the disadvantage that the rate is 
influenced by government policy concerning the relative size of the 
public sector.
Dailey and Turner (1992) attempted to comparably measure pri 
vate pension coverage for Canada and the United States. They found 
that, for many years, the private pension coverage rate was about 50 
percent higher in the United States than in Canada. Since 1975, the 
pension coverage rate for full-time private sector workers has varied 
between 28 and 30 percent in Canada and between 44 and 46 percent 
in the United States.
Several problems caused those figures to overstate the difference in 
private sector coverage rates between Canada and the United States. In 
1990, Statistics Canada determined it was impossible to accurately 
determine private sector pension coverage rates because of difficulties 
in determining who was in the private sector, and that previous figures 
underestimated pension coverage. The U.S. figures are overstated rela 
tive to those of Canada because the Canadian figures include the unem 
ployed as part of the labor force, while the U.S. figures include only 
wage and salary workers, not the unemployed. After adjusting for 
these factors based on a somewhat subjective assessment of the magni 
tude of their effects, it still appears that the private sector pension cov 
erage rate was at least 5 percentage points higher in the United States 
than it was in Canada.
By contrast, when examining pension coverage provided by both 
private and public sector employers, the coverage rates by income for 
all workers are higher in Canada for all income levels except the low 
est, where the rate is slightly lower (Table 1). The coverage rates are 
10 to 20 percentage points higher in the middle income categories; in 
the highest income category, the difference is only 4 percentage points.
Because one goal of pension tax policy is to encourage pension 
coverage, an important pension policy issue is the extent to which dif 
ferences in pension coverage in Canada and the United States arise
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Table 1 Pension Coverage Rates by Income, All Workers
Earnings (U.S.$)
1 - 14,999
15,000-22,499
22,500 - 29,999
30,000 - 44,999
45,000 or more
Canada (%) 
1989
27
59
72
82
73
United States (%) 
1993
28
48
52
62
69
SOURCE: Canada—Franken and Maser (1992, p. 29); United States—unpublished 
tabulations from the 1993 Current Population Survey Special Pension Supplement.
because of differences in the tax treatment of pensions. In both Canada 
and the United States, the tax system encourages employers to offer 
pensions. Workers reduce their total lifetime taxes when they receive 
some compensation as a pension rather than taking all compensation as 
wages. In both countries, pension coverage rates increase with 
income, presumably at least partially because tax rates increase with 
income.
Marginal Income Tax Rates
If an individual's marginal income tax rate is the same in the prere 
tirement and postretirement periods, the individual earns the pretax 
rate of return on pension saving in both Canada and the United States. 
This occurs because the investment earnings on pension funds are 
untaxed. The incentive that the tax system provides for participating in 
a pension is thus higher with higher marginal income tax rates. The 
"wedge" between the pretax and the after-tax rate of return is higher in 
Canada for most workers because income tax rates are higher in Can 
ada and the top rates are reached at much lower levels of income.
Provincial tax rates differ in Canada but to a lesser extent than do 
state income tax rates (Alpert, Shoven, and Whalley 1992). About 40 
percent of Canadian employees work in the province of Ontario, and 
thus Ontario is a major component of the Canadian experience. In 
1996, the maximum tax rate—federal plus provincial—was 53 percent 
in Ontario (Table 2). This maximum rate was reached at a taxable
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Table 2 Marginal Federal Plus Provincial or State Income Tax Rates in 
Canada and the United States
Family taxable income 
(U.S.$) Canada (%)
0 - 22,749
22,750 - 55,099
55,100-114,999
115,000-249,999
250,000 and up
(up to) 27
(up to) 53
53
53
53
United States (%)
19
33
36
42
46
NOTE: Data for Canada are from the Province of Ontano; data for the United States 
represents a national average. Provincial income tax rates are much higher in Canada 
than are state income tax rates in the United States. The average state income tax 
rates are calculated from the Current Population Survey Special Pension Supplement, 
April 1993 for the tax year 1992. For the income brackets in the table, they are, 
respectively, 3.8%, 4.6%, 5.1%, 5.9% and 5.9%. Because of top coding of income in 
the data, there is no income reported greater than $250,000. The average state income 
tax rate for the preceding category is used for the top income category in this table.
income of $49,990. (Unless indicated otherwise, all amounts are 
expressed in U.S. dollars, at the exchange rate of U.S.$0.75 for each 
Canadian dollar.)
In both Canada and the United States, marginal federal income tax 
rates were reduced during the 1980s. In Canada, they were reduced 
from 65 percent in 1980 to 29 percent in 1987. It should be noted, 
however, that provincial income tax rates are much higher than state 
income tax rates. For this reason, comparing only marginal federal tax 
rates is misleading because the federal/provincial split of income tax is 
far different than the federal/state split in the United States.
In the United States, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduced the top 
federal rate on the highest-income households to 28 percent. The high 
est rate was 33 percent, which applied for some middle income taxpay 
ers. The top rate in 1980 had been 70 percent. Marginal tax rates have 
since risen. The highest marginal federal income tax rate in 1994, 
applied to families with income above $250,000, was 39.6 percent 
(Table 2). In addition, taxpayers are liable for state income tax, which 
in some states reaches as high as 11 percent. Thus, the highest mar-
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ginal income tax rate in the United States (state plus federal rates) is 
currently 51 percent, but only the top few percent of families pay that 
rate. Workers with family income of $50,000 would pay, on average, a 
marginal tax rate (federal plus state) of about 33 percent and thus have 
marginal tax rates about 20 percentage points lower than in Canada. 9
These comparisons do not include social security taxes. Social 
security is largely funded through general revenues in Canada, while it 
is funded by a payroll tax in the United States. When social security 
taxes are included, the share of social security and personal income 
taxes in GNP in 1987 was 18.0 percent in Canada and 19.5 percent in 
the United States (Wilson 1992). The social security payroll tax rate in 
Canada in 1993 was 5 percent, shared equally by employers and 
employees. This compares to 12.4 percent shared equally by employ 
ers and employees in the United States (U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, Social Security Administration 1994). In both cases, 
it is presumed that employees bear the incidence of the payroll tax. 
However, to the extent social security benefits are related to earnings, 
some workers may view the true social security tax rate as being lower 
than the statutory rate (Burkhauser and Turner 1985).
Empirical studies in the United States have shown that higher mar 
ginal income tax rates encourage the provision of pensions. In their 
study of pension coverage in 1979,1988, and 1993, Reagan and Turner 
(2000) found that, on average, a 1 percentage point increase in mar 
ginal income tax rates increases pension coverage rates by 0.4 percent 
age points. 10 This finding suggests that, based solely on marginal 
income tax rates, pension coverage would be roughly 5 to 7 percentage 
points higher in Canada than in the United States.
Income Tax Progressivity
As well as being affected by the level of marginal income tax rates, 
the tax incentive for pensions is greater with a greater progressivity of 
the tax system. Workers generally have lower income in retirement 
than while working. The more progressive the tax system, the more 
their reduced income during retirement will lower the marginal tax rate 
they pay on their pension benefits.
Because the highest marginal rate starts at a much lower income in 
Canada, marginal rates are more "compressed," so that it might appear
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that higher income Canadians are less likely than Americans to face 
lower marginal rates in their retirement years than while working.
In the United States, however, the tax system is also not very pro 
gressive but for a different reason. The top marginal bracket begins at 
a high income level, and a single marginal rate covers a wide range of 
the distribution of income. Reagan and Turner (2000) found that, in 
their regression sample of males aged 21 to 55, the marginal tax rate 
(federal plus state) in 1979 was 32 percent, with a standard deviation of 
13 percentage points. These figures had declined in 1993 to a marginal 
rate of 25 percent with a standard deviation of 9 percentage points. 
Thus, it appears that neither the Canadian nor the U.S. tax system is 
very progressive, and differences in the progressivity of the income tax 
systems cannot explain the lower pension coverage rates for private 
sector workers in Canada.
Tax Subsidies for High-Income Workers
To further examine coverage rate differences between the two 
countries, we focus separately on the tax treatment of high- and low- 
income workers. The centerpiece of tax reform in Canada in the early 
1990s was the establishment of a comprehensive limit to tax-assisted 
pension saving. All workers are permitted to contribute the lesser of 
18 percent of their earned income (in the previous calendar year) or a 
maximum dollar amount (if lower) to an RRSP. In 1995, this dollar 
amount equalled $11,625, or 18 percent of $64,550. The latter is the 
level of earned income above which there is no tax-assisted pension 
saving for members of defined-benefit pension plans.
For individuals with relatively high incomes, the tax assistance 
provided to pension savings is considerably higher in the United 
States. In the United States, from 1993 to 1996, the maximum com 
pensation that could be used for calculating pension benefits that 
receive preferential tax treatment was $150,000, with this figure being 
raised to $160,000 in 1997."
Some benefits consultants have argued that a low ceiling on com 
pensation used for calculating pension benefits reduces the incentive 
for employers to provide pensions because the personal benefit to high- 
income employers is reduced. This argument is most likely to be valid 
for the owners of successful small firms, where the owner may weigh
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the amount that he or she can accumulate in a pension versus the cost 
of providing pensions to his or her employees. If this argument is 
valid, it may partly explain why pension coverage appears to be lower 
in the private sector in Canada.
In the United States since 1984, some higher income taxpayers 
have faced an implicit tax on their pension benefits in addition to the 
personal income tax. Up to 50 percent of social security benefits could 
be included in taxable income for persons with adjusted gross income 
plus certain nontaxable income above $25,000 for individuals and 
$32,000 for married couples. Under the 1993 Omnibus Budget Recon 
ciliation Act, a two-tier tax liability was established, so that the taxable 
proportion of social security benefits for retirees with income in the 
second-tier range was increased to 85 percent. Thus, for some workers 
at the margin, increases in pension benefits are taxed at the worker's 
marginal tax rate and cause the worker's social security benefits to 
become taxable. Eighteen percent of families with social security ben 
efits pay taxes on those benefits, but more than half of families in the 
eighth, ninth, and tenth deciles are taxed (Pattison 1994). The net 
result is that many higher income workers pay an implicit tax on pen 
sion benefits of 20 to 40 percent due to the taxation of their social secu 
rity benefits.
Housing as an Alternative Investment for High-Income Workers
Housing ownership is taxed differently in the two countries (Pot- 
erba 1992). In Canada, mortgage interest is not tax deductible, but 
capital gains are not taxed. In the United States, mortgage interest is 
tax deductible, but capital gains are taxed when a person sells their res 
idence and does not purchase a residence of equal or greater value. 
The tax liability is subject to a lifetime exclusion of $150,000. Since 
Canadians must pay the before-tax rate of interest on their mortgages, 
they can in effect receive the before-tax rate of return by paying down 
their mortgage. Thus, housing provides an alternative vehicle for 
investing at the before-tax rate of return. In the United States, home- 
owners in effect pay the after-tax rate of return on their mortgages 
because they can deduct their mortgage interest payments. Thus, it is 
relatively more favorable to finance housing with debt than equity in 
the United States, making pension investments relatively more favor-
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able in the United States. This is especially true for high-income work 
ers with high tax rates.
Two-thirds of Canadian elderly own their own homes and 86 per 
cent of those have homes that are mortgage free (Chappell 1990). The 
comparable figure for the United States is 70 percent home ownership, 
57 percent of which are mortgage free (Struyk, Turner, and Ueno 
1988). Thus, it appears that the different tax treatment of mortgages 
causes elderly Americans to be much more likely to have one.
In sum, high-income workers in Canada face a greater tax incen 
tive to invest in tax-sheltered assets than they do in the United States. 
However, the amount they can shelter through pensions is lower, and 
housing is relatively more favorable an equity investment in Canada.
Implicit Taxes on Low-Income Workers
In addition to explicit taxes, implicit taxes may also reduce the net 
receipt of pension benefits. For Canadians with low lifetime earnings, 
the income-tested component of the social security system discourages 
participation in an employer-sponsored pension plan. All Canadians 
aged 65 and over, independent of their work history, receive a flat-rate 
Old Age Security (OAS) benefit. As of January 1, 1994, these benefits 
were worth $3,472 per year. Canadians with no other source of income 
also receive income-tested benefits from the Guaranteed Income Sup 
plement (GIS), worth a maximum of $4,127 per year. For each dollar 
of retirement income in excess of the flat rate OAS benefits, GIS bene 
fits are reduced by 50 cents.
The maximum pension payable from the earnings-related compo 
nent of Canada's public retirement system, the Canada Pension Plan 
(CPP) was $6,250 as of January 1, 1994. The maximum Canada Pen 
sion Plan benefit would be received by individuals whose lifetime 
earnings (in 1994 dollars) average $25,800 per year. Thus, an individ 
ual who receives the maximum CPP benefit would still qualify for par 
tial GIS benefits if the individual had no other retirement income than 
the flat-rate OAS benefits. So, too, would individuals not entitled to 
the maximum CPP benefit.
The net result is that Canadians with low lifetime earnings face a 
50 percent tax rate on private pension income during retirement, this 
rate being in addition to federal and provincial income taxes. These
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public pension provisions, in effect since 1966, thus discourage low- 
income workers from participating in an employer-sponsored pension 
plan. 12 A similar disincentive exists in the United States because of the 
income testing for eligibility for Supplemental Security Income, but 
that program only affects very low income workers.
Individual Pension Plans
The Canadian government has set contribution limits for defined- 
contribution plans—money-purchase plans and RRSPs—equivalent to 
the limits for defined-benefit plans. Also, the federal tax rules treat 
employer and employee contributions the same, regardless of the type 
of pension plan.
A primary objective of the Canadian tax treatment of pensions is to 
provide equitable tax assistance for retirement, regardless of whether a 
worker participates in a company-sponsored pension plan or in an indi 
vidual account pension plan. In Canada, workers who set up a RRSP 
can access the same amount of tax assistance as do workers who par 
ticipate in an employer-provided plan.
Registered Retirement Savings Plans also enjoy other advantages 
over IRAs. Since Canadian tax reform in 1990, failure to contribute to 
a RRSP by the deadline does not cause the deduction to be lost. 
Unused contribution amounts, subject to a seven-year limit, may be 
carried forward and deducted later when made. No such carry-forward 
provision exists for IRAs in the United States.
Participation in RRSPs has increased greatly in Canada. In 1970, 2 
percent of the total population aged 18 to 70 contributed to a RRSP. 
By 1988, 25 percent of all tax filers contributed to a RRSP, with an 
average contribution of Can$3,545 (Venti and Wise 1995).
Since 1990, the tax treatment of RRSPs has meant there is no tax 
advantage to participating in an employer-provided plan since an equal 
amount could be contributed to either type of plan. This change should 
cause a reduction in pension coverage rates in Canada. However, a 
study of data prior to the change found no negative relationship 
between the amount of employer-provided pension assets held by an 
individual and their RRSP assets (Venti and Wise 1994). In 1987, for 
example, 37 percent of tax filers who contributed to a pension plan also
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contributed to a RRSP, versus only 16 percent of tax filers who did not 
contribute to a pension plan (Franken 1990).
In the United States, no attempt has been made to equalize the 
treatment between employer-sponsored plans and individual plans. 
Employers in the United States have a near monopoly in the provision 
of tax-favored pension benefits. Since 1981, the maximum an individ 
ual can deduct for contributions to an IRA has been frozen at $2,000. 13 
Inflation has reduced the real value of the tax deduction for IRAs by 
more than half since 1981.
Summary and Other Explanations
The higher marginal income tax rates in Canada would—other 
things equal—cause pension coverage rates to be roughly 5 to 7 per 
centage points higher in Canada than in the United States. This effect 
may be offset somewhat by higher social security tax rates in the 
United States. An explanation for relatively lower pension coverage 
rates at lower income levels in Canada is that the income-tested provi 
sions of the Canadian social security system place an implicit tax of 50 
percent on the pension benefits of workers with low lifetime earnings.
Other factors besides taxes affect pension coverage. While it is 
beyond the scope of this chapter to fully investigate other possible fac 
tors, several are mentioned that would cause pension coverage rates to 
be lower in Canada than in the United States. Social security is moder 
ately more generous in Canada than it is in the United States, which 
would lower pension benefit levels and probably also pension coverage 
rates in Canada. The United States, through nondiscrimination rules, 
requires employers that offer pensions to offer them to most of their 
employees. This regulation is one way that public policy attempts to 
expand coverage. Canada has no such regulation.
In Canada, pension benefits are locked in after vesting, and work 
ers cannot access them until retirement. In the United States, workers 
can often take a lump-sum distribution from their pension plan when 
they change jobs. Some U.S. policy analysts have argued that prohibit 
ing preretirement lump-sum distributions would reduce pension cover 
age because it would reduce the flexibility that workers have to use 
those funds for various purposes. These locking-in provisions, which
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are contained in provincial legislation, have been in effect in most 
provinces since only 1987.
THE GENEROSITY OF PENSION PLANS
While pension coverage measures one dimension of the extent to 
which pension plans are provided, the generosity of pension plans 
measures another. One measure of pension plan generosity is the level 
of pension benefits being paid to current retirees. The level of pension 
benefits, however, does not directly measure the generosity of pension 
benefit formulas because other factors also affect benefit levels. For 
example, if a pension system is immature, workers having participated 
in it for less than their full career, it will pay lower retirement benefits 
than an equally generous system that is fully mature. While it is not 
evident that the Canadian and U.S. pension systems differ in their 
maturity, such a difference could cause average benefits to differ.
Canadian private pension plans are slightly less generous than U.S 
private plans in the level of benefits they provide. Canadian pensions 
in the late 1980s provided slightly less and U.S. pensions provided 
slightly more than $6,000 in annual benefits (Dailey and Turner 1992).
Canada and the United States differ considerably in the maximum 
amount that a worker can save through the pension system. In Canada, 
the maximum percentage of earnings that a worker can save is lower 
and, as indicated earlier, the maximum earnings that can be used in 
determining pension benefits is much lower.
The maximum limit in Canada for contributions to a defined con 
tribution plan is 18 percent of worker earnings, based on the previous 
year's earnings. In Canada, the maximum benefit for a defined-benefit 
plan is the lesser of $45,185 per year or 70 percent of the participant's 
earnings in the three highest years.
Both the defined-contribution and defined-benefit limits are higher 
in the United States. The maximum contributions to a defined-contri 
bution plan in 1997 are the lesser of 25 percent of earnings or $30,000 
a year. For a defined-benefit plan, the maximum benefit is the lesser of 
$125,000 a year or 100 percent of the participant's average compensa 
tion for his or her three highest earnings years. For high-income work-
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ers, the maximum pension benefit in Canada is about half of that in the 
United States.
The lower maximum contributions and benefits, however, may be 
of little economic significance if few workers are constrained by the 
limits. The difference is most likely to be constraining for older work 
ers and higher income workers who, because of the ceiling on social 
security benefits, are more likely to wish to save a relatively large frac 
tion of their income for retirement.
If the 18 percent maximum is not a binding constraint, the higher 
marginal income tax rates in Canada would encourage middle income 
workers to save more in pensions than they do in the United States.
EMPLOYER VERSUS EMPLOYEE CONTRIBUTIONS
In Canada, a major tenet of pension policy is equal treatment of 
different options. This consideration has been considerably less 
important in the United States. One aspect of the policy of equal treat 
ment is that employees in Canada can make tax-deductible contribu 
tions to both defined-benefit and defined-contribution plans. In the 
United States, employee contributions to defined-benefit plans and to 
most types of defined-contribution plans are not tax deductible.
In the United States, employee contributions are only tax deduct 
ible if made to a type of defined-contribution plan called a salary 
reduction plan. The most common type of salary reduction plan is the 
401(k) plan. 14 As a result of the tax rules, few employees contribute to 
pension plans other than 401(k) plans.
Even for 401(k) plans, however, employee contributions are taxed 
more heavily than employer contributions. Employee contributions are 
subject to the social security payroll tax, while employer contributions 
are not. 15 Employee contributions are subject to the payroll tax on the 
grounds that to do otherwise would erode the payroll tax base, causing 
an increasingly small percentage of compensation to be subject to the 
payroll tax.
The feature permitting deductible employee contributions to 
401(k) plans favors those plans relative to other types of plans, and 
they have grown considerably. Between 1984 and 1993, 401(k) plans
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gained 15.6 million participants, while defined-benefit plans and all 
other types of defined-contribution plans lost participants (U.S. 
Department of Labor 1997).
Economic theory suggests that, due to compensating differentials, 
workers pay for employer contributions through reductions in wages 
and other compensation. While this theory has proven difficult to test 
empirically, some studies have found evidence supporting it (Mont 
gomery, Shaw, and Bennedict 1992). If workers do pay for employer 
pension contributions through reduced wages, the distinction between 
employer and employee contributions is unimportant. Assuming labor 
markets adjust imperfectly, however, or workers have imperfect knowl 
edge, there may be some effects. Benefits consultants frequently argue 
that workers undervalue employer pension contributions relative to 
their own contributions because they are less aware of, and thus tend to 
understate, the amount of employer contributions necessary to provide 
the benefits they will receive.
In spite of the argument that the distinction between employer 
and employee contributions is economically unimportant, provincial 
pension legislation throughout Canada, as well as pension legislation 
in the United States, treats employee contributions differently from 
employer contributions. In Canada, a universal provision in provincial 
pension regulation is that employer contributions must pay for at least 
50 percent of the accrued value of defined-benefit pensions at the date 
of the employee's termination, retirement, or death. Employee 
"excess" contributions may (depending upon the jurisdiction) be reim 
bursed, transferred, or used to increase benefits. To implement this 
provision, a minimum rate of interest is imputed to employee contribu 
tions, through regulation or statute.
Except for the flat benefit plans that predominate among unionized 
workers in the private sector, employees as well as employers contrib 
ute to most pension plans in Canada. Virtually all public sector plans 
are contributory, while about one-half of plan members in the private 
sector are in contributory plans.
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DEFINED-BENEFIT VERSUS 
DEFINED-CONTRIBUTION PLANS
In the United States, there has been a major shift from defined-ben- 
efit plans towards defined-contribution plans. While the number of 
participants in defined-benefit plans was slightly lower in 1993 than in 
1984, the number of participants in defined-contribution plans grew by 
11 million over that period due to the growth of 401(k) plans (U.S. 
Department of Labor 1997). In Canada, there has also been a trend 
towards defined-contribution plans, but that trend has been much 
weaker. Between 1982 and 1995, for example, the percentage of pen 
sion participants who belonged to money-purchase plans rose from 5.3 
percent to 10.0 percent, while the percentage who belonged to defined- 
benefit plans declined from 93.7 to 88.6 percent. 16 This section exam 
ines the extent to which differences in tax policy can account for the 
much more pronounced trend towards defined-contribution plans in the 
United States.
Tax reform in Canada, implemented in 1990, seeks to "level the 
playing field" with regard to the tax assistance provided to pension sav 
ing in different types of plans. The maximum amount of tax assistance 
provided to members of employer-sponsored defined-benefit and 
defined-contribution plans, as well as to individual RRSPs, is intended 
to be equal. Further, through the introduction of new carry-forward 
provisions, individuals are provided with greater flexibility in the tim 
ing of RRSP contributions. These provisions were enacted because 
firms who sponsor defined-benefit plans can make retroactive enrich 
ments in their plans.
In Canada, the 18 percent maximum allowable contribution to a 
defined-contribution plan was chosen because it is roughly equivalent 
to the defined-benefit limit. The defined-benefit limit is 2 percent of 
final earnings per year of service, with a maximum of 70 percent of 
highest earnings (Wyatt Company 1990).
In the United States, the defined-benefit limit does not vary with 
years of service, as it does in Canada. The maximum benefit that can 
be received from a defined-contribution plan, in both Canada and the 
United States, necessarily increases with service because the maximum 
benefit is based on the accumulation of contributions and investment
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earnings over time. Because the U.S. limit does not vary with service, 
short-service workers in the United States can receive higher benefits 
through a defined-benefit plan than through a defined-contribution 
plan. For long-service workers, the situation is the reverse.
Within its lower contribution limits, Canada allows individuals 
greater flexibility in the timing of their contributions. In Canada, an 
individual's unused contribution allowance in each year is carried for 
ward indefinitely for use in subsequent years, subject to certain dollar 
limits. Similarly, contributions not deductible in the year in which they 
are paid may be deducted in subsequent years.
This flexibility for defined-contribution plans was introduced to 
bring them on equal footing with the flexibility that is available to 
employers for contributions to defined-benefit plans. This flexibility 
occurs, however, at the cost of increased complexity of administration 
of pension plans.
In the United States, contributions not deductible in the year paid 
are subject to a 10 percent excise tax. Before 1987, a credit carry-for 
ward was available when an employer's contributions to a profit-shar 
ing plan were less than the maximum allowed (McGill and Grubbs 
1989, p. 652). That carryforward is no longer available. Flexibility is 
provided, however, by the higher limit on contributions, so it is not 
clear which system effectively provides the greater flexibility.
As indicated earlier, in the United States, employee contributions 
are only tax deductible for defined-contribution plans and then only for 
contributions to 401 (k) plans. This feature of the tax code may favor 
defined-contribution plans. In Canada, employee contributions are tax 
deductible to defined-benefit plans.
The Tax Benefit of Overfunding Defined Benefit-Plans
In assessing the reasons why employers might prefer to sponsor 
defined-benefit plans rather than defined-contribution plans, financial 
economists (Tepper 1981) have drawn attention to the tax advantages 
to shareholders of overfunding such plans. In the United States, the 
Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1987 (OBRA) reduced the desirability 
of defined-benefit plans relative to defined-contribution plans by reduc 
ing the amount that could be contributed to overfunded defined-benefit 
plans (Ippolito 1990).
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Under the OBRA rules, employer contributions are not tax deduct 
ible if the plan is overfunded by 50 percent on a termination basis. 
This reduces the flexibility firms have in managing defined-benefit 
plans, and it reduces the amount that can be sheltered from tax. Termi 
nation liabilities are calculated as if the plan were to terminate immedi 
ately. For plans with a typical age structure of workers, these liabilities 
are considerably less than the liabilities calculated assuming that the 
plan will continue in existence. Those liabilities for ongoing plans rec 
ognize that currently accruing benefits are based on future wages, in 
final average pay plans. Under the OBRA rules, many defined-benefit 
plans cannot contribute sufficient amounts to a pension plan to cover 
the current accrual of liabilities. This creates a tax disadvantage for 
defined benefit plans because, by comparison, in defined contribution 
plans firms can contribute an amount equal to the full current accrual 
of liabilities.
In Canada, too, the tax authorities seek to limit the amount of over- 
funding in defined-benefit plans. However, the restrictions are less 
onerous than those now in effect in the United States. In Canada, 
employer contributions are tax deductible so long as the surplus in the 
plan is no more than 10 percent of actual plan liabilities or twice the 
annual value of current service contributions. However, the plan's lia 
bilities are not valued on a termination basis for the purpose of this cal 
culation. Indeed, if the plan has a history of cost-of-living or similar 
adjustments, these may be taken into account in determining the plan's 
liability if it is reasonable to assume that such adjustments will con 
tinue. These adjustments would include ad hoc increases for pension 
ers and increases in accrued benefits under career average earnings 
plans and flat benefit plans. In Canada, a potentially more important 
constraint on the extent of overfunding is the uncertainty that may exist 
as to the ownership of surplus assets.
Summary
In Canada, an effort has been made to equalize the treatment of 
defined-benefit and defined-contribution plans. As a result, employee 
contributions are tax deductible for both defined-benefit and defined- 
contribution plans, while they are only tax deductible to (one type of) 
defined-contribution plans in the United States. Defined-benefit plans
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also receive more favorable tax treatment in Canada than in the United 
States in terms of allowable maximum funding. Greater flexibility is 
allowed for contributions to defined-contribution plans in Canada than 
in the United States, in order to try to equalize the degree of flexibility 
that employers and employees have to contribute to both types of 
plans. On balance, tax policy in Canada is relatively more favorable to 
defined-benefit plans than it is in the United States.
CONCLUSIONS
Major differences in the tax treatment of pensions in the United 
States and Canada may help explain differences in the pension systems 
in the two countries. They may account for differences in pension cov 
erage and the prevalence of defined-benefit plans relative to defined- 
contribution plans.
In Canada, high marginal tax rates on income at upper income lev 
els suggest that pension coverage should be higher among upper 
income workers in Canada than it is in the United States. However, the 
maximum benefit that an upper income worker can receive in Canada 
is much less than in the United States.
The high effective tax rates on private pension incomes of low- 
income retirees due to the earnings-testing of retirement benefits in 
Canada suggest that coverage rates should be lower in Canada than 
they are in the United States for low-income individuals.
Tax reform in Canada in 1990 sought to "level the playing field" 
with regard to the tax assistance provided pension savings. In particu 
lar, and unlike the United States, the self-employed and those not cov 
ered by an employer-provided pension plan are—through the vehicle 
of the Registered Retirement Savings Plan—provided with more equal 
access to tax assistance.
Employee contributions to occupational pension plans in Canada 
are tax deductible, unlike the case for employee contributions to 
defined-benefit plans in the United States. In both countries, employee 
contributions are treated differently by pension law than are employer 
contributions. This fact, in turn, focuses attention on the issue of the 
ultimate incidence of employer contributions. Implicit in pension law
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in Canada appears to be the assumption that the ultimate incidence of 
employer contributions does not fall upon employees.
Defined-benefit plans receive more favorable tax treatment in Can 
ada than they do in the United States. In Canada, the tax treatment of 
defmed-benefit plans is also more favorable relative to the tax treat 
ment of defined-contribution plans. The move towards defmed-benefit 
plans has been much weaker in Canada.
While assessment of the magnitude of the effects of these differ 
ences in tax policy is difficult, in part because the tax treatment of pen 
sions differs in a number of ways, we believe that important insights 
concerning the possible range of the parameters of pension tax policy 
can be gained by comparing Canada and the United States.
Notes
The material in this chapter is the responsibility of the authors and does not represent 
the position of the institutions with which they are associated. Patricia Reagan has 
made valuable comments.
1. This study used the 1988 purchasing power parity of Can$l equals U.S.$0 80. 
We use the slightly lower value of U.S.$0.72 for making comparisons.
2. The lower average Social Security benefits in the United States may arise in part 
because more older Americans are working and not receiving Social Security ben 
efits.
3. It is difficult to determine a precise estimate of the private sector unionization rate 
in Canada because of difficulties in measuring the private sector workforce, a 
topic that is discussed later.
4. Such financing is allowed in Germany and Japan by simply recording the liability 
for the pension plan on the company's financial books.
5. In the United States, premium payments to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corpo 
ration are based on the unfunded liabilities of pension plans. This is also true for 
the Guarantee Fund in Ontario. We are not considering these levies as taxes.
6. For a more complete discussion of taxation of pensions in Canada, see Jobm et al. 
(1991).
7. Generally, a tax policy affecting a workers' decisions distorts economic activity 
from what it would have been without taxes. However, in a system with multiple 
taxes, one aspect of taxation may correct distortions introduced by another aspect. 
The optimality of pension tax policy in terms of creating or correcting distortions 
is not discussed here (Ippolito 1990).
8. We thus do not discuss, for example, the effects of taxation of pensions on income 
distribution, government revenues, or the capital market.
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9. The higher marginal personal income taxes in Canada are reflected in personal 
income taxes being about 25 percent larger as a percentage of GNP in Canada 
than they are in the United States (Wilson 1992)
10. The marginal effect is probably lower at higher tax rates. See also Woodbury 
(1983), Woodbury and Bettinger (1991), and Woodbury and Huang (1991).
11. An explanation for the more favorable tax treatment for pensions of high-income 
workers in the United States may be that with its higher income inequality, there 
are relatively more high-income workers in the United States, and they therefore 
presumably have more political power.
12. This issue has important implications, as well, for public policy. In Canada, the 
fact that pension coverage is far from universal is often cited by critics as proof of 
the inadequacy of the private pensions system and the need, therefore, to expand 
the public pension system or to mandate private pension coverage (In 1990, 49.6 
percent of males and 33.1 percent of females who participated in the labor force 
belonged to an occupational pension plan. [Statistics Canada 1990, Text Table D, 
page 8].) However, the absence of universal coverage is perhaps best seen as a 
statement about workers' revealed preferences rather than as a "failure" of the pri 
vate pension system.
The introduction of a mandatory private pension plan, inclusive of part-time as 
well as full-time workers, is likely to reduce the lifetime resources available to 
those with low lifetime earnings. The incidence of employer contributions to a 
mandatory private pension plan (if it is not retroactive) is likely to fall ultimately 
on the employee. Workers, including those with low lifetime earnings, will be 
required to allocate a larger fraction of their lifetime earnings to provide for their 
retirement years On one hand, this will gradually reduce the likelihood of future 
claims on income-tested programs such as GIS. On the other hand, by forcing 
persons with low lifetime earnings to provide a larger share of their own retire 
ment incomes, this proposal may redistribute income away from those with low 
lifetime earnings.
In this context, two facts merit note. First, persons whose current earnings are 
low are less likely to be members of occupational pension plans To the extent 
that current earnings are positively correlated with lifetime earnings, this fact sug 
gests that those with low lifetime earnings are less likely to be -covered by an 
occupational pension plan. Second, Canadians with low current incomes gener 
ally choose not to contribute to RRSPs. Given the low value to them of the tax 
subsidy associated with RRSP contributions together with the likelihood that they 
would be substituting their own savings for retirement for benefits available from 
income-tested public programs, this decision is probably rational
13. The amount is $2,500 for a worker whose spouse does not also contribute to an 
IRA.
14. These plans are named after the enabling section of the Internal Revenue Code.
15. Because both tax payments and future benefits are increased by increases in earn 
ings, for some workers the payroll tax may not be a tax when viewed in a life- 
cycle setting (Burkhauser and Turner 1985).
16. These figures do not add to 100 percent due to the presence of "composite and 
other plans."
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13 Did the Decline in Marginal 
Tax Rates during the 1980s 
Reduce Pension Coverage?
Patricia B. Reagan 
Ohio State University
John A. Turner 
U.S. Department of Labor
After years of constancy or increase, private pension coverage 
rates declined during the 1980s. Because private pensions are an 
important source of retirement income, the decline in their coverage 
raises concern over the adequacy of future retirement income. 1 
Between 1979 and 1988, the percentage of full-time male private sec 
tor employees participating in a pension plan fell from 55 to 51 per 
cent, where it remained in 1993 (Beller and Lawrence 1992; U.S. 
Department of Labor 1994).
The coverage decline was particularly large for young males. Cov 
erage for full-time male private sector employees aged 25 to 29 
declined by nearly a quarter, from 53 percent in 1979 to 41 percent by 
1993 (U.S. Department of Labor 1994).
Because the decline in pension coverage rates has been particularly 
great for young males, researchers have looked for determinants of 
coverage that changed more for that group than for older males. 
Bloom and Freeman (1992) and Even and Macpherson (1994) used 
this approach to argue that the decline in coverage for young males is 
explained primarily by disproportionately large declines in their union 
ization and contemporaneous real income. 2 The fact that marginal tax 
rates declined most for high-income workers while coverage declined 
most for younger low-income workers led these researchers to ignore 
the potentially important effect of contemporaneous declines in mar 
ginal tax rates. 3
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The tax code encourages both pension coverage and generosity by 
exempting pension savings from the double taxation associated with 
other savings vehicles (Turner 1981; Woodbury and Bettinger 1991; 
Woodbury and Hamermesh 1992; Gentry and Peress 1995). 4 Workers' 
earnings are taxed, for example, before they contribute to savings 
accounts. The returns on savings are again taxed when they are real 
ized (Munnel 1982). In contrast, pension contributions made by firms 
on behalf of workers are not taxed. Pension benefits are only taxed 
when they are disbursed, thereby avoiding double taxation.
Preferential tax treatment causes the tax advantage of pensions to 
increase with marginal income tax rates. Workers with high marginal 
tax rates tend to seek jobs with pensions, suggesting that pension cov 
erage was reduced by declines in marginal tax rates during the 1980s 
and early 1990s. Woodbury and Bettinger (1991) found that decreases 
in marginal tax rates did reduce pension coverage for a sample pooled 
by gender and age. Woodbury and Huang (1991) and Feldstein (1997) 
found that the large cuts in marginal income tax rates encouraged high- 
income workers to take less compensation as fringe benefits and more 
as income.5
Because the tax expenditure for pensions is the largest tax expendi 
ture for individuals in the federal budget, it is important to understand 
the effects of that expenditure on pension coverage. 6 The tax expendi 
ture for pensions could lead to increased national savings through 
increased pension coverage, but of itself reduces government revenue, 
reducing savings.
We examine whether the decline in marginal tax rates during the 
1980s caused a decline in pension coverage rates. We empirically test 
the assertion that tax changes cannot explain the disproportionate 
decline in coverage for young males because "the 1980s fall in cover 
age was smallest among high-income (older) workers, for whom mar 
ginal tax rates declined the most" (Bloom and Freeman 1992, p. 543). 
We explore causal links between declines in tax rates and observed 
declines in pension coverage using cross-sectional data over a 15-year 
period, from the 1979, 1988, and 1993 Current Population Surveys. 7
Our estimates suggest that, on average, a 1 percentage point 
increase in the marginal tax rate leads to a 0.4 percentage point 
increase in private pension coverage. Declining tax rates explain 
almost 20 percent of the total decline in coverage for young males
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between 1979 and 1988. Our model predicts that changes in exoge 
nous variables lowered coverage rates 7.3 percentage points for young 
males between 1979 and 1988. Declining tax rates account for 1.4 per 
centage points of the total predicted decline in coverage. Declining 
unionization accounts for only 0.9 percentage points of the predicted 
decline, whereas declining earnings account for 5.7 percentage points 
of the predicted decline.
We test the robustness of our results by reestimating the coverage 
equation for a sample of female private sector workers. In contrast to 
the males, who experienced declining coverage rates in the 1980s and 
early 1990s, females experienced slightly rising coverage rates during 
this period. Our results from the female sample corroborate our earlier 
conclusions that on average a 1 percentage point increase in the mar 
ginal tax rate leads roughly to a 0.4 percentage point increase in pen 
sion coverage.
In the next section, we discuss the empirical specification. We then 
discuss the data and variables, with special attention to the problem of 
endogeneity of tax rates, and we estimate our model for males and then 
for females. In the final section, we offer concluding comments.
EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
Observed compensation packages consisting of wages and fringe 
benefits result from decisions made by firms and workers, subject to 
market and regulatory constraints. Woodbury (1983) and Woodbury 
and Huang (1991) estimated a demand equation for pensions as a share 
of total compensation. They modeled the determinants of pension pro 
vision and other nonwage compensation by assuming that employers 
offer a menu of compensation packages, given their costs. Utility- 
maximizing workers then choose their preferred compensation pack 
ages from the menu of available alternatives. As suggested by Deaton 
and Muellbauer (1980), the authors cited above specified a flexible 
form expenditure function, from which they derive a system of demand 
equations for wages and pension benefits as a share of total compensa 
tion. Since share data are more readily available at the firm level, they 
variously used the establishment and the two-digit industry as the unit
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of observation. Explanatory variables are firm or industry average 
characteristics.
Other studies, such as Woodbury and Bettinger (1991), Bloom and 
Freeman (1992), and Even and Macpherson (1994), focused on 
accounting for changes over time in observed coverage rates. These 
studies used household data and the individual as the unit of observa 
tion. Household data sets, however, do not contain information about 
the amount that the firm contributes to an individual's retirement pen 
sion. The data available are discrete and measure whether an employer 
offers a pension and, if so, whether the employee participates in the 
plan. These authors estimated a discrete model of the probability that a 
worker with given economic and demographic characteristics, 
employed at a firm with given attributes, is covered by a pension. The 
coverage equation is interpreted as the probability of a pension cover 
age outcome and is not interpreted as a behavioral equation. The esti 
mated coefficients in the coverage equation, appropriately transformed, 
measure the effect of a change in an exogenous variable on the proba 
bility that a worker/firm match leads to coverage for the worker.
Like Woodbury and Bettinger, Bloom and Freeman, and Even and 
Macpherson, we use household data to estimate a pension coverage 
equation. However, Bloom and Freeman and Even and Macpherson do 
not include a tax variable and maintain the hypothesis that changing 
tax rates have no effect on coverage. Woodbury and Bettinger, on the 
other hand, include a tax variable, but pool by age and gender. None of 
these authors have tested whether declines in tax rates contributed to 
the decline in coverage for young males. They also have not tested the 
hypothesis that declining tax rates put downward pressure on coverage 
rates for women, during a time period where observed coverage rates 
for women were rising.
To formalize the model, let Z represent a vector of worker and firm 
characteristics that affect the probability of coverage. 9 The equilibrium 
outcome is represented by an indicator variable, P, which takes a value 
of 1 if the worker is covered by a pension plan offered by the worker's 
firm. Let e represent a random variable interpreted as unobserved het 
erogeneity in the rates at which firms and workers are willing to substi 
tute pension benefits for wages. We can write the probability that 
worker / employed at firm j has pension coverage as:
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Prob(P=l) = F(Zg + <? > 0) = F(-Zg) (1)
where F is a cumulative distribution function and g is the vector of 
parameters to be estimated. We assume that e has a normal distribution 
and estimate a probit model.
Rather than report the estimated probit coefficients, g, we report 
the marginal effects of the continuous variables and the delta effects of 
the dichotomous variables. 9 The delta effect is the discrete analog of 
the marginal effect. We report f-statistics for the marginal and delta 
effects themselves. 10
DATA, VARIABLES, AND ENDOGENEITY
We use data from the 1979 and 1988 May Current Population Sur 
veys (CPS) and the 1993 April CPS, which include a special survey of 
workers concerning pension plan coverage and other employer 
attributes. These data have been matched to the March CPS of the 
same year, which provides income and other economic and demo 
graphic data. The sample is limited to full-time employed, private, 
wage and salary workers aged 21 to 55 who did not work in agriculture 
or the railroad industry and had valid responses to questions relevant 
for this study.
The dependent variable is worker self-reported pension plan partic 
ipation, which includes participation in both defined-benefit and 
defined-contribution plans. This is the best definition of pension cover 
age for our purposes because it represents the worker's intention to use 
a plan for retirement. Some workers who are in defined-contribution 
plans, which are like savings accounts, may intend to use those plans 
for preretirement consumption rather than for retirement and respond 
that they are not covered by a pension plan.
Most of our explanatory variables are standard in equations esti 
mating pension coverage. They include age, race, firm size, education, 
marital status, years with employer, and union status (Table 1). We 
also use nine industry and four occupation dichotomous variables.
In addition, we use two variables not universally included in pen 
sion coverage equations—the predicted combined state and federal
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marginal income tax rate and predicted yearly earnings at age 55. To 
avoid bias due to the endogeneity of earnings and thus marginal 
income tax rates, we use the predicted value of both variables. 11
We calculate the predicted marginal income tax rate, reflecting 
both state and federal income taxes, using current predicted family 
income (rather than actual family income), marital status, and number 
of children. These predicted tax rates are not subject to endogeneity 
bias arising from idiosyncratic variations in labor supply and earnings. 
To calculate marginal tax rates, we use the income tax codes for each 
of the 50 states for each of the three years of analysis. Marginal tax 
rate variability across states provides exogenous variation in tax rates.
Table 1 Variable Definitions
Variable________________________Definition__________ 
Covered Equals 1 if covered by a pension on the current job
Tax State plus federal marginal income tax rate based on
current predicted family earnings
Age Age in years
Pearn55 Predicted yearly earnings at age 55 in 1993 dollars,
assuming real earnings from the cross-sectional age/ 
earnings profile grow 1 percent annually
African American Equals 1 if African American 
Married Equals 1 if married with spouse present
Newhire Equals 1 if worked for current employer for no more than
one year
Union Equals 1 if covered by a collective bargaining agreement
Mult 1000 Equals 1 if employer operates at more than one location
and employs 1,000 or more workers
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Since the family income question in the CPS is retrospective, we use 
tax rates for the year prior to each CPSs. 12
The average predicted marginal income tax rate, state plus federal, 
for male workers aged 21-35 in our regression sample fell from 30.8 
percent in 1979 to 26.0 percent in 1988 and rose slightly to 26.1 percent 
in 1993. The average for workers aged 36-55 fell from 35.3 percent in 
1979 to 30.4 percent in 1988 and to 29.8 percent in 1993 (Table 2).
In addition to controlling for marginal tax rates, it is important to 
control for wealth or lifetime income. The argument for including 
such a measure is based on the normality of consumption during retire 
ment. Individuals who have greater earnings or wealth over their life 
time wish to consume more during retirement and thus have a higher 
demand for pension coverage. Because income and marginal income 
tax rates are positively correlated, if income is not adequately con 
trolled for, a finding of a significantly positive effect of marginal 
income tax rates on coverage could merely indicate that higher income 
workers have a higher demand for coverage.
Some authors, particularly Bloom and Freeman (1992) and Even 
and Macpherson (1994), include current earnings as a variable explain 
ing pension coverage. However, current earnings are endogenous and 
so the coefficient estimate on this variable is biased. The direction of 
the bias cannot be determined a priori. The estimated coefficient is 
likely to be upward biased if unobserved heterogeneity in ability is 
positively correlated with both earnings and pension coverage. How 
ever, compensating differentials for pension coverage would cause the 
coefficient on earnings to be downward biased since unobservables that 
are positively correlated with pension coverage may be negatively cor 
related with earnings.
Instead of using current earnings, we use the instrumental variables 
approach suggested by Dorsey (1982) and Woodbury and Bettinger 
(1991). First, for each data set we estimate an earnings equation, with 
a standard human capital formulation. Included in the explanatory 
variables is potential experience, measured as age minus years of edu 
cation minus 6. Using current job characteristics, we predict earnings 
for each individual at age 55. To do so, we assume that, in addition to 
age/earnings growth due to greater work experience as indicated by 
cross-sectional age earnings profiles, there is a 1 percent growth rate in 
real earnings over the life cycle. 13
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Table 2 Variable Means for Male Workers
(standard deviations of continuous variables in parentheses)
Ages 21-35
Variable
Covered
Tax
Pearn55a
Union
MultlOOO
African American
Married
Newhire
1979
0.569
30.8
(8.0)
31.52
(9.75)
0.285
0.423
0.055
0.705
0.206
1988
0.481
26.0
(9.3)
29.08
(10.85)
0.169
0.403
0.058
0.611
0.188
1993
0.453
26.1
(8.7)
26.80
(10.86)
0.128
0.397
0.056
0.584
0.193
Ages 36-55
1979
0.694
35.3
(7.9)
36.73
(11.08)
0.343
0.469
0.054
0.880
0.074
1988
0.674
30.4
(9.0)
36.85
(13.46)
0.250
0.485
0.050
0.831
0.094
1993
0.657
29.8
(7.5)
33.90
(13.48)
0.196
0.469
0.057
0.785
0.095
SOURCE: 1979 and 1998 March and May Current Population Surveys and 1993 
March and April Current Population Surveys. 1978 tax rates are from Commerce 
Clearinghouse (1979). 1987 and 1992 rates are from Advisory Commission (1988 
and 1993).
NOTE: The sample includes all full-time, male, private, wage and salary workers aged 
21 to 55. The sample is further restricted to those who have valid responses to ques 
tions relevant to this study. The sample size is 5,496 in 1979, 6,241 in 1988, and 
6,157 in 1993.
a Predicted earnings at age 55, in units of 10,000 1993 dollars. The variable used in the 
regressions was transformed by taking logarithms.
The predicted earnings measure is affected not only by changes in 
the worker's current earnings but also by changes in the entire age/ 
earnings profile for workers of that gender for the given year. It is also 
affected by changes in the rate of return to experience, unionization, 
industry of employment, and firm size.
This measure of predicted earnings is then included as an explana 
tory variable in the coverage equation. In addition to circumventing 
the endogeneity problem associated with current earnings, the instru 
mental variable approach measures (although imperfectly) the earnings 
power of all individuals at the same age. The imprecision is greater for 
young workers, for whom we project for more years.
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Predicted earnings at age 55 for young male workers fell by $2,400 
(1993 dollars) between 1979 and 1988 and fell another $2,300 between 
1988 and 1993. The fall during the 1980s occurred because young 
males were moving to lower paid occupations and industries in greater 
numbers than older males. In addition, young males experienced rela 
tively large declines in unionization and in employment in large 
firms. 14
COVERAGE ESTIMATES FOR MALE WORKERS
In this section, we present evidence from our data on the effect of 
the decline in income tax rates on the pension coverage of males. We 
examine effects separately for young and older workers for each of the 
three years of data.
We tested whether we could pool our data by age group, gender, or 
year, and the equality of coefficients across groups was always 
rejected. This result is in itself interesting because pension antidis 
crimination rules limit firms' ability to target specific groups of work 
ers. Whether a firm provides a pension to a worker should depend on 
the collective characteristics of the workers in the firm rather than the 
individual characteristics of the worker. Sorting in the labor market 
may account for the differing coefficients across age and gender 
groups.
Table 2 contains variable means for the three sample years while 
Tables 3 (young males) and 4 (older males) contain the estimates of the 
marginal effects for the continuous variables and the delta effects for 
the discrete variables.
A decline in marginal tax rates can result in reduced pension cov 
erage rates through several paths. Some firms may decide to terminate 
plans that have diminished value to their workers. New firms that oth 
erwise would have offered a pension plan may decide not to do so. 
Workers may change jobs, leaving firms offering a pension plan and 
moving to firms without one. Workers in firms where pension partici 
pation is optional may choose not to participate. Finally, workers 
entering the job market who would have otherwise sought firms offer-
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ing a pension plan may instead seek employment with nonpension 
firms.
The extent to which workers change their pension coverage status 
in reaction to a change in marginal tax rates depends on the extent of 
job change within the economy, which depends on the phase of the 
business cycle. It also depends on the length of time workers have had 
to adjust to tax rate changes and the length of time workers expect 
those new tax rates to be in effect. Workers in firms offering only a 
401(k) plan can adjust their pension status more quickly than other 
workers because they can simply decide not to participate in the plan. 
We do not attempt to distinguish by which path a change in marginal 
income tax rates influences pension coverage. Because of dynamic 
aspect of these factors, however, we expect the estimated tax coeffi 
cients to vary over time.
The estimated coefficient on marginal tax rates is positive and sig 
nificant in all six of the male samples (Tables 3 and 4). 15 Thus, these 
results suggest that the decline in marginal tax rates during the 1980s 
reduced pension coverage for both young and older males.
The coefficient on predicted earnings at age 55 is positive and sig 
nificant for all samples. 16 Given the positive correlation between mar 
ginal income tax rates and employee income, the finding of significant 
positive effects for predicted earnings as well as taxes is important 
because it suggests that we have isolated separate income and tax 
effects. 17
One way to quantify the predicted effect of changes in tax rates on 
pension coverage is to multiply the estimated marginal effect of taxes 
by the observed change in taxes. This approach is equivalent to taking 
the difference in the predicted probabilities of coverage with mean tax 
in the base year and mean tax in the comparison year, evaluated at the 
means of the other variables in the base year. The difference in the pre 
dicted probabilities gives the change in the estimated probability attrib 
utable to the tax change for an "average" individual.
This approach has the weakness that the sum over changes in all 
variables does not equal the change in coverage predicted by the 
model. Even and Macpherson (1990) developed a technique without 
this defect for calculating the predicted effect of changes in one vari 
able. With their technique, the sum over changes in all variables is 
constrained to equal the total predicted change.
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Table 3 Marginal And Delta Effects for Young (age 21-35) Male 
Pension Coverage Probit, 1979,1988, and 1993 
(/-statistics in parentheses)
Variable
Tax
PearnSS
Union
MultlOO
African American
Married
Newhire
Intercept
Log likelihood
N
1979
0 .0040
(2.34)
0.467
(3.97)
0.303
(1729)
0.278
(24.48)
0.055
(3.19)
0.147
(33 48)
-0.192
(36.10)
-0.863
-1492.9
3008
1988
0.0036
(2.03)
1.071
(371 99)
0.156
(15.54)
0.180
(35.82)
-0.180
(0.64)
0010
(31.60)
-0.205
(18.11)
-1.744
-1534.3
2931
1993
0.0043
(2.32)
1.064
(222.71)
0.166
(25.81)
0.123
(25.83)
-0.013
(1.35)
0.129
(21 26)
0.029
(3.16)
-1.877
-1524.1
2949
SOURCE: 1979 and 1988 March and May Current Population Surveys and 1993 
March and April Current Population Surveys. The 1978 tax rates are from Commerce 
Clearinghouse (1979), 1987 and 1992 rates are from Advisory Commission (1988 
and 1993).
NOTE: The sample includes all full-time, male, private, wage and salary workers aged 
21 to 55. The sample is further restricted to those who have valid responses to ques 
tions relevant to this study. The probit equation also contains four controls for educa 
tion, four controls for occupation, and nine industry controls. All controls were coded 
as dichotomous variables.
486 Reagan and Turner
Table 4 Marginal and Delta Effects for Older (age 36-55) Male 
Pension Coverage Profit, 1979,1988, and 1993 
(^-statistics in parentheses)
Variable
Tax
PearaSS
Union
MultlOO
African American
Married
Newhire
Intercept
Log likelihood
N
1979
0.0033
(1.97)
0.370
(5.28)
0.224
(11.74)
0.237
(14.67)
-0.023
(0.78)
-0.021
(0.85)
-0.150
(10.74)
-0.628
-1102.9
2516
1988
0.0066
(4.18)
0.627
(18.76)
0.195
(9.64)
0.190
(13.95)
-0.033
(1.26)
0.077
(5.01)
-0.126
(8.80)
-1.137
-1248.4
2886
1993
0.0048
(2.86)
0.662
(24.01)
0.154
(7.81)
0.224
(17.14)
0.148
(5.02)
0.035
(2.90)
-0.012
(0.44)
-1.312
-1452.9
3213
SOURCE: 1979 and 1988 March and May Current Population Surveys and 1993 
March and April Current Population Surveys. The 1978 tax rates are from Commerce 
Clearinghouse (1979), 1987 and 1992 rates are from Advisory Commission (1988 
and 1993).
NOTE: The sample includes all full-time, male, private, wage and salary workers aged 
21 to 55. The sample is further restricted to those who have valid responses to ques 
tions relevant to this study. The probit equation also contains four controls for educa 
tion, four controls for occupation, and nine industry controls. All controls were coded 
as dichotomous variables.
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The predicted change in coverage between 1979 and 1988 is calcu 
lated:
N88 N19
EXP= IO(Z,88g88 )- ZO(Z/79£79 ), (2) 
1=1 1=1
where N88 is the number of observations in 1988, N19 is the number of 
observations in 1979, and O is the standard normal cumulative distri 
bution function. EXP is the average predicted coverage rate in 1988 
minus the average predicted coverage rate in 1979. Using 1988 as the 
base year, the portion of the predicted change attributable to changes in 
variable Zk is
EXPk = EXP*(ZM -Zm )gkW /[(ZM -Z19 )gw ]
where Z79 and Z88 are the vectors of variable means in 1979 and 
1988; and Zkl9 and Z^88 are the means of variable k in 1979 and 1988. 
A similar formula applies for base year 1988 in comparison to 1993.
Calculations of the effects of the changes in selected variables are 
presented in Table 5. These calculations indicate that the changes in 
marginal income tax rates, in the earnings measure, and in the percent 
age of the workforce covered by a union help explain the decline in 
pension coverage. 18 Our results regarding the effects of declining 
unionization and earnings are comparable to those found by Bloom 
and Freeman (1992) and by Even and Macpherson (1994). However, 
we find that between 1979 and 1988, the effect of declining taxes was 
twice as large for young workers as for older workers. Between 1988 
and 1993, for both young and older workers, the estimated effect is so 
small as to be economically insignificant.
A calculation indicates that pension coverage rate for males aged 
21 to 36 was 1 percentage point lower in 1993 than it would have been 
had the marginal tax rates in 1979 been in effect. 19 Dividing the esti 
mated effect due to the change in tax rates by the change in tax rates, 
we find that a 1 percentage point increase in marginal tax rates on aver 
age leads to a 0.4 percentage point increase in pension coverage rates 
for this group.
As a test of robustness, we reestimate the model for males making 
three changes in the regression (Table 6). First, we pool the data. Sec-
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Table 5 Predicted Changes in Male Pension Coverage Attributed to 
Changes in Observed Characteristics
_____Age 21-35_____ _____Age 36-55____ 
Variable_________1979-1988 1988-1993 1979-1988 1988-1993 
Total predicted change -0.073 -0.041 -0.011 -0.026 
Change explained by
Tax
Union
Pearn55
-0.014
-0009
-0.057
-0.3-e5
-0.002
-0.038
-0.007
-0.004
-0.004
-0.6-e3
-0.002
-0.019
NOTE: These predicted changes are calculated using the 1988 estimates of the proba 
bility of coverage. Qualitatively similar predicted changes are found using the 1979 
estimates of the probability of coverage. The percentage change attributable to 
changes in representation in manufacturing predicted a decline of 0.002 for young 
male workers and a rise of 0.002 for old male workers. Since the predicted change in 
coverage is sufficiently close to zero, we do not report the percentage of total pre 
dicted change attributable to underlying variables.
ond, we test for the effect of lagged taxes. Third, we use the log of cur 
rent salary rather than our permanent earnings variable. Our measure 
of lagged taxes is the tax rate that would have applied in the second and 
third years of our data had the tax laws applying to the first or second 
years of the data prevailed. The interpretation of the lagged variable is 
complicated. It can indicate the effect of a lag in adjustment to taxes. 
It can also indicate for a particular time period that workers view 
lagged taxes to be more representative of the long run tax regime than 
they view current taxes.
COVERAGE ESTIMATES FOR FEMALE WORKERS
We test the robustness of our estimated tax effects for males by 
reestimating the model using data on females from the 1979, 1988, and 
1993 CPS. The additional estimates of the marginal effect of taxes on 
pension coverage are an independent measure to assess the plausibility 
of our estimated tax effects for males. These comparisons across gen 
der are particularly useful because changes in average tax rates were
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Table 6 Estimated Marginal Tax Effects from Probit Regressions for 
Females, 1979,1988, and 1993 (/-statistics in parentheses)
Sample____________1979_________1988_________1993
Young females 0.0046 0.0048 0.004 
(2.28) (2.63) (2.09)
Older females 0.0073 0.0046 0.0040 
_______________(2.30)________(2.11)________(1.90)_____
SOURCE: 1979 and 1988 March and May Current Population Surveys and 1993 
March and April Current Population Surveys. The 1978 tax rates are from Commerce 
Clearinghouse (1979), 1987 and 1992 rates are from Advisory Commission (1988 
and 1993)
NOTE: The sample includes all full-time, female, private, wage and salary workers 
aged 21 to 55. The sample is further restricted to those who have valid responses to 
questions relevant to this study. The probit equation also contains four controls for 
education, four controls for occupation, and nine industry controls. All controls were 
coded as dichotomous variables.
similar for both men and women, while changes in coverage rates were 
not. While coverage for men declined, women generally experienced 
rising coverage rates during the 1980s.20
We estimate female pension coverage equations using the same 
specification used for males. To economize on space, we summarize 
results concerning tax effects (Table 6). Coverage rates for females in 
our sample rose by 0.5 percentage points between 1979 and 1988 and 
by 2 percentage points between 1988 and 1993. 21 The mean tax rates 
in each year are virtually identical to those of men and display a similar 
trend. 22
Predicted earnings at age 55 for females rose over the period. The 
increase in predicted earnings reflects the rising wages and narrowing 
of the gender gap in wages that women have experienced from the late 
1970s. In addition, the percentage of the workforce that is unionized 
fell by 50 percent between 1979 and 1993. The overall percentage 
decline in unionization is comparable to the percentage decline for 
men, although in absolute levels men are twice as likely to be union 
ized.
The percentage of women who were new hires, defined to have 
less than one year of tenure with the employer, fell from 19 to 18 per 
cent between 1979 and 1988 and then fell to 14 percent in 1993. Since
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eligibility for coverage usually requires some minimum level of tenure, 
the 4 percent decline in new hires is potentially important in explaining 
women's rising coverage rates between 1988 and 1993.
The estimated coefficient on marginal tax rates is positive and sig 
nificant in five of the six female samples. 23 It is similar in magnitude to 
the estimated coefficients in the male regressions.
Table 7 presents the total predicted change in coverage and the pre 
dicted change in coverage attributable to changes over time in marginal 
tax rates. As we did for men, we use the 1988 coefficients as the base 
from which to extrapolate. The change in coverage for women pre 
dicted by our model is much smaller than it is for men, consistent with 
their smaller change in coverage.
Table 7 Predicted Changes in Female Pension Coverage Attributed to 
Changes in Observed Characteristics
_____Age 21-35_____ _____Age 36-55____ 
______________1979-1988 1988-1993 1979-1988 1988-1993 
Total predicted change 0.024 -0.035 0.013 0.030 
Change explained by
Tax
Union
PearnSS
-0.002
0.005
-0.045
-0.001
-0.004
0.018
-0.0-e3
-0.001
0.026
NOTE: These predicted changes are calculated using the 1988 estimates of the proba 
bility of coverage. Qualitatively similar predicted changes are found using the 1979 
estimates of the probability of coverage. Although the model predicts a 2.4 percentage 
point decline in coverage for young women between 1979 and 1988, almost all the 
change came about by changes in the estimated coefficients in the two years and not 
from changes in variable means. The decomposition described by Eq. 5 is meaning 
ful only if the denominator is not close to zero. When this occurs, the predicted 
change attributed to any one variable becomes implausibly large because of division 
by a number close to zero. Therefore, we do not report predicted changes attributable 
to individual variables for young women between 1979 and 1988.
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CONCLUSIONS
Private pension coverage rates for males declined during the 
1980s, especially for young males. Previous studies of pension cover 
age for young males have ignored the decline in marginal income tax 
rates. Using data from the 1979, 1988, and 1993 CPS Pension Supple 
ments, we find that the probability of coverage for an individual, in 
both our young and older samples, increases with increases in the mar 
ginal income tax rate. Declining marginal income tax rates are found 
to be nearly as important as the decline in unionism in explaining 
trends in coverage for young males. While our estimates vary, a rough 
summary indicates that a one percentage point increase in marginal tax 
rates causes a 0.4 percentage point increase in pension coverage rates. 
We find comparable tax effects for women.
Our results indicate that workers and firms react to changes in mar 
ginal income tax rates when making decisions concerning pension 
plans. Higher pension tax expenditures associated with higher mar 
ginal income tax rates "pay for" increased pension coverage.
Our results have implications for a number of issues not directly 
addressed in the paper. The decline in generosity of pension plans that 
many analysts believed occurred during the 1980s may have been due 
in part to the fall in marginal income tax rates. To the extent that pen 
sion saving is new saving, rather than replacing saving that would have 
occurred in another form, the decrease in marginal tax rates may have 
caused a decrease in savings. Finally, our results suggest that the 
reduction in tax rates partially paid for itself because the lower tax 
rates were associated with reduced tax expenditures on pensions.
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The opinions expressed in this paper are the responsibility of the authors and do not 
represent the position of the U.S. Department of Labor.
1. See Doescher (1994) for an extensive survey of studies on pension coverage.
2. We follow traditional usage and define coverage to indicate that a worker is a par 
ticipant in an employer-provided pension plan. When discussing 401(k) plans, we 
draw the distinction between being offered a plan and choosing to participate in it.
3. The primary legislative change in tax rates during the 1980s occurred with the 
passage of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, which cut the top federal 
marginal income tax rate from 70 percent to 50 percent and reduced marginal 
income tax rates in all other brackets by 23 percentage points over three years. 
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduced the top rate on wealthiest households to 38 
percent, effective 1988. It provided for a transitional top rate of 38.5 percent, 
effective 1987. The highest rate in 1988 was 33 percent, which applied that year 
for single (unmarried head of household) [married couple] households with tax 
able income between $44,315 and $100,480 ($61,650 and $156,550) [$71,900 
and $192,930]. The brackets increased in subsequent years.
4. The basic tax rules concerning pensions were established in the Internal Revenue 
Acts of 1922, 1926, and 1928. Employer contributions to private pension plans 
are not treated as income to workers. The investment earnings on those contribu 
tions accrue tax free. Benefits are taxed under the federal and state personal 
income taxes when received.
5. If managers of firms decide on whether to offer pension plans based, in part, on 
the desirability of pension benefits to themselves, the decline in tax rates at upper 
income levels will also affect the probability that lower income workers have pen 
sion coverage.
6. In 1979, 26 percent of all male workers with tax rates below 10 percent were cov 
ered. Coverage rates rose to 75 percent for the 40-49 percent tax bracket. A sim 
ilar profile emerges from the 1988 and 1993 data.
7. We follow the convention of referring to the data by the year of the survey that it 
is from. The income data, and the income tax rate data derived from it, are for the 
year preceding the survey.
8. Since the unit of observation is a match between worker i and firm j, we should 
subscnpt the vector and subsequent stochastic terms by ij. However, for ease of 
notation we suppress these subscripts.
9. The probit estimates are available from the authors on request. 
10. The practice of reporting marginal effects of continuous regressors is standard to 
the literature (see Even and Macpherson 1994). The authors, however, use the 
same formula to calculate the marginal effects of discrete regressors. We instead 
report delta effects for discrete variables. We also report ^-statistics based on stan 
dard errors of the marginal and delta effects. These differ from the f-statistics on 
the coefficient estimates of the probit equation. We believe that our approach rep 
resents a technical improvement over previous work. The vanance-covariance 
matrix for the marginal and delta effects is calculated by pre- and post-multiply-
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ing the variance-covariance matrix of the probit estimates by the matrix of the 
derivatives of the vector of marginal and delta effects with respect to the elements 
in the vector g. The code is available on request.
11. Gustman, Mitchell, and Steinmeier (1994) criticized previous studies for not 
addressing the issue of the endogeneity of marginal tax rates. In principle, the 
worker's expected marginal income tax rates for all future years affect the demand 
for pensions. We do not pursue that approach empirically because of cohnearity.
12. State tax data for 1987 and 1992 are contained in reports of the Advisory Com 
mission on Intergovernmental Relations (1988, 1993). Data for 1978 were sup 
plied by Commerce Clearing House (1979). The marginal income tax rate is 
calculated as follows. First, we take the family income data from the CPS, which 
is categorical, and replace it with the mean family income in each category. Since 
the data on family income is top coded, we use IRS Statistics of Income tables to 
obtain average family income conditional on income exceeding the maximum 
reported by the CPS. We then use information on marital status and number of 
children in the family from the CPS, coupled with information about allowed 
exemptions and deductions from the federal and state income tax codes to obtain a 
measure of taxable income. Taxable income was calculated separately for state 
and federal tax purposes. The combined federal and state tax rates take into 
account the deducibility of state income taxes in computing federal income tax 
rates.
13. We experimented with a 2 percent growth rate and found our results to be robust 
to the assumption of 1 percent growth.
14 Unionism is another variable that previous studies have found to have an impor 
tant effect on pension coverage. Between 1979 and 1988, the percentage of work 
ers covered by a union contract dropped 11.7 and 9.3 percentage points for young 
and old workers, respectively. Between 1988 and 1993, these rates dropped an 
additional 4 1 and 5.4 percentage points. Although older workers are more likely 
to be covered by union contracts in all years, the magnitude of the decline in 
unionization was large for both groups
15. We found statistically significant positive effects for all samples when we entered 
marginal tax rates calculated from actual family earnings rather than predicted 
family earnings.
16. The reported ^-statistics are for the marginal and delta effects. The marginal and 
delta effects and their r-statistics are calculated by a nonlinear transformation of 
the probit estimates. Because of the nonlmeanty of the transformation, it does not 
preserve the r-values in the probit estimates. The transformation increases the t- 
value for variables with already large f-values, explaining the very large reported 
/-values for some of the earnings coefficients.
17. In addition, we find the standard results that pension coverage increases with 
earnings, education, firm size, union status, and a marital status dichotomous vari 
able (l=married). When we entered age in regressions not shown, it is insignifi 
cant, age having been controlled for already in the choice of samples.
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18. For the calculations for both 1979 to 1988 and 1988 to 1993, we use 1988 as the 
base year. These calculations are entirely based on statistically significant esti 
mated coefficients.
19. We calculate this by multiplying the predicted tax effect on coverage rates by the 
number of male full-time private sector wage and salary workers not covered by a 
pension plan (U.S. Department of Labor 1994).
20. Between 1988 and 1993, young women experienced a slight decline
21. As with males, the coverage rates within the sample exceed the population cover 
age rates due to restrictions on valid responses to questions used in the regression 
analysis.
22. This is not surprising since marginal tax rates are based on family income.
23. The predicted earnings at age 55 is positive and significant, which suggests that 
the tax effect has been isolated.
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